spawn/e2b/lib/common.sh
A f1e8d946df
fix: secure upload_file functions against command injection in 5 clouds (#453)
Replace unsafe printf '%q'-escaped unquoted variables with validated
single-quoted embedding in upload_file() for fly, northflank, daytona,
e2b, and koyeb. The previous pattern used unquoted $escaped_content and
$escaped_path in command strings passed to bash -c or run_server, which
could allow command injection via crafted filenames.

The fix:
- Validates remote_path rejects unsafe chars (', $, `, newlines)
- Uses base64 content directly (alphanumeric + /+= is shell-safe)
- Single-quotes both content and path in the command string
- Uses printf '%s' instead of echo for safer output

Matches the pattern already used by render, modal, and railway.

Agent: security-auditor

Co-authored-by: A <6723574+louisgv@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-11 06:28:45 -08:00

148 lines
5 KiB
Bash

#!/bin/bash
# Common bash functions for E2B sandbox spawn scripts
# Uses E2B CLI (e2b) — https://e2b.dev
# Sandboxes are lightweight VMs that start in ~150ms
# No SSH — uses `e2b sandbox exec` for commands
# Bash safety flags
set -eo pipefail
# ============================================================
# Provider-agnostic functions
# ============================================================
# Source shared provider-agnostic functions (local or remote fallback)
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" 2>/dev/null && pwd)"
if [[ -n "${SCRIPT_DIR}" && -f "${SCRIPT_DIR}/../../shared/common.sh" ]]; then
source "${SCRIPT_DIR}/../../shared/common.sh"
else
eval "$(curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/OpenRouterTeam/spawn/main/shared/common.sh)"
fi
# Note: Provider-agnostic functions (logging, OAuth, browser, nc_listen) are now in shared/common.sh
# ============================================================
# E2B specific functions
# ============================================================
ensure_e2b_cli() {
if ! command -v e2b &>/dev/null; then
log_warn "Installing E2B CLI..."
npm install -g @e2b/cli 2>/dev/null || {
log_error "Failed to install E2B CLI. Install manually: npm install -g @e2b/cli"
return 1
}
fi
log_info "E2B CLI available"
}
test_e2b_token() {
local test_response
# Test token by listing sandboxes (lightweight API call)
test_response=$(e2b sandbox list 2>&1)
local exit_code=$?
if [[ ${exit_code} -ne 0 ]]; then
if echo "${test_response}" | grep -qi "unauthorized\|invalid.*key\|authentication"; then
log_error "Invalid API key"
log_warn "Remediation steps:"
log_warn " 1. Verify API key at: https://e2b.dev/dashboard"
log_warn " 2. Ensure the key has appropriate permissions"
log_warn " 3. Check key hasn't been revoked"
return 1
fi
fi
return 0
}
ensure_e2b_token() {
ensure_api_token_with_provider \
"E2B" \
"E2B_API_KEY" \
"${HOME}/.config/spawn/e2b.json" \
"https://e2b.dev/dashboard" \
"test_e2b_token"
}
get_server_name() {
get_resource_name "E2B_SANDBOX_NAME" "Enter sandbox name: "
}
create_server() {
local name="${1}"
local template="${E2B_TEMPLATE:-base}"
log_warn "Creating E2B sandbox '${name}' (template: ${template})..."
# Create sandbox and capture ID
local output
output=$(e2b sandbox create --template "${template}" --name "${name}" 2>&1)
E2B_SANDBOX_ID=$(echo "${output}" | grep -oE '[a-z0-9]{8}-[a-z0-9]{4}-[a-z0-9]{4}-[a-z0-9]{4}-[a-z0-9]{12}' | head -1)
if [[ -z "${E2B_SANDBOX_ID}" ]]; then
# Try alternate parsing
E2B_SANDBOX_ID=$(echo "${output}" | grep -oE 'sandbox_[a-zA-Z0-9]+' | head -1)
fi
if [[ -z "${E2B_SANDBOX_ID}" ]]; then
log_error "Failed to create sandbox: ${output}"
return 1
fi
export E2B_SANDBOX_ID
log_info "Sandbox created: ID=${E2B_SANDBOX_ID}"
}
wait_for_cloud_init() {
log_warn "Installing base tools in sandbox..."
run_server "apt-get update -y && apt-get install -y curl unzip git zsh" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
run_server "curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
run_server "curl -fsSL https://claude.ai/install.sh | bash" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
run_server 'echo "export PATH=\"${HOME}/.claude/local/bin:${HOME}/.bun/bin:${PATH}\"" >> ~/.bashrc' >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
run_server 'echo "export PATH=\"${HOME}/.claude/local/bin:${HOME}/.bun/bin:${PATH}\"" >> ~/.zshrc' >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
log_info "Base tools installed"
}
# E2B uses sandbox exec instead of SSH
# SECURITY: Uses printf %q to properly escape commands to prevent injection
run_server() {
local cmd="${1}"
local escaped_cmd
escaped_cmd=$(printf '%q' "${cmd}")
e2b sandbox exec "${E2B_SANDBOX_ID}" -- bash -c "${escaped_cmd}"
}
upload_file() {
local local_path="${1}"
local remote_path="${2}"
# SECURITY: Validate remote_path to prevent command injection via single-quote breakout
if [[ "$remote_path" == *"'"* || "$remote_path" == *'$'* || "$remote_path" == *'`'* || "$remote_path" == *$'\n'* ]]; then
log_error "Invalid remote path (contains unsafe characters): $remote_path"
return 1
fi
# base64 output is safe (alphanumeric + /+=) so no injection risk
local content
content=$(base64 -w0 "${local_path}" 2>/dev/null || base64 "${local_path}")
e2b sandbox exec "${E2B_SANDBOX_ID}" -- bash -c "printf '%s' '${content}' | base64 -d > '${remote_path}'"
}
interactive_session() {
local cmd="${1}"
local escaped_cmd
escaped_cmd=$(printf '%q' "${cmd}")
e2b sandbox exec "${E2B_SANDBOX_ID}" -- bash -c "${escaped_cmd}"
}
destroy_server() {
local sandbox_id="${1:-${E2B_SANDBOX_ID}}"
log_warn "Destroying sandbox ${sandbox_id}..."
e2b sandbox kill "${sandbox_id}" 2>/dev/null || true
log_info "Sandbox destroyed"
}
list_servers() {
e2b sandbox list
}