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Code Issues Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity Actions 25
unsloth/scripts/scan_packages.py
Daniel Han 71207827ca
Keep the JS-bundle scan check size-agnostic so the baseline does not drift (#6770) 
check_js_file put the bundle's KB size inside the finding's check label, which is
part of the baseline match key (package, file, check). When tensorboard's
projector_binary.js grew from 1918 KB to 1933 KB, the reviewed baseline entry stopped
matching and the benign HIGH resurfaced, red-failing the studio and extras
scan-packages shards. Move the size into the evidence field (shown for review, not
matched) and keep the check label constant, then update the one tensorboard baseline
entry to the size-agnostic label. The finding is suppressed again and will not
re-break when the bundle grows by a few KB. Scanner self-tests pass unchanged.

Co-authored-by: danielhanchen <michaelhan2050@gmail.com>
2026-06-30 22:24:46 -07:00

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#!/usr/bin/env python3
# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
# Copyright 2026-present the Unsloth AI Inc. team. All rights reserved.
#
# .github/workflows/security-audit.yml's pip-scan-packages job depends
# on this file existing at scripts/scan_packages.py.
"""
scan_packages.py -- Standalone pre-install package scanner.
Downloads PyPI packages WITHOUT installing them and inspects archive
contents for malicious patterns: weaponized .pth files, credential
stealers, obfuscated payloads, install-time droppers.
Motivated by the litellm 1.82.7/1.82.8 supply chain attack (March 2026).
Single file, stdlib only, Python 3.10+.
Examples:
# Scan specific packages
python scan_packages.py requests==2.32.5
python scan_packages.py fastapi uvicorn pydantic
# Scan requirements files
python scan_packages.py -r requirements.txt
python scan_packages.py -r base.txt -r extras.txt
# Auto-discover requirements files in a project
python scan_packages.py -d ./my-project/
# Scan with full transitive dependency tree
python scan_packages.py --with-deps unsloth unsloth-zoo
# Scan + auto-fix CRITICAL findings in requirements files
python scan_packages.py --fix -r requirements.txt
python scan_packages.py --fix --max-search 20 -r requirements.txt
# Triage to a baseline once, then gate on anything NEW
python scan_packages.py -r requirements.txt --write-baseline scripts/scan_packages_baseline.json
python scan_packages.py -r requirements.txt # auto-loads the baseline, exits 0 if only baselined findings remain
False positives:
.py files are scanned code-only: comments and bare docstrings/doctests are
blanked before pattern matching (line numbers preserved), so prose, usage
examples and `>>>` doctests cannot trip a finding. Residual findings that
are genuine library behavior (a HTTP client reading HF_TOKEN, a vendored
test fixture) are suppressed via a reviewed baseline allowlist, matched on
(package, basename(file), check). A NEW kind of finding in an already-listed
file is a different check and still fails. This mirrors the Hugging Face Hub
approach (ClamAV/picklescan: low-FP, signature/structural, surface status).
Exit codes:
0 -- no non-baselined CRITICAL or HIGH findings (or --write-baseline)
1 -- non-baselined CRITICAL or HIGH findings detected
2 -- no packages specified, or scan incomplete (pip download failure)
"""
import argparse
import atexit
import io
import json
import os
import re
import shutil
import subprocess
import sys
import tarfile
import tempfile
import tokenize
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
import zipfile
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from pathlib import Path
# Severity
CRITICAL = "CRITICAL"
HIGH = "HIGH"
MEDIUM = "MEDIUM"
SEVERITY_ORDER = {CRITICAL: 0, HIGH: 1, MEDIUM: 2}
# Hard pin-blocks for confirmed malicious PyPI versions (Socket.dev 2026-05-12
# Mini Shai-Hulud wave; earlier Semgrep/Endor reports for `lightning`).
BLOCKED_PYPI_VERSIONS: dict[str, set[str]] = {
"guardrails-ai": {"0.10.1"},
"mistralai": {"2.4.6"},
"lightning": {"2.6.2", "2.6.3"},
}
# Pattern definitions
# Subprocess / OS exec patterns
RE_SUBPROCESS = re.compile(
r"\bsubprocess\s*\.\s*(Popen|call|run|check_call|check_output)\b"
r"|\bos\s*\.\s*(system|popen|exec[lv]p?e?)\b",
)
# Encoding / obfuscation
RE_BASE64 = re.compile(
r"\bbase64\s*\.\s*(b64decode|decodebytes|b32decode|b16decode)\b|\bcodecs\s*\.\s*decode\b",
)
# exec / eval
RE_EXEC_EVAL = re.compile(r"\b(exec|eval)\s*\(")
# Network APIs (excludes urllib.parse which is pure string manipulation)
RE_NETWORK = re.compile(
r"\burllib\.request\b"
r"|\burlopen\s*\("
r"|\brequests\s*\.\s*(get|post|put|patch|delete|head|Session)\b"
r"|\bhttpx\s*\.\s*(get|post|put|patch|delete|Client|AsyncClient)\b"
r"|\bsocket\s*\.\s*(socket|create_connection)\b"
r"|\bhttp\.client\b"
r"|\bhttp\.server\b",
)
# Large base64 blob (>200 chars of contiguous base64 alphabet)
RE_LARGE_BLOB = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{200,}")
# Credential path access (requires file-access context, not just string mentions)
RE_CRED_ACCESS = re.compile(
r"(?:open|Path|read_text|read_bytes)\s*\([^)]*?"
r"(?:\.ssh[/\\]|\.aws[/\\]|\.kube[/\\]|\.gnupg[/\\]|\.docker[/\\]"
r"|\.azure[/\\]|\.gcp[/\\]"
r"|credentials\.json|\.git-credentials|\.npmrc|\.pypirc|wallet\.dat"
r"|/etc/shadow|/etc/passwd"
r"|id_rsa|id_ed25519|id_ecdsa"
r"|kubeconfig|service-account-token)"
r"|os\.path\.(?:join|expanduser)\([^)]*?"
r"(?:\.ssh|\.aws|\.kube|\.gnupg|\.docker|\.azure|\.gcp|credentials)"
r"|(?:open|Path)\(\s*['\"]\.env['\"]\s*[,)]",
re.DOTALL,
)
# Chained / advanced obfuscation (marshal, compile, zlib, nested decode)
RE_OBFUSCATION = re.compile(
r"\bmarshal\s*\.\s*(loads|load)\b"
r"|\bcompile\s*\([^)]*['\"]exec['\"]\s*\)"
r"|\bzlib\s*\.\s*decompress\b"
r"|\blzma\s*\.\s*decompress\b"
r"|\bbz2\s*\.\s*decompress\b"
r"|\bbytearray\s*\(\s*\[.*?\]\s*\)" # bytearray([104,101,...])
r"|\bchr\s*\(\s*\d+\s*\).*chr\s*\(\s*\d+\s*\)" # chr() obfuscation chains
r"|\b__import__\s*\(" # dynamic import
r"|\bgetattr\s*\(\s*__builtins__" # getattr(__builtins__, ...)
r"|\brotate\s*=.*\blambda\b.*\bchr\b" # rotation ciphers
r"|\b(?:b64decode|decodebytes)\s*\(.*(?:b64decode|decodebytes)\s*\(", # double base64
re.DOTALL,
)
# Embedded cryptographic keys (PEM-encoded)
RE_EMBEDDED_KEYS = re.compile(
r"-----BEGIN\s+(?:RSA\s+)?(?:PUBLIC|PRIVATE|ENCRYPTED|EC|DSA|OPENSSH)\s+KEY-----"
r"|\bRSA\s+PUBLIC\s+KEY\b.*[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{64,}"
r"|\bMII[A-Za-z0-9+/]{20,}", # DER-encoded key prefix (base64)
re.DOTALL,
)
# Cloud metadata / IMDS endpoints
RE_CLOUD_METADATA = re.compile(
r"169\.254\.169\.254" # AWS/Azure/GCP IMDS
r"|metadata\.google\.internal" # GCP metadata
r"|169\.254\.170\.2" # AWS ECS task metadata
r"|100\.100\.100\.200" # Alibaba Cloud metadata
r"|/latest/meta-data" # AWS IMDS path
r"|/metadata/instance" # GCP metadata path
r"|/metadata/identity" # Azure managed identity
r"|\bIMDSv[12]\b",
)
# Persistence mechanisms (systemd, cron, launchd, registry, startup dirs)
RE_PERSISTENCE = re.compile(
r"/etc/systemd/"
r"|systemctl\s+(enable|start|daemon-reload)"
r"|\.service\b.*\[Service\]" # systemd unit content
r"|/etc/cron"
r"|crontab\s"
r"|/etc/init\.d/"
r"|/Library/LaunchDaemons"
r"|/Library/LaunchAgents"
r"|~/\.config/autostart"
r"|~/.local/share/systemd"
r"|~/\.config/systemd/user/" # user-level systemd
r"|HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE.*\\\\Run" # Windows registry autorun
r"|HKEY_CURRENT_USER.*\\\\Run"
r"|\\\\Start Menu\\\\Programs\\\\Startup"
r"|schtasks\s", # Windows scheduled tasks
re.IGNORECASE,
)
# Container / orchestration abuse
RE_CONTAINER_ABUSE = re.compile(
r"/var/run/docker\.sock"
r"|\bdocker\s+(run|exec|cp|build)\b"
r"|\bkubectl\s+(apply|create|exec|run|cp)\b"
r"|\bkubernetes\.client\b"
r"|\bfrom_incluster_config\b"
r"|\blist_namespaced_secret\b"
r"|\bcreate_namespaced_pod\b"
r"|\bcreate_namespaced_daemon_set\b"
r"|\bcreate_namespaced_secret\b"
r"|\bkube-system\b"
r"|\bhostPID\s*:\s*true"
r"|\bprivileged\s*:\s*true"
r"|\bhostNetwork\s*:\s*true"
r"|\bhostPath\b.*\bpath\s*:\s*/", # k8s hostPath mounts
re.IGNORECASE,
)
# Environment variable harvesting (bulk access or known secret vars)
RE_ENV_HARVEST = re.compile(
r"\bos\.environ\s*\.\s*copy\s*\(" # full env copy
r"|\bdict\s*\(\s*os\.environ\s*\)"
r"|\bjson\.dumps\s*\(\s*(?:dict\s*\(\s*)?os\.environ"
r"|\bfor\s+\w+\s*,\s*\w+\s+in\s+os\.environ\.items\(\)" # iterating all env vars
r"|\bos\.environ\b.*(?:SECRET|TOKEN|KEY|PASSWORD|CREDENTIAL|API_KEY|PRIVATE)"
r"|\b(?:SECRET|TOKEN|PASSWORD|API_KEY|PRIVATE_KEY)\b.*os\.environ",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
# Archive staging / exfiltration prep (create archive + network send)
RE_ARCHIVE_STAGING = re.compile(
r"\btarfile\s*\.\s*open\s*\("
r"|\bzipfile\s*\.\s*ZipFile\s*\([^)]*['\"]w['\"]\s*\)"
r"|\bshutil\s*\.\s*make_archive\b"
r"|\b\.add\s*\([^)]*(?:\.ssh|\.aws|\.env|\.kube|credentials|\.gnupg|\.docker)"
r"|\b\.write\s*\([^)]*(?:\.ssh|\.aws|\.env|\.kube|credentials|\.gnupg|\.docker)",
re.DOTALL,
)
