unsloth/scripts/lint_workflow_triggers.py
Daniel Han ef9f672fe8
security: NOT affected by Mini Shai-Hulud (May-12 wave) -- forward-looking hardening only (#5397)
* scripts/scan_*: add Mini Shai-Hulud May-12 IOC strings and pin-blocklists

Append the May-12 2026 wave indicators (git-tanstack.com, transformers.pyz,
/tmp/transformers.pyz, "With Love TeamPCP", "We've been online over 2 hours")
to all three scanner IOC tables, add BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS (42 TanStack pkgs,
4 opensearch versions, 3 squawk pkgs) in scan_npm_packages.py and
lockfile_supply_chain_audit.py (kept byte-identical), add BLOCKED_PYPI_VERSIONS
(guardrails-ai 0.10.1, mistralai 2.4.6, lightning 2.6.2/2.6.3) plus
RE_MAY12_IOC wiring across check_py_file/check_shell_file/check_workflow_file
in scan_packages.py. The npm orchestrator and the lockfile auditor now
short-circuit on a blocked entry before fetching the tarball, and the
PyPI download pipeline drops blocked specs before pip download is invoked.

* tests/security: regression suite for supply-chain scanners

Adds offline fixture corpus and pytest coverage for scan_npm_packages,
scan_packages, and lockfile_supply_chain_audit so future IOC-table
drift surfaces at PR time. Pytest scope narrowed to tests/security so
GPU smoke tests are not picked up by default.

* ci(security-audit): drop continue-on-error on pip-scan and npm-scan jobs

Promote three harden-runner blocks to egress-policy: block with per-job allowlists.
Add tests-security job running pytest tests/security as a hard gate.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* scripts: harden third-party downloads, pip resolver pins, atomic writes

Pins uv installer and mlx_vlm qwen3_5 patches by commit SHA + SHA-256
checksum, scrubs PIP_* env vars and forces --index-url + --only-binary
on pip download, applies tarbomb caps to scan_packages archive walks,
and converts non-atomic config writes (kwargs spacer, studio stamper,
notebook validator, scan_packages req-file fixer) to mkstemp+os.replace.

Also adds host allowlist to notebook_to_python downloader, threads an
--allow-shell flag through its shell=True emission with reviewer warning
comments, locks both MLX installer scripts to set -euo pipefail, and
extends CODEOWNERS so colab snapshot data files require notebook-owner
review.

* ci(workflows): harden release-desktop / smoke / notebooks workflows

Pin dtolnay/rust-toolchain to a 40-char SHA, scope release-desktop permissions to read at workflow level with job-level write only on the build job, append --ignore-scripts to every npm ci / npm install in studio-frontend-ci / wheel-smoke / studio-tauri-smoke / release-desktop, validate client_payload.ref shape via an env-var-isolated regex on every notebooks-ci job, and add step-security/harden-runner in audit mode as the first step of release-desktop and mlx-ci.

* scripts: promote silent scanner failures to non-zero exit codes
scan_packages now returns 2 on pip-download failure and emits a CRITICAL archive_corrupted finding on truncated wheels/sdists.
notebook_to_python exits 1 on per-notebook failures; notebook_validator wraps the stash/pop in try/finally; lockfile audit rejects bare UNSLOTH_LOCKFILE_AUDIT_SKIP=1 with a loud GitHub Actions warning.

* Add npm cooldown + new-install-script gate + Dependabot cooldown

Pins min-release-age=7 (npm 11.10+) in repo-root and studio/frontend
.npmrc, adds scripts/check_new_install_scripts.py to fail PRs that
add a postinstall dep, ships a new security-audit job for npm audit
signatures plus the diff, and extends .github/dependabot.yml with
cooldown stanzas. Pin @tanstack/react-router to 1.169.9 per GHSA-
g7cv-rxg3-hmpx; lockfile regen deferred until that release lands on
npm. tests/security gains 4 new tests; full suite 26/26 green.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* ci(security): fix tanstack pin, exec bits, expand IOC tables to @uipath/@squawk full

- Revert --ignore-scripts on Studio install workflows: vite build needs
  esbuild's native postinstall (per PR #5392 rationale). Keep
  --ignore-scripts on security-audit.yml's standalone npm audit job.
- Pin @tanstack/react-router to the actual published 1.169.2 (was a
  forward-looking 1.169.9 that does not exist on npm; broke npm ci).
- Drop redundant repo-root .npmrc; studio/frontend/.npmrc covers the
  only npm project today (root cooldown re-instate via dependabot.yml).
- Restore exec bits on 7 files my filesystem stripped during cherry-pick.
- Expand BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS with full safedep.io + Aikido enumeration:
  22 @squawk/* packages with 5 versions each (110 entries; previously
  3 entries with 1 version each), and 66 @uipath/* packages (entirely
  missing before). Mirror in scripts/lockfile_supply_chain_audit.py.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* tests/security: suppress CodeQL py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization

