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Exercised the full provider portal as a pilot MSP would and fixed what made it feel broken: - The signed-out portal promised "a sign-in link is on the way" even when the control plane has no email provider (the bundle default), and team invitations silently sent nothing. The portal bootstrap now carries email_sign_in_available and provider_hosted_mode; the sign-in page shows the host command that actually prints a link, and the invite panel says invitation emails are not sent and how to hand over a link instead. - New "provider-msp portal-link --email" CLI mints a one-time portal link for an account member or pending invitee, so teammates can sign in at all on email-less installs (bootstrap only covers the owner). - Portal sessions were fixed at 12h; CP_SESSION_TTL now configures them and provider-hosted MSP mode defaults to 7 days. - Creating a client past the license cap showed a generic "Failed to create workspace." toast: the limit error is now a JSON payload with current/limit, the API client no longer drops non-JSON error bodies (double body read), and the toast explains the license limit. - Copy polish: provider-mode sign-in intro (no refunds/privacy register), least-privilege default invite role, queue tile label matches "Client onboarding", softer Support tab with a docs/MSP.md pointer, setup.sh summary now prints the bootstrap next step and day-2 sign-in commands, .env.example and docs/MSP.md document portal sign-in and sessions. Contracts updated (cloud-paid, api-contracts, deployment-installability, security-privacy) with verification pins in tenant_handlers_test, config_test, magiclink_test, and provider_msp_deploy_test. Verified live against a dockerless control plane: portal-link for an invitee redeems, promotes the invitation, and sets a 7-day session; the at-cap toast shows the license copy; portal vitest suite and cloudcp/auth/account/installtests Go suites pass.
273 lines
13 KiB
Markdown
273 lines
13 KiB
Markdown
# Pulse for MSPs (Provider Operations Guide)
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This guide covers running Pulse as a managed service provider: one central
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deployment monitoring multiple client estates, with per-client isolation,
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alert routing, and reporting. It assumes you have read
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[DEPLOYMENT_MODELS.md](DEPLOYMENT_MODELS.md) for the deployment-model overview.
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## Deployment models
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**Provider-hosted MSP (canonical).** A control plane runs one isolated Pulse
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runtime per client workspace. Alerts, webhook destinations, branded report
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settings, users, audit history, and metrics stay inside the client runtime;
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duplicate hostnames across clients never collide because they never share a
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runtime namespace.
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The canonical install is the deploy bundle at
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[`deploy/provider-msp/`](../deploy/provider-msp/): a Docker Compose stack
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(Traefik ingress with wildcard TLS, a hardened Docker socket proxy, and the
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control plane), a guided `setup.sh` for fresh hosts, `upgrade.sh` for
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backup-gated upgrades, and `run-install-proof.sh` for an end-to-end fresh
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install proof. `.env.example` in that directory doubles as the operator
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runbook. Start there rather than wiring containers by hand; among other
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things the compose stack provides the `pulse.provider-msp.role=traefik` and
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`pulse.provider-msp.role=control-plane` container labels that client
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workspace provisioning requires for isolated tenant networking, and it
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terminates TLS — the management portal sets a `__Host-` (HTTPS-only) session
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cookie, so the portal does not work over plain HTTP.
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Day-2 operations run through the `pulse-control-plane` binary (via
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`docker compose run --rm control-plane …` in the bundle):
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```bash
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pulse-control-plane provider-msp bootstrap --account-name "Your MSP" --owner-email you@example.com
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pulse-control-plane provider-msp status
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pulse-control-plane provider-msp backup
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pulse-control-plane provider-msp recover # restore workspaces from backup or disk
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pulse-control-plane provider-msp preflight # pre-install environment checks
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```
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### Portal sign-in and sessions
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The management portal signs you in with one-time links, not passwords. With
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no email provider configured (the bundle default), the portal cannot send
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those links itself; the sign-in page says so and points at the host command
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that prints one:
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```bash
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# Owner sign-in link (also safe to re-run any time; it never duplicates the account)
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docker compose run --rm control-plane provider-msp bootstrap \
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--account-name "Your MSP" --owner-email you@example.com
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# Sign-in link for an invited teammate
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docker compose run --rm control-plane provider-msp portal-link --email teammate@example.com
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```
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Teammates are invited from the portal Access tab; without an email provider
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the invitation email is not sent, so print their first sign-in link with
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`portal-link` after inviting them. To let the portal send sign-in links and
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invitations itself, set `RESEND_API_KEY` (plus `PULSE_EMAIL_FROM` and
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`PULSE_EMAIL_REPLY_TO`) in `.env` and restart the control plane.
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Portal sessions last 7 days on provider-hosted control planes; override with
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`CP_SESSION_TTL` (Go duration, e.g. `12h`, `168h`).
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Each client runtime is a normal Pulse instance, so it connects to that
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client's infrastructure with the standard methods: agents push over HTTPS for
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hosts, and Proxmox/PBS polling reaches across networks through your existing
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VPN or tunnel to the client site.
