8 commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Michael Han	6d8c18cd1a	Replace standalone Studio wording with Unsloth (#7221) ... * Replace standalone Studio wording with Unsloth Replace the single word Studio with Unsloth wherever it is used as shorthand for Unsloth Studio in docs, CLI output, UI strings, i18n locales, workflow display names, comments and docstrings. Kept unchanged: the full name Unsloth Studio, third party product names (LM Studio, Visual Studio, Mac Studio), feature names (Recipe Studio, Fine-tuning Studio and its translations), and all identifiers such as env vars, commands, paths and filenames. * Address review feedback on the Studio wording rename Use "an" before Unsloth where the rename left the article as "a". Restore the split brand where Unsloth and Studio render as two halves of the full product name: the onboarding sidebar subtitle and the IPv6 localhost warning. Scope two messages to the full name Unsloth Studio where plain Unsloth was misleading: the AMD README bullet and the CLI studio setup error.	2026-07-19 00:47:04 -07:00
Daniel Han	73d9653d5b	scan_packages: key baseline on matched-code hash so payloads in baselined files are not auto-suppressed (#6552) ... * scan_packages: key baseline on matched-code hash The baseline matched on (package, package-relative file, check), which excluded the matched code, so a future finding of the same check in the same file was suppressed regardless of what the code did. A malicious future version of an already-baselined package could place a payload in the same file under the same check and pass the enforcing gate. Key the baseline on a hash of the matched code too. The hash is over the deduped, sorted set of matched spans with L<NN>: line markers stripped, so version bumps, line shifts and match reordering stay stable while new or changed flagged code reopens the finding. Version is left out of the key so routine dependency bumps do not reopen every entry. The hash is capped and recomputable from the stored evidence. Regenerate scan_packages_baseline.json against the current dependency set; the hf-stack, studio and extras scan shards pass enforcing (no active CRITICAL or HIGH). * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * scan_packages: refresh baseline for newer unsloth-zoo release A newer unsloth-zoo published after the first regenerate added tests/test_mlx_save_export_regressions.py, a benign test fixture (temporary_location="/tmp/ignored") that trips the /tmp dropper check. Regenerate the hf-stack shard against the current set so the entry is allowlisted; studio and extras are unchanged. * scan_packages: harden baseline loading against malformed JSON Guard against a non-dict top-level baseline and non-dict entries so a corrupt or hand-edited allowlist warns and fails closed instead of crashing with AttributeError, and treat an explicit evidence: null as empty. * scan_packages: hash the full match set, keep indentation, strip only the marker Address the evidence-hash review feedback: - Capture every matching line, not the first three, so a payload appended after existing matches in a baselined file and check reopens the finding instead of riding the sample. - Preserve leading indentation so a flagged line moved out of a guarded block reads as changed. - Strip only each span's prefix up to the first L<NN>: marker, so an L<NN>: inside the matched code is kept and a change to it reopens the finding. Evidence and its hash are stored in full and stay recomputable from the stored field. Regenerate the baseline; hf-stack, studio and extras pass enforcing with no active CRITICAL or HIGH. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * scan_packages: bind baseline evidence to full matched code Address review feedback on the evidence-hash baseline key: - Split evidence only on real span delimiters (" | " before an L<NN>: marker, or a newline), so a bitwise-or or union type in matched code is no longer split apart into separate spans. - Record matched lines in full (drop the 160-char per-line cap) and record every distinct multiline match, so code appended past the cap or a second cross-line match reopens the finding instead of riding the first one. - Give the large-JS-bundle and .pth base64-blob findings a content digest instead of empty or prefix-only evidence, and record all .pth import lines, so a changed bundle, blob or import no longer inherits a baselined empty or truncated key. - Warn when a loaded baseline has entries without evidence_hash so a legacy baseline is regenerated rather than silently degraded. Regenerate scripts/scan_packages_baseline.json against the current dep set and add regression tests for each case. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * scan_packages: harden multiline and duplicate evidence handling Follow-up hardening so the evidence hash tracks the full matched code: - For DOTALL patterns that match across lines, record every line the match spans (not just the start line), so a change on a continuation line (the URL inside a baselined C2 loop, a swapped credential path) reopens the finding. A pathological greedy span is bounded to its head line plus a digest of the rest. - Keep duplicate spans in the canonical evidence so a second identical matched line in a new code path changes the key instead of deduping away. - Anchor the evidence prefix to strip only a genuine leading label or line-number marker, leaving a marker-like "L<NN>:" inside raw .pth code intact. - Make the legacy-baseline warning explicit that entries without an evidence_hash reopen rather than suppress under a coarse key. Regenerate scripts/scan_packages_baseline.json (same finding set; entries for same-file repeated checks are now tracked separately) and add tests. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * scan_packages: bind every combo and large finding to its full content Close the remaining asymmetric-evidence gaps so a changed payload cannot ride a reviewed baseline entry: - Digest a capped multiline span from the code without line markers, so a pure line shift stays stable while a continuation-line change reopens. - Give the "Unusually large executable .pth" finding a content digest instead of keying on byte size and import-line count alone. - Record both contributing signals for the JS credential+network stealer, the shell credential+network and persistence-hook combos, and the hidden network+exec docstring payload, so changing the network/exec side reopens. - Allow punctuation in an evidence label prefix so a "network+exec:" label is stripped and line shifts do not change the key. Regenerate scripts/scan_packages_baseline.json and add tests for each case. * scan_packages: bind remaining Python combos; key npm baseline on evidence Python scanner: the openssl+key, anti-analysis, DNS-exfil and base64+exec+blob combos recorded only one contributing signal, so a changed payload on the other side could ride a reviewed baseline entry. Each now binds every co-occurring signal (and the blob is digested, since it can sit on a separate line from the decode call). npm scanner: scan_npm_packages.py keyed its allowlist on (package, path, pattern) only, the same coarse-key bypass the Python scanner just closed. Add an evidence hash to the key (schema v3, fail-closed on older baselines) and store full evidence. The committed baseline stays empty by design. Regenerate scripts/scan_packages_baseline.json and add tests for each case. