Users on exec-based clouds (Fly, Render, Koyeb, Northflank, Railway,
Modal, Daytona, E2B, CodeSandbox, GitHub Codespaces) got no warning
when their session ended that their service was still running and
incurring charges. This adds:
- _show_exec_post_session_summary() in shared/common.sh for non-SSH
providers that use CLI exec commands instead of direct SSH
- SPAWN_DASHBOARD_URL for all 10 exec-based clouds so users get
actionable dashboard links
- Post-session summary calls in each cloud's interactive_session()
- 33 new tests covering the exec post-session summary feature
Agent: ux-engineer
Co-authored-by: A <6723574+louisgv@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Unquoted `<< EOF` heredocs in nanoclaw .env file creation cause shell
expansion of the API key value. If an API key contains `$`, backticks,
or `\`, the value is silently corrupted or could trigger command
execution. Replace with `printf '%s'` which safely writes the value
without interpretation.
Also fix unquoted variable expansion in upload_config_file's mv command
and the github-codespaces/openclaw.sh config heredoc.
Fixes 34 scripts across all cloud providers.
Agent: security-auditor
Co-authored-by: A <6723574+louisgv@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace fragile blocklist validation and printf '%q' escaping in upload_file()
with strict allowlist regex [a-zA-Z0-9/_.~-]+ across all non-SSH cloud providers.
For codesandbox, additionally migrate from shell command interpolation to SDK
filesystem API via environment variables, eliminating the injection surface entirely.
Affected clouds: codesandbox, daytona, e2b, fly, koyeb, modal, northflank,
railway, render, sprite
Fixes#989
Agent: security-auditor
Co-authored-by: A <6723574+louisgv@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Hetzner lib: replace all Python JSON parsing with jq. Uses the
/datacenters API as the authoritative source for server type
availability (server_types.available), cross-referenced with
/server_types for specs and pricing. jq is auto-installed if missing.
URLs: update openrouter.ai/lab/spawn → openrouter.ai/labs/spawn
across all READMEs and CLI source.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
8 scripts were embedding OPENROUTER_API_KEY directly into shell command
strings passed to run_server/run_in_codespace, allowing command injection
if the API key contains shell metacharacters (single quotes, semicolons,
backticks, etc.).
The worst case was latitude/continue.sh which had zero quoting:
export OPENROUTER_API_KEY=${OPENROUTER_API_KEY}
allowing arbitrary command execution on the remote server with a
crafted API key value.
Fixed by replacing unsafe inline patterns with the existing secure
helpers (inject_env_vars_ssh, inject_env_vars_local, inject_env_vars)
which use generate_env_config to properly single-quote values with
embedded quote escaping.
Affected scripts:
- scaleway/continue.sh (single-quote breakout)
- upcloud/continue.sh (double-quote breakout)
- e2b/continue.sh (single-quote breakout)
- modal/continue.sh (single-quote breakout)
- daytona/continue.sh (single-quote breakout)
- latitude/continue.sh (no quoting at all - critical)
- github-codespaces/continue.sh (single-quote breakout)
- kamatera/nanoclaw.sh (single-quote breakout in .env write)
Agent: security-auditor
Co-authored-by: A <6723574+louisgv@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The get_model_id_interactive function returned MODEL_ID from env vars
without calling validate_model_id, bypassing the allowlist check. Also
migrated 13 legacy scripts from raw safe_read to get_model_id_interactive
which includes validation.
Agent: security-auditor
Co-authored-by: A <6723574+louisgv@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
~1500 progress messages across 481 files were using log_warn (yellow)
for normal status updates like "Installing...", "Setting up...",
"Creating server...", etc. This made users think something was wrong
when everything was proceeding normally.
Changes:
- Replace log_warn with log_step for all progress/status messages
- Keep log_warn only for actual warnings (errors, remediation hints)
- Remove emoji from 3 sprite completion messages
Agent: ux-engineer
Co-authored-by: A <6723574+louisgv@users.noreply.github.com>
- Clarify download error messages: distinguish HTTP errors from network errors
with specific status codes in the message
- Add actionable next steps to OAuth timeout: re-run command or set key manually
- Standardize error help labels to "How to fix:" across CLI and shell scripts
(was inconsistently "What to do:", "Troubleshooting:", or missing)
- Add API method/endpoint context to retry failure messages so users know
which API call failed
- Make verify_agent_installed error cases mutually exclusive: first for
PATH/installation issues, second for runtime/dependency issues
Agent: ux-engineer
Co-authored-by: A <6723574+louisgv@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace vulnerable heredoc patterns across 27 continue.sh scripts with
setup_continue_config() helper that uses json_escape() + upload_config_file()
to safely handle API keys containing special characters like quotes or braces.
