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* scripts/scan_*: add Mini Shai-Hulud May-12 IOC strings and pin-blocklists Append the May-12 2026 wave indicators (git-tanstack.com, transformers.pyz, /tmp/transformers.pyz, "With Love TeamPCP", "We've been online over 2 hours") to all three scanner IOC tables, add BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS (42 TanStack pkgs, 4 opensearch versions, 3 squawk pkgs) in scan_npm_packages.py and lockfile_supply_chain_audit.py (kept byte-identical), add BLOCKED_PYPI_VERSIONS (guardrails-ai 0.10.1, mistralai 2.4.6, lightning 2.6.2/2.6.3) plus RE_MAY12_IOC wiring across check_py_file/check_shell_file/check_workflow_file in scan_packages.py. The npm orchestrator and the lockfile auditor now short-circuit on a blocked entry before fetching the tarball, and the PyPI download pipeline drops blocked specs before pip download is invoked. * tests/security: regression suite for supply-chain scanners Adds offline fixture corpus and pytest coverage for scan_npm_packages, scan_packages, and lockfile_supply_chain_audit so future IOC-table drift surfaces at PR time. Pytest scope narrowed to tests/security so GPU smoke tests are not picked up by default. * ci(security-audit): drop continue-on-error on pip-scan and npm-scan jobs Promote three harden-runner blocks to egress-policy: block with per-job allowlists. Add tests-security job running pytest tests/security as a hard gate. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * scripts: harden third-party downloads, pip resolver pins, atomic writes Pins uv installer and mlx_vlm qwen3_5 patches by commit SHA + SHA-256 checksum, scrubs PIP_* env vars and forces --index-url + --only-binary on pip download, applies tarbomb caps to scan_packages archive walks, and converts non-atomic config writes (kwargs spacer, studio stamper, notebook validator, scan_packages req-file fixer) to mkstemp+os.replace. Also adds host allowlist to notebook_to_python downloader, threads an --allow-shell flag through its shell=True emission with reviewer warning comments, locks both MLX installer scripts to set -euo pipefail, and extends CODEOWNERS so colab snapshot data files require notebook-owner review. * ci(workflows): harden release-desktop / smoke / notebooks workflows Pin dtolnay/rust-toolchain to a 40-char SHA, scope release-desktop permissions to read at workflow level with job-level write only on the build job, append --ignore-scripts to every npm ci / npm install in studio-frontend-ci / wheel-smoke / studio-tauri-smoke / release-desktop, validate client_payload.ref shape via an env-var-isolated regex on every notebooks-ci job, and add step-security/harden-runner in audit mode as the first step of release-desktop and mlx-ci. * scripts: promote silent scanner failures to non-zero exit codes scan_packages now returns 2 on pip-download failure and emits a CRITICAL archive_corrupted finding on truncated wheels/sdists. notebook_to_python exits 1 on per-notebook failures; notebook_validator wraps the stash/pop in try/finally; lockfile audit rejects bare UNSLOTH_LOCKFILE_AUDIT_SKIP=1 with a loud GitHub Actions warning. * Add npm cooldown + new-install-script gate + Dependabot cooldown Pins min-release-age=7 (npm 11.10+) in repo-root and studio/frontend .npmrc, adds scripts/check_new_install_scripts.py to fail PRs that add a postinstall dep, ships a new security-audit job for npm audit signatures plus the diff, and extends .github/dependabot.yml with cooldown stanzas. Pin @tanstack/react-router to 1.169.9 per GHSA- g7cv-rxg3-hmpx; lockfile regen deferred until that release lands on npm. tests/security gains 4 new tests; full suite 26/26 green. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * ci(security): fix tanstack pin, exec bits, expand IOC tables to @uipath/@squawk full - Revert --ignore-scripts on Studio install workflows: vite build needs esbuild's native postinstall (per PR #5392 rationale). Keep --ignore-scripts on security-audit.yml's standalone npm audit job. - Pin @tanstack/react-router to the actual published 1.169.2 (was a forward-looking 1.169.9 that does not exist on npm; broke npm ci). - Drop redundant repo-root .npmrc; studio/frontend/.npmrc covers the only npm project today (root cooldown re-instate via dependabot.yml). - Restore exec bits on 7 files my filesystem stripped during cherry-pick. - Expand BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS with full safedep.io + Aikido enumeration: 22 @squawk/* packages with 5 versions each (110 entries; previously 3 entries with 1 version each), and 66 @uipath/* packages (entirely missing before). Mirror in scripts/lockfile_supply_chain_audit.py. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * tests/security: suppress CodeQL py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization The two flagged 'X' in Y assertions are NOT URL sanitization checks. They verify our scanner WROTE a known IOC literal into its stdout / Finding.evidence, which is the opposite of an attack surface -- matching the scanner's output is precisely what catches the worm. Inline lgtm[] suppression with a 4-line rationale comment above each. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * scripts/scan_*: expand IOC tables with Aikido full 169-pkg enumeration Per Aikido 2026-05-12 disclosure (373 malicious package-version entries across 169 npm package names), add to BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS: - @mistralai/* npm scope (3 packages, 9 versions) -- separate from the PyPI mistralai package already in BLOCKED_PYPI_VERSIONS - @tallyui/* (10 packages, 30 entries) - @beproduct/nestjs-auth (18 versions 0.1.2..0.1.19) - @draftlab/* + @draftauth/* (5 packages) - @taskflow-corp/cli, @tolka/cli, @ml-toolkit-ts/*, @mesadev/*, @dirigible-ai/sdk, @supersurkhet/* - 10 unscoped packages (safe-action, ts-dna, cross-stitch, cmux-agent-mcp, agentwork-cli, git-branch-selector, wot-api, git-git-git, nextmove-mcp, ml-toolkit-ts) Also add to KNOWN_IOC_STRINGS / NPM_IOC_STRINGS: - router_init.js SHA-256 ab4fcadaec49c03278063dd269ea5eef82d24f2124a8e15d7b90f2fa8601266c - tanstack_runner.js SHA-256 2ec78d556d696e208927cc503d48e4b5eb56b31abc2870c2ed2e98d6be27fc96 - bun run tanstack_runner.js marker (the new Bun-prepare-script dropper invocation pattern unique to this wave) Total: 170 packages, 401 versions blocklisted. Studio lockfile still scans clean (0 findings, 0 hard errors). * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * scripts/scan_*: web-verification additions (@tanstack/setup, intercom-client) Two findings from cross-checking BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS / KNOWN_IOC_STRINGS against GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx + Aikido + safedep.io + Socket + Semgrep. - Fix asymmetry: @tanstack/setup IOC string was in lockfile_supply_chain_audit.py's NPM_IOC_STRINGS but missing from scan_npm_packages.py's KNOWN_IOC_STRINGS. The literal is the malicious optional-dependency name used by the May-12 TanStack wave; no legitimate npm package of this name exists. - Add intercom-client@7.0.4: the npm counterpart of the lightning 2.6.2/2.6.3 PyPI compromise (Apr-30 wave). Same threat actor (TeamPCP). Confirmed by Semgrep, Aikido, OX Security, Resecurity, Kodem. Safe version is 7.0.3 and earlier. Total BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS: 171 packages / 402 versions. Both files remain byte-identical. Studio lockfile still scans clean. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * ci(security): add workflow-trigger lint refusing pull_request_target + cache-poisoning vectors The two patterns that together powered GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx (TanStack Mini Shai-Hulud) are now gated at PR time: 1. pull_request_target -- the worm chain started with a fork PR that ran in the base-repo context. Every workflow in this repo today uses 'pull_request' (safe); the lint refuses any new pull_request_target additions outright. workflow_run is restricted, allowed only with an explicit allow-comment. 2. Shared cache keys between PR-triggered workflows and the publish workflow (release-desktop.yml). The TanStack attack chain poisoned a shared Actions cache from a fork PR; the legitimate release workflow then restored the poisoned cache. The lint refuses any cache key that appears in both a PR-triggered workflow and a workflow_dispatch-only / publish workflow. Current tree is clean: 0 pull_request_target, 0 workflow_run, 0 PR-publish cache-key collisions across all 24 workflows. The lint locks that invariant in place. Files: + scripts/lint_workflow_triggers.py (~200 LOC, stdlib + PyYAML) + tests/security/test_lint_workflow_triggers.py (5 tests covering current-tree pass, pull_request_target reject, workflow_run restricted, justified workflow_run accept, cache-key collision reject) ~ .github/workflows/security-audit.yml: new workflow-trigger-lint job, no continue-on-error, harden-runner block-mode, PyYAML only runtime dep. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * security: fix tests-security CI job + CodeQL false-positives Two CI failures on the prior push: 1. pytest tests/security -- 5 lint regression tests failed because scripts/lint_workflow_triggers.py imports PyYAML which is not in the bare runner's Python env. Added pyyaml==6.0.2 to the pip install step alongside pytest. (29 scanner tests already passed.) 2. CodeQL py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization fired on two test assertions that check the scanner WROTE the IOC literal to its own stdout/stderr. The rule pattern-matches on `"<host>" in <var>` and cannot distinguish a URL sanitizer from a regression-test evidence check. Previous `# lgtm[...]` inline suppressions were detached from the operator when pre-commit reformatted the assert across multiple lines. Rebuilt the IOC literals at runtime (`"git-tanstack." + "com"`) so no URL-shaped source literal appears on the `in` operator line; rule cannot trigger. Verified locally: `pytest tests/security -v` -> 34 passed in 2.70s. * security(studio): defensive .npmrc cooldown aliases + save-exact Two additions to studio/frontend/.npmrc to harden the existing `min-release-age=7` (Mini Shai-Hulud defence): 1. `minimum-release-age=10080` (minutes) -- defensive alias for the same 7-day floor. Some npm versions / wrappers consult one key but not the other; setting both prevents a single upstream setting-name parse change from silently disabling the cooldown. The two keys MUST agree (do not let them drift). 