# Anti-analysis / sandbox evasion / debugger detection
# NB: deliberately does NOT include a bare ``platform.system() ... Linux/Windows
# /Darwin`` branch. Under re.DOTALL that matched across the whole file -- any
# cross-platform library (typer, packaging, pandas, pymupdf, ...) trips it -- so
# it had ~zero precision and only generated false positives. OS detection alone
# is not an anti-analysis signal; the debugger/VM/long-sleep signals below are.
RE_ANTI_ANALYSIS = re.compile(
r"\bptrace\b"
r"|\bsys\s*\.\s*gettrace\s*\("
r"|\bsys\s*\.\s*settrace\b"
r"|\bTracerPid\b"
# /proc/self/status is read to scrape TracerPid for anti-debug. A leading
# \b here is unsatisfiable (\b never holds between a non-word boundary and
# "/"), so the old pattern was dead; a lookbehind that only forbids a
# preceding word char or path separator lets `open("/proc/self/status")`
# and `cat /proc/self/status` match while avoiding mid-path partials.
r"|(?<![\w/])/proc/self/status\b"
r"|\bIsDebuggerPresent\b"
r"|\bvirtualbox\b.*\bhardware\b"
r"|\bvmware\b.*\bdetect\b"
r"|\btime\.sleep\s*\(\s*(?:[3-9]\d{2,}|[1-9]\d{3,})\s*\)", # long sleep (anti-sandbox)
re.IGNORECASE | re.DOTALL,
)
# DNS exfiltration / tunneling
RE_DNS_EXFIL = re.compile(
r"\bdns\.resolver\b"
r"|\bsocket\.getaddrinfo\s*\([^)]*\+[^)]*\)" # dynamic hostname construction
r"|\bdnspython\b"
r"|\bTXT\b.*\bresolver\b"
r"|\bresolver\b.*\bTXT\b"
r"|\bnslookup\b"
r"|\bdig\s+",
)
# File system enumeration / bulk file theft
RE_FS_ENUM = re.compile(
r"\bos\.walk\s*\(\s*['\"](?:/|~|/home|/root|/Users|C:\\\\)"
r"|\bglob\s*\.\s*glob\s*\([^)]*(?:\*\*|\*\.pem|\*\.key|\*\.cer|\*\.pfx|\*\.p12)"
r"|\bos\.listdir\s*\(\s*['\"](?:/home|/root|/Users|/etc)"
r"|\bPath\s*\(\s*['\"]~['\"]\s*\)\s*\.\s*glob\b"
r"|\bhistory\b.*\bread\b" # reading shell history
r"|\b\.bash_history\b"
r"|\b\.zsh_history\b"
r"|/etc/shadow"
r"|/etc/passwd",
re.DOTALL,
)
# Reverse shell / bind shell patterns
RE_REVERSE_SHELL = re.compile(
r"\bsocket\b.*\bconnect\b.*\bsubprocess\b"
r"|\bsocket\b.*\bconnect\b.*\b(?:sh|bash|cmd)\b"
r"|\b/bin/(?:sh|bash)\b.*\bsocket\b"
r"|\bpty\s*\.\s*spawn\b"
r"|\bos\s*\.\s*dup2\s*\("
r"|\bwebbrowser\s*\.\s*open\b.*\bdata:\b", # data: URI abuse
re.DOTALL,
)
# Process injection / code loading from remote
RE_REMOTE_CODE = re.compile(
r"\bexec\s*\(\s*(?:urllib|requests|httpx|urlopen)" # exec(requests.get(...))
r"|\bexec\s*\([^)]*\.(?:text|content|read)\s*\("
r"|\beval\s*\([^)]*\.(?:text|content|read)\s*\("
r"|\bimportlib\s*\.\s*import_module\s*\([^)]*\+" # dynamic import with concatenation
r"|\b__import__\s*\([^)]*\+", # __import__ with concatenation
re.DOTALL,
)
# Crypto wallet / cryptocurrency theft
RE_CRYPTO_THEFT = re.compile(
r"\bwallet\.dat\b"
r"|\b\.bitcoin[/\\]"
r"|\b\.ethereum[/\\]"
r"|\b\.solana[/\\]"
r"|\b\.monero[/\\]"
r"|\b\.litecoin[/\\]"
r"|\b\.config/solana[/\\]"
r"|\bkeystore[/\\]UTC--"
r"|\bseed\s*phrase\b"
r"|\bmnemonic\b.*\b(?:word|phrase|recover|restore)\b"
r"|\b(?:xprv|xpub|bc1|0x[a-fA-F0-9]{40})\b",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
# Import line in .pth (Python site.py only exec()s lines starting with "import")
RE_PTH_IMPORT = re.compile(r"^\s*import\s+", re.MULTILINE)
# openssl CLI invocations via subprocess (encrypted exfiltration)
RE_OPENSSL_CLI = re.compile(r"\bopenssl\s+(enc|rand|rsautl|pkeyutl|genrsa|dgst|s_client)\b")
# Write to /tmp then execute (staged dropper)
RE_TEMP_EXEC = re.compile(
r"/tmp/\S+.*(?:subprocess|os\.system|os\.popen|Popen|chmod.*\+x)",
re.DOTALL,
)
# C2 polling / beaconing loop
RE_C2_POLLING = re.compile(
r"while\s+True.*(?:time\.sleep|sleep)\s*\(.*(?:urlopen|requests\.|httpx\.)",
re.DOTALL,
)
# Developer-tool persistence hooks. Lightning 2.6.x planted SessionStart hooks
# into Claude Code / VS Code / Cursor so the payload re-attached on editor open.
RE_DEV_TOOL_HIJACK = re.compile(
r"\.claude/settings\.json"
r"|\.cursor/.*hooks"
r"|\.vscode/(?:tasks|settings|launch)\.json"
r"|SessionStart|folderOpen|onCommand:.*runTask"
r"|/etc/profile\.d/"
r"|\b\.bashrc\b|\b\.zshrc\b|\b\.profile\b"
r"|\bautomator\b.*\.workflow\b",
)
# Hard-coded credential / API-token regexes embedded in source. Packages that
# ship regexes for OTHER people's secrets are nearly always stealers.
RE_TOKEN_REGEX = re.compile(
r"\bgh[psoru]_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}" # GitHub PAT/OAuth/etc.
r"|\bgithub_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}"
r"|\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}" # npm token
r"|\bsk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}" # OpenAI / Anthropic
r"|\bxox[bpaesr]-" # Slack
r"|\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{20,}" # Google API key
r"|\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}" # AWS access key id
r"|\bASIA[0-9A-Z]{16}" # AWS STS
r"|\bgithub.com/login/oauth/access_token"
r"|\bglpat-[0-9A-Za-z_-]{20,}", # GitLab PAT
)
# Mini Shai-Hulud May-12 2026 wave indicators. `transformers.pyz` dropper name
# is high-confidence; the host + slogans are CRITICAL.
RE_MAY12_IOC = re.compile(
r"(git-tanstack\.com|/tmp/transformers\.pyz|transformers\.pyz"
r"|With Love TeamPCP|We've been online over 2 hours)",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
# JavaScript-side obfuscation. A bundle full of `_0x1f2e3d` hex-var identifiers
# is a near-universal tell for a malicious npm payload, rare in legit wheels.
RE_JS_OBFUSCATION = re.compile(
r"_0x[a-f0-9]{4,6}\s*=\s*function"
r"|var\s+_0x[a-f0-9]{4,6}\b"
r"|(?:\\x[0-9a-f]{2}){10,}" # \x-escape strings
r"|String\.fromCharCode\s*\(\s*\d+\s*(?:,\s*\d+\s*){10,}\)",
)
# Web3 / wallet-hijack pattern. The Qix npm phish overrode fetch/XMLHttpRequest
# and swapped recipient addresses via a `window.ethereum` listener.
RE_WEB3_HIJACK = re.compile(
r"\bwindow\.ethereum\b"
r"|\bweb3\.eth\.\w+\s*\("
r"|XMLHttpRequest\.prototype\.(?:open|send)\s*="
r"|(?:^|\s)fetch\s*=\s*\(?\s*async"
r"|TronWeb|solanaWeb3",
)
# Self-propagating worms (Shai-Hulud, ForceMemo) plant their own GitHub workflow
# in every repo they reach and use trufflehog/gitleaks for credential discovery.
# Any of these strings in a package payload is strong repo-takeover evidence.
RE_WORKFLOW_INJECT = re.compile(
r"\.github/workflows/[^\"\']*\.ya?ml"
r"|\btrufflehog\b|\bgitleaks\b"
r"|/user/repos\?affiliation=.*owner.*collaborator"
r"|\bshai-hulud\b|EveryBoiWeBuildIsAWormyBoi"
r"|\bgit\s+push\s+--force\b.*--no-verify",
re.IGNORECASE | re.DOTALL,
)
# install.sh / postinstall scripts piping remote code into a shell.
# `curl ... | sh` is the canonical npm postinstall dropper.
RE_SHELL_DROPPER = re.compile(
r"\bcurl\b[^\n|]*\|\s*(?:sh|bash|zsh)\b"
r"|\bwget\b[^\n|]*-O-\s*\|\s*(?:sh|bash|zsh)\b"
r"|\bnpx\b\s+-y\s+[^\s]+@latest\s*\|"
r"|\beval\s+\$\(\s*curl\b"
r"|\bbash\s+<\(\s*curl\b",
)
@dataclass
class Finding:
severity: str
package: str
filename: str
check: str
evidence: str = ""
# Checkers
def check_pth_file(content: str, filename: str, package: str) -> list[Finding]:
"""Run all .pth-specific checks.
Executable .pth files run on every Python startup, so any suspicious
pattern in a .pth is treated as CRITICAL.
"""
findings = []
# Only .pth files with import lines are executable
import_lines = [line for line in content.splitlines() if RE_PTH_IMPORT.match(line)]
if not import_lines:
return findings # Pure path entries, inert
# All patterns are CRITICAL inside executable .pth files
_pth_checks = [
(RE_SUBPROCESS, ".pth has subprocess/os exec calls"),
(RE_BASE64, ".pth has base64/encoding obfuscation"),
(RE_EXEC_EVAL, ".pth has exec()/eval()"),
(RE_NETWORK, ".pth has network API calls"),
(
RE_OBFUSCATION,
".pth has advanced obfuscation (marshal/compile/zlib/__import__)",
),
(RE_EMBEDDED_KEYS, ".pth has embedded cryptographic key material"),
(RE_CLOUD_METADATA, ".pth accesses cloud metadata / IMDS endpoints"),
(RE_PERSISTENCE, ".pth installs persistence (systemd/cron/launchd/registry)"),
(RE_CONTAINER_ABUSE, ".pth interacts with container/orchestration runtime"),
(RE_ENV_HARVEST, ".pth harvests environment variables / secrets"),
(RE_ARCHIVE_STAGING, ".pth stages archive for exfiltration"),
(RE_ANTI_ANALYSIS, ".pth has anti-analysis / sandbox evasion"),
(RE_DNS_EXFIL, ".pth has DNS exfiltration / tunneling patterns"),
(RE_FS_ENUM, ".pth enumerates filesystem / steals files"),
(RE_REVERSE_SHELL, ".pth has reverse/bind shell patterns"),
(RE_REMOTE_CODE, ".pth loads and executes remote code"),
(RE_CRYPTO_THEFT, ".pth targets cryptocurrency wallets / keys"),
(RE_CRED_ACCESS, ".pth accesses credential files"),
(RE_OPENSSL_CLI, ".pth invokes openssl CLI (encrypted exfil pattern)"),
(RE_TEMP_EXEC, ".pth writes to /tmp and executes (staged dropper)"),
(RE_C2_POLLING, ".pth has C2 polling/beaconing loop"),
]
for pattern, description in _pth_checks:
if pattern.search(content):
findings.append(
Finding(
CRITICAL,
package,
filename,
description,
_extract_evidence(content, pattern),
)
)
# Large base64 blob
if RE_LARGE_BLOB.search(content):
blob = RE_LARGE_BLOB.search(content).group()
findings.append(
Finding(
CRITICAL,
package,
filename,
f".pth has large base64-like blob ({len(blob)} chars)",
blob[:120] + "...",
)
)
# Catch-all: any import line in .pth if nothing else triggered
if not findings and import_lines:
evidence = "\n".join(import_lines[:5])
if len(import_lines) > 5:
evidence += f"\n... ({len(import_lines)} import lines total)"
findings.append(
Finding(
HIGH,
package,
filename,
f".pth has {len(import_lines)} executable import line(s)",
evidence,
)
)
# Unusually large executable .pth (litellm's was 34 KB; legit ones are <100 bytes)
size = len(content)
if size > 500 and import_lines:
findings.append(
Finding(
HIGH,
package,
filename,
f"Unusually large executable .pth ({size} bytes)",
f"{len(import_lines)} import line(s) in {size}-byte .pth file",
)
)
return findings
# A STRING after one of these tokens (and before a NEWLINE) is a bare
# docstring/doctest/prose statement -- the dominant FP source -- so we blank it.
# A string after `=` or `(` is real code and is never blanked.
_LINE_START_TOKENS = frozenset({tokenize.NEWLINE, tokenize.NL, tokenize.INDENT, tokenize.DEDENT})
def _is_fstring(tok_string: str) -> bool:
"""True if a STRING token is an f-string (3.10/3.11 emit one STRING token).