Also fix _save_token_to_config() in shared/common.sh which had the same
unescaped heredoc vulnerability for local token storage.
Relates to #104
Agent: security-auditor
Co-authored-by: A <6723574+louisgv@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Railway's inject_env_vars passed user-controlled values (e.g. OPENROUTER_API_KEY)
through bash -c without proper escaping, allowing shell injection. Replace with
the safe file-based pattern used by other providers (write to temp file, upload,
append to .bashrc).
Also add remote_path validation to Railway and Modal upload_file functions to
prevent single-quote breakout injection, matching the pattern already used by
Koyeb. Fix gptme.sh reference to non-existent inject_env_vars_railway function.
Agent: security-auditor
Co-authored-by: A <6723574+louisgv@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Railway: Missing base64 -w0 caused newline injection; unescaped remote_path
in single quotes allowed single-quote breakout command injection. Now uses
base64 -w0 with macOS fallback, printf '%q' for path escaping, and routes
through run_server instead of direct railway run bash -c.
Modal: Remote path was embedded in single quotes without escaping, allowing
single-quote breakout. Now uses printf '%q' for safe path escaping.
Koyeb: Used fragile deny-list validation for remote_path (rejecting specific
characters) and base64 without -w0 flag. Replaced with printf '%q' escaping
and added base64 -w0 with macOS fallback.
Agent: security-auditor
Co-authored-by: A <6723574+louisgv@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
MODAL_SANDBOX_ID and sandbox name were interpolated directly into
Python code strings, allowing potential code injection. Now all
user-controlled values are passed via environment variables and
read with os.environ in Python.
Changes:
- create_server: pass name/image via _MODAL_NAME/_MODAL_IMAGE env vars,
use getattr() for image lookup, add sandbox name validation
- run_server: pass sandbox ID and command via env vars
- interactive_session: pass sandbox ID and command via env vars
- destroy_server: pass sandbox ID via env var
- Add validate_sandbox_id() to enforce sb-<alphanumeric> format
- upload_file: remove printf '%q' escaping (base64 is safe)
Agent: security-auditor
Co-authored-by: A <6723574+louisgv@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Fix triple-quote injection in SSH keys (Scaleway, UpCloud), userdata
(BinaryLane), init scripts (Civo, Kamatera), and GraphQL queries
(RunPod) by passing data via stdin/json_escape instead of inline
string interpolation
- Add input validation for all cloud provider env vars (region, type,
plan, etc.) using validate_region_name/validate_resource_name to block
shell metacharacters before they reach Python string interpolation
- Validate Modal image name as Python identifier to prevent code injection
- Validate numeric env vars (RAM, GPU count, disk size) across all providers
Affects: 19 cloud provider lib/common.sh files
Agent: security-auditor
Co-authored-by: A <6723574+louisgv@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Show clear error when --prompt/-p or --prompt-file is used without a
value (previously silently ignored)
- Fix --prompt-file splice index bug when used after --prompt
- Replace echo -e with printf in fly/lib/common.sh for macOS bash 3.x
compatibility
- Fix incorrect env var name in README (DIGITALOCEAN_TOKEN -> DO_API_TOKEN)
- Add missing agent entries (gptme, OpenCode, Plandex) to 11 cloud READMEs
- Add all 13 agents to Civo README (previously only had 3)
Agent: ux-engineer
Co-authored-by: A <6723574+louisgv@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Enhance UX across CLI and cloud providers with actionable error messages:
1. Modal sandbox creation failures now provide:
- Detailed error output from Python SDK
- Common causes (auth expired, quota issues, network)
- Step-by-step troubleshooting (re-auth, check quota, status page)
2. Modal CLI installation failures now explain:
- Missing pip/pip3 (with installation commands)
- Permission issues (suggest --user flag)
- Manual installation steps
3. Sprite connectivity failures now include:
- Commands to check sprite status and logs
- Steps to recreate sprite
- Support contact information
4. Sprite CLI installation now:
- Catches installation failures with helpful error messages
- Verifies installation succeeded before proceeding
- Provides manual installation instructions
5. CLI script download failures improved:
- Distinguish between 404 (doesn't exist) and other errors
