spawn/daytona/lib/common.sh
A f1e8d946df
fix: secure upload_file functions against command injection in 5 clouds (#453)
Replace unsafe printf '%q'-escaped unquoted variables with validated
single-quoted embedding in upload_file() for fly, northflank, daytona,
e2b, and koyeb. The previous pattern used unquoted $escaped_content and
$escaped_path in command strings passed to bash -c or run_server, which
could allow command injection via crafted filenames.

The fix:
- Validates remote_path rejects unsafe chars (', $, `, newlines)
- Uses base64 content directly (alphanumeric + /+= is shell-safe)
- Single-quotes both content and path in the command string
- Uses printf '%s' instead of echo for safer output

Matches the pattern already used by render, modal, and railway.

Agent: security-auditor

Co-authored-by: A <6723574+louisgv@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-11 06:28:45 -08:00

209 lines
7.6 KiB
Bash

#!/bin/bash
# Common bash functions for Daytona sandbox spawn scripts
# Uses Daytona CLI (daytona) — https://www.daytona.io
# Sandboxes are cloud dev environments with true SSH access
# Default: 1 vCPU / 1GB RAM / 3GB disk (max: 4 vCPU / 8GB / 10GB)
# Bash safety flags
set -eo pipefail
# ============================================================
# Provider-agnostic functions
# ============================================================
# Source shared provider-agnostic functions (local or remote fallback)
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" 2>/dev/null && pwd)"
if [[ -n "${SCRIPT_DIR}" && -f "${SCRIPT_DIR}/../../shared/common.sh" ]]; then
source "${SCRIPT_DIR}/../../shared/common.sh"
else
eval "$(curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/OpenRouterTeam/spawn/main/shared/common.sh)"
fi
# Note: Provider-agnostic functions (logging, OAuth, browser, nc_listen) are now in shared/common.sh
# ============================================================
# Daytona specific functions
# ============================================================
ensure_daytona_cli() {
if ! command -v daytona &>/dev/null; then
log_warn "Installing Daytona CLI..."
if command -v brew &>/dev/null; then
brew install daytonaio/cli/daytona 2>/dev/null || {
log_error "Failed to install Daytona CLI via Homebrew"
log_error "Install manually: brew install daytonaio/cli/daytona"
return 1
}
else
log_error "Daytona CLI not found and Homebrew is not available"
log_error "Install manually: brew install daytonaio/cli/daytona"
log_error "See: https://www.daytona.io/docs/en/getting-started"
return 1
fi
fi
log_info "Daytona CLI available"
}
test_daytona_token() {
local test_response
# Authenticate CLI with the API key first
test_response=$(daytona login --api-key "${DAYTONA_API_KEY}" 2>&1)
local exit_code=$?
if [[ ${exit_code} -ne 0 ]]; then
if printf '%s' "${test_response}" | grep -qi "unauthorized\|invalid.*key\|authentication\|forbidden"; then
log_error "Invalid API key"
log_warn "Remediation steps:"
log_warn " 1. Verify API key at: https://app.daytona.io"
log_warn " 2. Ensure the key has sandbox permissions"
log_warn " 3. Check key hasn't expired or been revoked"
return 1
fi
# Non-auth error during login — could be network, still fail
log_error "Daytona login failed: ${test_response}"
return 1
fi
# Verify by listing sandboxes (lightweight API call)
test_response=$(daytona list --limit 1 2>&1)
exit_code=$?
if [[ ${exit_code} -ne 0 ]]; then
if printf '%s' "${test_response}" | grep -qi "unauthorized\|invalid.*key\|authentication\|forbidden"; then
log_error "Invalid API key"
log_warn "Remediation steps:"
log_warn " 1. Verify API key at: https://app.daytona.io"
log_warn " 2. Ensure the key has sandbox permissions"
log_warn " 3. Check key hasn't expired or been revoked"
return 1
fi
fi
return 0
}
ensure_daytona_token() {
ensure_api_token_with_provider \
"Daytona" \
"DAYTONA_API_KEY" \
"${HOME}/.config/spawn/daytona.json" \
"https://app.daytona.io" \
"test_daytona_token"
}
get_server_name() {
get_resource_name "DAYTONA_SANDBOX_NAME" "Enter sandbox name: "
