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Implements comprehensive security hardening for pulse-sensor-proxy: - Privilege drop from root to unprivileged user (UID 995) - Hash-chained tamper-evident audit logging with remote forwarding - Per-UID rate limiting (0.2 QPS, burst 2) with concurrency caps - Enhanced command validation with 10+ attack pattern tests - Fuzz testing (7M+ executions, 0 crashes) - SSH hardening, AppArmor/seccomp profiles, operational runbooks All 27 Phase 1 tasks complete. Ready for production deployment.
4.8 KiB
4.8 KiB
Pulse Sensor Proxy – Phase 1 Summary
Executive Summary
Phase 1 delivered a complete hardening and observability overhaul for the Pulse sensor proxy. The service now runs under least privilege, exposes tamper-evident audit trails, forwards logs off-host, enforces adaptive rate caps, and ships with comprehensive validation tests plus documentation for ongoing operations and security posture. These improvements dramatically reduce the proxy's attack surface while giving operators clear visibility and controls.
Security Improvements
- Host hardening
- SSH daemon locked down (no passwords, no forwarding,
ForceCommandwrapper). - Dedicated user
pulse-sensorwith minimal home/project directories. - File permissions tightened (0750 binaries, 0600 private keys, 0640 append-only logs).
- Privilege drop via
Setuid/Setgidpost-bind; service confirms running as unprivileged UID 995.
- SSH daemon locked down (no passwords, no forwarding,
- Command execution guardrails
- Whitelist-based command validator for
sensors/ipmitool; rejects shell metacharacters, subshells, dangerous ipmitool subcommands, null bytes, and path traversal. - Enhanced node-name validation covering unicode, length, and absolute path abuse.
- Whitelist-based command validator for
- Logging & audit
- Structured audit logger with hash chain + HMAC-style tamper detection.
- Remote forwarding via
rsyslog(RELP/TLS) and local queue for resilience.
- Sandboxing
- Network segmentation documentation with firewall ACLs.
- AppArmor profile restricting filesystem/networking; seccomp profile (classic + OCI JSON).
- Rate limiting
- Per-UID token bucket (0.2 QPS burst 2) + global concurrency cap (8) + penalty sleeps.
- Audit + metrics instrumentation for limiter decisions and penalties.
Key Metrics & Tests
go test ./cmd/pulse-sensor-proxy/...passes (including new unit suites for command validation, sanitizer, limiter penalties, audit logging).- 10 hostile-command attack cases covered (metacharacters, subshells, redirects, homoglyphs, null bytes, long args, path traversal, dangerous ipmitool ops, env prefixes, absolute paths).
- Fuzz harness (
FuzzValidateCommand) executing for 24 h (Task #24). - Prometheus metrics validated:
pulse_proxy_limiter_rejections_total{reason="rate"}increments under load.pulse_proxy_limiter_penalties_total{reason="invalid_json"}increments on validation failure.pulse_proxy_limiter_active_peersaccurate (UID grouping).
- Audit log entries verified: connection acceptance, limiter rejections, validation failures, command start/finish with event hash chaining.
Deployment Checklist
- Scripts
- Run
scripts/create-sensor-user.sh - Run
scripts/harden-sensor-proxy.sh - Run
scripts/secure-sensor-files.sh - Run
scripts/setup-log-forwarding.sh
- Run
- Binaries
- Build/install
/opt/pulse/sensor-proxy/bin/pulse-sensor-proxy(0750, root:pulse-sensor).
- Build/install
- Configuration
/etc/pulse-sensor-proxy/config.yamlupdated (allowed subnets, UID/GID list, metrics addr).- Systemd unit exports
PULSE_SENSOR_PROXY_USER,PULSE_SENSOR_PROXY_SSH_DIR,PULSE_SENSOR_PROXY_AUDIT_LOG.
- Profiles
- Deploy AppArmor profile (
security/apparmor/pulse-sensor-proxy.apparmor). - Apply seccomp (systemd
SystemCallFilteroverrides or container JSON profile).
- Deploy AppArmor profile (
- Networking
- Implement firewall ACLs per
docs/security/pulse-sensor-proxy-network.md.
- Implement firewall ACLs per
- Log Forwarding
- Place TLS certs in
/etc/pulse/log-forwarding. - Verify rsyslog forwarding to remote collector.
- Place TLS certs in
- Restart & Validate
systemctl restart pulse-sensor-proxy.- Confirm metrics endpoint, audit log creation, limiter behaviour.
Verification Steps
- Privilege Drop:
ps -o user= -p $(pgrep -f pulse-sensor-proxy)→pulse-sensor. - Audit Trail: Trigger RPC (
get_status) → verifyaudit.logentries with validevent_hash. - Rate Limiter: Fire >10 concurrent requests → confirm
pulse_proxy_limiter_rejections_total{reason="rate"}and auditlimiter.rejection. - Remote Logging:
loggeror manual append to proxy log → confirm arrival at remote collector. - Security Profiles:
aa-status | grep pulse-sensor-proxy(enforced),systemctl show pulse-sensor-proxy -p SystemCallFilter. - App Functionality: Run
ensure_cluster_keys,get_temperatureRPCs, ensure success and no audit warnings.
Known Limitations / Deferred to Phase 2
- Adaptive Polling: still fixed intervals (Phase 2 focuses on controller, backpressure, staleness SLOs).
- Queue Backpressure: groundwork in rate limiter; full queue-based collector scheduling to be built next.
- External Sentinels: cross-check monitoring and metric ingestion planned in Phase 3.
- AppArmor/Seccomp Tuning: profiles may need refinement after real-world observation.
- Long-run Fuzz Results: Task #24 fuzz campaign active; incorporate findings post-run.