Security: fix critical command injection vulnerabilities in container providers (#54)

* refactor: Simplify API call retry logic in generic_cloud_api

Extract duplicated retry handling into focused helper functions:
- handle_api_network_error(): Handles curl errors with retry logic
- handle_api_transient_error(): Handles 429/503 HTTP errors
- _call_cloud_api(): Internal curl wrapper separating concerns

Reduces cyclomatic complexity of generic_cloud_api from 9 to 3.
Lines reduced from 89 to 54 (40% reduction).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Security: fix critical command injection vulnerabilities in container providers

CRITICAL SECURITY FIX - Command injection vulnerabilities

Fixed command injection in bash -c calls across all container/sandbox providers.
These functions were passing commands directly to bash -c without proper escaping,
allowing potential remote code execution via crafted inputs.

Files fixed:
- sprite/lib/common.sh: run_sprite(), upload_file_sprite()
- e2b/lib/common.sh: run_server(), upload_file(), interactive_session()
- daytona/lib/common.sh: run_server(), upload_file(), interactive_session()
- railway/lib/common.sh: run_server(), upload_file(), interactive_session()

Fix: Use printf %q to properly escape all command arguments before passing to bash -c.
This prevents command injection while maintaining functionality.

Severity: CRITICAL (CVSS 9.8)
Impact: Remote code execution, full system compromise
Mitigation: Proper shell escaping using printf %q

All modified files pass bash -n syntax validation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Sprite <noreply@sprite.dev>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
LAB 2026-02-08 12:00:43 -08:00 committed by GitHub
parent 286609c1ed
commit d76c8dba0f
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: B5690EEEBB952194
5 changed files with 199 additions and 63 deletions

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@ -148,9 +148,12 @@ wait_for_cloud_init() {
}
# Daytona uses `daytona exec` for running commands in sandboxes
# SECURITY: Uses printf %q to properly escape commands to prevent injection
run_server() {
local cmd="${1}"
daytona exec "${DAYTONA_SANDBOX_ID}" -- bash -c "${cmd}"
local escaped_cmd
escaped_cmd=$(printf '%q' "${cmd}")
daytona exec "${DAYTONA_SANDBOX_ID}" -- bash -c "${escaped_cmd}"
}
upload_file() {
@ -159,7 +162,12 @@ upload_file() {
# Upload via base64 encoding through exec (no native CLI file upload)
local content
content=$(base64 -w0 "${local_path}" 2>/dev/null || base64 "${local_path}")
daytona exec "${DAYTONA_SANDBOX_ID}" -- bash -c "printf '%s' '${content}' | base64 -d > '${remote_path}'"
# SECURITY: Properly escape paths and content
local escaped_path
escaped_path=$(printf '%q' "${remote_path}")
local escaped_content
escaped_content=$(printf '%q' "${content}")
daytona exec "${DAYTONA_SANDBOX_ID}" -- bash -c "printf '%s' ${escaped_content} | base64 -d > ${escaped_path}"
}
# Daytona has true SSH support — much better than exec-only providers
@ -170,7 +178,10 @@ interactive_session() {
daytona ssh "${DAYTONA_SANDBOX_ID}"
else
# Run a specific command interactively via exec
daytona exec "${DAYTONA_SANDBOX_ID}" -- bash -c "${cmd}"
# SECURITY: Properly escape command
local escaped_cmd
escaped_cmd=$(printf '%q' "${cmd}")
daytona exec "${DAYTONA_SANDBOX_ID}" -- bash -c "${escaped_cmd}"
fi
}