}
create_server() {
local name="${1}"
local cpu="${DAYTONA_CPU:-2}"
local memory="${DAYTONA_MEMORY:-2048}"
local disk="${DAYTONA_DISK:-5}"
# Validate numeric env vars to prevent command injection
if [[ ! "${cpu}" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]]; then log_error "Invalid DAYTONA_CPU: must be numeric"; return 1; fi
if [[ ! "${memory}" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]]; then log_error "Invalid DAYTONA_MEMORY: must be numeric"; return 1; fi
if [[ ! "${disk}" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]]; then log_error "Invalid DAYTONA_DISK: must be numeric"; return 1; fi
log_warn "Creating Daytona sandbox '${name}' (${cpu} vCPU / ${memory}MB RAM / ${disk}GB disk)..."
# Create sandbox with resource flags and auto-stop disabled
local output
output=$(daytona create \
--name "${name}" \
--cpu "${cpu}" \
--memory "${memory}" \
--disk "${disk}" \
--auto-stop 0 \
--auto-archive 0 \
2>&1)
local exit_code=$?
if [[ ${exit_code} -ne 0 ]]; then
log_error "Failed to create sandbox: ${output}"
return 1
fi
# Try to get the sandbox ID from `daytona info`
local info_output
info_output=$(daytona info "${name}" --format json 2>/dev/null) || true
if [[ -n "${info_output}" ]]; then
DAYTONA_SANDBOX_ID=$(printf '%s' "${info_output}" | python3 -c "import json,sys; print(json.load(sys.stdin).get('id',''))" 2>/dev/null) || true
fi
# Fall back to using the name as the identifier (Daytona accepts both)
if [[ -z "${DAYTONA_SANDBOX_ID:-}" ]]; then
DAYTONA_SANDBOX_ID="${name}"
fi
export DAYTONA_SANDBOX_ID
export DAYTONA_SANDBOX_NAME_ACTUAL="${name}"
log_info "Sandbox created: ${DAYTONA_SANDBOX_ID}"
}
wait_for_cloud_init() {
log_warn "Installing base tools in sandbox..."
run_server "apt-get update -y && apt-get install -y curl unzip git zsh" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
run_server "curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
run_server "curl -fsSL https://claude.ai/install.sh | bash" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
run_server 'echo "export PATH=\"${HOME}/.claude/local/bin:${HOME}/.bun/bin:${PATH}\"" >> ~/.bashrc' >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
run_server 'echo "export PATH=\"${HOME}/.claude/local/bin:${HOME}/.bun/bin:${PATH}\"" >> ~/.zshrc' >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
log_info "Base tools installed"
}
# Daytona uses `daytona exec` for running commands in sandboxes
# SECURITY: Uses printf %q to properly escape commands to prevent injection
run_server() {
local cmd="${1}"
local escaped_cmd
escaped_cmd=$(printf '%q' "${cmd}")
daytona exec "${DAYTONA_SANDBOX_ID}" -- bash -c "${escaped_cmd}"
}
upload_file() {
local local_path="${1}"
local remote_path="${2}"
# SECURITY: Validate remote_path to prevent command injection via single-quote breakout
if [[ "$remote_path" == *"'"* || "$remote_path" == *'$'* || "$remote_path" == *'`'* || "$remote_path" == *$'\n'* ]]; then
log_error "Invalid remote path (contains unsafe characters): $remote_path"
return 1
fi
# base64 output is safe (alphanumeric + /+=) so no injection risk
local content
content=$(base64 -w0 "${local_path}" 2>/dev/null || base64 "${local_path}")
daytona exec "${DAYTONA_SANDBOX_ID}" -- bash -c "printf '%s' '${content}' | base64 -d > '${remote_path}'"
}
# Daytona has true SSH support — much better than exec-only providers
interactive_session() {
local cmd="${1}"
if [[ -z "${cmd}" ]]; then
# Pure interactive shell via SSH
daytona ssh "${DAYTONA_SANDBOX_ID}"
else
# Run a specific command interactively via exec
# SECURITY: Properly escape command
local escaped_cmd
escaped_cmd=$(printf '%q' "${cmd}")
daytona exec "${DAYTONA_SANDBOX_ID}" -- bash -c "${escaped_cmd}"
fi
}
destroy_server() {
local sandbox_id="${1:-${DAYTONA_SANDBOX_ID:-}}"
if [[ -z "${sandbox_id}" ]]; then
log_warn "No sandbox ID to destroy"
return 0
fi
log_warn "Destroying sandbox ${sandbox_id}..."
daytona delete "${sandbox_id}" 2>/dev/null || true
log_info "Sandbox destroyed"
}
list_servers() {
daytona list
}