Release v3.8.1 — feature flags settings page, bracketed combo names, security hardening, multi-driver SQLite
8.5 KiB
| title | version | lastUpdated |
|---|---|---|
| Error Message Sanitization | 3.8.1 | 2026-05-14 |
Error Message Sanitization
Source of truth:
open-sse/utils/error.ts—sanitizeErrorMessage,buildErrorBody,createErrorResultTests:tests/unit/error-message-sanitization.test.tsLast updated: 2026-05-14 — v3.8.0 Audience: Any engineer touching error responses (HTTP routes, SSE streams, executors, MCP handlers). Status: MANDATORY for every code path that returns an error message to a client.
Why this exists
CodeQL rule js/stack-trace-exposure (CWE-209) flags any code path where an error message originating from a runtime exception reaches an HTTP / SSE response without being sanitized. Stack traces and absolute file paths in production responses give attackers:
- Internal directory layout (
/srv/app/src/lib/...) → reconnaissance for further attacks. - Library / framework versions inferred from stack frames → targeted exploit selection.
- Sensitive runtime values that may be string-interpolated into errors (DB queries, config values).
The sanitizeErrorMessage helper in open-sse/utils/error.ts strips both classes of leakage:
- Multi-line stack traces — only the first line (the actual error message) is kept.
- Absolute paths (
/...*.{ts,js,tsx,jsx,mjs,cjs}[:line[:col]]andC:\...) — replaced with<path>.
The mandatory pattern
1. Building an error response (HTTP / API routes)
Use buildErrorBody() — sanitization is built-in:
import { buildErrorBody } from "@omniroute/open-sse/utils/error.ts";
export async function POST(req: Request) {
try {
// ... handler logic ...
} catch (err) {
return new Response(JSON.stringify(buildErrorBody(500, String(err))), {
status: 500,
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
});
}
}
Or, for the convenience wrappers in the same module:
import {
errorResponse, // one-shot Response object
writeStreamError, // SSE writer
createErrorResult, // { success: false, status, response, ... } shape
unavailableResponse, // adds Retry-After
providerCircuitOpenResponse,
modelCooldownResponse,
} from "@omniroute/open-sse/utils/error.ts";
All of these route through buildErrorBody and therefore through sanitizeErrorMessage. You never need to call sanitizeErrorMessage manually when using these helpers.
2. Custom error envelopes (rare)
When you can't use the helpers above (e.g. the response shape is dictated by an upstream protocol like Connect-RPC), import sanitizeErrorMessage directly:
import { sanitizeErrorMessage } from "@omniroute/open-sse/utils/error.ts";
const body = JSON.stringify({
error: {
message: sanitizeErrorMessage(rawMessage),
type: "invalid_request_error",
code: "",
},
});
This is the only sanctioned way to assemble a custom error body. See open-sse/executors/cursor.ts::buildErrorResponse for the reference implementation.
3. Logging vs. responding
sanitizeErrorMessage should only wrap the value that crosses the network boundary. Internal logs (pino, console) should keep the full message, including stack, so operators can debug. Pattern:
try {
// ...
} catch (err) {
log.error({ err }, "handler failed"); // full err with stack — internal log
return errorResponse(500, getErrorMessage(err)); // sanitized — sent to client
}
4. Forbidden patterns
❌ Never put raw exception output in a Response body:
// BAD: stack trace + file paths reach the client
return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: { message: err.stack || err.message } }), {
status: 500,
});
❌ Never roll your own first-line splitter:
// BAD: forgets to strip absolute paths, may drift from the canonical helper
const safe = String(err).split("\n")[0];
❌ Never sanitize in the route and forget the SSE path. Anything that writes to a stream goes through writeStreamError (or its underlying buildErrorBody).
❌ Never include process.cwd(), __filename, __dirname, env-derived paths in error messages — they bypass the path regex and reveal the deployment topology.
Coverage in CI
tests/unit/error-message-sanitization.test.ts enforces:
- Every route under
/api/model-combo-mappings/*returns sanitized bodies on 4xx/5xx. sanitizeErrorMessagestrips multi-line stack traces.sanitizeErrorMessagereplaces POSIX and Windows absolute paths with<path>.sanitizeErrorMessagehandlesnull/undefined/Errorinstance inputs safely.buildErrorBodynever exposes stack traces in itsmessagefield.
When adding a new route or executor, copy the assertion pattern from this file. The coverage gate (npm run test:coverage) enforces ≥75% statements/lines/functions and ≥70% branches — error paths must be covered.
Related controls
js/stack-trace-exposureCodeQL alerts in.github/securityshould always be either fixed via these helpers or dismissed with a comment citing this doc.- The
pinoredaction config (src/lib/log/redaction.ts— if present) handles structured log redaction separately. This doc covers only the response-message surface. - Upstream-header denylist (
src/shared/constants/upstreamHeaders.ts) covers header leakage — keep both files aligned when adding a new exfiltration concern.
Upstream details passthrough
buildErrorBody accepts an optional third argument upstreamDetails (raw
parsed body from the upstream provider). When provided, it is sanitized by
sanitizeUpstreamDetails before inclusion in the response as upstream_details.
Sanitization rules applied to upstreamDetails:
- String leaves: run through
sanitizeErrorMessage(strips stacks + absolute paths). - Key blocklist: keys matching
/stack|trace|path|file|cwd|dir|password|secret|token|key/iare removed. - Depth cap: nesting beyond 4 levels is replaced with the string
"[truncated]". - Arrays are capped at 32 elements.
Only the seven upstream-error createErrorResult call sites in chatCore.ts pass
upstreamErrorBody. Internal OmniRoute errors (SSE parse failures, empty content,
guardrail blocks) do not include upstream_details.
Do NOT pass raw err.stack, err.message, or any string from a runtime exception to
upstreamDetails. Those must still go through errorResponse / buildErrorBody(code, msg)
without an upstream body.
Known CodeQL limitation: custom sanitizers not recognized
The CodeQL query js/stack-trace-exposure uses a fixed allowlist of sanitizer patterns (e.g. inline .split("\n")[0], String#replace with specific regex shapes, access to .message on Error). It does not recognize indirection through a custom helper like our sanitizeErrorMessage().
This means callsites that demonstrably sanitize via this module — for example open-sse/utils/error.ts::errorResponse and open-sse/executors/cursor.ts::buildErrorResponse — may continue to raise the alert even though the code is functionally safe. Precedent dismissals: #224, #231 (May 2026), both marked false positive with technical justification.
How to handle a new occurrence:
- Confirm the callsite actually routes the message through
sanitizeErrorMessage/buildErrorBody/ one of the wrappers documented above (read the call chain end-to-end — don't trust a comment). - Confirm
tests/unit/error-message-sanitization.test.tsexercises the path (or add coverage). - Dismiss the alert via
gh api ... -X PATCH state=dismissed -f 'dismissed_reason=false positive'referencing this doc. - Do not "fix" by inlining
.split("\n")[0]everywhere — the helper is the single source of truth; duplicating the pattern weakens the sanitizer (loses path scrubbing, length cap, type coercion) for the appearance of placating the scanner.
Adopting opt-in features like CodeQL's @codeql/javascript-models custom sanitizer config is the long-term fix; it lives outside this doc.
References
- CWE-209: Information Exposure Through an Error Message
- CodeQL
js/stack-trace-exposure - OWASP: Error Handling Cheat Sheet
- Commit centralizing the helper:
1a39c31f— fix(security): mask public upstream creds + centralize error sanitization