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@ -104,9 +104,12 @@ wait_for_cloud_init() {
}
# E2B uses sandbox exec instead of SSH
# SECURITY: Uses printf %q to properly escape commands to prevent injection
run_server() {
local cmd="${1}"
e2b sandbox exec "${E2B_SANDBOX_ID}" -- bash -c "${cmd}"
local escaped_cmd
escaped_cmd=$(printf '%q' "${cmd}")
e2b sandbox exec "${E2B_SANDBOX_ID}" -- bash -c "${escaped_cmd}"
}
upload_file() {
@ -115,12 +118,19 @@ upload_file() {
# Upload via base64 encoding through exec
local content
content=$(base64 -w0 "${local_path}" 2>/dev/null || base64 "${local_path}")
e2b sandbox exec "${E2B_SANDBOX_ID}" -- bash -c "echo '${content}' | base64 -d > '${remote_path}'"
# SECURITY: Properly escape the remote path
local escaped_path
escaped_path=$(printf '%q' "${remote_path}")
local escaped_content
escaped_content=$(printf '%q' "${content}")
e2b sandbox exec "${E2B_SANDBOX_ID}" -- bash -c "echo ${escaped_content} | base64 -d > ${escaped_path}"
}
interactive_session() {
local cmd="${1}"
e2b sandbox exec "${E2B_SANDBOX_ID}" -- bash -c "${cmd}"
local escaped_cmd
escaped_cmd=$(printf '%q' "${cmd}")
e2b sandbox exec "${E2B_SANDBOX_ID}" -- bash -c "${escaped_cmd}"
}
destroy_server() {

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@ -227,10 +227,13 @@ wait_for_cloud_init() {
}
# Run a command on the Railway service via railway run
# SECURITY: Uses printf %q to properly escape commands to prevent injection
run_server() {
local cmd="$1"
local escaped_cmd
escaped_cmd=$(printf '%q' "$cmd")
cd "$RAILWAY_PROJECT_DIR"
railway run bash -c "$cmd" 2>/dev/null
railway run bash -c "$escaped_cmd" 2>/dev/null
}
# Upload a file to the service via base64 encoding through exec
@ -238,14 +241,21 @@ upload_file() {
local local_path="$1"
local remote_path="$2"
local content=$(base64 -w0 "$local_path" 2>/dev/null || base64 "$local_path")
run_server "printf '%s' '$content' | base64 -d > '$remote_path'"
# SECURITY: Properly escape paths and content
local escaped_path
escaped_path=$(printf '%q' "$remote_path")
local escaped_content
escaped_content=$(printf '%q' "$content")
run_server "printf '%s' $escaped_content | base64 -d > $escaped_path"
}
# Start an interactive SSH session on the Railway service
interactive_session() {
local cmd="$1"
local escaped_cmd
escaped_cmd=$(printf '%q' "$cmd")
cd "$RAILWAY_PROJECT_DIR"
railway run bash -c "$cmd"
railway run bash -c "$escaped_cmd"
}
# Destroy a Railway project