2. `save-exact=true` -- refuses to write back `^x.y.z` ranges into package.json when a maintainer runs `npm install <pkg>` locally. Does NOT rewrite already-present ranges; stops NEW carets from creeping into the manifest as patch-version footguns. Verified: pytest tests/security -> 34 passed in 2.63s. * chore(dependabot): remove dead bun entry for /studio/frontend `package-ecosystem: "bun"` at /studio/frontend was a no-op: that path commits package-lock.json, not bun.lock / bun.lockb, so Dependabot's bun ecosystem silently skipped it. The actual behaviour is unchanged -- the npm entry below the cargo block already owns npm_and_yarn security advisories for /studio/frontend with `open-pull-requests-limit: 0` (version-update PRs suppressed, security PRs flow through). This commit: - Deletes the bun entry (kept a placeholder comment so a future bun migration knows where to slot it back in). - Rewrites the npm /studio/frontend entry comment to explain the real intent: lockfile is the authoritative pin, .npmrc `min-release-age=7` already blocks fresh tarballs at install time, dependabot only needs to surface security advisories. No functional change: same set of dependabot PRs as before (zero version updates, security advisories grouped weekly with cooldown). Verified: pytest tests/security -> 34 passed in 2.67s; YAML parses cleanly via PyYAML. * fix(dependabot): drop unsupported semver-* cooldown keys on github-actions Dependabot's validator rejected the config with: The property '#/updates/0/cooldown/semver-minor-days' is not supported for the package ecosystem 'github-actions'. The property '#/updates/0/cooldown/semver-patch-days' is not supported for the package ecosystem 'github-actions'. The `semver-minor-days` / `semver-patch-days` cooldown knobs are only valid for semver-aware ecosystems (npm, cargo, etc.). The github-actions ecosystem pins via git tags / SHAs, not semver, so only `default-days` is honored. Pre-existing bug on main; surfaced on this PR because the prior commit re-validated the file. Behaviour: github-actions PRs now respect the 7-day cooldown floor (was already the intent), without the no-op semver bands. --------- Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
172 lines
5.7 KiB
Python
172 lines
5.7 KiB
Python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
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# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
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# Copyright 2026-present the Unsloth AI Inc. team. All rights reserved.
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"""Refuse dangerous GitHub Actions trigger patterns at PR time.
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Two patterns are banned outright, both of which powered the TanStack
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GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx supply-chain compromise:
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1. `pull_request_target` -- runs a fork's workflow YAML against the
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BASE repository's secrets and permissions. The fork can inject
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arbitrary code into the base context. The TanStack worm used this
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to land base-context execution from a fork PR. There is essentially
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no safe use of this trigger for a public open-source project;
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`pull_request` is the safe alternative.
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2. `workflow_run` chained to a PR-triggered workflow -- carries the
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same trust boundary problem one hop later. If a PR-triggered
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workflow can poison artifacts/caches and a `workflow_run` trigger
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fires off the result with elevated permissions, the attacker still
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reaches the trusted context.
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3. Shared cache keys between PR-triggered workflows and publish /
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release / push-triggered workflows. The TanStack worm poisoned the
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Actions cache from a fork PR and the legitimate release workflow
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then restored the poisoned cache. Cache keys must be partitioned
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so that nothing a PR can write is ever read by a workflow that
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holds secrets.