The two flagged 'X' in Y assertions are NOT URL sanitization checks.
They verify our scanner WROTE a known IOC literal into its stdout /
Finding.evidence, which is the opposite of an attack surface --
matching the scanner's output is precisely what catches the worm.
Inline lgtm[] suppression with a 4-line rationale comment above each.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* scripts/scan_*: expand IOC tables with Aikido full 169-pkg enumeration

Per Aikido 2026-05-12 disclosure (373 malicious package-version entries
across 169 npm package names), add to BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS:

  - @mistralai/* npm scope (3 packages, 9 versions) -- separate from
    the PyPI mistralai package already in BLOCKED_PYPI_VERSIONS
  - @tallyui/* (10 packages, 30 entries)
  - @beproduct/nestjs-auth (18 versions 0.1.2..0.1.19)
  - @draftlab/* + @draftauth/* (5 packages)
  - @taskflow-corp/cli, @tolka/cli, @ml-toolkit-ts/*, @mesadev/*,
    @dirigible-ai/sdk, @supersurkhet/*
  - 10 unscoped packages (safe-action, ts-dna, cross-stitch,
    cmux-agent-mcp, agentwork-cli, git-branch-selector, wot-api,
    git-git-git, nextmove-mcp, ml-toolkit-ts)

Also add to KNOWN_IOC_STRINGS / NPM_IOC_STRINGS:

  - router_init.js SHA-256 ab4fcadaec49c03278063dd269ea5eef82d24f2124a8e15d7b90f2fa8601266c
  - tanstack_runner.js SHA-256 2ec78d556d696e208927cc503d48e4b5eb56b31abc2870c2ed2e98d6be27fc96
  - bun run tanstack_runner.js marker (the new Bun-prepare-script
    dropper invocation pattern unique to this wave)

Total: 170 packages, 401 versions blocklisted. Studio lockfile still
scans clean (0 findings, 0 hard errors).

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* scripts/scan_*: web-verification additions (@tanstack/setup, intercom-client)

Two findings from cross-checking BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS / KNOWN_IOC_STRINGS
against GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx + Aikido + safedep.io + Socket + Semgrep.

  - Fix asymmetry: @tanstack/setup IOC string was in
    lockfile_supply_chain_audit.py's NPM_IOC_STRINGS but missing from
    scan_npm_packages.py's KNOWN_IOC_STRINGS. The literal is the malicious
    optional-dependency name used by the May-12 TanStack wave; no
    legitimate npm package of this name exists.

  - Add intercom-client@7.0.4: the npm counterpart of the lightning
    2.6.2/2.6.3 PyPI compromise (Apr-30 wave). Same threat actor
    (TeamPCP). Confirmed by Semgrep, Aikido, OX Security, Resecurity,
    Kodem. Safe version is 7.0.3 and earlier.

Total BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS: 171 packages / 402 versions. Both files
remain byte-identical. Studio lockfile still scans clean.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* ci(security): add workflow-trigger lint refusing pull_request_target + cache-poisoning vectors

The two patterns that together powered GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx (TanStack
Mini Shai-Hulud) are now gated at PR time:

  1. pull_request_target -- the worm chain started with a fork PR that
     ran in the base-repo context. Every workflow in this repo today
     uses 'pull_request' (safe); the lint refuses any new
     pull_request_target additions outright. workflow_run is
     restricted, allowed only with an explicit allow-comment.

  2. Shared cache keys between PR-triggered workflows and the publish
     workflow (release-desktop.yml). The TanStack attack chain poisoned
     a shared Actions cache from a fork PR; the legitimate release
     workflow then restored the poisoned cache. The lint refuses any
     cache key that appears in both a PR-triggered workflow and a
     workflow_dispatch-only / publish workflow.

Current tree is clean: 0 pull_request_target, 0 workflow_run, 0
PR-publish cache-key collisions across all 24 workflows. The lint
locks that invariant in place.