A bare f-string statement evaluates its expressions at import, so unlike an
inert docstring it must never be blanked.
"""
q = min((tok_string.find(c) for c in "'\"" if c in tok_string), default = -1)
return q > 0 and "f" in tok_string[:q].lower()
def _strip_noncode(content: str, blank_comments: bool = True) -> str:
"""Blank comments and bare docstrings so IOC patterns see code only.
Removed regions become spaces (newlines kept) so line numbers stay exact for
_extract_evidence. Fails open on tokenizer errors (the raw text is still
fully scanned, so a real detection is never lost). ``blank_comments=False``
keeps comments (only strings/docstrings blanked) to isolate the span that
exec() could actually run.
"""
try:
toks = list(tokenize.generate_tokens(io.StringIO(content).readline))
except (tokenize.TokenError, IndentationError, SyntaxError, ValueError):
return content
spans: list[tuple[int, int, int, int]] = [] # (srow, scol, erow, ecol)
prev_significant = tokenize.NEWLINE # start-of-file behaves like a new line
n = len(toks)
for i, tok in enumerate(toks):
ttype = tok.type
if ttype == tokenize.COMMENT:
if blank_comments:
spans.append((*tok.start, *tok.end))
continue # transparent; never advances prev_significant
if (
ttype == tokenize.STRING
and prev_significant in _LINE_START_TOKENS
and not _is_fstring(tok.string) # f-strings execute; never blank them
):
# Bare string only if it is the whole statement: next significant
# token must close the logical line.
j = i + 1
while j < n and toks[j].type in (tokenize.COMMENT, tokenize.NL):
j += 1
if j < n and toks[j].type == tokenize.NEWLINE:
spans.append((*tok.start, *tok.end))
prev_significant = ttype
continue
if ttype in (
tokenize.NL,
tokenize.NEWLINE,
tokenize.INDENT,
tokenize.DEDENT,
tokenize.ENCODING,
):
prev_significant = ttype
continue
prev_significant = ttype
if not spans:
return content
buf = content.splitlines(keepends = True)
for srow, scol, erow, ecol in spans:
for row in range(srow, erow + 1):
line = buf[row - 1]
if line.endswith("\n"):
body, nl = line[:-1], "\n"
elif line.endswith("\r"):
body, nl = line[:-1], "\r"
else:
body, nl = line, ""
start = scol if row == srow else 0
end = ecol if row == erow else len(body)
end = min(end, len(body))
if start < end:
body = body[:start] + (" " * (end - start)) + body[end:]
buf[row - 1] = body + nl
return "".join(buf)
# Payload carriers that are suspicious when hidden in a blanked region (a
# docstring/string) of a file that can dynamically execute strings.
_HIDDEN_PAYLOAD_PATTERNS = (
(RE_LARGE_BLOB, "large base64 blob"),
(RE_EMBEDDED_KEYS, "embedded key material"),
(RE_MAY12_IOC, "Shai-Hulud IOC string"),
(RE_OBFUSCATION, "marshal/compile/obfuscation"),
)
def _hidden_payload_findings(
original: str, stripped: str, filename: str, package: str
) -> list[Finding]:
"""Flag payloads that live only in the blanked (docstring/string) region of
a file that contains exec/eval. Such a string is invisible to code-only
scanning yet ``exec(__doc__)`` / ``exec(<str>)`` could still run it."""
if not RE_EXEC_EVAL.search(stripped):
return []
# Only docstrings/strings run via exec(__doc__)/exec(<str>); comments cannot.
# Isolate that span: keep comments as real code, take what string-blanking
# removed (length-preserved, so offsets stay exact for _extract_evidence).
code = _strip_noncode(original, blank_comments = False)
removed = "".join(o if o != s else " " for o, s in zip(original, code))
out = []
def _hidden(pat):
# Carrier present in a blanked region but NOT in real code. A carrier in
# real code is already caught by the normal check, so restricting to
# blanked-only avoids re-flagging legitimate in-code constants.
return bool(pat.search(removed)) and not pat.search(stripped)
for pat, label in _HIDDEN_PAYLOAD_PATTERNS:
if _hidden(pat):
out.append(
Finding(
HIGH,
package,
filename,
"exec/eval with payload hidden in a docstring/string",
f"{label}: {_extract_evidence(removed, pat)}",
)
)
# Fetch-then-run dropper: a network call AND an os/subprocess exec that both
# live in the blanked region. Search the removed span directly (not "absent
# from real code") so a benign visible network/subprocess call cannot mask
# the docstring payload.
if RE_NETWORK.search(removed) and RE_SUBPROCESS.search(removed):
out.append(
Finding(
HIGH,
package,
filename,
"exec/eval with hidden network+exec payload",
f"network+exec: {_extract_evidence(removed, RE_SUBPROCESS)}",
)
)
return out
def check_py_file(content: str, filename: str, package: str) -> list[Finding]:
"""Run all .py-specific checks."""
# Code-only scanning: strip comments/docstrings up front so prose, doctests
# and usage examples cannot manufacture false positives. Aligns with the
# Hugging Face Hub model (ClamAV/picklescan: low-FP, signature/structural).
original = content
content = _strip_noncode(content)
findings = _hidden_payload_findings(original, content, filename, package)
basename = os.path.basename(filename)
is_setup = basename in ("setup.py", "setup.cfg")
is_init = basename == "__init__.py"
# Pre-compute pattern matches
has_network = bool(RE_NETWORK.search(content))
has_subprocess = bool(RE_SUBPROCESS.search(content))
has_base64 = bool(RE_BASE64.search(content))
has_exec_eval = bool(RE_EXEC_EVAL.search(content))
has_creds = bool(RE_CRED_ACCESS.search(content))
has_blob = bool(RE_LARGE_BLOB.search(content))
has_obfuscation = bool(RE_OBFUSCATION.search(content))
has_keys = bool(RE_EMBEDDED_KEYS.search(content))
has_cloud_meta = bool(RE_CLOUD_METADATA.search(content))
has_persistence = bool(RE_PERSISTENCE.search(content))
has_container = bool(RE_CONTAINER_ABUSE.search(content))
has_env_harvest = bool(RE_ENV_HARVEST.search(content))
has_archive = bool(RE_ARCHIVE_STAGING.search(content))
has_anti = bool(RE_ANTI_ANALYSIS.search(content))
has_dns_exfil = bool(RE_DNS_EXFIL.search(content))
has_fs_enum = bool(RE_FS_ENUM.search(content))
has_rev_shell = bool(RE_REVERSE_SHELL.search(content))
has_remote_code = bool(RE_REMOTE_CODE.search(content))
has_crypto_theft = bool(RE_CRYPTO_THEFT.search(content))
has_openssl_cli = bool(RE_OPENSSL_CLI.search(content))
has_temp_exec = bool(RE_TEMP_EXEC.search(content))
has_c2_polling = bool(RE_C2_POLLING.search(content))
has_may12_ioc = bool(RE_MAY12_IOC.search(content))
# CRITICAL: combination patterns that strongly indicate malice
# base64 decode + subprocess execution (staged payload)
if has_base64 and has_subprocess:
findings.append(
Finding(
CRITICAL,
package,
filename,
"base64 decode + subprocess execution (staged payload)",
f"Base64: {_extract_evidence(content, RE_BASE64)}\n"
f"Subprocess: {_extract_evidence(content, RE_SUBPROCESS)}",
)
)
# openssl encryption + network/key material (encrypted exfiltration)
if has_openssl_cli and (has_network or has_keys):
findings.append(
Finding(
CRITICAL,
package,
filename,
"openssl encryption + network/key material (encrypted exfiltration)",
f"OpenSSL: {_extract_evidence(content, RE_OPENSSL_CLI)}\n"
f"Network: {_extract_evidence(content, RE_NETWORK)}",
)
)
# Writes to /tmp and executes (staged dropper)
if has_temp_exec:
findings.append(
Finding(
CRITICAL,
package,
filename,
"Writes to /tmp and executes (staged dropper)",
_extract_evidence(content, RE_TEMP_EXEC),
)
)
# May-12 Shai-Hulud IOC string in Python source.
if has_may12_ioc:
findings.append(
Finding(
CRITICAL,
package,
filename,
"May-12 Shai-Hulud IOC string present in Python file",
_extract_evidence(content, RE_MAY12_IOC),
)
)
# C2 polling/beaconing loop
if has_c2_polling:
findings.append(
Finding(
CRITICAL,
package,
filename,
"C2 polling/beaconing loop detected",
_extract_evidence(content, RE_C2_POLLING),
)
)
# Credential stealer: reads cred paths AND phones home
if has_creds and has_network:
findings.append(
Finding(
CRITICAL,
package,
filename,
"Reads credential paths AND makes network calls",
f"Creds: {_extract_evidence(content, RE_CRED_ACCESS)}\n"
f"Network: {_extract_evidence(content, RE_NETWORK)}",
)
)
# Reverse / bind shell
if has_rev_shell:
findings.append(
Finding(
CRITICAL,
package,
filename,
"Reverse shell / bind shell pattern",
_extract_evidence(content, RE_REVERSE_SHELL),
)
)
# Remote code execution: exec/eval on HTTP response
if has_remote_code:
findings.append(
Finding(
CRITICAL,
package,
filename,
"Downloads and executes remote code",
_extract_evidence(content, RE_REMOTE_CODE),
)
)
# Env harvest + network exfil
if has_env_harvest and has_network:
findings.append(
Finding(
CRITICAL,
package,
filename,
"Harvests environment variables/secrets AND makes network calls",
f"Env: {_extract_evidence(content, RE_ENV_HARVEST)}\n"
f"Network: {_extract_evidence(content, RE_NETWORK)}",
)
)
# Filesystem enum + network exfil
if has_fs_enum and has_network:
findings.append(
Finding(
CRITICAL,
package,
filename,
"Enumerates filesystem AND makes network calls",
f"FS: {_extract_evidence(content, RE_FS_ENUM)}\n"
f"Network: {_extract_evidence(content, RE_NETWORK)}",
)
)
# Cloud metadata access + network (exfil IMDS tokens)
if has_cloud_meta and has_network:
findings.append(
Finding(
CRITICAL,
package,
filename,
"Accesses cloud metadata/IMDS AND makes network calls",
f"IMDS: {_extract_evidence(content, RE_CLOUD_METADATA)}\n"
f"Network: {_extract_evidence(content, RE_NETWORK)}",
)
)
# Crypto wallet theft + network
if has_crypto_theft and has_network:
findings.append(
Finding(
CRITICAL,
package,
filename,
"Targets cryptocurrency wallets AND makes network calls",
f"Crypto: {_extract_evidence(content, RE_CRYPTO_THEFT)}\n"
f"Network: {_extract_evidence(content, RE_NETWORK)}",
)
)
# Archive staging with credential content + network
if has_archive and has_network:
findings.append(
Finding(
CRITICAL,
package,
filename,
"Creates archive with sensitive data AND makes network calls",
f"Archive: {_extract_evidence(content, RE_ARCHIVE_STAGING)}\n"
f"Network: {_extract_evidence(content, RE_NETWORK)}",
)
)
# Persistence + network (dropper that persists)
if has_persistence and has_network:
findings.append(
Finding(
CRITICAL,
package,
filename,
"Installs persistence AND makes network calls (backdoor pattern)",
f"Persist: {_extract_evidence(content, RE_PERSISTENCE)}\n"
f"Network: {_extract_evidence(content, RE_NETWORK)}",
)
)
# Container/k8s abuse + network
if has_container and has_network:
findings.append(
Finding(
CRITICAL,
package,
filename,
"Container/orchestration abuse AND makes network calls",
f"Container: {_extract_evidence(content, RE_CONTAINER_ABUSE)}\n"
f"Network: {_extract_evidence(content, RE_NETWORK)}",
)
)
# HIGH: single strong signals or weaker combinations
# Obfuscated payload: base64 + exec/eval + large blob
if has_base64 and has_exec_eval and has_blob:
findings.append(
Finding(
HIGH,
package,
filename,
"base64 decode + exec/eval + large encoded blob",
f"Base64: {_extract_evidence(content, RE_BASE64)}\n"