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * scan_npm_packages: bind full blob evidence and harden baseline loader Follow-up on the npm evidence-hash key: - _evidence now records every match and, when a snippet is truncated for display, appends a digest of the full match. The obfuscated-blob key was hashing only the truncated first-match snippet, so a changed payload tail or an appended blob in the same package/file/pattern could ride a reviewed entry. - _load_baseline guards that the root is an object, entries is a list, and each entry is a dict before reading it, so a malformed baseline warns and fails closed instead of raising AttributeError. Add tests for a changed blob tail reopening the key and for malformed entries. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * scan_packages: symmetric baseline-loader guards; bind npm outbound host context - Python _load_baseline now rejects a non-list "entries" with a warning instead of raising TypeError, matching the npm loader. - npm cred-surface-host (outbound) records the host with its URL path / fetch call / host config, so a changed outbound path, headers or body reopens the key rather than riding the bare host literal. Add tests for both. * scan_npm_packages: migrate v2 baselines and bind host-config outbound context - _load_baseline now migrates schema v2 entries by recomputing the evidence hash from stored evidence (with a legacy warning), matching the Python loader, instead of discarding them; only pre-v2 basename schemas are rejected. - The cred-surface-host (outbound) host-config branch now captures the whole line (path, headers, body), so a changed outbound payload on the same hostname line reopens the key instead of riding the bare host snippet. Add tests for v2 migration and the host-config context binding. * scan packages: bind PEM key bodies and npm windowed evidence to baseline keys scan_packages: embedded-key findings now pin the full PEM block (BEGIN..END) via a content digest, so a key body swapped under the same marker reopens the finding instead of riding the unchanged BEGIN line. Single-line and DER keys were already bound by their full matched line; marker-only references with no END block (validation header lists) are unaffected, so the committed baseline is unchanged. scan_npm_packages: _evidence now digests the full containing line whenever the shown snippet is only a window into it (short match on a long line, or a truncated payload), so a changed payload tail outside the display window reopens the key. The npm baseline is empty, so this changes no suppressions. Adds regression tests for both cases. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * scan packages: bind multi-line evidence and every blob to baseline keys _extract_evidence now extends each single-line match over its bracket continuations, so a multi-line call binds its argument lines and a changed URL or body on a continuation line reopens the key. After the per-line pass it also records cross-line matches the scan cannot otherwise see (a DOTALL regex, or a multi-line construct appended under a check that already had a one-line match), so an appended multiline payload reopens instead of riding the key. _blob_digest hashes every large base64 blob (not just the first) for the base64+exec finding and the .pth large-blob finding, so an appended or swapped second encoded payload reopens; single-blob files keep the same digest. scan_npm_packages _evidence digests the full logical line (the matched line plus its bracket-continuation lines), so a multi-line fetch's option and header lines bind and a changed payload on a following line reopens the outbound key. Regenerated the Python baseline: same package/file/check set, 24 entries pick up the wider multi-line evidence. Adds regression tests for each case. * scan packages: stop giant greedy spans from binding a whole-file digest When a greedy DOTALL pattern (reverse shell socket...subprocess, C2 loop) has its anchor tokens far apart, the match span covers the whole file. Digesting that span bound thousands of unrelated lines, so the evidence hash drifted on any edit between the anchors (a dependency bump reshuffling the file), which made a baselined finding reopen on an upstream release. The multiline pass now skips an oversized span when the per-line pass already bound the signal lines, so the evidence is the stable matched lines; a genuinely appended multi-line construct stays under the cap and is still recorded. Regenerated the Python baseline against Python 3.12 (the version the scan CI shards run) so the resolved dependency set matches CI. Same package/file/check set. Adds a regression test. * scan packages: tighten evidence binding (order, string brackets, span size) Address review follow-ups on the evidence extraction: - _canon_evidence keeps discovery (line) order instead of sorting. Line-shift stability already comes from stripping the L<NN>: markers, so order stays significant and reordering matched lines (a multi-line call's arguments) reopens the finding. - _logical_line_end (Python) and _logical_line_text (npm) blank string literals before counting brackets, so a ) inside a string argument does not close the logical line early and drop later argument lines. - The oversized-span skip now only drops a giant whole-file bridge (over 60 lines); a genuinely appended multi-line construct is recorded so its payload reopens, rather than riding an existing one-line match. - npm _logical_line_text binds the enclosing bracket group, so a host-config object whose { is on a prior line binds its path/headers/body lines. Regenerated the Python baseline (Python 3.12, matching the scan CI shards): same package/file/check set. Adds regression tests for each. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * scan npm packages: normalize and bound the logical-line digest - _evidence whitespace-normalizes the logical line before digesting (matching _evidence_hash), so a formatter-only reindent of the bound continuation lines does not change the sha256 suffix and reopen an unchanged finding. - _logical_line_text follows a bracket group to its close up to a hard 200-line cap (digest input only), so a config object longer than the backward window still binds its whole tail instead of silently truncating. Adds regression tests. npm baseline is empty, so no regeneration is needed. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * scan: cap single-line evidence and widen npm opener window Cap each rendered evidence line at 200 chars in scan_packages.py: a long or minified one-line file is shown as a bounded prefix plus a sha256 of the full line, so a packed payload cannot dump unbounded content into the CI logs or baseline while a change past the cutoff still changes the digest and reopens the finding. Mirrors how the npm scanner bounds its snippets. Widen the npm backward opener window (_MAX_CONT_LINES 12 to 200, symmetric with the forward cap) so a host deep inside a large options object binds the whole object, not just its own line; a changed path, header, or body on any property reopens. Regenerate the Python baseline with Python 3.12: only the protobuf nspkg.pth and unsloth-zoo compiler.py evidence change, both from the new line cap; the package/file/check key set is unchanged. