mirror of
https://github.com/TrustTunnel/TrustTunnel.git
synced 2026-04-28 03:39:53 +00:00
Squashed commit of the following:
commit eecd19ff93
Author: Zhavoronkov Aleksei <a.zhavoronkov@adguard.com>
Date: Tue Feb 3 19:42:26 2026 +0300
Add GPG signing of trusttunnel binaries
1.9 KiB
1.9 KiB
Verifying TrustTunnel Releases
Since TrustTunnel v0.9.126 we sign the executable files we build so that you can verify they are really created by us and no one else. Inside an archive file there's a small file with .sig extension which contains the signature data. In a hypothetic situation when the binary file inside an archive is replaced by someone, you'll know that it isn't an official release from AdGuard.
How to verify that the executable file was built by AdGuard?
-
Unpack the TrustTunnel archive file.
-
Import TrustTunnel public key from keyserver. For current release, run:
gpg --keyserver 'keys.openpgp.org' --recv-key '28645AC9776EC4C00BCE2AFC0FE641E7235E2EC6'The above command will print something similar to:
gpg: key 0FE641E7235E2EC6: public key "AdGuard <devteam@adguard.com>" imported gpg: Total number processed: 1 gpg: imported: 1 -
Verify. On Unix:
gpg --verify trusttunnel/setup_wizard.sig gpg --verify trusttunnel/trusttunnel_endpoint.sigYou'll see something like this:
gpg: assuming signed data in 'trusttunnel' gpg: Signature made Mon 2 Feb 2026 19:30:55 MSK gpg: using RSA key 28645AC9776EC4C00BCE2AFC0FE641E7235E2EC6 gpg: issuer "devteam@adguard.com" gpg: Good signature from "AdGuard <devteam@adguard.com>" [ultimate]Check the following:
- RSA key: must be 28645AC9776EC4C00BCE2AFC0FE641E7235E2EC6;
- Issuer name: must be AdGuard;
- E-mail address: must be devteam@adguard.com.
There may also be the following warning:
gpg: WARNING: The key's User ID is not certified with a trusted signature! gpg: There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner. Primary key fingerprint: 2864 5AC9 776E C4C0 0BCE 2AFC 0FE6 41E7 235E 2EC6