f"Exec: {_extract_evidence(content, RE_EXEC_EVAL)}",
)
)
# Advanced obfuscation + exec/eval
if has_obfuscation and has_exec_eval:
findings.append(
Finding(
HIGH,
package,
filename,
"Advanced obfuscation (marshal/compile/zlib) + exec/eval",
f"Obfusc: {_extract_evidence(content, RE_OBFUSCATION)}\n"
f"Exec: {_extract_evidence(content, RE_EXEC_EVAL)}",
)
)
# Embedded crypto key + network (hardcoded key for encrypted exfil)
if has_keys and has_network:
findings.append(
Finding(
HIGH,
package,
filename,
"Embedded cryptographic key + network calls (encrypted exfil pattern)",
f"Key: {_extract_evidence(content, RE_EMBEDDED_KEYS)}\n"
f"Network: {_extract_evidence(content, RE_NETWORK)}",
)
)
# Anti-analysis + any other suspicious pattern
if has_anti and (has_network or has_subprocess or has_exec_eval):
findings.append(
Finding(
HIGH,
package,
filename,
"Anti-analysis/sandbox evasion + suspicious behavior",
f"Anti: {_extract_evidence(content, RE_ANTI_ANALYSIS)}",
)
)
# DNS exfiltration with dynamic hostnames
if has_dns_exfil and (has_base64 or has_network or has_creds):
findings.append(
Finding(
HIGH,
package,
filename,
"DNS exfiltration / tunneling patterns",
_extract_evidence(content, RE_DNS_EXFIL),
)
)
# Cloud metadata standalone (IMDS access in a PyPI package is suspicious)
if has_cloud_meta and not findings:
findings.append(
Finding(
HIGH,
package,
filename,
"Accesses cloud metadata / IMDS endpoints",
_extract_evidence(content, RE_CLOUD_METADATA),
)
)
# Persistence standalone (a PyPI package installing systemd/cron is suspicious)
if has_persistence and not has_network:
findings.append(
Finding(
HIGH,
package,
filename,
"Installs persistence mechanism (systemd/cron/launchd/registry)",
_extract_evidence(content, RE_PERSISTENCE),
)
)
# Container abuse standalone
if has_container and not has_network:
findings.append(
Finding(
HIGH,
package,
filename,
"Interacts with container/orchestration runtime",
_extract_evidence(content, RE_CONTAINER_ABUSE),
)
)
# openssl CLI standalone (uncommon in PyPI packages)
if has_openssl_cli and not (has_network or has_keys):
findings.append(
Finding(
HIGH,
package,
filename,
"Invokes openssl CLI (uncommon in PyPI packages)",
_extract_evidence(content, RE_OPENSSL_CLI),
)
)
# setup.py checks
if is_setup:
if has_network and has_subprocess:
findings.append(
Finding(
HIGH,
package,
filename,
"setup.py has network calls + subprocess (dropper pattern)",
f"Network: {_extract_evidence(content, RE_NETWORK)}\n"
f"Subprocess: {_extract_evidence(content, RE_SUBPROCESS)}",
)
)
elif has_network:
findings.append(
Finding(
MEDIUM,
package,
filename,
"setup.py makes network calls at install time",
_extract_evidence(content, RE_NETWORK),
)
)
# MEDIUM: standalone signals (informational, may be legitimate)
# base64 + exec/eval without blob
if has_base64 and has_exec_eval and not has_blob:
findings.append(
Finding(
MEDIUM,
package,
filename,
"base64 decode + exec/eval (no large blob)",
f"Base64: {_extract_evidence(content, RE_BASE64)}\n"
f"Exec: {_extract_evidence(content, RE_EXEC_EVAL)}",
)
)
# Standalone obfuscation without exec
if has_obfuscation and not has_exec_eval:
findings.append(
Finding(
MEDIUM,
package,
filename,
"Advanced obfuscation patterns (marshal/compile/zlib/__import__)",
_extract_evidence(content, RE_OBFUSCATION),
)
)
# Embedded crypto keys standalone
if has_keys and not has_network:
findings.append(
Finding(
MEDIUM,
package,
filename,
"Embedded cryptographic key material",
_extract_evidence(content, RE_EMBEDDED_KEYS),
)
)
# Env harvest standalone
if has_env_harvest and not has_network:
findings.append(
Finding(
MEDIUM,
package,
filename,
"Harvests environment variables / secrets",
_extract_evidence(content, RE_ENV_HARVEST),
)
)
# Filesystem enum standalone
if has_fs_enum and not has_network:
findings.append(
Finding(
MEDIUM,
package,
filename,
"Enumerates filesystem / reads sensitive file paths",
_extract_evidence(content, RE_FS_ENUM),
)
)
# Crypto wallet references standalone
if has_crypto_theft and not has_network:
findings.append(
Finding(
MEDIUM,
package,
filename,
"References cryptocurrency wallets / keys",
_extract_evidence(content, RE_CRYPTO_THEFT),
)
)
return findings
def _extract_evidence(
content: str,
pattern: re.Pattern,
max_matches: int = 3,
) -> str:
"""Pull matching lines as evidence snippets.
Falls back to a whole-content search when the pattern only matches across
line boundaries (several IOC regexes use ``re.DOTALL``). Without this an
anti-analysis / archive-staging finding could report empty evidence, making
the baseline entry impossible to review.
"""
lines = content.splitlines()
matches = []
for i, line in enumerate(lines, 1):
if pattern.search(line):
snippet = line.strip()
if len(snippet) > 160:
snippet = snippet[:160] + "..."
matches.append(f"L{i}: {snippet}")
if len(matches) >= max_matches:
break
if matches:
return " | ".join(matches)
# Multiline (DOTALL) match: report the line where the match begins.
m = pattern.search(content)
if m:
line_no = content.count("\n", 0, m.start()) + 1
snippet = lines[line_no - 1].strip() if line_no - 1 < len(lines) else ""
if len(snippet) > 160:
snippet = snippet[:160] + "..."
return f"L{line_no}: {snippet}" if snippet else f"L{line_no}: <multiline match>"
return ""
# Non-Python checkers
# Recent PyPI compromises (Lightning 2.6.x, ForceMemo) carried the payload in a
# bundled .js / .sh / workflow yaml so the Python imports looked clean. These
# checkers scan those file types when they appear inside a wheel/sdist.
def check_js_file(content: str, filename: str, package: str) -> list[Finding]:
"""Run JS-side checks. Triggered by .js / .mjs / .cjs / .ts."""
findings = []
# A >100 KB JS file inside a Python wheel is anomalous: CRITICAL combined
# with any other JS heuristic, HIGH standalone.
is_large = len(content) > 100 * 1024
has_obf = bool(RE_JS_OBFUSCATION.search(content))
has_web3 = bool(RE_WEB3_HIJACK.search(content))
has_token_regex = bool(RE_TOKEN_REGEX.search(content))
has_workflow_inj = bool(RE_WORKFLOW_INJECT.search(content))
has_network = bool(RE_NETWORK.search(content))
if has_obf:
sev = CRITICAL if (is_large or has_web3 or has_token_regex) else HIGH
findings.append(
Finding(
sev,
package,
filename,
"JS minifier-style hex-var obfuscation (npm-payload signature)",
_extract_evidence(content, RE_JS_OBFUSCATION),
)
)
if has_web3:
findings.append(
Finding(
CRITICAL,
package,
filename,
"JS Web3 / wallet hijack (window.ethereum or fetch override)",
_extract_evidence(content, RE_WEB3_HIJACK),
)
)
if has_token_regex and has_network:
findings.append(
Finding(
CRITICAL,
package,
filename,
"JS embeds credential regexes AND makes network calls (stealer)",
_extract_evidence(content, RE_TOKEN_REGEX),
)
)
if has_workflow_inj:
findings.append(
Finding(
CRITICAL,
package,
filename,
"JS self-propagation: workflow injection / repo takeover signature",
_extract_evidence(content, RE_WORKFLOW_INJECT),
)
)
if is_large and not findings:
findings.append(
Finding(
HIGH,
package,
filename,
# Size stays in evidence, not the check label, so the baseline key
# does not drift when a wheel's bundle grows by a few KB.
"Python wheel ships large JS bundle (uncommon; manually review)",
f"{len(content) // 1024} KB JS bundle",
)
)
return findings
def check_shell_file(content: str, filename: str, package: str) -> list[Finding]:
"""Run shell-side checks. Triggered by .sh / .bash / install scripts."""
findings = []
if RE_SHELL_DROPPER.search(content):
findings.append(
Finding(
CRITICAL,
package,
filename,
"Shell pipes remote code into an interpreter (curl|sh dropper)",
_extract_evidence(content, RE_SHELL_DROPPER),
)
)
if RE_DEV_TOOL_HIJACK.search(content) and (
RE_NETWORK.search(content) or RE_SUBPROCESS.search(content)
):
findings.append(
Finding(
CRITICAL,
package,
filename,
"Shell installs developer-tool persistence hook (.bashrc / "
"profile.d / vscode tasks) AND has network or exec",
_extract_evidence(content, RE_DEV_TOOL_HIJACK),
)
)
if RE_TOKEN_REGEX.search(content) and RE_NETWORK.search(content):
findings.append(
Finding(
CRITICAL,
package,
filename,
"Shell embeds credential regexes AND makes network calls",
_extract_evidence(content, RE_TOKEN_REGEX),
)
)
if RE_WORKFLOW_INJECT.search(content):
findings.append(
Finding(
CRITICAL,
package,
filename,
"Shell self-propagation: workflow injection / repo takeover signature",
_extract_evidence(content, RE_WORKFLOW_INJECT),
)
)
if RE_MAY12_IOC.search(content):
findings.append(
Finding(
CRITICAL,
package,
filename,
"May-12 Shai-Hulud IOC string present in shell script",
_extract_evidence(content, RE_MAY12_IOC),
)
)
return findings
def check_workflow_file(content: str, filename: str, package: str) -> list[Finding]:
"""Run GitHub-Actions workflow checks. Triggered by .github/workflows/*.yml."""
findings = []
# A workflow file inside a PyPI package is suspicious (Shai-Hulud plants
# `shai-hulud.yml` everywhere); injection-signature matches are CRITICAL.
if RE_WORKFLOW_INJECT.search(content):
findings.append(
Finding(
CRITICAL,
package,
filename,
"Workflow file inside PyPI package matches self-propagation signature",
_extract_evidence(content, RE_WORKFLOW_INJECT),
)
)
if RE_TOKEN_REGEX.search(content):
findings.append(
Finding(
HIGH,
package,
filename,
"Workflow file embeds credential regexes (token harvesting?)",
_extract_evidence(content, RE_TOKEN_REGEX),
)
)
if RE_SHELL_DROPPER.search(content):
findings.append(
Finding(
CRITICAL,
package,
filename,
"Workflow pipes remote code into a shell (curl|sh dropper)",
_extract_evidence(content, RE_SHELL_DROPPER),
)
)
if RE_MAY12_IOC.search(content):
findings.append(
Finding(
CRITICAL,
package,
filename,
"May-12 Shai-Hulud IOC string present in workflow file",
_extract_evidence(content, RE_MAY12_IOC),
)
)
return findings
# Archive handling
# Tarbomb caps, mirrored from scripts/scan_npm_packages.py::safe_extract.
# Refuses zip/tar-of-death so a hostile archive cannot exhaust memory before
# scanning. Keep in sync with the npm side; duplicated to stay standalone.
HARD_MAX_FILE_BYTES = 64 * 1024 * 1024 # 64 MiB per member
HARD_MAX_TOTAL_BYTES = 512 * 1024 * 1024 # 512 MiB cumulative
HARD_MAX_MEMBERS = 50_000 # entries per archive
def _refuse_unsafe_member_name(name: str) -> str | None:
"""Return a refusal reason for a member name, or None if safe.
Mirrors `safe_extract`: no absolute paths, no `..` traversal. We never write
to disk, so the name-shape check plus the in-memory size cap is sufficient.
"""
if name.startswith("/") or ".." in Path(name).parts:
return f"unsafe member name {name!r}"
return None
def iter_archive_files(archive_path: str):
"""Yield (filename, text_content) for every file in a wheel/sdist.
Streams members with per-member size + count caps so a tarbomb/zipbomb can't
blow the memory budget. On cap breach, emits a `[WARN]` and short-circuits.