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * scan: bind all host contexts, deep call continuations, far-back npm openers Three fail-closed evidence gaps surfaced by review of the previous round. scan_npm_packages.py: measure the forward bracket-group cap from the matched line (idx + _MAX_GROUP_LINES) instead of the opener, so an opener found near the widened backward limit no longer consumes the forward budget and drops the path, headers, or body that follow the host. scan_npm_packages.py: _outbound_host_evidence now records every outbound context form for a host (URL, fetch-context, host-config), claiming each non-overlapping match in form order, so a separate host-config request added beside an already-baselined URL changes the evidence and reopens the key. The common single-context case keeps its existing snippet. scan_packages.py: follow a matched Python call over its continuations up to a separate _MAX_CALL_LINES (40), decoupled from the 12-line display threshold, so a multi-line requests.post( binds its whole argument list in the digest and a changed body deep in the call reopens; bounded so a miscounted bracket cannot swallow unrelated code. No baseline change: the current dependency set has no matched call that closes between 13 and 40 lines, confirmed by a Python 3.12 regenerate that produced a byte-identical baseline. * scan: clamp npm depth, pin large bundles, follow backslash and bound .pth dump Four fail-closed evidence gaps surfaced by review of the previous round. scan_npm_packages.py: clamp the backward opener scan at depth 0 so a leading unmatched closer (a preceding block whose opener is outside the backward window) no longer drives depth negative and masks the real enclosing opener that follows; a host-config object after such a block now binds and a changed path reopens. scan_packages.py: a large JS bundle now pins its whole content even when another JS heuristic already fired. The bundle digest was only added when no other finding existed; it is now appended to every finding's evidence on a large bundle, so an unchanged obfuscation signature no longer lets changed payload elsewhere ride the matched-line key. scan_packages.py: _logical_line_end follows explicit backslash line continuations, so a call split with a backslash before its parenthesis binds the continuation line (URL/body) instead of returning at the zero-depth API line. scan_packages.py: the catch-all .pth import evidence is bounded through _cap_line (prefix plus a digest of every line) so a large .pth of benign imports cannot dump the whole member into the logs or baseline while an appended or swapped import still reopens. Baseline regenerated with Python 3.12: key set unchanged; one entry (unsloth-zoo compiler.py) gains the backslash-continued banner lines now bound by the continuation fix. * scan: handle multi-line strings, lifecycle bodies, and de-quadratic evidence Addresses a review round plus a performance audit of the evidence extractor. Correctness (fail-closed): - Bind the UNION of the single-line-blanked and multi-line-blanked bracket spans in both scanners. The multi-line view blanks a triple-quoted Python string or a backtick template literal that spans lines, so a `)` inside such a string no longer closes the enclosing call early and drop later arguments. The single-line view still counts a payload embedded INSIDE a string, so a dropper that hides a call in a string keeps its argument lines bound. Taking the larger span never shrinks the binding below either view, avoiding a fail-open regression. - cred-env-in-lifecycle now pins the whole lifecycle script body via a digest, so a changed non-token line (e.g. adding a curl exfil beside the token reference) reopens, not just a change on the token line. Performance / DoS (the scanner runs on attacker-controlled package files up to the 64 MiB / 16 MiB member caps, with no per-file time budget): - _extract_evidence precomputes newline offsets once and maps match offsets with bisect, removing the O(matches) whole-file content.count per match that made the finditer fallback quadratic (a crafted minified file went from ~13 s/MiB and hours at the cap to linear). - npm _index_text splits and string-blanks the file once per evidence call instead of per match (was O(matches x file) time and allocation). - Bound evidence output: _MAX_EVIDENCE_SPANS (Python) and _MAX_EVIDENCE_MATCHES (npm) fold the remainder into a digest so a file with thousands of matches cannot build a multi-megabyte evidence/baseline blob while an added/removed match past the cap still changes the key. - _outbound_host_evidence caps matches per form and bounds the overlap claim so a host repeated many times cannot make it quadratic. No baseline change: a Python 3.12 regenerate is byte-identical (the union equals the legacy single-line span for every current dependency file; the cap thresholds sit above the largest real entry), so these are forward-looking hardening with no drift. * scan: count all overflow matches, bind their context, blank JS regex literals Follow-ups on the evidence output caps from the previous commit. - _outbound_host_evidence no longer truncates each pattern's match iterator with islice; it iterates every match and runs the overlap dedup only while the display list is below the cap (so claimed stays bounded and the check is O(cap) per match, not quadratic), folding every match past the cap into the overflow digest. A host context beyond the 64th is counted again, so it reopens. - The overflow digest (both scanners, via a shared _overflow_digest) binds each overflow match's logical-line context, not just the regex match text, so a changed payload on an over-cap line reopens even with the matched token unchanged. - The multi-line JS blanked view now blanks regex-literal bodies (tracking the previous significant char for regex-vs-division and char classes for a literal `/` inside `[...]`), so a `)` inside `/)/` no longer closes an outbound call early. The bound span is the union of the single-line and multi-line views, so an imperfect regex decision only ever grows the span, never shrinks it. - The Python overflow digest canonicalizes spans (strips L<NN>: markers via _canon_evidence) before hashing, restoring line-shift stability for the over-cap region. No baseline change: the overflow branches only trigger above the per-finding caps (above the largest real entry), and the npm baseline is empty, so a Python 3.12 regenerate is byte-identical. * scan: refresh baseline for ipython interactiveshell.py span drift A newer ipython release changed the filesystem-enumeration span in IPython/core/interactiveshell.py, so its content digest no longer matched the baselined evidence and the studio scan shard flagged it as a non-baselined CRITICAL. Regenerated with Python 3.12: only the ipython entry's evidence_hash changes; the package/file/check key set is unchanged, and a studio enforcing spot-check exits 0. * Bound scanner evidence memory: stream overflow spans and cap lifecycle baseline size scan_packages.py: _extract_evidence no longer materializes