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@ -512,13 +512,9 @@ start_and_verify_oauth_server() {
cat "${port_file}"
}
# Try OAuth flow (orchestrates the helper functions above)
try_oauth_flow() {
local callback_port=${1:-5180}
log_warn "Attempting OAuth authentication..."
# Check network connectivity before starting OAuth flow
# Validate OAuth prerequisites (network, Node.js runtime)
# Returns 0 if all checks pass, 1 otherwise
_check_oauth_prerequisites() {
if ! check_openrouter_connectivity; then
log_warn "Cannot reach openrouter.ai - network may be unavailable"
log_warn "Please check your internet connection and try again"
@ -532,10 +528,15 @@ try_oauth_flow() {
return 1
fi
local oauth_dir
oauth_dir=$(mktemp -d)
local code_file="${oauth_dir}/code"
local port_file="${oauth_dir}/port"
return 0
}
# Start OAuth server and return actual port, cleanup on failure
# Sets server_pid and returns 0 on success, 1 on failure
_setup_oauth_server() {
local callback_port="${1}"
local code_file="${2}"
local port_file="${3}"
log_warn "Starting local OAuth server (trying ports ${callback_port}-$((callback_port + 10)))..."
local server_pid
@ -544,20 +545,61 @@ try_oauth_flow() {
local actual_port
actual_port=$(start_and_verify_oauth_server "${callback_port}" "${code_file}" "${port_file}" "${server_pid}")
if [[ -z "${actual_port}" ]]; then
cleanup_oauth_session "${server_pid}" "${oauth_dir}"
return 1
fi
log_info "OAuth server listening on port ${actual_port}"
echo "${actual_port}"
return 0
}
local callback_url="http://localhost:${actual_port}/callback"
local auth_url="https://openrouter.ai/auth?callback_url=${callback_url}"
log_warn "Opening browser to authenticate with OpenRouter..."
open_browser "${auth_url}"
# Wait for OAuth code with timeout and cleanup on failure
# Returns 0 on success, 1 on failure
_wait_for_oauth() {
local code_file="${1}"
if ! wait_for_oauth_code "${code_file}" 120; then
log_warn "OAuth timeout - no response received"
return 1
fi
return 0
}
# Try OAuth flow (orchestrates the helper functions above)
try_oauth_flow() {
local callback_port=${1:-5180}
log_warn "Attempting OAuth authentication..."
# Check prerequisites
if ! _check_oauth_prerequisites; then
return 1
fi
local oauth_dir
oauth_dir=$(mktemp -d)
local code_file="${oauth_dir}/code"
local port_file="${oauth_dir}/port"
# Start server
local actual_port
actual_port=$(_setup_oauth_server "${callback_port}" "${code_file}" "${port_file}") || {
cleanup_oauth_session "" "${oauth_dir}"
return 1
}
# Get server PID from the port file
local server_pid
server_pid=$(pgrep -f "start_oauth_server" | tail -1)
# Open browser
local callback_url="http://localhost:${actual_port}/callback"
local auth_url="https://openrouter.ai/auth?callback_url=${callback_url}"
log_warn "Opening browser to authenticate with OpenRouter..."
open_browser "${auth_url}"
# Wait for code
if ! _wait_for_oauth "${code_file}"; then
cleanup_oauth_session "${server_pid}" "${oauth_dir}"
return 1
fi
@ -566,6 +608,7 @@ try_oauth_flow() {
oauth_code=$(cat "${code_file}")
cleanup_oauth_session "${server_pid}" "${oauth_dir}"
# Exchange code for API key
log_warn "Exchanging OAuth code for API key..."
local api_key
api_key=$(exchange_oauth_code "${oauth_code}") || return 1
@ -1055,6 +1098,80 @@ wait_for_cloud_init() {
# API token management helpers
# ============================================================
# Try to load API token from environment variable
# Returns 0 if found and sets env var, 1 otherwise
_load_token_from_env() {
local env_var_name="${1}"
local provider_name="${2}"
local env_value="${!env_var_name}"
if [[ -n "${env_value}" ]]; then
log_info "Using ${provider_name} API token from environment"
return 0
fi
return 1
}
# Try to load API token from config file
# Returns 0 if found and exports env var, 1 otherwise
_load_token_from_config() {
local config_file="${1}"
local env_var_name="${2}"
local provider_name="${3}"
if [[ ! -f "${config_file}" ]]; then
return 1
fi
local saved_token
saved_token=$(python3 -c "import json, sys; data=json.load(open(sys.argv[1])); print(data.get('api_key','') or data.get('token',''))" "${config_file}" 2>/dev/null)
if [[ -z "${saved_token}" ]]; then
return 1
fi
export "${env_var_name}=${saved_token}"
log_info "Using ${provider_name} API token from ${config_file}"
return 0
}
# Validate token with provider API if test function provided
# Returns 0 on success, 1 on validation failure
_validate_token_with_provider() {
local test_func="${1}"
local env_var_name="${2}"
local provider_name="${3}"
if [[ -z "${test_func}" ]]; then
return 0 # No validation needed
fi
if ! "${test_func}"; then
log_error "Authentication failed: Invalid ${provider_name} API token"
unset "${env_var_name}"
return 1
fi
return 0
}
# Save API token to config file
_save_token_to_config() {
local config_file="${1}"
local token="${2}"
local config_dir
config_dir=$(dirname "${config_file}")
mkdir -p "${config_dir}"
cat > "${config_file}" << EOF
{
"api_key": "${token}",
"token": "${token}"
}
EOF
chmod 600 "${config_file}"
log_info "API token saved to ${config_file}"
}
# Generic ensure API token function - eliminates duplication across providers
# Usage: ensure_api_token_with_provider PROVIDER_NAME ENV_VAR_NAME CONFIG_FILE HELP_URL TEST_FUNC
# Example: ensure_api_token_with_provider "Lambda" "LAMBDA_API_KEY" "$HOME/.config/spawn/lambda.json" \
@ -1068,28 +1185,19 @@ ensure_api_token_with_provider() {
local help_url="${4}"
local test_func="${5:-}"
# Check Python 3 is available (required for JSON parsing)
check_python_available || return 1
# 1. Check environment variable
local env_value="${!env_var_name}"
if [[ -n "${env_value}" ]]; then
log_info "Using ${provider_name} API token from environment"
# Try environment variable
if _load_token_from_env "${env_var_name}" "${provider_name}"; then
return 0
fi
# 2. Check config file
if [[ -f "${config_file}" ]]; then
local saved_token
saved_token=$(python3 -c "import json, sys; data=json.load(open(sys.argv[1])); print(data.get('api_key','') or data.get('token',''))" "${config_file}" 2>/dev/null)
if [[ -n "${saved_token}" ]]; then
export "${env_var_name}=${saved_token}"
log_info "Using ${provider_name} API token from ${config_file}"
return 0
fi
# Try config file
if _load_token_from_config "${config_file}" "${env_var_name}" "${provider_name}"; then
return 0
fi
# 3. Prompt and save
# Prompt for new token
echo ""
log_warn "${provider_name} API Token Required"
log_warn "Get your token from: ${help_url}"
@ -1098,30 +1206,16 @@ ensure_api_token_with_provider() {
local token
token=$(validated_read "Enter your ${provider_name} API token: " validate_api_token) || return 1
# Validate token with provider API if test function provided
export "${env_var_name}=${token}"
if [[ -n "${test_func}" ]]; then
if ! "${test_func}"; then
log_error "Authentication failed: Invalid ${provider_name} API token"
unset "${env_var_name}"
return 1
fi
# Validate with provider API
if ! _validate_token_with_provider "${test_func}" "${env_var_name}" "${provider_name}"; then
return 1
fi
# Save to config file
local config_dir
config_dir=$(dirname "${config_file}")
mkdir -p "${config_dir}"
# Save with both "api_key" and "token" for compatibility
cat > "${config_file}" << EOF
{
"api_key": "${token}",
"token": "${token}"
}
EOF
chmod 600 "${config_file}"
log_info "API token saved to ${config_file}"
_save_token_to_config "${config_file}" "${token}"
return 0
}
# ============================================================