"""
path = Path(archive_path)
if path.suffix == ".whl" or path.suffix == ".zip":
total = 0
count = 0
with zipfile.ZipFile(path) as zf:
for info in zf.infolist():
if info.is_dir():
continue
count += 1
if count > HARD_MAX_MEMBERS:
print(
f" [WARN] {path.name}: refused; member count "
f"{count} exceeds cap {HARD_MAX_MEMBERS}",
file = sys.stderr,
)
return
reason = _refuse_unsafe_member_name(info.filename)
if reason is not None:
print(
f" [WARN] {path.name}: refused member ({reason})",
file = sys.stderr,
)
continue
# Declared (uncompressed) size cap
if info.file_size > HARD_MAX_FILE_BYTES:
print(
f" [WARN] {path.name}: skipped {info.filename!r} "
f"(declared {info.file_size} > cap {HARD_MAX_FILE_BYTES})",
file = sys.stderr,
)
continue
if total + info.file_size > HARD_MAX_TOTAL_BYTES:
print(
f" [WARN] {path.name}: cumulative bytes cap "
f"{HARD_MAX_TOTAL_BYTES} hit at {info.filename!r}",
file = sys.stderr,
)
return
try:
data = zf.read(info.filename)
total += len(data)
text = data.decode("utf-8", errors = "replace")
yield info.filename, text
except Exception:
continue
elif path.name.endswith((".tar.gz", ".tgz", ".tar.bz2", ".tar.xz", ".tar")):
total = 0
count = 0
# Streaming open so we never read the whole archive into memory.
with tarfile.open(path, mode = "r|*") as tf:
for member in tf:
count += 1
if count > HARD_MAX_MEMBERS:
print(
f" [WARN] {path.name}: refused; member count "
f"{count} exceeds cap {HARD_MAX_MEMBERS}",
file = sys.stderr,
)
return
# Refuse symlinks/hardlinks/devices: tar parsers have
# historically dereferenced them on extract.
if member.issym() or member.islnk():
print(
f" [WARN] {path.name}: refused link member " f"{member.name!r}",
file = sys.stderr,
)
continue
if member.isdev() or member.isfifo():
print(
f" [WARN] {path.name}: refused special member " f"{member.name!r}",
file = sys.stderr,
)
continue
if not member.isfile():
continue
reason = _refuse_unsafe_member_name(member.name)
if reason is not None:
print(
f" [WARN] {path.name}: refused member ({reason})",
file = sys.stderr,
)
continue
declared = max(member.size, 0)
if declared > HARD_MAX_FILE_BYTES:
print(
f" [WARN] {path.name}: skipped {member.name!r} "
f"(declared {declared} > cap {HARD_MAX_FILE_BYTES})",
file = sys.stderr,
)
continue
if total + declared > HARD_MAX_TOTAL_BYTES:
print(
f" [WARN] {path.name}: cumulative bytes cap "
f"{HARD_MAX_TOTAL_BYTES} hit at {member.name!r}",
file = sys.stderr,
)
return
try:
f = tf.extractfile(member)
if f is None:
continue
# Bound the read: a tar header may lie about size
data = f.read(HARD_MAX_FILE_BYTES + 1)
if len(data) > HARD_MAX_FILE_BYTES:
print(
f" [WARN] {path.name}: body of "
f"{member.name!r} exceeded declared cap",
file = sys.stderr,
)
continue
total += len(data)
text = data.decode("utf-8", errors = "replace")
yield member.name, text
except Exception:
continue
else:
print(f" [WARN] Unknown archive format: {path.name}", file = sys.stderr)
def scan_archive(archive_path: str, package: str) -> list[Finding]:
"""Scan all files in an archive for malicious patterns.
A corrupted archive container (truncated wheel, bad gzip header, etc.) emits
a CRITICAL ``archive_corrupted`` finding rather than being silently skipped
and reported as "0 findings" (silent-failure hardening SF1).
"""
findings: list[Finding] = []
try:
for filename, content in iter_archive_files(archive_path):
lower = filename.lower()
if lower.endswith(".pth"):
findings.extend(check_pth_file(content, filename, package))
elif lower.endswith(".py"):
findings.extend(check_py_file(content, filename, package))
elif lower.endswith((".js", ".mjs", ".cjs", ".ts")):
# Lightning 2.6.x hid its payload in a 14.8 MB router_runtime.js;
# without this branch we'd only see the small Python loader.
findings.extend(check_js_file(content, filename, package))
elif lower.endswith((".sh", ".bash")):
findings.extend(check_shell_file(content, filename, package))
elif "/.github/workflows/" in lower and lower.endswith((".yml", ".yaml")):
# Shai-Hulud/ForceMemo plant their own GHA workflow
findings.extend(check_workflow_file(content, filename, package))
except (zipfile.BadZipFile, tarfile.TarError, EOFError, OSError) as exc:
# Archive cannot be opened / is structurally broken: either transport
# corruption or a deliberate attempt to bypass error-swallowing scanners.
findings.append(
Finding(
CRITICAL,
package,
os.path.basename(archive_path),
"archive_corrupted",
f"{type(exc).__name__}: {exc}"[:240],
)
)
return findings
# Download packages
_RE_PYPI_SPEC_VERSION = re.compile(r"==\s*([A-Za-z0-9_.\-+!]+)")
def _check_blocked_pypi_versions(specs: list[str]) -> tuple[list[str], list[Finding]]:
"""Filter ``specs`` against ``BLOCKED_PYPI_VERSIONS``.
Returns ``(safe_specs, findings)``. Each blocked spec emits a CRITICAL
``Finding`` and is dropped so the malicious tarball is never fetched. Specs
without an ``==X.Y.Z`` pin pass through; the IOC regexes catch them later.
"""
safe: list[str] = []
findings: list[Finding] = []
for spec in specs:
name = _extract_pkg_name(spec).lower()
blocked = BLOCKED_PYPI_VERSIONS.get(name, set())
if not blocked:
safe.append(spec)
continue
m = _RE_PYPI_SPEC_VERSION.search(spec)
version = m.group(1) if m else None
if version is not None and version in blocked:
findings.append(
Finding(
CRITICAL,
f"{name}=={version}",
"<spec>",
"blocked-known-malicious",
f"{name}=={version} is on the BLOCKED_PYPI_VERSIONS list",
)
)
# Drop the spec; do not download
continue
safe.append(spec)
return safe, findings
def _pip_download_env() -> dict[str, str]:
"""Return a scrubbed environment for invoking `pip download`.
Strips every PIP_* override and forces the resolver at PyPI; PIP_CONFIG_FILE
is /dev/null so a stray pip.conf extra-index-url cannot bypass the pin.
"""
env = {**os.environ}
# Drop any user override
for key in [k for k in env if k.startswith("PIP_")]:
env.pop(key, None)
env["PIP_INDEX_URL"] = "https://pypi.org/simple"
env["PIP_EXTRA_INDEX_URL"] = ""
env["PIP_CONFIG_FILE"] = "/dev/null"
env["PIP_DISABLE_PIP_VERSION_CHECK"] = "1"
return env
# Pip resolver flags shared by both download branches. CLI index-URL pin is
# belt + braces with the env scrub; `--only-binary :all:` avoids running setup.py.
_PIP_DOWNLOAD_PIN_FLAGS = [
"--index-url",
"https://pypi.org/simple",
"--only-binary",
":all:",
]
# Strip characters that could escape `dest` via `os.path.join`, so a spec like
# `../../etc/foo==1.0` cannot land outside the temp tree.
_RE_PKG_NAME_SANITIZE = re.compile(r"[^A-Za-z0-9._-]")
# sdist fallback. `--only-binary :all:` never builds an sdist (no setup.py
# exec), but a wheel-less project then can't be fetched at all and one such
# package fails the whole --with-deps resolve (exit 2) -- a coverage hole. So on
# resolve failure we drop to per-spec and fetch any sdist-only package's raw
# tarball from the PyPI JSON API for scan_archive() to read statically: no pip,
# no build, same no-exec guarantee. Transport failures are still exit 2; only
# "no wheel" is downgraded to a direct fetch.
# How many levels of indirect-dep recovery to chase (a wheel dep whose own child
# is sdist-only, and so on). Bounded with dedup so recovery always terminates.
_MAX_DEP_FOLLOWUP_DEPTH = 2
_SDIST_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT = 180
# Never fetch an archive larger than we would be willing to scan (iter_archive_files cap).
_MAX_SDIST_BYTES = HARD_MAX_TOTAL_BYTES
# Direct sdist bytes only ever come from PyPI's own CDN; refuse anything else.
_TRUSTED_PYPI_HOSTS = frozenset({"files.pythonhosted.org", "pypi.org", "pypi.python.org"})
def _spec_pin_version(spec: str) -> str | None:
"""Return the ``==X.Y.Z`` pin from a spec, or None if unpinned."""
m = _RE_PYPI_SPEC_VERSION.search(spec)
return m.group(1) if m else None
def _pypi_json(name: str, version: str | None = None) -> dict | None:
"""Fetch PyPI metadata JSON (read-only HTTPS GET, no exec); None on error.
With ``version`` it fetches that release's document, whose ``requires_dist``
is accurate for the pin (the project-level doc describes only the latest)."""
url = "https://pypi.org/pypi/" + urllib.parse.quote(name, safe = "")
if version:
url += "/" + urllib.parse.quote(version, safe = "")
url += "/json"
try:
req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers = {"Accept": "application/json"})
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout = 30) as resp:
if getattr(resp, "status", 200) != 200:
return None
data = resp.read(16 * 1024 * 1024) # metadata is small; cap regardless
return json.loads(data.decode("utf-8", errors = "replace"))
except Exception:
return None
def _release_files(meta: dict, version: str | None) -> list[dict]:
"""Files for a pinned version, else the latest release's. A pin that is
absent or empty returns [] (never the latest) so a yanked/bad pin fails
closed instead of a different artifact being scanned in its place."""
if version is not None:
return meta.get("releases", {}).get(version) or []
return meta.get("urls", []) or []
def _release_has_wheel(meta: dict, version: str | None) -> bool:
"""True if the (pinned or latest) release publishes any bdist_wheel."""
return any(f.get("packagetype") == "bdist_wheel" for f in _release_files(meta, version))
def _is_trusted_pypi_url(url: str) -> bool:
"""Only download sdist bytes from PyPI's own hosts, over HTTPS."""
try:
parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(url)
except Exception:
return False
return parsed.scheme == "https" and parsed.hostname in _TRUSTED_PYPI_HOSTS
_MARKER_ENV_VARS = (
"sys_platform",
"platform_system",
"platform_machine",
"platform_release",
"platform_version",
"platform_python_implementation",
"os_name",
"python_version",
"python_full_version",
"implementation_name",
"implementation_version",
)
def _marker_holds_by_default(marker: str) -> bool:
"""Keep (scan) a dep unless its marker is purely ``extra``-gated. The scanner
runs on one OS/Python but a package may be installed on another, so a marker
that can be true on a different target (``sys_platform == 'win32'``,
``python_version == '3.13'``) is always kept; only a marker depending solely
on ``extra`` and false with no extra requested is dropped. Conservative: on
any uncertainty, keep (over-scan, never silently skip)."""
m = marker.strip()
if not m or "extra" not in m:
return True # no extra gate: installed by default on some target -> scan
if any(v in m for v in _MARKER_ENV_VARS):
return True # also platform/python gated: true on some target -> scan
# Pure extra marker: decide by evaluating with no extra requested.
try:
from packaging.markers import Marker, default_environment
env = default_environment()
env["extra"] = ""
return bool(Marker(m).evaluate(env))
except Exception:
# packaging missing/unparseable: drop only a pure positive extra-equality.
return re.fullmatch(r"\s*extra\s*==\s*['\"][^'\"]+['\"]\s*", m) is None
def _requires_dist_names(meta: dict) -> list[str]:
"""Transitive dep specs (name + version specifier) from metadata, to recover
a sdist-only package's tree. The specifier is kept so a pinned malicious
version is fetched, not latest. Drops deps whose marker cannot hold for a
default install."""
info = meta.get("info", {}) or {}
reqs = info.get("requires_dist") or []
specs: list[str] = []
for r in reqs:
if not isinstance(r, str):
continue
head = r
if ";" in r:
head, marker = r.split(";", 1)
if not _marker_holds_by_default(marker):
continue
if not _RE_NAME.match(head.strip()):
continue
# "torch (>=1.10)" / "torch >=1.10" -> "torch>=1.10" (pip-friendly).
specs.append(re.sub(r"\s+", "", head).replace("(", "").replace(")", ""))
return specs
def _requires_dist_for(
name: str,
version: str | None,
project_meta: dict,
errors: list[str] | None = None,
) -> list[str]:
"""Declared deps for the pinned version, read from that release's metadata
(its ``requires_dist`` can differ from latest). Unpinned uses the
project-level (latest) document. A pinned version whose own metadata cannot
be fetched returns [] (never latest's deps) and, when ``errors`` is given,
records an incomplete-scan error so a partial tree is not read as "no deps"."""
if not version:
return _requires_dist_names(project_meta)
vmeta = _pypi_json(name, version)
if vmeta is None:
msg = f"metadata fetch failed for pinned {name}=={version}; dependency scan incomplete"
if errors is None:
print(f" [WARN] {msg}", file = sys.stderr)
else:
errors.append(msg)
return []
return _requires_dist_names(vmeta)
def _download_sdist_direct(
name: str,
version: str | None,
dest: str,
*,
meta: dict | None = None,
) -> tuple[str | None, str | None]:
"""Fetch a project's sdist tarball directly from PyPI (no pip, no build).