a rendered span per match before slicing at the display cap. Once out holds _MAX_EVIDENCE_SPANS spans, further spans fold straight into a running digest, so a minified or padded file with hundreds of thousands of matching lines keeps memory bounded to the display cap instead of the match count. The fold reproduces _canon_evidence(" | ".join(overflow)) byte for byte, so the overflow digest and every baseline key are unchanged. scan_npm_packages.py: lifecycle-fetch-exec and cred-path-in-lifecycle stored the entire install script body as evidence, so --write-baseline on a package with a multi-MiB lifecycle script bloated the baseline JSON. Both now store a bounded matched snippet plus a body-sha256 digest, matching cred-env-in-lifecycle. The digest still binds the whole body, so a change to any line reopens the finding. Adds tests for the streamed overflow bound and the bounded-but-reopens lifecycle evidence. Baseline unchanged (byte-identical Python evidence; npm baseline empty). * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * Make npm bracket-group scan order-aware so a same-line close-then-open binds _scan_group counted brackets with a per-line net (opens minus closes), which collapses intra-line order: a line that closes a prior block and then opens the host-config object on the same line, e.g. `}); const opts = {`, nets to <= 0, so the trailing `{` was dropped and the group started at the hostname line. A changed path/headers on the following lines then hashed to the same evidence and could ride an existing baseline key. Replace the net count with an order-aware (L, R) reduction per line (L closers needing an opener to the left, R openers needing a closer to the right) and apply it in order in both the backward and forward scans, clamping stray closers at 0. The trailing opener now stays visible so the whole object binds and a changed payload reopens. Per-line cost is unchanged (one C-level bracket findall), so the existing outbound-host evidence is byte-identical on all prior shapes; only the previously-dropped same-line case changes. Adds a regression test for it. * Harden scanner evidence: bound memory and bind Python call tails fail-closed Five fixes across both scanners, none of which change the committed baseline (a full regen of all three pip shards produced a byte-identical 185-key set). scan_npm_packages.py: _evidence and _outbound_host_evidence collected every regex match into a list before applying the 64-match display cap, so a text file under the size cap that repeats a cheap signal (such as NPM_TOKEN) millions of times could allocate a huge list of re.Match objects and stall or OOM before the overflow digest ran. They now stream from finditer and fold overflow as matches arrive via a shared _fold_overflow_match helper, byte-identical to the prior digest. scan_packages.py: - _extract_evidence kept inserting every unique over-cap span into the seen set even after it stopped appending to the display list, so a generated file with millions of one-line matches still grew that set unbounded. It now tracks spans only while filling the display list (per-line spans are unique by line number, so dropping them past the cap cannot miss a dedup). - _scan_line_end counted brackets with a per-line net, so a continued statement that closes on the same line it opens a flagged call (a leading "]" before "requests.post(") had the call's open paren cancelled and bound only the opener line. It now applies brackets in order via _bracket_lr (leading closers clamp at 0), matching the npm bracket fix. - a single-quoted string continued by a trailing backslash was not tracked across lines, so a close paren inside the continued string on the next line closed the call early; _blank_code_strings now carries the continuation. - a call with more argument lines than the soft cap was hashed only through the cap, so a changed data=/headers tail past it stayed suppressed; a closing call is now followed to its real close under a 200-line hard limit (a never-closing opener still stops at the 40-line soft cap so it cannot swallow the file). Adds regression tests for each. npm baseline is empty; the Python baseline is unchanged (verified byte-identical by regenerating all three shards). * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * Bind giant DOTALL span anchors and add context to constant IOC evidence Two fail-closed gaps where a changed payload could keep the same evidence hash and stay suppressed by the baseline. scan_packages.py: a giant greedy DOTALL span (a cross-line IOC match bridging more than 60 lines, e.g. RE_TEMP_EXEC matching a /tmp line and a much-later subprocess line) was dropped entirely once the per-line pass had any match, so an appended cross-line payload -- a new /tmp line plus a later subprocess line that share no single line, so the per-line pass never binds them -- produced the same evidence and rode the key. The span is no longer dropped: it is bound by its head and tail anchor lines plus a digest over just those (no line numbers, so a pure line shift is stable). An added or moved anchor reopens the finding, while churn in the bridged interior stays stable, so this does not reintroduce whole-file drift. Two baseline entries (multiprocess test, unsloth-zoo scanner file) carry such a span and are refreshed; a full three-shard regen confirmed only those two keys change. scan_npm_packages.py: known-ioc-string and cred-surface-host (always-bad) recorded only the bare needle/host as evidence, so a reviewed tarball that kept the IOC string while altering the adjacent fetch/exfil body produced an identical key. They now bind matched-line context: known-ioc-string via the matched line and its bracket-group continuation, cred-surface-host (always-bad) via the outbound call context (path/headers/body, falling back to the bare host when not in an outbound call). A changed payload on the same call now reopens. Adds regression tests for each. npm baseline is empty; the Python baseline updates only the two giant-span entries. * Hash giant-span interiors, bind exec/eval trigger, JS content, intra-literal whitespace Four fail-closed gaps where a changed payload could keep the same evidence hash. scan_packages.py: - A giant bridged DOTALL span was bound only by its head and tail anchors, so a cross-line payload inserted into the bridged interior between unchanged outer anchors kept the same key. The whole span content is now digested (via _render), so any interior change reopens; a pure line shift stays stable because the digest is over the markerless code. Two baseline entries (multiprocess test, unsloth-zoo scanner file) carry such a span; with full-interior binding, multiprocess resolved at two versions across shards now yields two distinct entries where the anchor digest had collapsed them into one. - The exec/eval-with-hidden-payload findings omitted the visible exec/eval line that makes the hidden string executable, so flipping a harmless eval("1+1") to exec(__doc__) kept the same key while arming the payload. The trigger line from the real-code view is now bound into the evidence. - check_js_file extracted evidence with the Python-string-aware extractor, which does not blank JS backtick template literals, so a template containing a close paren closed a call's bracket span early and omitted later option/body lines. The full file content digest is now pinned to every JS finding (not just large bundles), binding the whole call. scan_npm_packages.py: the evidence canon collapsed all whitespace via split(), erasing whitespace inside JS string literals along with harmless indentation, so a changed request body 'a b' -> 'a b' kept the same key. A new _canon_preserve_strings collapses whitespace only OUTSIDE string literals (reindent-stable) while preserving it INSIDE single/double/backtick literals (intra-payload edits reopen). Used for the evidence hash and the logical-line digests. Adds regression tests for each. npm baseline is empty; the Python baseline updates the two giant-span entries and adds the second multiprocess version's entry. --------- Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-07-01 04:03:59 -07:00