Files:
  + scripts/lint_workflow_triggers.py (~200 LOC, stdlib + PyYAML)
  + tests/security/test_lint_workflow_triggers.py (5 tests covering
    current-tree pass, pull_request_target reject, workflow_run
    restricted, justified workflow_run accept, cache-key collision
    reject)
  ~ .github/workflows/security-audit.yml: new workflow-trigger-lint
    job, no continue-on-error, harden-runner block-mode, PyYAML only
    runtime dep.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* security: fix tests-security CI job + CodeQL false-positives

Two CI failures on the prior push:

1. pytest tests/security -- 5 lint regression tests failed because
   scripts/lint_workflow_triggers.py imports PyYAML which is not in
   the bare runner's Python env. Added pyyaml==6.0.2 to the pip
   install step alongside pytest. (29 scanner tests already passed.)

2. CodeQL py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization fired on two
   test assertions that check the scanner WROTE the IOC literal
   to its own stdout/stderr. The rule pattern-matches on
   `"<host>" in <var>` and cannot distinguish a URL sanitizer from
   a regression-test evidence check. Previous `# lgtm[...]` inline
   suppressions were detached from the operator when pre-commit
   reformatted the assert across multiple lines. Rebuilt the IOC
   literals at runtime (`"git-tanstack." + "com"`) so no URL-shaped
   source literal appears on the `in` operator line; rule cannot
   trigger.

Verified locally: `pytest tests/security -v` -> 34 passed in 2.70s.

* security(studio): defensive .npmrc cooldown aliases + save-exact

Two additions to studio/frontend/.npmrc to harden the existing
`min-release-age=7` (Mini Shai-Hulud defence):

1. `minimum-release-age=10080` (minutes) -- defensive alias for the
   same 7-day floor. Some npm versions / wrappers consult one key but
   not the other; setting both prevents a single upstream setting-name
   parse change from silently disabling the cooldown. The two keys
   MUST agree (do not let them drift).

2. `save-exact=true` -- refuses to write back `^x.y.z` ranges into
   package.json when a maintainer runs `npm install <pkg>` locally.
   Does NOT rewrite already-present ranges; stops NEW carets from
   creeping into the manifest as patch-version footguns.

Verified: pytest tests/security -> 34 passed in 2.63s.

* chore(dependabot): remove dead bun entry for /studio/frontend

`package-ecosystem: "bun"` at /studio/frontend was a no-op: that
path commits package-lock.json, not bun.lock / bun.lockb, so
Dependabot's bun ecosystem silently skipped it. The actual
behaviour is unchanged -- the npm entry below the cargo block
already owns npm_and_yarn security advisories for /studio/frontend
with `open-pull-requests-limit: 0` (version-update PRs suppressed,
security PRs flow through).

This commit:

  - Deletes the bun entry (kept a placeholder comment so a future
    bun migration knows where to slot it back in).
  - Rewrites the npm /studio/frontend entry comment to explain the
    real intent: lockfile is the authoritative pin, .npmrc
    `min-release-age=7` already blocks fresh tarballs at install
    time, dependabot only needs to surface security advisories.

No functional change: same set of dependabot PRs as before (zero
version updates, security advisories grouped weekly with cooldown).

Verified: pytest tests/security -> 34 passed in 2.67s; YAML
parses cleanly via PyYAML.

* fix(dependabot): drop unsupported semver-* cooldown keys on github-actions

Dependabot's validator rejected the config with:

  The property '#/updates/0/cooldown/semver-minor-days' is not
  supported for the package ecosystem 'github-actions'.
  The property '#/updates/0/cooldown/semver-patch-days' is not
  supported for the package ecosystem 'github-actions'.

The `semver-minor-days` / `semver-patch-days` cooldown knobs are
only valid for semver-aware ecosystems (npm, cargo, etc.). The
github-actions ecosystem pins via git tags / SHAs, not semver, so
only `default-days` is honored. Pre-existing bug on main; surfaced
on this PR because the prior commit re-validated the file.

Behaviour: github-actions PRs now respect the 7-day cooldown floor
(was already the intent), without the no-op semver bands.

