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Code Issues Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity Actions 6
Ruview/docs/qe-reports/EXECUTIVE-SUMMARY.md
ruv 924c32547e fix: ADR-080 P0 security + CI remediation from QE analysis 
Address all 5 P0 issues from QE analysis (55/100 score):

- P0-1: Rate limiter bypass — validate X-Forwarded-For against trusted proxy list
- P0-2: Exception detail leak — generic 500 messages, exception_type gated by dev mode
- P0-3: WebSocket JWT in URL (CWE-598) — first-message auth pattern replaces query param
- P0-4: Rust tests not in CI — add rust-tests job gating docker-build and notify
- P0-5: WebSocket path mismatch — use WS_PATH constant instead of hardcoded /ws/sensing

Includes ADR-080 remediation plan and 9 QE reports (4,914 lines).
Firmware validated on ESP32-S3 (COM8): CSI collecting, calibration OK.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-04-06 16:12:13 -04:00

5.9 KiB
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RuView / WiFi-DensePose -- QE Executive Summary

Date: 2026-04-05 Analysis: Full-spectrum Quality Engineering assessment (8 specialized agents) Codebase: ~305K lines across Rust (153K), Python (39K), C firmware (9K), TypeScript/JS (33K), Docs (71K) Fleet ID: fleet-02558e91

Overall Quality Score: 55/100 (C+) -- QUALITY GATE FAILED

Domain Score Verdict
Code Quality & Complexity 55-82/100 CONDITIONAL PASS
Security 68/100 CONDITIONAL PASS
Performance Borderline AT RISK (37-54ms vs 50ms budget)
Test Suite Quality Mixed 3,353 tests but heavy duplication
Coverage 77% file-level FAIL (Python 30%, Firmware 19%)
Quality Experience (QX) 71/100 CONDITIONAL PASS
Product Factors (SFDIPOT) TIME = CRITICAL FAIL on time factor

P0 -- Fix Immediately (Security + CI)

# Issue File(s) Impact
1 Rate limiter bypass -- trusts X-Forwarded-For without validation v1/src/middleware/rate_limit.py:200-206 Any client can bypass rate limits via header spoofing
2 Exception details leaked in HTTP responses regardless of environment v1/src/api/routers/pose.py:140, stream.py:297, +5 others Stack traces visible to attackers
3 WebSocket JWT in URL -- tokens visible in logs, browser history, proxies v1/src/api/routers/stream.py:74, v1/src/middleware/auth.py:243 Token exposure (CWE-598)
4 Rust tests not in CI -- 2,618 tests in largest codebase never run in pipeline No cargo test in any GitHub Actions workflow Regressions ship undetected
5 WebSocket path mismatch -- mobile app sends to wrong endpoint ui/mobile/src/services/ws.service.ts:104 vs constants/websocket.ts:1 Mobile WebSocket connections fail silently

P1 -- Fix This Sprint (Performance + Code Health)

# Issue File(s) Impact
6 God file: 4,846 lines, CC=121 -- sensing-server main.rs crates/wifi-densepose-sensing-server/src/main.rs Untestable, unmaintainable monolith
7 O(L*V) tomography voxel scan per frame ruvsense/tomography.rs:345-383 ~10ms wasted per frame; use DDA ray march for 5-10x speedup
8 Sequential neural inference -- defeats GPU batching wifi-densepose-nn inference.rs:334-336 2-4x latency penalty
9 720 .unwrap() calls in Rust production code Across entire Rust workspace Each is a potential panic in real-time/safety-critical paths
10 Python Doppler: 112KB alloc per frame at 20Hz v1/src/core/csi_processor.py:412-414 Converts deque -> list -> numpy every frame

P2 -- Fix This Quarter (Coverage + Safety)

# Issue File(s) Impact
11 11/12 Python modules untested -- only CSI extraction has unit tests v1/src/services/, middleware/, database/, tasks/ 12,280 LOC with zero unit tests
12 Firmware at 19% coverage -- WASM runtime, OTA, swarm bridge untested firmware/esp32-csi-node/main/wasm_runtime.c (867 LOC) Security-critical code with no tests
13 MAT simulation fallback -- disaster tool auto-falls back to simulated data ui/mobile/src/screens/MATScreen/index.tsx Risk of operators monitoring fake data during real incidents
14 Token blacklist never consulted during auth v1/src/api/middleware/auth.py:246-252 Revoked tokens remain valid
15 50ms frame budget never benchmarked -- no latency CI gate No benchmark harness exists Real-time requirement is aspirational, not verified

P3 -- Technical Debt

# Issue Impact
16 340 unsafe blocks need formal safety audit Potential UB in production
17 5 duplicate CSI extractor test files (~90 redundant tests) Maintenance burden
18 Performance tests mock inference with asyncio.sleep() Tests measure scheduling, not performance
19 CORS wildcard + credentials default Browser security weakened
20 ESP32 UDP CSI stream unencrypted CSI data interceptable on LAN

Bright Spots

  • 79 ADRs -- exceptional architectural governance
  • Witness bundle system (ADR-028) -- deterministic SHA-256 proof verification
  • Rust test depth -- 2,618 tests with mathematical rigor (Doppler, phase, losses)
  • Daily security scanning in CI (Bandit, Semgrep, Safety)
  • Mobile state management -- clean Zustand stores with good test coverage
  • Ed25519 WASM signature verification on firmware
  • Constant-time OTA PSK comparison -- proper timing-safe crypto

Reports Index

All detailed reports are in the docs/qe-reports/ directory:

Report Lines Description
00-qe-queen-summary.md 315 Master synthesis, quality score, cross-cutting analysis
01-code-quality-complexity.md 591 Cyclomatic/cognitive complexity, code smells, top 20 hotspots
02-security-review.md 600 15 findings (0 CRITICAL, 3 HIGH, 7 MEDIUM), OWASP coverage
03-performance-analysis.md 795 23 findings (4 CRITICAL), frame budget analysis, optimization roadmap
04-test-analysis.md 544 3,353 tests inventoried, duplication analysis, quality assessment
05-quality-experience.md 746 API/CLI/Mobile/DX/Hardware UX assessment, 3 oracle problems
06-product-assessment-sfdipot.md 711 SFDIPOT analysis, 57 test ideas, 14 exploratory session charters
07-coverage-gaps.md 514 Coverage matrix, top 20 risk gaps, 8-week improvement roadmap

Total analysis: 4,816 lines across 8 reports (265 KB)

Generated by QE Swarm (8 agents, fleet-02558e91) on 2026-04-05 Orchestrated by QE Queen Coordinator with shared learning/memory