Daniel Han	07c7f9bfca	Package scanners: close fail-open gaps in the sdist fallback and hidden-payload paths (#6359) ... * Package scanners: close fail-open gaps in the sdist fallback and hidden-payload paths Follow-up hardening on the now-blocking scanners so the enforcing gate cannot report clean while a malicious artifact goes unscanned. scan_packages.py - Hidden payload: also flag a network call AND an os/subprocess exec that live only in a blanked docstring/string of an exec/eval file (the fetch-then-run shape of an exec(__doc__) dropper). Either alone in real code was already covered; hidden together they are the payload. - Pinned releases fail closed: _release_files no longer falls back to the latest artifact when a pinned version is missing or empty, so a yanked/bad pin is an error instead of a different file being scanned in its place. - requires_dist is read from the pinned release's metadata, not the project-level (latest) document, so a sdist-only pin follows its own dependency tree. - Environment markers are evaluated (PEP 508) instead of dropping any marker that merely contains the word extra, so default-true markers like extra != 'dev' are kept; conservative fallback keeps a dep on any uncertainty. - Transitive recovery is a depth-bounded worklist: a wheel dependency whose own child is sdist-only is fetched (--no-deps) and scanned, then its children are recovered in turn, rather than being silently skipped. scan_npm_packages.py - Baseline keys use the package-relative path instead of the basename, so the same basename in a different directory is not over-suppressed. Tests cover each case; full scripts pass AST and ruff checks. * Address review: tighten marker scope, decoy-proof the dropper check, fail closed on missing pin metadata - Markers: keep any dep whose marker can hold on another install target (sys_platform == 'win32', python_version == '3.13'); only drop a marker that depends solely on extra and is false with no extra. A scanner runs on one target but must cover code installed on others. Pure-extra markers are evaluated against default_environment() with extra unset. - Hidden dropper: the network+exec docstring check now inspects the removed (blanked) span directly, so a benign visible network or subprocess call cannot mask a payload that still lives in a docstring. Carrier checks stay blanked-only (an in-code carrier is already caught by the normal check), so corpus findings are unchanged. - requires_dist: a pinned version whose own metadata cannot be fetched recovers nothing rather than substituting the latest release's dependency tree. - Transitive recovery: the last-ditch direct-sdist branch also chases the recovered package's declared deps, matching the other branches. - npm baseline: schema bumped to v2 (package-relative keys); a pre-v2 baseline with entries is ignored (fail closed) instead of mis-applying basename keys. Tests cover each case; scripts pass AST, ruff, and the import-hoist verifier. * Scanner: exclude comments from hidden-payload check, flag missing pin metadata as incomplete Hidden network+exec detection now inspects only docstring/string spans (what exec(__doc__)/exec(<str>) can actually run), so a real exec() beside comments that mention a network and a subprocess call no longer false-positives. Missing pinned-release metadata in transitive recovery records a download_error so the --with-deps path fails closed instead of treating it as no dependencies. Adds regression tests for both. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci --------- Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-06-18 06:50:16 -07:00
Daniel Han	21612c2e32	Package scanners: cut false positives and make the CI gate blocking (#6355) ... * Package scanners: cut false positives and make the CI gate blocking scan_packages.py and scan_npm_packages.py red-failed on legitimate library code, so the security-audit steps were left advisory. Reduce the false positives at the source and flip both gates to blocking. scan_packages.py: - Scan code only: blank comments and bare docstrings/doctests before matching (line numbers preserved), so prose and >>> examples cannot trip a finding. - Drop the platform.system() branch from the anti-analysis regex (under DOTALL it matched across the whole file, so every cross-platform library tripped it) and fix the dead /proc/self/status alternative. - Add a reviewed baseline allowlist (scan_packages_baseline.json) keyed on (package, basename, check): only non-baselined CRITICAL/HIGH exit 1, and a new kind of finding in a listed file still fails. - sdist fallback: when --with-deps cannot resolve a shard (a sdist-only package or a version conflict), drop to per-spec and fetch the raw sdist from the PyPI JSON API (no pip build, no setup.py), so every package is still scanned and no shard exits 2. scan_npm_packages.py: - Mirror the code-only JS/TS scanning (blank // and /* */ comments, string/template/regex aware) and the baseline allowlist. The npm corpus is clean today, so the baseline is empty. security-audit.yml: - Flip both scan steps to blocking (SCAN_ENFORCE=1), capturing the scanner exit via PIPESTATUS so tee does not mask it. tests/security: add coverage for the strip, baseline and sdist paths. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * Address review feedback on the package scanners - Do not blank f-strings during code-only scanning (they evaluate at import); and when a file uses exec/eval, rescan the original for payload carriers hidden in a docstring/string so exec(__doc__) style payloads stay visible. - sdist fallback: recover transitive deps with their version specifier (fetch the pinned version, not latest), and recover deps in the --no-deps branch too so a sdist-only transitive dependency is still scanned instead of silently skipped. - Baseline: key by package-relative path, not basename, so a future same-named file in another directory is not auto-suppressed. Regenerated the baseline accordingly. --------- Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-06-16 01:46:15 -07:00
Daniel Han	187144d4e7	Reduce and tighten code comments and docstrings repo-wide (#6095) ... Trim and tighten code comments and docstrings across the repository. Comment-only: every changed file verified code-identical to main via AST/token comparison.	2026-06-08 23:09:51 -07:00