- Provide specific next steps for each scenario
- Suggest checking matrix for implementation status
All error messages follow the pattern:
- What went wrong
- Why it might have happened (common causes)
- What to do next (actionable steps)
Agent: ux-engineer
Co-authored-by: A <6723574+louisgv@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security:
- Fix command injection in modal/lib/common.sh (run_server, upload_file, interactive_session)
- Fix command injection in fly/lib/common.sh (run_server, upload_file, interactive_session)
- All container providers now use printf '%q' for proper shell escaping
Complexity:
- Extract _api_should_retry_on_error() helper in shared/common.sh (-19 lines)
- Refactor scaleway_api and upcloud_api to use shared retry helper (-24 lines)
- Extract _save_fly_token() helper in fly/lib/common.sh (-11 lines)
- Extract validateAndGetAgent() in commands.ts, reducing cmdRun/cmdAgentInfo duplication
- Refactor cmdList column width calculation to use calculateColumnWidth()
UX:
- Add actionable next steps to error messages in shared/common.sh
- Improve CLI bash fallback error messages with guidance (spawn.sh)
- Add OAuth progress indicator during browser authentication wait
- Show invalid model ID value and link to openrouter.ai/models
- Add troubleshooting steps for agent installation failures
Tests:
- Update test assertions in test/run.sh to match refactored patterns
- All tests passing: 74 TypeScript + 75 bash = 149 total, 0 failures
Co-authored-by: A <6723574+louisgv@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The upstream OpenCode installer pipes `curl -# -L | tar xz` which fails
in container exec environments (Sprite, E2B, Modal, Daytona) where the
binary stream gets corrupted through the exec layer, producing
"gzip: stdin: not in gzip format" errors.
Added opencode_install_cmd() to shared/common.sh that downloads the
binary to a file first, then extracts it. Updated all 17 opencode.sh
scripts to use this robust method instead of the upstream installer.
The previous fix (#44) only addressed Sprite with a hardcoded
linux-x86_64 architecture. This fix detects OS/arch dynamically and
applies to all cloud providers.
Fixes#42
Co-authored-by: Sprite <noreply@sprite.dev>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Plandex is an open source AI coding agent for complex tasks (15k+ GitHub
stars, multiple HN frontpage posts). It natively supports OpenRouter via
OPENROUTER_API_KEY environment variable and installs via a single curl
command. Go-based CLI with sandbox and version control for AI changes.
Implemented on all 14 clouds: sprite, hetzner, digitalocean, vultr,
linode, lambda, aws-lightsail, gcp, e2b, modal, fly, civo, scaleway,
daytona.
Co-authored-by: Sprite <noreply@sprite.dev>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Completed ENV_TEMP pattern extraction across remaining providers:
1. Modal: gptme.sh (1 script) - uses inject_env_vars_local
2. GCP: all 10 agent scripts - uses inject_env_vars_ssh
3. Fly.io: all 11 agent scripts - uses new inject_env_vars_fly
- Added inject_env_vars_fly() to fly/lib/common.sh
- Handles both .bashrc and .zshrc (Fly-specific requirement)
4. Sprite: amazonq, cline, gemini (3 scripts) - uses inject_env_vars_sprite
Total scripts converted in this commit: 25
Total scripts converted in Round 25 Task #1: 78 scripts
Each conversion replaces 11-15 lines of temp file management with a single
function call that handles creation, permissions, content generation, upload,
sourcing, and cleanup.
The only remaining ENV_TEMP patterns are DOTENV_TEMP in nanoclaw scripts,
which are agent-specific .env files and should remain as-is.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: add gptme agent to spawn matrix
Add gptme (https://github.com/gptme/gptme) - a personal AI agent in the
terminal with tools for code editing, terminal commands, web browsing,
and more. Natively supports OpenRouter via OPENROUTER_API_KEY.
- Add gptme agent entry to manifest.json with OpenRouter env vars
- Implement sprite/gptme.sh deployment script
- Implement hetzner/gptme.sh deployment script
- Add "missing" matrix entries for remaining 8 clouds
- Update README.md with usage instructions for Sprite and Hetzner
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: add Fly.io cloud provider with claude and aider agents
Add Fly.io as a new cloud provider using the Machines REST API for
provisioning and flyctl CLI for SSH access. Docker-based machines
with pay-per-second pricing.
