fix(phase6): make gh CLI actually usable inside the VM (graphql, utility paths, safe.directory)

Two related fixes from real end-to-end testing of Phase 6:

**Fix 1: gh CLI was effectively broken inside the VM.**
The original github_path_allowed accepted only /user/* and
/repos/<owner>/<repo>/..., which blocked the GraphQL endpoint gh CLI
needs for the most common workflows:

- `gh pr create` → POST /graphql (rejected with 403)
- `gh issue create` → POST /graphql (rejected)
- `gh repo view --json` → POST /graphql (rejected)
- `gh issue list --search ...` → /search/issues (rejected)
- `gh repo view org/x` → /orgs/<org> (rejected)
- gh ambient probes → /rate_limit, /meta, /markdown (rejected)

Extend the allow-list:

- /graphql is allowed unconditionally. Per-repo scoping doesn't reach
  into GraphQL bodies in v1; this is a documented trade-off.
- /search/*, /rate_limit, /meta, /markdown are allowed (read-only
  utility, no per-repo state exposed).
- /orgs/<org> (bare) is allowed for `gh repo view org/...` resolution;
  /orgs by itself (listing) is denied to avoid leaking org membership.
- /user surface narrowed: only /user (auth probe) and /user/orgs are
  allowed. /user/repos, /user/keys, /user/emails, /user/gpg_keys are
  now BLOCKED — the previous catch-all leaked the full inventory of
  private repos and SSH keys / verified emails (see code-review
  finding #4 from this session).
- Reject any path segment equal to ".." anywhere to close the
  /repos/<allowed>/<repo>/../../<victim> path-traversal that GitHub
  would otherwise normalise upstream (code-review finding #2).

**Fix 2: `fatal: detected dubious ownership in repository`.**
The project is bind-mounted into the guest as the host user (UID 1000)
but the in-guest agent runs as root (UID 0). git refuses operations on
repos whose .git is owned by a different UID. Symptom: every `git
status` / `git log` / `git show` etc. inside the guest aborts.

write_guest_gh_config now ALWAYS writes a base /root/.gitconfig with
`[safe] directory = *` regardless of whether gh auth was captured.
The credential helper + url.insteadOf stanzas are only included
when has_gh_token=true; the gh hosts.yml is still gated on having
a token. Launcher always calls write_guest_gh_config (was gated on
gh_token_file before) so safe.directory is in place even with
--no-git or no host gh auth.

Verified inside the guest:
- `git status` returns "On branch master / nothing to commit" — no
  dubious-ownership abort.
- `git log` reads the bind-mounted history.
- `gh api graphql -f query="query { viewer { login } }"` reaches
  GitHub (response is Bad credentials, same nested-host limit as
  documented for the other providers — not our allow-list).
- `gh api /rate_limit` reaches GitHub.
- `gh api repos/octocat/Hello-World` still returns the clean 403
  naming the allow-listed repos.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

crates/agent-vm/src/intercept_hook.rs

@@ -235,17 +235,61 @@ fn parse_http_request(req: &[u8]) -> Result<(String, String, Vec<(String, String
 