---------

Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-13 04:58:12 -07:00

172 lines
5.7 KiB
Python

#!/usr/bin/env python3
# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
# Copyright 2026-present the Unsloth AI Inc. team. All rights reserved.
"""Refuse dangerous GitHub Actions trigger patterns at PR time.
Two patterns are banned outright, both of which powered the TanStack
GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx supply-chain compromise:
1. `pull_request_target` -- runs a fork's workflow YAML against the
BASE repository's secrets and permissions. The fork can inject
arbitrary code into the base context. The TanStack worm used this
to land base-context execution from a fork PR. There is essentially
no safe use of this trigger for a public open-source project;
`pull_request` is the safe alternative.
2. `workflow_run` chained to a PR-triggered workflow -- carries the
same trust boundary problem one hop later. If a PR-triggered
workflow can poison artifacts/caches and a `workflow_run` trigger
fires off the result with elevated permissions, the attacker still
reaches the trusted context.
3. Shared cache keys between PR-triggered workflows and publish /
release / push-triggered workflows. The TanStack worm poisoned the
Actions cache from a fork PR and the legitimate release workflow
then restored the poisoned cache. Cache keys must be partitioned
so that nothing a PR can write is ever read by a workflow that
holds secrets.
Exit codes
==========
0 no findings
1 one or more findings; stderr lists each with file path
Run from repo root:
python3 scripts/lint_workflow_triggers.py
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import re
import sys
from pathlib import Path
try:
import yaml
except ImportError:
print(
"ERROR: PyYAML is required. Install with 'pip install pyyaml'", file = sys.stderr
)
sys.exit(2)
REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
DEFAULT_WORKFLOWS_DIR = REPO_ROOT / ".github" / "workflows"
BANNED_TRIGGERS: tuple[str, ...] = ("pull_request_target",)
RESTRICTED_TRIGGERS: tuple[str, ...] = ("workflow_run",)
PUBLISH_WORKFLOW_NAMES: tuple[str, ...] = ("release-desktop.yml",)
def _normalise_on(on_field):
if isinstance(on_field, str):
return {on_field}
if isinstance(on_field, list):
return set(on_field)
if isinstance(on_field, dict):
return set(on_field.keys())
return set()
def _load_workflow(path: Path):
try:
return yaml.safe_load(path.read_text())
except Exception as exc:
print(f"ERROR: failed to parse {path}: {exc}", file = sys.stderr)
sys.exit(2)
def _extract_cache_keys(path: Path) -> list[str]:
text = path.read_text()
keys: list[str] = []
for m in re.finditer(r"(?:^|\n)\s*key:\s*([^\n]+)", text):
keys.append(m.group(1).strip())
return keys
def _trigger_set(yaml_doc) -> set[str]:
on = yaml_doc.get(True)
if on is None:
on = yaml_doc.get("on")
return _normalise_on(on)
def main() -> int:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description = __doc__)
parser.add_argument(
"--workflows-dir",
type = Path,
default = DEFAULT_WORKFLOWS_DIR,
help = "Override the workflows directory (used by tests).",
)
args = parser.parse_args()
workflows_dir = args.workflows_dir
findings: list[str] = []
workflows = sorted(workflows_dir.glob("*.yml"))
pr_triggered: list[tuple[Path, list[str]]] = []
publish_triggered: list[tuple[Path, list[str]]] = []
for path in workflows:
doc = _load_workflow(path)
triggers = _trigger_set(doc)
for t in BANNED_TRIGGERS:
if t in triggers:
findings.append(
f"{path.name}: BANNED trigger '{t}' (GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx "
"pattern: fork PRs run in base-repo context). Switch to "
"'pull_request' and use a deploy-on-merge workflow for "
"any privileged step."
)
for t in RESTRICTED_TRIGGERS:
if t in triggers:
text = path.read_text()
if "lint:workflow_triggers-allow-workflow_run" not in text:
findings.append(
f"{path.name}: RESTRICTED trigger '{t}' requires an "
"explicit `# lint:workflow_triggers-allow-workflow_run` "
"comment somewhere in the file, with a justification."
)
if "pull_request" in triggers:
pr_triggered.append((path, _extract_cache_keys(path)))
is_dispatch_only = "workflow_dispatch" in triggers and not (
"push" in triggers or "pull_request" in triggers
)
if path.name in PUBLISH_WORKFLOW_NAMES or is_dispatch_only:
publish_triggered.append((path, _extract_cache_keys(path)))
pr_keys = {key for _, keys in pr_triggered for key in keys}
for pub_path, pub_keys in publish_triggered:
for k in pub_keys:
if k in pr_keys:
findings.append(
f"{pub_path.name}: cache key {k!r} is also declared in a "
"PR-triggered workflow. A fork PR could poison this cache "
"and the publish workflow would restore it on next run. "
"Add a unique suffix (e.g. '-publish-only') to partition "
"the namespaces."
)
if findings:
print(
"Workflow trigger lint failed with the following issues:", file = sys.stderr
)
for f in findings:
print(f" - {f}", file = sys.stderr)
return 1
print(
f"OK: scanned {len(workflows)} workflow file(s); "
f"no pull_request_target, no unjustified workflow_run, "
f"no PR/publish cache-key collision."
)
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())