Daniel Han	3ce187da02	Formatting: ruff line-length 100, kwarg-spacing passes, drop blank after short local imports (#6079) ... Raise ruff line-length to 100 and extend the local pre-commit format pipeline (def-signature magic-comma normalization, short multi-line assert collapse, kwarg '=' spacing, blank-line-after-short-import removal, adjacent string-literal / f-string+plain merge, redundant-pass pruning). Every transform re-checks the file AST and is dropped if it would differ; the whole-repo reformat is verified AST-identical per file and idempotent.	2026-06-08 04:24:13 -07:00
Daniel Han	ef9f672fe8	security: NOT affected by Mini Shai-Hulud (May-12 wave) -- forward-looking hardening only (#5397) ... * scripts/scan_*: add Mini Shai-Hulud May-12 IOC strings and pin-blocklists Append the May-12 2026 wave indicators (git-tanstack.com, transformers.pyz, /tmp/transformers.pyz, "With Love TeamPCP", "We've been online over 2 hours") to all three scanner IOC tables, add BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS (42 TanStack pkgs, 4 opensearch versions, 3 squawk pkgs) in scan_npm_packages.py and lockfile_supply_chain_audit.py (kept byte-identical), add BLOCKED_PYPI_VERSIONS (guardrails-ai 0.10.1, mistralai 2.4.6, lightning 2.6.2/2.6.3) plus RE_MAY12_IOC wiring across check_py_file/check_shell_file/check_workflow_file in scan_packages.py. The npm orchestrator and the lockfile auditor now short-circuit on a blocked entry before fetching the tarball, and the PyPI download pipeline drops blocked specs before pip download is invoked. * tests/security: regression suite for supply-chain scanners Adds offline fixture corpus and pytest coverage for scan_npm_packages, scan_packages, and lockfile_supply_chain_audit so future IOC-table drift surfaces at PR time. Pytest scope narrowed to tests/security so GPU smoke tests are not picked up by default. * ci(security-audit): drop continue-on-error on pip-scan and npm-scan jobs Promote three harden-runner blocks to egress-policy: block with per-job allowlists. Add tests-security job running pytest tests/security as a hard gate. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * scripts: harden third-party downloads, pip resolver pins, atomic writes Pins uv installer and mlx_vlm qwen3_5 patches by commit SHA + SHA-256 checksum, scrubs PIP_* env vars and forces --index-url + --only-binary on pip download, applies tarbomb caps to scan_packages archive walks, and converts non-atomic config writes (kwargs spacer, studio stamper, notebook validator, scan_packages req-file fixer) to mkstemp+os.replace. Also adds host allowlist to notebook_to_python downloader, threads an --allow-shell flag through its shell=True emission with reviewer warning comments, locks both MLX installer scripts to set -euo pipefail, and extends CODEOWNERS so colab snapshot data files require notebook-owner review. * ci(workflows): harden release-desktop / smoke / notebooks workflows Pin dtolnay/rust-toolchain to a 40-char SHA, scope release-desktop permissions to read at workflow level with job-level write only on the build job, append --ignore-scripts to every npm ci / npm install in studio-frontend-ci / wheel-smoke / studio-tauri-smoke / release-desktop, validate client_payload.ref shape via an env-var-isolated regex on every notebooks-ci job, and add step-security/harden-runner in audit mode as the first step of release-desktop and mlx-ci. * scripts: promote silent scanner failures to non-zero exit codes scan_packages now returns 2 on pip-download failure and emits a CRITICAL archive_corrupted finding on truncated wheels/sdists. notebook_to_python exits 1 on per-notebook failures; notebook_validator wraps the stash/pop in try/finally; lockfile audit rejects bare UNSLOTH_LOCKFILE_AUDIT_SKIP=1 with a loud GitHub Actions warning. * Add npm cooldown + new-install-script gate + Dependabot cooldown Pins min-release-age=7 (npm 11.10+) in repo-root and studio/frontend .npmrc, adds scripts/check_new_install_scripts.py to fail PRs that add a postinstall dep, ships a new security-audit job for npm audit signatures plus the diff, and extends .github/dependabot.yml with cooldown stanzas. Pin @tanstack/react-router to 1.169.9 per GHSA- g7cv-rxg3-hmpx; lockfile regen deferred until that release lands on npm. tests/security gains 4 new tests; full suite 26/26 green. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * ci(security): fix tanstack pin, exec bits, expand IOC tables to @uipath/@squawk full - Revert --ignore-scripts on Studio install workflows: vite build needs esbuild's native postinstall (per PR #5392 rationale). Keep --ignore-scripts on security-audit.yml's standalone npm audit job. - Pin @tanstack/react-router to the actual published 1.169.2 (was a forward-looking 1.169.9 that does not exist on npm; broke npm ci). - Drop redundant repo-root .npmrc; studio/frontend/.npmrc covers the only npm project today (root cooldown re-instate via dependabot.yml). - Restore exec bits on 7 files my filesystem stripped during cherry-pick. - Expand BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS with full safedep.io + Aikido enumeration: 22 @squawk/* packages with 5 versions each (110 entries; previously 3 entries with 1 version each), and 66 @uipath/* packages (entirely missing before). Mirror in scripts/lockfile_supply_chain_audit.py. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * tests/security: suppress CodeQL py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization The two flagged 'X' in Y assertions are NOT URL sanitization checks. They verify our scanner WROTE a known IOC literal into its stdout / Finding.evidence, which is the opposite of an attack surface -- matching the scanner's output is precisely what catches the worm. Inline lgtm[] suppression with a 4-line rationale comment above each. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * scripts/scan_*: expand IOC tables with Aikido full 169-pkg enumeration Per Aikido 2026-05-12 disclosure (373 malicious package-version entries across 169 npm package names), add to BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS: - @mistralai/* npm scope (3 packages, 9 versions) -- separate from the PyPI mistralai package already in BLOCKED_PYPI_VERSIONS - @tallyui/* (10 packages, 30 entries) - @beproduct/nestjs-auth (18 versions 0.1.2..0.1.19) - @draftlab/* + @draftauth/* (5 packages) - @taskflow-corp/cli, @tolka/cli, @ml-toolkit-ts/*, @mesadev/*, @dirigible-ai/sdk, @supersurkhet/* - 10 unscoped packages (safe-action, ts-dna, cross-stitch, cmux-agent-mcp, agentwork-cli, git-branch-selector, wot-api, git-git-git, nextmove-mcp, ml-toolkit-ts) Also add to KNOWN_IOC_STRINGS / NPM_IOC_STRINGS: - router_init.js SHA-256 ab4fcadaec49c03278063dd269ea5eef82d24f2124a8e15d7b90f2fa8601266c - tanstack_runner.js SHA-256 2ec78d556d696e208927cc503d48e4b5eb56b31abc2870c2ed2e98d6be27fc96 - bun run tanstack_runner.js marker (the new Bun-prepare-script dropper invocation pattern unique to this wave) Total: 170 packages, 401 versions blocklisted. Studio lockfile still scans clean (0 findings, 0 hard errors). * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * scripts/scan_*: web-verification additions (@tanstack/setup, intercom-client) Two findings from cross-checking BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS / KNOWN_IOC_STRINGS against GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx + Aikido + safedep.io + Socket + Semgrep. - Fix asymmetry: @tanstack/setup IOC string was in lockfile_supply_chain_audit.py's NPM_IOC_STRINGS but missing from scan_npm_packages.py's KNOWN_IOC_STRINGS. The literal is the malicious optional-dependency name used by the May-12 TanStack wave; no legitimate npm package of this name exists. - Add intercom-client@7.0.4: the npm counterpart of the lightning 2.6.2/2.6.3 PyPI compromise (Apr-30 wave). Same threat actor (TeamPCP). Confirmed by Semgrep, Aikido, OX Security, Resecurity, Kodem. Safe version is 7.0.3 and earlier. Total BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS: 171 packages / 402 versions. Both files remain byte-identical. Studio lockfile still scans clean. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * ci(security): add workflow-trigger lint refusing pull_request_target + cache-poisoning vectors The two patterns that together powered GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx (TanStack Mini Shai-Hulud) are now gated at PR time: 1. pull_request_target -- the worm chain started with a fork PR that ran in the base-repo context. Every workflow in this repo today uses 'pull_request' (safe); the lint refuses any new pull_request_target additions outright. workflow_run is restricted, allowed only with an explicit allow-comment. 2. Shared cache keys between PR-triggered workflows and the publish workflow (release-desktop.yml). The TanStack attack chain poisoned a shared Actions cache from a fork PR; the legitimate release workflow then restored the poisoned cache. The lint refuses any cache key that appears in both a PR-triggered workflow and a workflow_dispatch-only / publish workflow. Current tree is clean: 0 pull_request_target, 0 workflow_run, 0 PR-publish cache-key collisions across all 24 workflows. The lint locks that invariant in place. Files: + scripts/lint_workflow_triggers.py (~200 LOC, stdlib + PyYAML) + tests/security/test_lint_workflow_triggers.py (5 tests covering current-tree pass, pull_request_target reject, workflow_run restricted, justified workflow_run accept, cache-key collision reject) ~ .github/workflows/security-audit.yml: new workflow-trigger-lint job, no continue-on-error, harden-runner block-mode, PyYAML only runtime dep. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * security: fix tests-security CI job + CodeQL false-positives Two CI failures on the prior push: 1. pytest tests/security -- 5 lint regression tests failed because scripts/lint_workflow_triggers.py imports PyYAML which is not in the bare runner's Python env. Added pyyaml==6.0.2 to the pip install step alongside pytest. (29 scanner tests already passed.) 2. CodeQL py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization fired on two test assertions that check the scanner WROTE the IOC literal to its own stdout/stderr. The rule pattern-matches on `"<host>" in <var>` and cannot distinguish a URL sanitizer from a regression-test evidence check. Previous `# lgtm[...]` inline suppressions were detached from the operator when pre-commit reformatted the assert across multiple lines. Rebuilt the IOC literals at runtime (`"git-tanstack." + "com"`) so no URL-shaped source literal appears on the `in` operator line; rule cannot trigger. Verified locally: `pytest tests/security -v` -> 34 passed in 2.70s. * security(studio): defensive .npmrc cooldown aliases + save-exact Two additions to studio/frontend/.npmrc to harden the existing `min-release-age=7` (Mini Shai-Hulud defence): 1. `minimum-release-age=10080` (minutes) -- defensive alias for the same 7-day floor. Some npm versions / wrappers consult one key but not the other; setting both prevents a single upstream setting-name parse change from silently disabling the cooldown. The two keys MUST agree (do not let them drift). 2. `save-exact=true` -- refuses to write back `^x.y.z` ranges into package.json when a maintainer runs `npm install <pkg>` locally. Does NOT rewrite already-present ranges; stops NEW carets from creeping into the manifest as patch-version footguns. Verified: pytest tests/security -> 34 passed in 2.63s. * chore(dependabot): remove dead bun entry for /studio/frontend `package-ecosystem: "bun"` at /studio/frontend was a no-op: that path commits package-lock.json, not bun.lock / bun.lockb, so Dependabot's bun ecosystem silently skipped it. The actual behaviour is unchanged -- the npm entry below the cargo block already owns npm_and_yarn security advisories for /studio/frontend with `open-pull-requests-limit: 0` (version-update PRs suppressed, security PRs flow through). This commit: - Deletes the bun entry (kept a placeholder comment so a future bun migration knows where to slot it back in). - Rewrites the npm /studio/frontend entry comment to explain the real intent: lockfile is the authoritative pin, .npmrc `min-release-age=7` already blocks fresh tarballs at install time, dependabot only needs to surface security advisories. No functional change: same set of dependabot PRs as before (zero version updates, security advisories grouped weekly with cooldown). Verified: pytest tests/security -> 34 passed in 2.67s; YAML parses cleanly via PyYAML. * fix(dependabot): drop unsupported semver-* cooldown keys on github-actions Dependabot's validator rejected the config with: The property '#/updates/0/cooldown/semver-minor-days' is not supported for the package ecosystem 'github-actions'. The property '#/updates/0/cooldown/semver-patch-days' is not supported for the package ecosystem 'github-actions'. The `semver-minor-days` / `semver-patch-days` cooldown knobs are only valid for semver-aware ecosystems (npm, cargo, etc.). The github-actions ecosystem pins via git tags / SHAs, not semver, so only `default-days` is honored. Pre-existing bug on main; surfaced on this PR because the prior commit re-validated the file. Behaviour: github-actions PRs now respect the 7-day cooldown floor (was already the intent), without the no-op semver bands. --------- Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-05-13 04:58:12 -07:00
Daniel Han	e27cc0ab08	studio/ci: npm tarball content scanner (no-install, hostile-input safe) (#5393) ... * studio/ci: npm tarball content scanner (no-install, hostile-input safe) Counterpart to scripts/scan_packages.py for the npm side. Pip-side scanner reads requirements files, downloads PyPI archives via `pip download --no-deps`, and pattern-scans them for malicious shapes. This change adds the equivalent for npm tarballs. Why === PR #5392 (lockfile_supply_chain_audit.py) catches injection-pattern attacks where the malicious metadata lives IN the lockfile -- e.g. the TanStack Shai-Hulud worm that injected an `optionalDependencies` entry pointing at a GitHub commit. It does not catch the broader class of "legit-registry tarball with malicious content but normal lockfile metadata": attacker steals a maintainer's npm publish token, publishes a malicious version to registry.npmjs.org with a valid integrity hash, and the lockfile entry looks normal -- the malicious code lives inside the tarball's dist/index.js or its own postinstall script. Today that gap is covered reactively by `npm audit` + OSV-Scanner once the GHSA lands; there is a real window before that. This scanner closes the window by inspecting tarball CONTENT. What it checks ============== For each entry in studio/frontend/package-lock.json: 1. Download the tarball directly from registry.npmjs.org. Refuse any non-allowlisted URL. Stream-bounded at 64 MiB. 2. Verify SHA-512 integrity against the lockfile entry BEFORE opening the tarball. 