 /// Path-based allow-list check for api.github.com requests.
 ///
-/// Accepts:
+/// Accepts (case-insensitive on owner/repo):
 /// - `/repos/<owner>/<repo>[/...]` where `<owner>/<repo>` is in the
-///   allow-list (case-insensitive).
-/// - `/user` and `/user/...` (gh CLI uses these to confirm auth +
-///   list accessible repos; doesn't expose specific-repo state).
-/// - `/repos/<owner>/<repo>` for the parent-fetch of a fork (we
-///   accept any owner here since the parent is read-only metadata —
-///   reconsider if this proves too permissive).
+///   allow-list, after rejecting any `..` traversal segment so a
+///   crafted path like `/repos/<allowed>/<repo>/../../<victim>/<private>`
+///   can't pass the surface check and let GitHub resolve `..`
+///   upstream.
+/// - `/user` and `/user/...` — gh CLI auth-status, current-user info.
+///   Limited to the small set gh actually needs: /user (auth probe),
+///   /user/orgs (org membership). Excludes /user/repos, /user/keys,
+///   /user/emails, /user/gpg_keys to avoid leaking full inventory /
+///   PII.
+/// - **`/graphql`** — gh CLI's `gh pr create`, `gh issue create`,
+///   `gh repo view --json` all use GraphQL mutations. We DO NOT body-
+///   filter the GraphQL request: per-repo scoping doesn't reach into
+///   the JSON body in v1. Accept that an agent that crafts arbitrary
+///   GraphQL queries can read anything the token can; the practical
+///   trade-off is "gh CLI works" vs. "no GraphQL".
+/// - `/search/...`, `/rate_limit`, `/meta`, `/markdown` — small
+///   utility endpoints gh CLI uses ambiently.
+/// - `/orgs/<org>` (no further path) — gh CLI reads org metadata to
+///   resolve `gh repo view org/...`.
 fn github_path_allowed(path: &str, allowed: &[String]) -> bool {
     let p = path.split_once('?').map(|(p, _)| p).unwrap_or(path);
-    if p == "/user" || p.starts_with("/user/") {
+
+    // Reject traversal anywhere in the path. GitHub normalises `..`
+    // upstream and would otherwise serve a different (blocked) repo.
+    for seg in p.split('/') {
+        if seg == ".." {
+            return false;
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Narrow /user/* surface to what gh actually needs for auth +
+    // org-membership checks. Excludes /user/repos, /user/keys,
+    // /user/emails, /user/gpg_keys (PII / full-inventory leak).
+    if p == "/user" || p == "/user/orgs" || p.starts_with("/user/orgs/") {
+        return true;
+    }
+    // Utility endpoints — read-only, no per-repo state.
+    if matches!(p, "/rate_limit" | "/meta" | "/markdown") {
+        return true;
+    }
+    if p == "/search" || p.starts_with("/search/") {
+        return true;
+    }
+    if p == "/orgs" {
+        return false; // listing orgs isn't useful and exposes membership
+    }
+    // gh resolves `gh repo view org/x` via /orgs/<org> first; allow
+    // bare org-info reads (no /repos sub-path which would be a list).
+    if let Some(rest) = p.strip_prefix("/orgs/") {
+        return !rest.is_empty() && !rest.contains('/');
+    }
+    // GraphQL: gh PR/issue creation. No body-filter — see fn doc.
+    if p == "/graphql" {
         return true;
     }
     if let Some(rest) = p.strip_prefix("/repos/") {

crates/agent-vm/src/run.rs

@@ -230,13 +230,13 @@ pub async fn launch(agent: Agent, args: Args) -> Result<i32> {
     let creds = crate::secrets::refresh(&session.state_dir, &project_guest_path, use_github)
         .context("snapshotting host credentials")?;
 
-    // Phase 6: write guest-side gh/git config that reaches for the
-    // placeholder bearer the proxy will substitute on outbound. Only
-    // wired when we actually captured a gh token.
-    if creds.gh_token_file.is_some() {
-        crate::secrets::write_guest_gh_config(&session.state_dir)
-            .context("writing guest gh/git config")?;
-    }
+    // Phase 6/9: always write the guest gitconfig (carries the
+    // unconditional `safe.directory = *` so git inside the guest
+    // accepts the host-bind-mounted project despite the UID
+    // mismatch). The credential-helper / gh hosts.yml stanzas are
+    // gated on having actually captured a host gh token.
+    crate::secrets::write_guest_gh_config(&session.state_dir, creds.gh_token_file.is_some())
+        .context("writing guest gh/git config")?;
 
     // Phase 7: parse `--mount HOST[:GUEST]` extras. The libkrun IRQ
     // pool is *tight* — empirically the project bind + state bind +

crates/agent-vm/src/secrets.rs

@@ -627,47 +627,69 @@ fn write_default_claude_root_state(path: &Path, project_guest_path: &str) -> Res
     Ok(())
 }
 
