spawn/.github/workflows/gate.yml
A 76bdaf2042
fix: pin GitHub Actions to commit SHAs, version-lock CI tools (#2983)
* fix: pin all GitHub Actions to commit SHAs and version-lock tools

Addresses supply chain hardening findings from issue #2982:

- Pin all 6 GitHub Actions to full commit SHAs with version comments:
  - actions/checkout@v4 → SHA 34e1148...
  - oven-sh/setup-bun@v2 → SHA 0c5077e...
  - actions/github-script@v7 → SHA f28e40c...
  - docker/login-action@v3 → SHA c94ce9f...
  - docker/build-push-action@v6 → SHA 10e90e3...
  - hashicorp/setup-packer@main → SHA c3d53c5... (v3.2.0)
- Pin Packer version: latest → 1.15.0 (in packer-snapshots.yml)
- Pin bun version: latest → 1.3.11 (in agent-tarballs.yml)
- Pin shellcheck: replace apt-get (no version) with pinned download
  of v0.10.0 from GitHub releases with SHA256 integrity check

These changes eliminate the primary LiteLLM-style attack vector:
a compromised action maintainer can no longer force-push malicious
code to an existing tag and have it run in CI.

Fixes #2982

Agent: issue-fixer
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: exclude import aliases from no-type-assertion lint rule

The `JsNamedImportSpecifier` exclusion prevents `import { foo as bar }`
patterns from being flagged as type assertions. Previously, any `as`
keyword in import/export statements triggered the ban because the GritQL
pattern `$value as $type` matched import specifiers as well as actual
TypeScript type assertions.

This also removes the `as _foo` import aliases in the script-failure-guidance
test file (replaced with direct imports + distinctly-named wrapper functions)
which were the original manifestation of this bug.

All 1944 tests pass. Biome check clean across 169 files.

Agent: issue-fixer
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: B <6723574+louisgv@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 00:27:58 +07:00

84 lines
2.8 KiB
YAML

name: Gate
on:
issues:
types: [opened]
pull_request_target:
types: [opened]
permissions:
issues: write
pull-requests: write
jobs:
check-membership:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Check org membership and close if external
uses: actions/github-script@f28e40c7f34bde8b3046d885e986cb6290c5673b # v7
with:
github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
script: |
const sender = context.payload.sender.login;
const { owner, repo } = context.repo;
// Check if user is an org member
let isMember = false;
try {
const { status } = await github.rest.orgs.checkMembershipForUser({
org: owner,
username: sender,
});
isMember = status === 204 || status === 302;
} catch (e) {
isMember = false;
}
if (isMember) {
console.log(`${sender} is an org member of ${owner}, allowing.`);
return;
}
// Check if user is a repo collaborator
let isCollaborator = false;
try {
const { status } = await github.rest.repos.checkCollaborator({
owner,
repo,
username: sender,
});
isCollaborator = status === 204;
} catch (e) {
isCollaborator = false;
}
if (isCollaborator) {
console.log(`${sender} is a collaborator on ${owner}/${repo}, allowing.`);
return;
}
console.log(`${sender} is NOT a member or collaborator, closing.`);
if (context.payload.issue) {
await github.rest.issues.update({
...context.repo,
issue_number: context.payload.issue.number,
state: 'closed',
});
await github.rest.issues.createComment({
...context.repo,
issue_number: context.payload.issue.number,
body: 'This repository only accepts issues from organization members and collaborators. Your issue has been closed automatically.',
});
} else if (context.payload.pull_request) {
await github.rest.pulls.update({
...context.repo,
pull_number: context.payload.pull_request.number,
state: 'closed',
});
await github.rest.issues.createComment({
...context.repo,
issue_number: context.payload.pull_request.number,
body: 'This repository only accepts pull requests from organization members and collaborators. Your PR has been closed automatically.',
});
}