Returns ``(filepath, error)``, one non-None. Suffix preserved for the archive
reader; bounded by ``_MAX_SDIST_BYTES`` and restricted to PyPI's CDN.
"""
if meta is None:
meta = _pypi_json(name)
if meta is None:
return None, f"PyPI metadata fetch failed for {name}"
picked: tuple[str, str] | None = None
for f in _release_files(meta, version):
if f.get("packagetype") == "sdist" and f.get("url") and f.get("filename"):
picked = (f["filename"], f["url"])
break
if picked is None:
return None, f"no sdist published for {name} (version={version or 'latest'})"
fname, url = picked
if not _is_trusted_pypi_url(url):
return None, f"refusing non-PyPI sdist URL for {name}: {url[:80]}"
# basename + sanitize keeps the path inside dest; the char class preserves
# the real `.tar.gz` / `.zip` suffix so the archive reader picks the format.
safe_fname = _RE_PKG_NAME_SANITIZE.sub("_", os.path.basename(fname)) or "sdist.tar.gz"
out = os.path.join(dest, safe_fname)
try:
req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers = {"Accept": "application/octet-stream"})
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout = _SDIST_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT) as resp:
if getattr(resp, "status", 200) != 200:
return None, f"sdist HTTP {getattr(resp, 'status', '?')} for {name}"
data = resp.read(_MAX_SDIST_BYTES + 1)
if len(data) > _MAX_SDIST_BYTES:
return None, f"sdist for {name} exceeds {_MAX_SDIST_BYTES} byte cap"
with open(out, "wb") as fh:
fh.write(data)
print(
f" [INFO] fetched sdist directly (no build) for {name}: {safe_fname}",
file = sys.stderr,
)
return out, None
except Exception as exc:
return None, f"sdist download failed for {name}: {type(exc).__name__}: {str(exc)[:120]}"
def _pip_download_with_deps(
specs: list[str],
dest: str,
env: dict,
*,
timeout: int = 600,
) -> tuple[int, str]:
"""One `pip download --with-deps --only-binary :all:` call. Returns (rc, stderr)."""
cmd = [
sys.executable,
"-m",
"pip",
"download",
*_PIP_DOWNLOAD_PIN_FLAGS,
"--dest",
dest,
] + list(specs)
try:
proc = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output = True, text = True, timeout = timeout, env = env)
return proc.returncode, proc.stderr or ""
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
return 124, "pip download (with deps) timed out"
def _collect_flat_dir(dest: str, results: list[tuple[str, str]]) -> None:
"""Append every archive in a flat dest dir as (pkg_name, path)."""
for fname in sorted(os.listdir(dest)):
fpath = os.path.join(dest, fname)
if os.path.isfile(fpath):
pkg_name = fname.split("-")[0].replace("_", "-").lower()
results.append((pkg_name, fpath))
def _resolve_per_spec_with_deps(
specs: list[str], dest: str, env: dict, download_errors: list[str]
) -> None:
"""Fallback when the bulk --with-deps resolve fails: resolve each spec alone.
A still-failing spec is probed against PyPI: sdist-only -> direct fetch (deps
recovered one level); wheel-present but tree-unresolvable -> a --no-deps fetch
of just that package. Only a genuine fetch failure errors (caller exits 2);
unfetchable indirect deps are warned, since the named package is still scanned.
"""
sdist_dep_followups: list[str] = []
for spec in specs:
name = _extract_pkg_name(spec)
version = _spec_pin_version(spec)
cmd = [
sys.executable,
"-m",
"pip",
"download",
*_PIP_DOWNLOAD_PIN_FLAGS,
"--dest",
dest,
spec,
]
try:
proc = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output = True, text = True, timeout = 300, env = env)
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
download_errors.append(f"per-spec --with-deps timed out for {spec}")
continue
if proc.returncode == 0:
continue # archives landed in dest; collected by the caller
meta = _pypi_json(name)
if meta is not None and not _release_has_wheel(meta, version):
fpath, serr = _download_sdist_direct(name, version, dest, meta = meta)
if fpath is None:
download_errors.append(serr or f"sdist fetch failed for {name}")
continue
sdist_dep_followups.extend(_requires_dist_for(name, version, meta, download_errors))
continue
# Has a wheel but the full transitive tree won't co-resolve
# (ResolutionImpossible) -- typically a package the requirement file
# installs with --no-deps by design (e.g. descript-audio-codec, whose
# own pins conflict). Fetch just the package itself with --no-deps so it
# is still scanned; its conflicting deps are out of scope here (the file
# excludes them on purpose). Only a genuine fetch failure is an error.
nd_cmd = [
sys.executable,
"-m",
"pip",
"download",
"--no-deps",
*_PIP_DOWNLOAD_PIN_FLAGS,
"--dest",
dest,
spec,
]
try:
nd = subprocess.run(nd_cmd, capture_output = True, text = True, timeout = 180, env = env)
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
download_errors.append(f"per-spec --no-deps timed out for {spec}")
continue
if nd.returncode == 0:
print(
f" [INFO] {name}: full tree unresolvable; scanned the package "
f"alone (--no-deps), recovering deps individually.",
file = sys.stderr,
)
# The --with-deps failure may have been a sdist-only TRANSITIVE dep,
# which --no-deps skips. Recover the declared deps so that class is
# still scanned (each is fetched as a wheel or direct sdist below).
if meta is not None:
sdist_dep_followups.extend(_requires_dist_for(name, version, meta, download_errors))
continue
# --no-deps also failed: last-ditch sdist fetch at the pinned version.
if meta is not None:
fpath, _serr = _download_sdist_direct(name, version, dest, meta = meta)
if fpath is not None:
continue
download_errors.append(
f"per-spec failed for {spec} (with-deps and --no-deps): " f"{nd.stderr.strip()[:240]}"
)
# Recover the transitive deps of sdist-only packages. A depth-bounded,
# deduped worklist so a wheel dep whose own child is sdist-only is itself
# fetched (--no-deps) and scanned -- not silently dropped -- and that child
# is then recovered in turn. `dep` carries the version specifier so a pinned
# version is fetched.
seen: set[str] = set()
worklist: list[tuple[str, int]] = [(d, 0) for d in sdist_dep_followups]
while worklist:
dep, depth = worklist.pop()
dep_name = _extract_pkg_name(dep)
key = _norm_pkg(dep_name)
if key in seen:
continue
seen.add(key)
dep_ver = _spec_pin_version(dep)
cmd = [
sys.executable,
"-m",
"pip",
"download",
*_PIP_DOWNLOAD_PIN_FLAGS,
"--dest",
dest,
dep,
]
try:
proc = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output = True, text = True, timeout = 300, env = env)
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
print(f" [WARN] dep download timed out for {dep}", file = sys.stderr)
continue
if proc.returncode == 0:
continue
meta = _pypi_json(dep_name)
if meta is None:
print(f" [WARN] could not resolve indirect dep {dep}; skipping", file = sys.stderr)
continue
if not _release_has_wheel(meta, dep_ver):
fpath, serr = _download_sdist_direct(dep_name, dep_ver, dest, meta = meta)
if fpath is None:
print(f" [WARN] could not fetch sdist dep {dep}: {serr}", file = sys.stderr)
elif depth < _MAX_DEP_FOLLOWUP_DEPTH:
worklist.extend((d, depth + 1) for d in _requires_dist_for(dep_name, dep_ver, meta))
continue
# Wheel published but its tree won't co-resolve (a sdist-only child).
# Fetch the dep alone so it is scanned, then chase its own declared deps.
nd_cmd = [
sys.executable,
"-m",
"pip",
"download",
"--no-deps",
*_PIP_DOWNLOAD_PIN_FLAGS,
"--dest",
dest,
dep,
]
try:
nd = subprocess.run(nd_cmd, capture_output = True, text = True, timeout = 180, env = env)
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
print(f" [WARN] dep --no-deps timed out for {dep}", file = sys.stderr)
continue
if nd.returncode == 0:
if depth < _MAX_DEP_FOLLOWUP_DEPTH:
worklist.extend((d, depth + 1) for d in _requires_dist_for(dep_name, dep_ver, meta))
continue
fpath, _serr = _download_sdist_direct(dep_name, dep_ver, dest, meta = meta)
if fpath is None:
print(f" [WARN] could not resolve indirect dep {dep}; skipping", file = sys.stderr)
elif depth < _MAX_DEP_FOLLOWUP_DEPTH:
worklist.extend((d, depth + 1) for d in _requires_dist_for(dep_name, dep_ver, meta))
def download_packages(
specs: list[str],
dest: str,
*,
with_deps: bool = False,
) -> tuple[list[tuple[str, str]], list[str]]:
"""Download packages to dest using pip download. NEVER installs.
Returns ``(results, download_errors)``: ``results`` is ``(spec_or_name,
filepath)`` per archive; ``download_errors`` is one-line transport-failure
summaries. A non-empty ``download_errors`` MUST make the caller exit
non-zero so a partial scan can't masquerade as "0 findings, all clean".
with_deps=True downloads the full transitive tree (flat dir); a bulk resolve
failure (sdist-only package or version conflict) degrades to per-spec
resolution + direct sdist fetch rather than blanking the shard.
with_deps=False (default) downloads each spec individually with --no-deps,
also falling back to a direct sdist fetch when no wheel exists.
"""
results: list[tuple[str, str]] = []
download_errors: list[str] = []
env = _pip_download_env()
if with_deps:
os.makedirs(dest, exist_ok = True)
# Fast path: resolve + download the whole transitive tree in one call.
# `--only-binary :all:` refuses sdists so we never build for metadata.
rc, stderr = _pip_download_with_deps(specs, dest, env)
if rc != 0:
# Atomic resolve failed -- a sdist-only package, or a cross-package
# version conflict (ResolutionImpossible). Degrade to per-spec
# resolution so one bad spec can't blank the shard, then direct-fetch
# any sdist-only holdouts (no build). Genuine failures still record an
# error so the caller exits 2.
print(
f" [INFO] bulk --with-deps resolve failed "
f"({stderr.strip()[:160]}); falling back to per-spec resolution "
f"for {len(specs)} spec(s).",
file = sys.stderr,
)
_resolve_per_spec_with_deps(specs, dest, env, download_errors)
# Collect everything that landed (bulk OR per-spec OR direct sdist).
_collect_flat_dir(dest, results)
else:
for spec in specs:
raw_name = _extract_pkg_name(spec)
# Sanitize before joining into `dest` to prevent path traversal
safe_name = _RE_PKG_NAME_SANITIZE.sub("_", raw_name) or "_pkg"
pkg_dir = os.path.join(dest, safe_name)
os.makedirs(pkg_dir, exist_ok = True)
cmd = [
sys.executable,
"-m",
"pip",
"download",
"--no-deps",
*_PIP_DOWNLOAD_PIN_FLAGS,
"--dest",
pkg_dir,
spec,
]
try:
proc = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output = True, text = True, timeout = 120, env = env)
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
download_errors.append(f"pip download timed out for {spec}")
continue
if proc.returncode != 0:
# No wheel? Direct-fetch the sdist (no build) before erroring.
name = _extract_pkg_name(spec)
version = _spec_pin_version(spec)
meta = _pypi_json(name)
if meta is not None and not _release_has_wheel(meta, version):
fpath, serr = _download_sdist_direct(name, version, pkg_dir, meta = meta)
if fpath is not None:
results.append((spec, fpath))
continue
download_errors.append(serr or f"sdist fetch failed for {name}")
continue
download_errors.append(
f"pip download failed for {spec}: {proc.stderr.strip()[:300]}"
)
continue
for fname in os.listdir(pkg_dir):
fpath = os.path.join(pkg_dir, fname)
if os.path.isfile(fpath):
results.append((spec, fpath))
return results, download_errors
# Parse requirements files
_RE_NAME = re.compile(r"^([A-Za-z0-9]([A-Za-z0-9._-]*[A-Za-z0-9])?)")
def _extract_pkg_name(spec: str) -> str:
"""Extract the package name from a pip spec string."""
m = _RE_NAME.match(spec)
return (
m.group(1) if m else spec.split("==")[0].split(">=")[0].split("<=")[0].split("[")[0].strip()
)
def parse_requirements(req_files: list[str]) -> list[dict]:
"""Parse requirements files into a list of dicts with source tracking.