-/// Phase 6: write the gh/git config the guest agent uses to talk to
-/// GitHub. Files land under `state_dir` so they're available inside
-/// the guest via the existing bind mount + symlinks (see run.rs
-/// patch builder).
+/// Phase 6/9: write the guest's gitconfig and (if `has_gh_token`)
+/// gh/git credential plumbing. Always called so the
+/// `safe.directory = *` line is in place — without it, git inside the
+/// guest fails with "fatal: detected dubious ownership in repository"
+/// because the host-owned bind-mounted project is read by the guest's
+/// root user (different UID).
+///
+/// Files land under `state_dir` so they're available inside the guest
+/// via the existing bind mount + symlinks (see run.rs patch builder).
 ///
 /// - `<state>/gitconfig` → symlinked to `/root/.gitconfig` in the
-///   guest. A `credential.helper` echoes `username=x-access-token`
-///   and `password=<placeholder>` so `git push` to GitHub goes out
-///   as `Authorization: Basic base64(x-access-token:placeholder)`,
-///   which the proxy substitutes on the wire.
+///   guest. Always contains `safe.directory = *`. When the host has
+///   gh auth, also contains a `credential.helper` that echoes
+///   `username=x-access-token` / `password=<placeholder>` so
+///   `git push` to GitHub goes out as
+///   `Authorization: Basic base64(x-access-token:placeholder)`, which
+///   the proxy substitutes on the wire.
 /// - `<state>/gh-config/hosts.yml` → symlinked to `/root/.config/gh`
-///   in the guest. The placeholder is what gh CLI sends; the proxy
-///   substitutes outbound to api.github.com.
-pub fn write_guest_gh_config(state_dir: &Path) -> Result<()> {
-    let gitconfig = format!(
-        // The credential helper is a shell snippet; git invokes it
-        // with `get` and reads `username=`/`password=` lines.
-        "[credential \"https://github.com\"]\n\
-         \thelper = \"!f() {{ test \\\"$1\\\" = get && echo username=x-access-token && echo password={tok}; }}; f\"\n\
-         [credential \"https://gist.github.com\"]\n\
-         \thelper = \"!f() {{ test \\\"$1\\\" = get && echo username=x-access-token && echo password={tok}; }}; f\"\n\
-         [url \"https://github.com/\"]\n\
-         \tinsteadOf = git@github.com:\n\
+///   in the guest. Only written when `has_gh_token`; the placeholder
+///   is what gh CLI sends and the proxy substitutes outbound to
+///   api.github.com.
+pub fn write_guest_gh_config(state_dir: &Path, has_gh_token: bool) -> Result<()> {
+    // safe.directory = * is unconditional: the guest IS the security
+    // boundary (microVM), so trusting every path is fine and git
+    // operating on the host-bind-mounted project requires it. Use
+    // wildcard form so any --mount extra also works without
+    // listing every path.
+    let mut gitconfig = String::from(
+        "[safe]\n\
+         \tdirectory = *\n\
          [user]\n\
          \tname = agent-vm\n\
          \temail = agent-vm@msb.local\n",
-        tok = GH_TOKEN_PLACEHOLDER,
     );
+    if has_gh_token {
+        // git's credential helper for github.com pushes/clones. The
+        // helper is a shell snippet; git invokes it with `get` and
+        // reads `username=`/`password=` lines from stdout.
+        gitconfig.push_str(&format!(
+            "[credential \"https://github.com\"]\n\
+             \thelper = \"!f() {{ test \\\"$1\\\" = get && echo username=x-access-token && echo password={tok}; }}; f\"\n\
+             [credential \"https://gist.github.com\"]\n\
+             \thelper = \"!f() {{ test \\\"$1\\\" = get && echo username=x-access-token && echo password={tok}; }}; f\"\n\
+             [url \"https://github.com/\"]\n\
+             \tinsteadOf = git@github.com:\n",
+            tok = GH_TOKEN_PLACEHOLDER,
+        ));
+    }
     atomic_write(&state_dir.join("gitconfig"), gitconfig.as_bytes(), 0o600)?;
 
-    let gh_dir = state_dir.join("gh-config");
-    std::fs::create_dir_all(&gh_dir)?;
-    let hosts_yml = format!(
-        "github.com:\n\
-         \\x20\\x20user: agent-vm\n\
-         \\x20\\x20oauth_token: {tok}\n\
-         \\x20\\x20git_protocol: https\n",
-        tok = GH_TOKEN_PLACEHOLDER,
-    )
-    .replace("\\x20", " ");
-    atomic_write(&gh_dir.join("hosts.yml"), hosts_yml.as_bytes(), 0o600)?;
+    if has_gh_token {
+        let gh_dir = state_dir.join("gh-config");
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&gh_dir)?;
+        let hosts_yml = format!(
+            "github.com:\n\
+             \\x20\\x20user: agent-vm\n\
+             \\x20\\x20oauth_token: {tok}\n\
+             \\x20\\x20git_protocol: https\n",
+            tok = GH_TOKEN_PLACEHOLDER,
+        )
+        .replace("\\x20", " ");
+        atomic_write(&gh_dir.join("hosts.yml"), hosts_yml.as_bytes(), 0o600)?;
+    }
     Ok(())
 }