- Create fly/lib/common.sh with Fly.io Machines API integration
- Implement fly/claude.sh for Claude Code deployment
- Implement fly/aider.sh for Aider deployment
- Update README.md with Fly.io usage instructions and env vars
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: add gemini, amazonq, cline, gptme to Fly.io
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: add openclaw, nanoclaw, goose, codex, interpreter to Fly.io
Implements 5 new agent scripts for the Fly.io cloud provider:
- fly/openclaw.sh: OpenClaw with gateway + TUI, model selection, config
- fly/nanoclaw.sh: NanoClaw WhatsApp agent with .env configuration
- fly/goose.sh: Block's Goose agent with OpenRouter provider
- fly/codex.sh: OpenAI Codex CLI with OpenRouter base URL override
- fly/interpreter.sh: Open Interpreter with OpenRouter base URL override
All scripts follow the Fly.io pattern (flyctl-based, no IP args for
run_server/interactive_session) and use upload_file for env injection.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: add gptme agent to 8 remaining clouds
Implement gptme agent scripts for digitalocean, vultr, linode, lambda,
aws-lightsail, gcp, e2b, and modal. Each script follows the exact
pattern of that cloud's existing aider.sh, adapted for gptme's install
and launch commands. Updates manifest.json matrix entries from "missing"
to "implemented".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Add guardrails from insights: CLAUDE.md rules, hooks, pre-commit
Based on usage insights analysis:
CLAUDE.md:
- Shell script rules: curl|bash compat, macOS bash 3.x compat
- Autonomous loop rules: test after each iteration, never revert fixes
- Git workflow rules: always use feature branches
.claude/settings.json:
- PostToolUse hook validates .sh files on every Write/Edit:
syntax check, no relative source, no echo -e, no set -u
.githooks/pre-commit:
- Blocks commits with: syntax errors, relative sources, echo -e,
set -euo, references to deleted functions
- Install: git config core.hooksPath .githooks
README.md:
- Added developer setup section with hook installation
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Sprite <noreply@sprite.dev>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fixed SC2016 warnings by removing unnecessary backslashes from ${HOME}
and ${PATH} variables inside single-quoted strings in e2b and modal
provider libraries. Variables inside single quotes don't expand, so
the backslashes were literal characters being written to config files.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add trap 'rm -f "${ENV_TEMP}"' EXIT after mktemp creation
- Scripts with DOTENV_TEMP get combined trap for both files
- Remove manual rm calls that are now redundant
- Prevents temp file leaks on early script exit (errors, signals)
- Affects 67 agent scripts across all providers
Impact: Prevents /tmp pollution in production deployments
Score: 90 (Impact: 9, Confidence: 10, Risk: 1)
- Add shellcheck source comments to all agent scripts
- Tells shellcheck where provider-exported variables are defined
- Fix 132+ SC2154 warnings across all providers
Score: 30 (Impact: 6, Confidence: 10, Risk: 2)
All modal scripts now validate that create_server() succeeded and that
MODAL_SANDBOX_ID is set before proceeding with setup steps. This prevents
silent failures when Modal sandbox creation fails.
Changes:
- Added explicit error checking after create_server() call
- Added validation that MODAL_SANDBOX_ID is not empty
- Applied to all 10 modal scripts (nanoclaw, aider, claude, interpreter,
cline, amazonq, gemini, openclaw, goose, codex)
Fixes SC2154 shellcheck warnings for unassigned MODAL_SANDBOX_ID variable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Protects against 'unbound variable' errors even if set -u is
re-enabled or inherited. Every [[ -n "$UPPER_VAR" ]] pattern now
uses [[ -n "${UPPER_VAR:-}" ]] to safely default to empty.
Co-authored-by: Sprite <noreply@sprite.dev>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three issues broke the OAuth callback server on macOS:
1. echo -e doesn't work in bash 3.x — \r\n appears as literal text
in the HTTP response, browser gets malformed headers.
Fix: pre-write response with printf to a file before the subshell.
2. local variables inside ( ... ) & subshell — undefined behavior in
bash 3.x since subshells aren't function scope.
Fix: use plain variables in subshells.
3. ((elapsed++)) when elapsed=0 evaluates to falsy — set -e kills
the script on the first iteration of the timeout loop.
Fix: use elapsed=$((elapsed + 1)) instead.
Also simplified nc_listen detection to only check for BusyBox
(the -p flag check could misfire on macOS nc).
Applied to all 10 lib/common.sh files.
Co-authored-by: Sprite <noreply@sprite.dev>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
macOS ships bash 3.x which doesn't support nested process substitution.
When scripts are run via `bash <(curl ...)`, the inner `source <(curl ...)`
for loading common.sh fails silently, causing "command not found" errors.
Fix: replace `source <(curl -fsSL URL)` with `eval "$(curl -fsSL URL)"`
across all 100 agent scripts. eval+curl works on bash 3.x and newer.
Co-authored-by: Sprite <noreply@sprite.dev>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