Each dict has keys: spec, name, source_file, line_num, raw_line, is_git.
"""
results = []
for req_file in req_files:
abs_path = os.path.abspath(req_file)
try:
with open(req_file) as f:
for line_num, raw_line in enumerate(f, 1):
line = raw_line.strip()
# Skip blanks, comments, options, nested -r
if not line or line.startswith("#") or line.startswith("-"):
continue
is_git = line.startswith("git+") or "git+" in line.split("#")[0]
# Strip inline comments and env markers
spec = line.split("#")[0].strip()
spec = spec.split(";")[0].strip()
if not spec:
continue
name = _extract_pkg_name(spec) if not is_git else spec
results.append(
{
"spec": spec,
"name": name,
"source_file": abs_path,
"line_num": line_num,
"raw_line": raw_line.rstrip("\n"),
"is_git": is_git,
}
)
except FileNotFoundError:
print(f" [ERROR] Requirements file not found: {req_file}", file = sys.stderr)
return results
def get_downloaded_version(archive_path: str) -> str | None:
"""Extract version from wheel/sdist filename.
Wheel: {name}-{version}(-...).whl
Sdist: {name}-{version}.tar.gz / .zip
"""
basename = os.path.basename(archive_path)
# Wheel: name-version-pytag-abitag-platform.whl
if basename.endswith(".whl"):
parts = basename[:-4].split("-")
if len(parts) >= 2:
return parts[1]
# Sdist: name-version.<ext>
for ext in (".tar.gz", ".tar.bz2", ".tar.xz", ".tar", ".zip"):
if basename.endswith(ext):
stem = basename[: -len(ext)]
parts = stem.rsplit("-", 1)
if len(parts) == 2:
return parts[1]
return None
# Display
def severity_color(sev: str) -> str:
colors = {CRITICAL: "\033[91m", HIGH: "\033[93m", MEDIUM: "\033[33m"}
return colors.get(sev, "")
RESET = "\033[0m"
def print_findings(findings: list[Finding]) -> None:
if not findings:
print("\n All clean. No suspicious patterns found.")
return
findings.sort(key = lambda f: SEVERITY_ORDER.get(f.severity, 99))
print(f"\n {'=' * 72}")
print(f" SCAN RESULTS: {len(findings)} finding(s)")
print(f" {'=' * 72}")
for i, f in enumerate(findings, 1):
color = severity_color(f.severity)
print(f"\n [{i}] {color}{f.severity}{RESET} {f.check}")
print(f" Package: {f.package}")
print(f" File: {f.filename}")
if f.evidence:
for eline in f.evidence.split("\n"):
print(f" Evidence: {eline}")
print(f"\n {'=' * 72}")
crits = sum(1 for f in findings if f.severity == CRITICAL)
highs = sum(1 for f in findings if f.severity == HIGH)
meds = sum(1 for f in findings if f.severity == MEDIUM)
parts = []
if crits:
parts.append(f"{crits} CRITICAL")
if highs:
parts.append(f"{highs} HIGH")
if meds:
parts.append(f"{meds} MEDIUM")
print(f" Summary: {', '.join(parts)}")
# PyPI version queries and --fix logic
def version_sort_key(v: str) -> tuple:
"""PEP 440-ish sort key using stdlib only.
Handles: epoch!, major.minor.patch, pre/post/dev suffixes.
Returns a tuple that sorts in ascending version order.
"""
epoch = 0
if "!" in v:
epoch_str, v = v.split("!", 1)
try:
epoch = int(epoch_str)
except ValueError:
pass
# Split off pre/post/dev suffixes
v_clean = re.split(
r"[-_.]?(a|alpha|b|beta|rc|c|pre|preview|dev|post)", v, maxsplit = 1, flags = re.I
)
base = v_clean[0]
suffix = v[len(base) :]
parts = []
for seg in base.split("."):
try:
parts.append(int(seg))
except ValueError:
parts.append(0)
while len(parts) < 3: # pad to at least 3 parts
parts.append(0)
# Suffix ordering: dev < alpha < beta < rc < (none) < post
suffix_lower = suffix.lower().lstrip(".-_")
if suffix_lower.startswith("dev"):
suffix_rank = -4
elif suffix_lower.startswith(("a", "alpha")):
suffix_rank = -3
elif suffix_lower.startswith(("b", "beta")):
suffix_rank = -2
elif suffix_lower.startswith(("rc", "c", "pre", "preview")):
suffix_rank = -1
elif suffix_lower.startswith("post"):
suffix_rank = 1
else:
suffix_rank = 0 # stable
return (epoch, tuple(parts), suffix_rank, suffix)
def fetch_pypi_versions(name: str) -> list[str]:
"""Fetch all available versions for a package from PyPI JSON API.
Returns versions sorted ascending by version_sort_key.
"""
url = f"https://pypi.org/pypi/{name}/json"
try:
req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers = {"Accept": "application/json"})
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout = 30) as resp:
data = json.loads(resp.read().decode("utf-8"))
except Exception as e:
print(f" [ERROR] Failed to query PyPI for {name}: {e}", file = sys.stderr)
return []
versions = list(data.get("releases", {}).keys())
versions.sort(key = version_sort_key)
return versions
def find_safe_version(
name: str,
bad_ver: str,
tmpdir: str,
max_search: int = 10,
) -> str | None:
"""Search backward from bad_ver for a clean version.
Downloads and scans up to max_search older versions.
Returns the first clean version found, or None.
"""
versions = fetch_pypi_versions(name)
if not versions:
print(f" [WARN] No versions found on PyPI for {name}", file = sys.stderr)
return None
try:
bad_idx = versions.index(bad_ver)
except ValueError:
# bad_ver may resolve to a different string; search by sort key
bad_key = version_sort_key(bad_ver)
bad_idx = None
for i, v in enumerate(versions):
if version_sort_key(v) >= bad_key:
bad_idx = i
break
if bad_idx is None:
bad_idx = len(versions) - 1
# Search backward from the version before bad_ver
candidates = versions[:bad_idx]
candidates.reverse() # newest-first among older versions
candidates = candidates[:max_search]
if not candidates:
print(f" [WARN] No older versions to scan for {name}", file = sys.stderr)
return None
print(f" Searching {len(candidates)} older version(s) of {name}...")
for ver in candidates:
spec = f"{name}=={ver}"
scan_dir = os.path.join(tmpdir, f"{name}_{ver}")
os.makedirs(scan_dir, exist_ok = True)
downloaded, download_errors = download_packages([spec], scan_dir)
if not downloaded:
for err in download_errors:
print(f" [WARN] {err}", file = sys.stderr)
continue
clean = True
for _, archive_path in downloaded:
findings = scan_archive(archive_path, name)
# Delete archive immediately after scanning
try:
os.remove(archive_path)
except OSError:
pass
crit_findings = [f for f in findings if f.severity == CRITICAL]
if crit_findings:
clean = False
print(f" {ver} -- CRITICAL finding(s), skipping")
break
shutil.rmtree(scan_dir, ignore_errors = True)
if clean:
print(f" {ver} -- clean!")
return ver
return None
def update_req_line(raw_line: str, safe_ver: str, old_ver: str | None) -> str:
"""Rewrite a single requirements line to pin to safe_ver.
Preserves env markers, inline comments, and line format.
Appends a comment noting the pin.
"""
# Split off inline comment
comment = ""
if " #" in raw_line:
code_part, comment = raw_line.split(" #", 1)
comment = " #" + comment
else:
code_part = raw_line
# Split off env markers (after semicolon)
marker = ""
if ";" in code_part:
code_part, marker = code_part.split(";", 1)
marker = ";" + marker
# Replace version specifier (==1.2.3, >=1.2, ~=1.0, !=1.1, or bare name)
rewritten = re.sub(
r"([A-Za-z0-9._-]+)\s*(?:[><=!~]=?[^;#,\s]*(?:\s*,\s*[><=!~]=?[^;#,\s]*)*)?",
lambda m: f"{m.group(1)}=={safe_ver}",
code_part.strip(),
count = 1,
)
was_note = f" (was {old_ver})" if old_ver else ""
pin_comment = f" # pinned by pth_scanner{was_note}"
return f"{rewritten}{marker}{pin_comment}"
def update_req_file(filepath: str, updates: dict[int, str]) -> None:
"""Apply line-level updates to a requirements file.
updates: {line_num (1-indexed): new_line_text}
Writes atomically (sibling tmp file, fsync, os.replace) so a crash mid-write
never leaves a half-written file that re-introduces a malicious pin.
"""
with open(filepath) as f:
lines = f.readlines()
for line_num, new_text in updates.items():
idx = line_num - 1
if 0 <= idx < len(lines):
ending = "\n" if lines[idx].endswith("\n") else "" # preserve line ending
lines[idx] = new_text + ending
dirpath = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(filepath)) or "."
fd, tmp_path = tempfile.mkstemp(
prefix = ".req_fix.",
dir = dirpath,
)
try:
with os.fdopen(fd, "w") as f:
f.writelines(lines)
f.flush()
os.fsync(f.fileno())
os.replace(tmp_path, filepath)
except Exception:
# Best effort cleanup; the destination was never touched.
try:
os.unlink(tmp_path)
except OSError:
pass
raise
def _run_fix(critical_pkgs: set[str], entries: list[dict], max_search: int) -> None:
"""Run the --fix flow: find safe versions, update requirements files."""
# Map package names to entries for source tracking
pkg_entries: dict[str, list[dict]] = {}
for e in entries:
norm = e["name"].lower().replace("-", "_").replace(".", "_")
pkg_entries.setdefault(norm, []).append(e)
changes_summary: list[str] = []
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix = "pth_fix_") as tmpdir:
for pkg_name in sorted(critical_pkgs):
norm = pkg_name.lower().replace("-", "_").replace(".", "_")
related = pkg_entries.get(norm, [])
# Check if any are git deps
git_entries = [e for e in related if e["is_git"]]
if git_entries:
for e in git_entries:
src = e["source_file"] or "CLI"
print(f" [SKIP] {pkg_name} is a git URL dep in {src}, cannot auto-update")
changes_summary.append(f" SKIP {pkg_name} (git URL)")
continue
# Resolved version: try to extract from the spec (name==1.2.3)
current_ver = None
for e in related:
spec = e["spec"]
if "==" in spec:
current_ver = spec.split("==", 1)[1].split(";")[0].strip()
break
if not current_ver:
# If no pinned version, download to find what pip resolves
dl_dir = os.path.join(tmpdir, f"resolve_{pkg_name}")
os.makedirs(dl_dir, exist_ok = True)
downloaded, download_errors = download_packages([pkg_name], dl_dir)
if downloaded:
current_ver = get_downloaded_version(downloaded[0][1])
else:
for err in download_errors:
print(f" [WARN] {err}", file = sys.stderr)
shutil.rmtree(dl_dir, ignore_errors = True)
if not current_ver:
print(f" [WARN] Cannot determine current version of {pkg_name}, skipping fix")
changes_summary.append(f" SKIP {pkg_name} (version unknown)")
continue
print(f"\n Fixing {pkg_name} (current: {current_ver})...")
safe_ver = find_safe_version(pkg_name, current_ver, tmpdir, max_search)
if not safe_ver:
print(
f" [FAIL] No safe version found for {pkg_name} within {max_search} older versions"
)
changes_summary.append(
f" FAIL {pkg_name}=={current_ver} -> no safe version found"
)
continue
print(f" [OK] {pkg_name}: {current_ver} -> {safe_ver}")
changes_summary.append(f" FIX {pkg_name}=={current_ver} -> {pkg_name}=={safe_ver}")
# Update all occurrences in requirements files
file_updates: dict[str, dict[int, str]] = {}
for e in related:
if e["source_file"] is None:
# CLI arg, no file to update
print(f" (CLI arg, no file to update)")
continue
new_line = update_req_line(e["raw_line"], safe_ver, current_ver)
file_updates.setdefault(e["source_file"], {})[e["line_num"]] = new_line
print(f" {e['source_file']}:{e['line_num']}")
print(f" - {e['raw_line']}")
print(f" + {new_line}")
for filepath, updates in file_updates.items():
update_req_file(filepath, updates)
print(f"\n {'=' * 72}")
print(f" FIX SUMMARY")
print(f" {'=' * 72}")
for line in changes_summary:
print(line)
print(f"\n Re-run without --fix to verify the scan is clean.")
