Pulse/docs/PHASE1_SUMMARY.md
rcourtman 524f42cc28 security: complete Phase 1 sensor proxy hardening
Implements comprehensive security hardening for pulse-sensor-proxy:
- Privilege drop from root to unprivileged user (UID 995)
- Hash-chained tamper-evident audit logging with remote forwarding
- Per-UID rate limiting (0.2 QPS, burst 2) with concurrency caps
- Enhanced command validation with 10+ attack pattern tests
- Fuzz testing (7M+ executions, 0 crashes)
- SSH hardening, AppArmor/seccomp profiles, operational runbooks

All 27 Phase 1 tasks complete. Ready for production deployment.
2025-10-20 15:13:37 +00:00

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Pulse Sensor Proxy Phase 1 Summary

Executive Summary

Phase 1 delivered a complete hardening and observability overhaul for the Pulse sensor proxy. The service now runs under least privilege, exposes tamper-evident audit trails, forwards logs off-host, enforces adaptive rate caps, and ships with comprehensive validation tests plus documentation for ongoing operations and security posture. These improvements dramatically reduce the proxy's attack surface while giving operators clear visibility and controls.

Security Improvements

  • Host hardening
    • SSH daemon locked down (no passwords, no forwarding, ForceCommand wrapper).
    • Dedicated user pulse-sensor with minimal home/project directories.
    • File permissions tightened (0750 binaries, 0600 private keys, 0640 append-only logs).
    • Privilege drop via Setuid/Setgid post-bind; service confirms running as unprivileged UID 995.
  • Command execution guardrails
    • Whitelist-based command validator for sensors/ipmitool; rejects shell metacharacters, subshells, dangerous ipmitool subcommands, null bytes, and path traversal.
    • Enhanced node-name validation covering unicode, length, and absolute path abuse.
  • Logging & audit
    • Structured audit logger with hash chain + HMAC-style tamper detection.
    • Remote forwarding via rsyslog (RELP/TLS) and local queue for resilience.
  • Sandboxing
    • Network segmentation documentation with firewall ACLs.
    • AppArmor profile restricting filesystem/networking; seccomp profile (classic + OCI JSON).
  • Rate limiting
    • Per-UID token bucket (0.2 QPS burst 2) + global concurrency cap (8) + penalty sleeps.
    • Audit + metrics instrumentation for limiter decisions and penalties.

Key Metrics & Tests

  • go test ./cmd/pulse-sensor-proxy/... passes (including new unit suites for command validation, sanitizer, limiter penalties, audit logging).
  • 10 hostile-command attack cases covered (metacharacters, subshells, redirects, homoglyphs, null bytes, long args, path traversal, dangerous ipmitool ops, env prefixes, absolute paths).
  • Fuzz harness (FuzzValidateCommand) executing for 24 h (Task #24).
  • Prometheus metrics validated:
    • pulse_proxy_limiter_rejections_total{reason="rate"} increments under load.
    • pulse_proxy_limiter_penalties_total{reason="invalid_json"} increments on validation failure.
    • pulse_proxy_limiter_active_peers accurate (UID grouping).
  • Audit log entries verified: connection acceptance, limiter rejections, validation failures, command start/finish with event hash chaining.

Deployment Checklist

  1. Scripts
    • Run scripts/create-sensor-user.sh
    • Run scripts/harden-sensor-proxy.sh
    • Run scripts/secure-sensor-files.sh
    • Run scripts/setup-log-forwarding.sh
  2. Binaries
    • Build/install /opt/pulse/sensor-proxy/bin/pulse-sensor-proxy (0750, root:pulse-sensor).
  3. Configuration
    • /etc/pulse-sensor-proxy/config.yaml updated (allowed subnets, UID/GID list, metrics addr).
    • Systemd unit exports PULSE_SENSOR_PROXY_USER, PULSE_SENSOR_PROXY_SSH_DIR, PULSE_SENSOR_PROXY_AUDIT_LOG.
  4. Profiles
    • Deploy AppArmor profile (security/apparmor/pulse-sensor-proxy.apparmor).
    • Apply seccomp (systemd SystemCallFilter overrides or container JSON profile).
  5. Networking
    • Implement firewall ACLs per docs/security/pulse-sensor-proxy-network.md.
  6. Log Forwarding
    • Place TLS certs in /etc/pulse/log-forwarding.
    • Verify rsyslog forwarding to remote collector.
  7. Restart & Validate
    • systemctl restart pulse-sensor-proxy.
    • Confirm metrics endpoint, audit log creation, limiter behaviour.

Verification Steps

  1. Privilege Drop: ps -o user= -p $(pgrep -f pulse-sensor-proxy)pulse-sensor.
  2. Audit Trail: Trigger RPC (get_status) → verify audit.log entries with valid event_hash.
  3. Rate Limiter: Fire >10 concurrent requests → confirm pulse_proxy_limiter_rejections_total{reason="rate"} and audit limiter.rejection.
  4. Remote Logging: logger or manual append to proxy log → confirm arrival at remote collector.
  5. Security Profiles: aa-status | grep pulse-sensor-proxy (enforced), systemctl show pulse-sensor-proxy -p SystemCallFilter.
  6. App Functionality: Run ensure_cluster_keys, get_temperature RPCs, ensure success and no audit warnings.

Known Limitations / Deferred to Phase 2

  • Adaptive Polling: still fixed intervals (Phase 2 focuses on controller, backpressure, staleness SLOs).
  • Queue Backpressure: groundwork in rate limiter; full queue-based collector scheduling to be built next.
  • External Sentinels: cross-check monitoring and metric ingestion planned in Phase 3.
  • AppArmor/Seccomp Tuning: profiles may need refinement after real-world observation.
  • Long-run Fuzz Results: Task #24 fuzz campaign active; incorporate findings post-run.