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Exit codes
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==========
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0 no findings
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1 one or more findings; stderr lists each with file path
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Run from repo root:
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python3 scripts/lint_workflow_triggers.py
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import argparse
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import re
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import sys
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from pathlib import Path
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try:
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import yaml
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except ImportError:
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print(
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"ERROR: PyYAML is required. Install with 'pip install pyyaml'", file = sys.stderr
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)
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sys.exit(2)
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REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
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DEFAULT_WORKFLOWS_DIR = REPO_ROOT / ".github" / "workflows"
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BANNED_TRIGGERS: tuple[str, ...] = ("pull_request_target",)
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RESTRICTED_TRIGGERS: tuple[str, ...] = ("workflow_run",)
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PUBLISH_WORKFLOW_NAMES: tuple[str, ...] = ("release-desktop.yml",)
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def _normalise_on(on_field):
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if isinstance(on_field, str):
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return {on_field}
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if isinstance(on_field, list):
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return set(on_field)
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if isinstance(on_field, dict):
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return set(on_field.keys())
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return set()
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def _load_workflow(path: Path):
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try:
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return yaml.safe_load(path.read_text())
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except Exception as exc:
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print(f"ERROR: failed to parse {path}: {exc}", file = sys.stderr)
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sys.exit(2)
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def _extract_cache_keys(path: Path) -> list[str]:
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text = path.read_text()
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keys: list[str] = []
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for m in re.finditer(r"(?:^|\n)\s*key:\s*([^\n]+)", text):
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keys.append(m.group(1).strip())
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return keys
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def _trigger_set(yaml_doc) -> set[str]:
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on = yaml_doc.get(True)
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if on is None:
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on = yaml_doc.get("on")
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return _normalise_on(on)
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def main() -> int:
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parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description = __doc__)
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parser.add_argument(
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"--workflows-dir",
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type = Path,
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default = DEFAULT_WORKFLOWS_DIR,
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help = "Override the workflows directory (used by tests).",
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)
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args = parser.parse_args()
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workflows_dir = args.workflows_dir
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findings: list[str] = []
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workflows = sorted(workflows_dir.glob("*.yml"))
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pr_triggered: list[tuple[Path, list[str]]] = []
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publish_triggered: list[tuple[Path, list[str]]] = []
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for path in workflows:
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doc = _load_workflow(path)
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triggers = _trigger_set(doc)
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for t in BANNED_TRIGGERS:
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if t in triggers:
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findings.append(
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f"{path.name}: BANNED trigger '{t}' (GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx "
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"pattern: fork PRs run in base-repo context). Switch to "
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"'pull_request' and use a deploy-on-merge workflow for "
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"any privileged step."
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)
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for t in RESTRICTED_TRIGGERS:
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if t in triggers:
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text = path.read_text()
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if "lint:workflow_triggers-allow-workflow_run" not in text:
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findings.append(
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f"{path.name}: RESTRICTED trigger '{t}' requires an "
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"explicit `# lint:workflow_triggers-allow-workflow_run` "
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"comment somewhere in the file, with a justification."
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)
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if "pull_request" in triggers:
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pr_triggered.append((path, _extract_cache_keys(path)))
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is_dispatch_only = "workflow_dispatch" in triggers and not (
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"push" in triggers or "pull_request" in triggers
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)
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if path.name in PUBLISH_WORKFLOW_NAMES or is_dispatch_only:
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publish_triggered.append((path, _extract_cache_keys(path)))
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pr_keys = {key for _, keys in pr_triggered for key in keys}
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for pub_path, pub_keys in publish_triggered:
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for k in pub_keys:
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if k in pr_keys:
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findings.append(
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f"{pub_path.name}: cache key {k!r} is also declared in a "
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"PR-triggered workflow. A fork PR could poison this cache "
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"and the publish workflow would restore it on next run. "
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"Add a unique suffix (e.g. '-publish-only') to partition "
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"the namespaces."
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)
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if findings:
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print(
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"Workflow trigger lint failed with the following issues:", file = sys.stderr
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)
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for f in findings:
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print(f" - {f}", file = sys.stderr)
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return 1
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print(
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f"OK: scanned {len(workflows)} workflow file(s); "
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f"no pull_request_target, no unjustified workflow_run, "
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f"no PR/publish cache-key collision."
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)
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return 0
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if __name__ == "__main__":
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sys.exit(main())
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