Project freshly minted installer command intent onto the stable host before returning remote config, and consume that intent once so later admin policy changes remain authoritative.
Live proof on a real systemd host (Debian 12 container, full
install/report/update/uninstall cycle) caught what no unit test did:
NoNewPrivileges=true blocks sudo outright, so the --grant-smart and
--grant-pct helpers failed inside the service and SMART/pct silently
disappeared while the install reported success. A unit with an active
grant now sets NoNewPrivileges=false, keeping the rest of the hardening;
a grantless least-privilege install keeps NNP enabled. Docs and contracts
state the trade-off: each grant is a scoped, auditable widening.
Also proven in the same live cycle: the flag-conflict refusals, user and
sudoers provisioning, wrapper execution as the service user, the healthy
privilege report ({runningAsRoot:false, serviceUser:pulse-agent,
smartctlHelper:true}), --update preserving the profile without repeated
flags, and uninstall removing the sudoers file and helpers.
The unified agent's Linux installer only offered the root profile, and the
docs called non-root unsupported. That default is the most-cited reason
security-conscious evaluators reject Pulse without trying it. install.sh
gains --least-privilege: the service runs as a dedicated nologin
pulse-agent system user with every existing hardening directive, no
LXC-attach ambient capabilities, docker-group membership for socket reads,
and refusal (not silent root fallback) on appliance platforms, non-systemd
init systems, and --enable-commands. Optional --grant-smart and --grant-pct
restore the only two collectors that need elevation through
visudo-validated exact-command sudoers rules and root-owned wrappers the
agent reaches via new absolute-path-only PULSE_SMARTCTL_PATH /
PULSE_PCT_PATH overrides; the pct grant covers pct list and pct df only
and can never widen into pct exec. --update preserves the profile and its
grants by reading the installed unit.
The agent now authors a privilege block in its report (effective root,
service user, active helpers), carried through models into the fleet
doctor as a descriptive field: Agent Doctor shows the profile and its
helpers instead of presenting intentionally absent collectors as a fault,
and a least-privilege agent can never be marked unhealthy on that evidence
alone.
Discovering Docker inside Proxmox LXC guests previously required an
undocumented environment variable plus a hand-edited systemd unit,
which is how the surface kept shipping invisible. The opt-in is now a
persisted system setting with an admin-only toggle in Settings →
System → General, presented as its own "Docker in Proxmox LXCs" card
under the existing Docker/Podman updates card, with the requirements
(node agent with command execution) and data-collection bounds stated
inline.
The setting rides the admin-gated system settings endpoint
(RequireAdmin + settings:write, matching every other server-wide
toggle). Flipping it persists first, then applies to the runtime
config and fires a reconfigure hook so the router rebuilds the
monitor's Docker checker and inventory collector immediately — no
restart. PULSE_ENABLE_PROXMOX_GUEST_DOCKER_INVENTORY remains
authoritative: when set it locks the toggle (EnvironmentLockBadge in
the UI, HTTP 400 from the API), and an unrelated settings save can
never clobber the runtime value. The opt-in guardrail test now pins
the settings path, the env lock, and the persisted field.
Installer and node setup-guide callouts now point at the toggle first
with the environment variable as the locking override, and the docs,
their public mirrors, and the agent-lifecycle subsystem contract say
the same. New i18n strings shipped for en/de/es.
Verified live in mock mode: toggle off/on from the UI drives the
collector teardown/setup log lines, the value survives a server
restart, and all three touched surfaces render at desktop and mobile
widths (receipt in frontend-modern/browser-verification.json).
PULSE_AGENT_INGEST_PORT existed in code but was absent from operator-facing
docs, so the network-isolation feature (dedicated agent-ingest port serving
only /api/agents/*, firewalled from the web UI/management API) was
undiscoverable. Adds it to CONFIGURATION.md (env-var row + Split-Port Agent
Ingest section with the security model and agent wiring via
PULSE_AGENT_CONNECT_URL) and an API Security cross-reference in
AGENT_SECURITY.md. Also aligns WEBHOOKS.md multi-tenant licensing wording with
MULTI_TENANT.md / API.md (Enterprise license + multi_tenant capability).
- Major updates to README.md and docs/README.md for Pulse v5
- Added technical deep-dives for Pulse Pro (docs/PULSE_PRO.md) and AI Patrol (docs/AI.md)
- Updated Prometheus metrics documentation and Helm schema for metrics separation
- Refreshed security, installation, and deployment documentation for unified agent models
- Cleaned up legacy summary files
The storage deduplication logic only checked cluster config's Shared
flag, but this required the cluster config API call to succeed. When
the per-node storage API already returns shared=1 (as the user
verified), we should use that directly.
Now we check three sources for shared storage detection:
1. Per-node API shared flag (storage.Shared)
2. Cluster config shared flag (if available)
3. Storage type heuristics (NFS, RBD, PBS, etc.)
Related to #1049
- Separated metrics collection into internal/dockeragent/collect.go
- Added agent self-update pre-flight check (--self-test)
- Implemented signed binary verification with key rotation for updates
- Added batch update support to frontend with parallel processing
- Cleaned up agent.go and added startup cleanup for backup containers
- Updated documentation for Docker features and agent security