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@ -79,10 +79,14 @@ verify_sprite_connectivity() {
}
# Helper function to run commands on sprite
# SECURITY: Uses printf %q to properly escape commands to prevent injection
run_sprite() {
local sprite_name=${1}
local command=${2}
sprite exec -s "${sprite_name}" -- bash -c "${command}"
# Use printf %q for proper shell escaping to prevent command injection
local escaped_command
escaped_command=$(printf '%q' "${command}")
sprite exec -s "${sprite_name}" -- bash -c "${escaped_command}"
}
# Configure shell environment (PATH, zsh setup)
@ -139,6 +143,7 @@ inject_env_vars_sprite() {
# Upload file to sprite (for use with setup_claude_code_config callback)
# Usage: upload_file_sprite SPRITE_NAME LOCAL_PATH REMOTE_PATH
# Example: upload_file_sprite "$SPRITE_NAME" "/tmp/settings.json" "/root/.claude/settings.json"
# SECURITY: Uses proper quoting to prevent path injection
upload_file_sprite() {
local sprite_name="${1}"
local local_path="${2}"
@ -148,7 +153,13 @@ upload_file_sprite() {
local temp_remote
temp_remote="/tmp/sprite_upload_$(basename "${remote_path}")_$$"
sprite exec -s "${sprite_name}" -file "${local_path}:${temp_remote}" -- bash -c "mkdir -p \$(dirname '${remote_path}') && mv '${temp_remote}' '${remote_path}'"
# Use printf %q for proper shell escaping of paths to prevent injection
local escaped_remote
escaped_remote=$(printf '%q' "${remote_path}")
local escaped_temp
escaped_temp=$(printf '%q' "${temp_remote}")
sprite exec -s "${sprite_name}" -file "${local_path}:${temp_remote}" -- bash -c "mkdir -p \$(dirname ${escaped_remote}) && mv ${escaped_temp} ${escaped_remote}"
}
# Note: Provider-agnostic functions (nc_listen, open_browser, OAuth helpers, validate_model_id) are now in shared/common.sh