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**Shared-process organizations (alternative).** One Pulse process serves
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multiple organizations with isolated data directories, org-bound tokens, and
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per-org alert/webhook/notification state. This is documented in
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[MULTI_TENANT.md](MULTI_TENANT.md) and gated by `PULSE_MULTI_TENANT_ENABLED=true`
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plus a licence carrying the `multi_tenant` capability. It is designed for one
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owner separating internal estates (sites, departments, environments); the
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isolated-runtime model above is the canonical choice for separate customer
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businesses.
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## Network topology and ingress isolation
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Run the management UI and agent check-in on separate, separately firewalled
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ports. See [Split-Port Agent Ingest](CONFIGURATION.md#split-port-agent-ingest-network-isolation)
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for the full reference.
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```bash
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FRONTEND_PORT=7655 # management UI + API: private network / VPN only
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PULSE_AGENT_INGEST_PORT=7656 # agent check-in only: reachable from client sites
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PULSE_AGENT_CONNECT_URL=https://agents.example.com:7656
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```
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Firewall baseline:
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| Surface | Port | Reachable from |
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|---------|------|----------------|
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| Management UI + API | `FRONTEND_PORT` (7655) | Provider staff network / VPN only |
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| Agent ingest | `PULSE_AGENT_INGEST_PORT` (7656) | Client sites (or client VPN tunnels) |
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| Prometheus metrics | 9091 | Provider monitoring network only |
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The dedicated agent port serves **only** `/api/agents/*`; every other path,
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including login and the management API, returns `404`. Agent check-in
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authenticates with an `agent:report`-scoped API token, which cannot read
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monitoring data or change settings — the token scope and the port isolation
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are independent layers.
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If agents reach the central server over per-client VPN tunnels instead of the
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public internet, the same split still applies: expose only the agent port into
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the tunnels and keep the management port out of them.
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### Validation checklist (run after setup, repeat after network changes)
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1. **Agent port serves agent ingest only.** Both must return `404`:
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```bash
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curl -sk -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' https://agents.example.com:7656/ # 404
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curl -sk -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' https://agents.example.com:7656/api/login # 404
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```
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2. **Management port is not reachable from a client site.** From a client
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network (or through a client tunnel), a connection to `FRONTEND_PORT` must
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time out or be refused by your firewall — not answer.
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3. **Agent tokens cannot manage.** A request to a management endpoint with an
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agent token must be rejected:
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```bash
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curl -sk -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' \
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-H "X-API-Token: <agent:report token>" https://pulse.internal:7655/api/notifications/webhooks # 401/403
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```
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4. **Cross-tenant isolation (shared-process mode only).** A token bound to one
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organization must get `403` when targeting another organization AND when
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targeting the default org (a leaked client-site token must not read the
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provider's own estate):
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```bash
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curl -sk -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' \
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-H "X-API-Token: <org-A token>" -H "X-Pulse-Org-ID: org-b" \
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https://pulse.internal:7655/api/alerts/active # 403
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curl -sk -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' \
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-H "X-API-Token: <org-A token>" -H "X-Pulse-Org-ID: default" \
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https://pulse.internal:7655/api/alerts/active # 403
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```
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Keep your own monitoring estate in its own organization too, rather than
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in the default org, so every boundary in the instance is an explicit org
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boundary.
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## Connecting a client's Proxmox or PBS over your VPN
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Most MSP estates pair one or two Proxmox nodes per client site with a
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site-to-site VPN or tunnel back to the provider network. Proxmox and PBS are
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**polled**: the client's Pulse runtime reaches out to the client-site API
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(port `8006` for PVE, `8007` for PBS) — nothing at the client site connects
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inbound to the runtime for this. That inverts the agent direction, so check
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both paths in your firewall:
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| Traffic | Direction | Port |
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|---------|-----------|------|
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| Proxmox/PBS polling | provider → client site, through the tunnel | 8006 / 8007 |
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| Agent check-in (hosts) | client site → provider agent ingest | `PULSE_AGENT_INGEST_PORT` (7656) |
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Per client, the steps are:
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1. Make the client's PVE/PBS API address reachable from the Docker host that
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runs the client workspaces (route or interface into that client's
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tunnel). From the host, `curl -sk https://<client-pve>:8006` should
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answer before you involve Pulse.
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2. Open the client's workspace (portal → workspace → **Open**) and add the
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node under **Settings → Infrastructure**, using the tunnel-reachable
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address. The guided flow generates a setup command to run once on the
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client's Proxmox host (over SSH through the same tunnel); it creates the
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monitoring user, API token, and permissions. Self-signed certificates
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are handled automatically (the certificate fingerprint is pinned on
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first connect).
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3. If you create the token by hand instead, note that Proxmox
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privilege-separated tokens need ACLs on the **token** as well as the
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user, and the built-in `PVEAuditor` role is not sufficient on its own —
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see [TROUBLESHOOTING.md](TROUBLESHOOTING.md) for the exact role setup.