# Directory scanning
def _find_requirements_files(root: str) -> list[str]:
"""Recursively find pip requirements files under root.
Matches:
- requirements*.txt (e.g. requirements.txt, requirements-dev.txt)
- *.txt inside directories named 'requirements' (e.g. requirements/base.txt)
Skips:
- .egg-info dirs, venvs, hidden dirs, __pycache__, node_modules
"""
import fnmatch
skip_dirs = {"__pycache__", "node_modules", "venv", ".venv", "site-packages"}
results = []
for dirpath, dirnames, filenames in os.walk(root):
# Skip hidden and known non-requirement dirs
dirnames[:] = [
d
for d in dirnames
if not d.startswith(".") and d not in skip_dirs and not d.endswith(".egg-info")
]
dirname = os.path.basename(dirpath)
for fname in sorted(filenames):
if not fname.endswith(".txt"):
continue
if fnmatch.fnmatch(fname.lower(), "requirements*.txt"):
results.append(os.path.join(dirpath, fname))
# *.txt inside a directory named "requirements"
elif dirname == "requirements":
results.append(os.path.join(dirpath, fname))
return sorted(results)
# Baseline allowlist: triaged known-good CRITICAL/HIGH findings so the gate can
# enforce without drowning in legitimate-library noise. Matched on
# ``(package, basename(filename), check)`` -- not evidence text -- so a version
# bump does not reopen a finding, but a *new* kind of finding in a listed file
# is a different check and still fails. Regenerate with ``--write-baseline``.
_DEFAULT_BASELINE_PATH = os.path.join(
os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)), "scan_packages_baseline.json"
)
def _norm_pkg(name: str) -> str:
"""PEP 503-style normalization so requests/Requests/req_uests collapse."""
return re.sub(r"[-_.]+", "-", (name or "").strip().lower())
# Leading "<name>-<version>/" archive root of an sdist member, which carries the
# version. Stripping it (but keeping the rest of the path) gives a key that is
# stable across version bumps yet still distinguishes same-named files.
_RE_SDIST_ROOT = re.compile(r"^[^/]+-\d[^/]*/")
def _relpath_in_package(filename: str) -> str:
"""Package-relative path: drop an sdist's version-carrying archive root.
Wheel members are already package-relative (``numba/cuda/utils.py``); sdist
members sit under ``numba-0.60.0/...``, so strip that one leading segment.
"""
return _RE_SDIST_ROOT.sub("", filename, count = 1)
def _finding_key(f: Finding) -> tuple[str, str, str]:
"""Stable allowlist key: normalized package, package-relative path, check.
The package-relative path (not just basename) keeps the key stable across
version bumps while still distinguishing same-named files like ``utils.py``.
"""
return (_norm_pkg(f.package), _relpath_in_package(f.filename), f.check)
def _load_baseline(path: str) -> set[tuple[str, str, str]]:
"""Load an allowlist JSON into a set of match keys. Missing file -> empty."""
try:
with open(path, "r", encoding = "utf-8") as fh:
data = json.load(fh)
except FileNotFoundError:
return set()
except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
print(f" [WARN] could not read baseline {path}: {exc}", file = sys.stderr)
return set()
keys: set[tuple[str, str, str]] = set()
for e in data.get("entries", []):
try:
keys.add((_norm_pkg(e["package"]), _relpath_in_package(e["file"]), e["check"]))
except (KeyError, TypeError):
continue
return keys
def _write_baseline(path: str, findings: list[Finding]) -> None:
"""Persist CRITICAL/HIGH findings as an allowlist for human triage."""
entries = []
seen: set[tuple[str, str, str]] = set()
for f in sorted(findings, key = lambda f: SEVERITY_ORDER.get(f.severity, 99)):
if f.severity not in (CRITICAL, HIGH):
continue
key = _finding_key(f)
if key in seen:
continue
seen.add(key)
entries.append(
{
"package": f.package,
"file": _relpath_in_package(f.filename),
"check": f.check,
"severity": f.severity,
"evidence": f.evidence[:240],
}
)
doc = {
"_comment": (
"scan_packages.py allowlist. Each entry is a CRITICAL/HIGH finding "
"manually judged benign. Matched on (package, package-relative file, "
"check); evidence/severity are for review only. Regenerate with "
"--write-baseline AFTER reviewing every line."
),
"version": 1,
"entries": entries,
}
with open(path, "w", encoding = "utf-8") as fh:
json.dump(doc, fh, indent = 2, sort_keys = False)
fh.write("\n")
print(f" Wrote {len(entries)} baseline entr(y/ies) to {path}")
def _partition_baseline(
findings: list[Finding], baseline: set[tuple[str, str, str]]
) -> tuple[list[Finding], list[Finding]]:
"""Split findings into (active, suppressed) by allowlist membership."""
if not baseline:
return list(findings), []
active, suppressed = [], []
for f in findings:
(suppressed if _finding_key(f) in baseline else active).append(f)
return active, suppressed
# Main
def main() -> int:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
description = __doc__,
formatter_class = argparse.RawDescriptionHelpFormatter,
)
parser.add_argument(
"packages",
nargs = "*",
help = "Package specs (e.g. requests==2.32.5 fastapi)",
)
parser.add_argument(
"-r",
"--requirements",
action = "append",
default = [],
metavar = "FILE",
help = "Requirements file(s) to scan",
)
parser.add_argument(
"-d",
"--scan-dir",
action = "append",
default = [],
metavar = "DIR",
help = "Recursively find requirements*.txt files in DIR",
)
parser.add_argument(
"--with-deps",
action = "store_true",
help = "Also download and scan transitive dependencies (full dependency tree)",
)
parser.add_argument(
"--fix",
action = "store_true",
help = "Auto-search for safe versions and update requirements files",
)
parser.add_argument(
"--max-search",
type = int,
default = 10,
metavar = "N",
help = "Max older versions to scan when searching for safe version (default: 10)",
)
parser.add_argument(
"--baseline",
metavar = "FILE",
default = None,
help = (
"Allowlist JSON of triaged known-good findings to suppress. "
f"Defaults to {os.path.basename(_DEFAULT_BASELINE_PATH)} next to this "
"script if present."
),
)
parser.add_argument(
"--no-baseline",
action = "store_true",
help = "Ignore the auto-discovered baseline allowlist.",
)
parser.add_argument(
"--write-baseline",
metavar = "FILE",
default = None,
help = (
"Write the current CRITICAL/HIGH findings to FILE as an allowlist, "
"then exit 0. Review every entry before committing it."
),
)
args = parser.parse_args()
# --scan-dir: auto-discover requirements files
req_files = list(args.requirements)
for scan_dir in args.scan_dir:
found = _find_requirements_files(scan_dir)
if found:
print(f" Found {len(found)} requirements file(s) in {scan_dir}/")
for f in found:
print(f" {f}")
req_files.extend(found)
else:
print(f" [WARN] No requirements files found in {scan_dir}/", file = sys.stderr)
# Build unified entry list: list of dicts with source tracking
entries: list[dict] = []
# CLI args -> entries with no source file
for pkg in args.packages or []:
entries.append(
{
"spec": pkg,
"name": _extract_pkg_name(pkg),
"source_file": None,
"line_num": None,
"raw_line": pkg,
"is_git": pkg.startswith("git+") or "git+" in pkg,
}
)
# Requirements files -> entries with source tracking
if req_files:
entries.extend(parse_requirements(req_files))
if not entries:
parser.print_help()
return 2
# Deduplicate by normalized name, preserving first occurrence
seen: set[str] = set()
unique_entries: list[dict] = []
for e in entries:
key = e["name"].lower().replace("-", "_").replace(".", "_")
if key not in seen:
seen.add(key)
unique_entries.append(e)
specs = [e["spec"] for e in unique_entries]
mode_label = " (with transitive deps)" if args.with_deps else ""
print(f" Scanning {len(specs)} package(s){mode_label}...")
all_findings: list[Finding] = []
# Hard pin-block: refuse to download known-malicious PyPI versions
specs, blocked_findings = _check_blocked_pypi_versions(specs)
all_findings.extend(blocked_findings)
tmpdir = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix = "pth_scan_")
atexit.register(lambda d = tmpdir: shutil.rmtree(d, ignore_errors = True))
download_errors: list[str] = []
try:
downloaded, download_errors = download_packages(
specs,
tmpdir,
with_deps = args.with_deps,
)
print(f" Downloaded {len(downloaded)} archive(s).")
for spec, archive_path in downloaded:
pkg_name = _extract_pkg_name(spec)
findings = scan_archive(archive_path, pkg_name)
all_findings.extend(findings)
# Delete archive immediately after scanning
try:
os.remove(archive_path)
except OSError:
pass
finally:
shutil.rmtree(tmpdir, ignore_errors = True)
# Baseline allowlist: suppress triaged, known-good findings so the CI gate
# can be enforcing without red-failing on legitimate-library noise.
if args.no_baseline:
baseline_path = None
elif args.baseline:
baseline_path = args.baseline
elif os.path.isfile(_DEFAULT_BASELINE_PATH):
baseline_path = _DEFAULT_BASELINE_PATH
else:
baseline_path = None
baseline = _load_baseline(baseline_path) if baseline_path else set()
active, suppressed = _partition_baseline(all_findings, baseline)
print_findings(active)
if suppressed:
crit_s = sum(1 for f in suppressed if f.severity == CRITICAL)
high_s = sum(1 for f in suppressed if f.severity == HIGH)
med_s = sum(1 for f in suppressed if f.severity == MEDIUM)
print(
f"\n {len(suppressed)} finding(s) suppressed by baseline "
f"{baseline_path} "
f"({crit_s} CRITICAL, {high_s} HIGH, {med_s} MEDIUM)."
)
# --fix mode: auto-search for safe versions (only real, non-baselined ones)
if args.fix and active:
critical_pkgs = {f.package for f in active if f.severity == CRITICAL}
if critical_pkgs:
print(
f"\n --fix: Searching for safe versions of {len(critical_pkgs)} CRITICAL package(s)..."
)
_run_fix(critical_pkgs, entries, args.max_search)
# Surface pip-download failures BEFORE the exit code so a partial download
# can't masquerade as "0 findings, all clean" (silent-failure hardening 4).
# Also keeps us from writing a baseline from an incomplete scan.
if download_errors:
print(
f"\n {'=' * 72}\n"
f" SCAN INCOMPLETE: {len(download_errors)} pip download "
f"failure(s):\n"
f" {'=' * 72}",
file = sys.stderr,
)
for err in download_errors:
print(f" [ERROR] {err}", file = sys.stderr)
print(
" Refusing to report 'all clean' on a partial scan; exiting 2.",
file = sys.stderr,
)
return 2
# --write-baseline: persist the full current CRITICAL/HIGH set as the new
# allowlist (ignoring any loaded baseline), then exit 0. Only reached once
# the scan is known complete.
if args.write_baseline:
_write_baseline(args.write_baseline, all_findings)
return 0
# Exit code: 1 only if a NON-baselined CRITICAL or HIGH remains. This is the
# signal CI gates on once the baseline reaches a clean run.
if any(f.severity in (CRITICAL, HIGH) for f in active):
return 1
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())
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