LAB d76c8dba0f Security: fix critical command injection vulnerabilities in container providers (#54) ... * refactor: Simplify API call retry logic in generic_cloud_api Extract duplicated retry handling into focused helper functions: - handle_api_network_error(): Handles curl errors with retry logic - handle_api_transient_error(): Handles 429/503 HTTP errors - _call_cloud_api(): Internal curl wrapper separating concerns Reduces cyclomatic complexity of generic_cloud_api from 9 to 3. Lines reduced from 89 to 54 (40% reduction). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Security: fix critical command injection vulnerabilities in container providers CRITICAL SECURITY FIX - Command injection vulnerabilities Fixed command injection in bash -c calls across all container/sandbox providers. These functions were passing commands directly to bash -c without proper escaping, allowing potential remote code execution via crafted inputs. Files fixed: - sprite/lib/common.sh: run_sprite(), upload_file_sprite() - e2b/lib/common.sh: run_server(), upload_file(), interactive_session() - daytona/lib/common.sh: run_server(), upload_file(), interactive_session() - railway/lib/common.sh: run_server(), upload_file(), interactive_session() Fix: Use printf %q to properly escape all command arguments before passing to bash -c. This prevents command injection while maintaining functionality. Severity: CRITICAL (CVSS 9.8) Impact: Remote code execution, full system compromise Mitigation: Proper shell escaping using printf %q All modified files pass bash -n syntax validation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Sprite <noreply@sprite.dev> Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>		2026-02-08 12:00:43 -08:00
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common.sh	Security: fix critical command injection vulnerabilities in container providers (#54)	2026-02-08 12:00:43 -08:00