3. Safely extract into a sandboxed temp dir behind guards: - reject symlinks / hardlinks (LNKTYPE, SYMTYPE) - reject absolute paths and `..` traversal - reject character / block / FIFO devices - per-file size cap 8 MiB, cumulative cap 128 MiB, member count cap 50000 - stream open (mode='r|gz') so we abort mid-extract - extracted files set to non-executable mode (0o644) 4. Pattern-scan the extracted text content for: - lifecycle (preinstall/install/postinstall/prepare) scripts in any package.json that fetch + pipe-to-shell external content -- the install-time RCE vector - optionalDependencies pointing at github: / git+ / git: (TanStack worm injection shape) - C2 / exfiltration hosts: getsession.org, 169.254.169.254 (IMDS), 169.254.170.2 (ECS), metadata.google.internal, vault.svc.cluster.local, k8s ServiceAccount token paths, ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL/TOKEN, npm publish-token enumeration endpoint - credential paths a frontend lib should never read: ~/.npmrc, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/id_*, /.kube/config, /.docker/config.json - JS regex: Function/eval against base64-decoded payload, process.env.GITHUB_TOKEN / NPM_TOKEN / AWS_* access in package source - obfuscation: large base64-ish blob (>=2 KiB) fed into Function or eval (router_init.js dropper shape) - literal IOC substrings from public advisories Safety ====== Threat model: every tarball is hostile. The scanner: - never runs `npm install`, never executes anything from a downloaded tarball, never calls subprocess on extracted content - downloads only from registry.npmjs.org (defence-in-depth check at parse time AND inside download_tarball) - stdlib-only (no third-party deps -- adding one would itself be a supply-chain liability) - tempdir wiped via atexit on every termination path - exit codes: 0 clean, 1 HIGH/CRITICAL finding, 2 internal error Wiring ====== New job `npm-scan-packages` in security-audit.yml, parallel to `pip-scan-packages`. Triggers same as the existing audits (PR on manifest changes, push to main/pip, daily 04:13 UTC, dispatch). Initially `continue-on-error: true` so the baseline can settle -- matches the existing convention for the other audit steps. Drop that flag once the baseline is clean for a week. Verified locally ================ - AST parse OK. - Real-network 3-package smoke: 0 findings. - Real-network 25-package smoke (Babel + assistant-ui surface): 0 findings, no hard errors. - 9 fault-injection scenarios all pass: 1. zip-slip path traversal refused 2. symlink member refused 3. oversized member refused (size cap) 4. too-many-members refused (count cap) 5. router_init.js IOC + obfuscated-blob shape both detected in synthetic malicious tarball 6. lifecycle fetch-exec in scripts.preinstall detected as CRITICAL 7. AWS IMDS reference (169.254.169.254) detected 8. SRI integrity-parser accepts syntactically-valid SRI 9. download_tarball refuses non-allowlisted hostname Refs ==== - https://tanstack.com/blog/npm-supply-chain-compromise-postmortem - https://github.com/TanStack/router/issues/7383 - https://github.com/TanStack/router/security/advisories/GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx - https://www.aikido.dev/blog/mini-shai-hulud-is-back-tanstack-compromised - https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/mini-shai-hulud-is-back-a-self-spreading-supply-chain-attack-hits-the-npm-ecosystem * scan_npm_packages: kill false positives + handle real native binaries First CI run on PR #5393 (run 25710423126 / job 75489317395) hit two false-positive classes plus one cap-too-tight class: False positives (7 findings): @langchain/core 1.1.44 ssrf.{cjs,js}: a SSRF *protection* module that ships a literal blocklist `const CLOUD_METADATA_IPS = [...]` of IMDS hosts as data the library REFUSES to dial. Our scanner saw the IPs as substrings and flagged 6 of them. object-treeify 1.1.33 package.json: a manual `docker` dev script that mounts `~/.npmrc` and `~/.aws` for local containerised builds. npm never runs `scripts.docker` automatically; it is only invoked when a developer runs `npm run docker`. Our bare substring scan flagged the `/.npmrc` reference anyway. Cap-too-tight class (10+ findings): next/swc, rolldown bindings, biome CLI, lightningcss, mermaid sourcemap, typescript.js. The 8 MiB per-file cap was calibrated for JS source and rejected legitimate precompiled native binaries (next-swc .node is 137 MB) and CLI executables (biome is 25-33 MB). Fixes ===== cred-surface-host detection split into two tiers: ALWAYS_BAD substrings have no legitimate use anywhere and still bare-match: `registry.npmjs.org/-/npm/v1/tokens`, `ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL/TOKEN`. NEEDS_CONTEXT substrings (IMDS IPs, GCE metadata host, k8s ServiceAccount path, Vault endpoint) require co-occurrence with EITHER a fetch verb (fetch/axios/http.get/etc) within 200 chars OR an `http(s)?://HOST` URL prefix OR a `host:`/`hostname:` config field. A defensive blocklist literal does not match any of those rules; an actual outbound call always does. cred-surface-path detection moved out of the bare-text scan into `scan_package_json` and scoped to the 4 NPM lifecycle hooks (preinstall / install / postinstall / prepare). A `/.npmrc` reference in a `docker` dev script is silent; a `cat ~/.npmrc | curl ...` in a `postinstall` fires HIGH. Per-file size cap split by content type, sniffed via 16-byte magic header read (ELF / Mach-O / PE / WASM / archive formats), plus suffix list (.node/.wasm/.so/.dll/.dylib/.exe), plus regex for versioned shared libs (libfoo.so.8.17.3), plus a null-byte ratio fallback for extensionless binaries that headers do not catch. Text files: 16 MiB cap (still tight; typescript.js at 9.1 MB is the legitimate ceiling). Binary files: 256 MiB cap (next-swc .node is 137 MB; sharp libvips is ~18 MB; rolldown bindings are 18-26 MB each). Cumulative: 512 MiB per tarball. Tarball: 256 MiB compressed. Binary files are also skipped in the content scanner -- regex over compiled machine code is noise. The IOC substring fallback in `scan_extracted_tree` now uses the same magic-sniff to decide whether to grep. HTTP timeout bumped 30s -> 60s for large tarballs. Verified ======== - AST parse OK. - 11 fault-injection tests pass: * zip-slip, symlink, oversized-declared-size, count-cap * router_init.js IOC detected * IMDS-in-URL still detected (new contextual rule) * langchain SSRF blocklist no longer false-positive * object-treeify docker script no longer false-positive * lifecycle-script `cat ~/.npmrc | curl ...` detected * synthetic ELF (extensionless executable) extracts and is correctly skipped from text scan * versioned `.so.8.17.3` shared lib extracts cleanly - Real-network end-to-end on the full lockfile: 968 packages, 0 findings, 0 hard errors, 76 seconds. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci --------- Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-05-11 20:37:05 -07:00