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Because each client workspace is its own runtime, overlapping RFC1918
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subnets across client sites never collide inside Pulse: each workspace only
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ever dials its own client's tunnel addresses.
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## Per-client alert routing
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Configure notification destinations inside each client's scope — the client
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runtime in the provider-hosted model, or the organization in shared-process
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mode. A per-client Gotify server, Slack channel, or PSA endpoint only ever
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sees that client's alerts.
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Webhook targets on private IPs (a Gotify server reached over a VPN tunnel,
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for example) are blocked by default for SSRF safety. Allow them once in
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**Settings → System → Network → Webhook Security**; the allowlist is
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instance-wide and applies to every organization, including ones created
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later.
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Alert webhook payloads carry the firing tenant's identity (`{{.TenantID}}`,
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`{{.TenantName}}`), so a single central PSA endpoint can also route by client.
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For ticket bridges (ConnectWise and similar), use the delivery contract —
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stable severity/type fields, `X-Pulse-Event-ID` deduplication, and HMAC-signed
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deliveries via `signingSecret` — documented in [WEBHOOKS.md](WEBHOOKS.md).
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In the provider-hosted model, client runtimes receive `PULSE_TENANT_ID` and
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`PULSE_TENANT_NAME` (the workspace display name) from the control plane, so
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payloads carry a human-readable client label automatically. A display-name
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change applies on the client runtime's next rollout, which recreates the
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container. Shared-process organizations stamp the org ID and display name
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automatically.
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## Per-client reports
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Each client runtime (or organization) generates its own reports, scoped to
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that client's resources:
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- **UI**: Settings → Reports.
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- **API**: `GET /api/admin/reports/generate` (single resource) and
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`POST /api/admin/reports/generate-multi` (up to 50 resources per report),
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returning PDF or CSV. In shared-process mode, scope with `X-Pulse-Org-ID`
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or an org-bound token.
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- **Schedules**: `GET`/`POST /api/admin/reports/schedules`,
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`PUT`/`DELETE /api/admin/reports/schedules/{id}`, and
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`POST /api/admin/reports/schedules/{id}/run`. Schedules can target explicit
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resources and/or comma-separated resource tags, choose weekly or monthly
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cadence, and deliver PDF or CSV output by email or to disk.
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Report branding (logo + display name) supports a provider-wide default via
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environment (`PULSE_REPORT_PROVIDER_BRAND_DISPLAY_NAME`,
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`PULSE_REPORT_PROVIDER_BRAND_LOGO_PATH` or `..._LOGO_BASE64` +
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`..._LOGO_FORMAT`) plus a settings-based override. In the provider-hosted
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model each client runtime has its own settings, so the override is
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per-client; in shared-process mode the settings override applies
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instance-wide, so all organizations share one brand (usually yours). Branding
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requires the `white_label` entitlement on the licence.
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Scheduled reports are tenant-local. In provider-hosted MSP, each client
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runtime stores its own schedules in `report_schedules.json`, writes generated
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outputs under `reports/generated/`, and applies its own SMTP settings,
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recipients, resource tags, branding, and entitlement checks. If email delivery
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is selected before SMTP is configured, Pulse records the run and saves the
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report to disk instead of sending it. The Pulse Account portal may show whether
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a workspace has an enabled report schedule, but it does not render cross-client
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reports or collect report data in the provider control plane.
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## Licensing
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MSP and Enterprise capabilities (`multi_tenant`, `unlimited`, `white_label`)
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are carried on the licence key. MSP plans are sized by client workspace count
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(Starter 5, Growth 15, Scale 40); workspace creation is blocked, not billed,
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when the limit is reached. MSP and Enterprise keys are issued through sales —
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contact support to get set up or to join the MSP design-partner program.
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In the provider-hosted model the licence is a signed file
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(`CP_PROVIDER_MSP_LICENSE_FILE`) that also binds your control plane's
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entitlement lease signing key:
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1. `setup.sh` generates `CP_ENTITLEMENT_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY` locally; the
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private key never leaves your host.
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2. Send the derived public key
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(`./setup.sh --print-lease-signing-public-key`) with your licence request.
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3. The issued licence binds that key. The control plane refuses to start in
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provider mode if the licence and key do not match, so a misconfigured
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stack fails at startup instead of provisioning client workspaces that
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silently run unlicensed.
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Client runtimes lease their entitlements from your control plane (the
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control plane injects the refresh endpoint; nothing phones Pulse Cloud) and
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verify each lease through the licence chain: Pulse's embedded key signs your
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licence, your licence binds your signing key, your signing key signs the
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lease. Leases carry the MSP capability set plus `white_label`, so branded
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per-client reports work inside every client workspace. When the licence
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expires, leases stop verifying after the grace period and client runtimes
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fall back to Community behavior; renew and restart the control plane to
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restore them.
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