Commit graph

7 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
A
3d274bf3d2
fix: escape shell commands and sanitize JSON to prevent injection (#463)
- Add printf %q command escaping to run_server/interactive_session in
  Koyeb, Render, Railway, and GitHub Codespaces (matching pattern used
  by E2B, Daytona, Northflank, Fly, and other providers)
- Use json_escape in exchange_oauth_code to prevent JSON injection via
  crafted OAuth codes in shared/common.sh
- Use json_escape in Fly.io _fly_create_app to prevent JSON injection
  via FLY_ORG env var, plus add validation for org slug format
- Pass Fly.io _fly_create_machine values via env vars instead of Python
  string interpolation to prevent code injection

Agent: security-auditor

Co-authored-by: A <6723574+louisgv@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-11 07:20:41 -08:00
A
f1e8d946df
fix: secure upload_file functions against command injection in 5 clouds (#453)
Replace unsafe printf '%q'-escaped unquoted variables with validated
single-quoted embedding in upload_file() for fly, northflank, daytona,
e2b, and koyeb. The previous pattern used unquoted $escaped_content and
$escaped_path in command strings passed to bash -c or run_server, which
could allow command injection via crafted filenames.

The fix:
- Validates remote_path rejects unsafe chars (', $, `, newlines)
- Uses base64 content directly (alphanumeric + /+= is shell-safe)
- Single-quotes both content and path in the command string
- Uses printf '%s' instead of echo for safer output

Matches the pattern already used by render, modal, and railway.

Agent: security-auditor

Co-authored-by: A <6723574+louisgv@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-11 06:28:45 -08:00
A
4f23276338
refactor: reduce complexity in Fly, Koyeb, and Railway providers (#293)
- Split _fly_create_and_start_machine (70 lines) into _fly_create_machine
  and _fly_wait_for_machine_start for single-responsibility
- Replace ensure_koyeb_token (38 lines) with ensure_api_token_with_provider
- Replace ensure_railway_token (37 lines) with ensure_api_token_with_provider
- Remove _save_koyeb_token and _save_railway_token (handled by shared helper)

Net reduction: ~80 lines of duplicated code

Agent: complexity-hunter

Co-authored-by: A <6723574+louisgv@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-10 15:30:32 -08:00
A
116305f32c
fix: Secure upload_file() against command injection in Railway, Modal, and Koyeb (#221)
Railway: Missing base64 -w0 caused newline injection; unescaped remote_path
in single quotes allowed single-quote breakout command injection. Now uses
base64 -w0 with macOS fallback, printf '%q' for path escaping, and routes
through run_server instead of direct railway run bash -c.

Modal: Remote path was embedded in single quotes without escaping, allowing
single-quote breakout. Now uses printf '%q' for safe path escaping.

Koyeb: Used fragile deny-list validation for remote_path (rejecting specific
characters) and base64 without -w0 flag. Replaced with printf '%q' escaping
and added base64 -w0 with macOS fallback.

Agent: security-auditor

Co-authored-by: A <6723574+louisgv@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-10 12:33:15 -08:00
A
54ef5e451a
fix: Prevent command injection via env var values in Koyeb and Hyperstack scripts (#196)
Koyeb's inject_env_vars used sed escaping that didn't handle single quotes,
allowing API key values containing ' to break out of the shell command string
passed to `koyeb instances exec`. Replace with file-based injection using
generate_env_config + upload_file, matching the safe pattern in shared/common.sh.

Hyperstack goose/gemini/interpreter/codex scripts embedded $OPENROUTER_API_KEY
directly in double-quoted command strings passed to run_server (SSH). Values
containing double quotes, backticks, or $() could execute arbitrary commands
on the remote VM. Replace with inject_env_vars_ssh which writes env vars to a
temp file, uploads via SCP, and appends to shell config without interpolation.

Also hardens Koyeb upload_file to reject remote paths containing shell
metacharacters (', $, `, newline).

Agent: security-auditor

Co-authored-by: A <6723574+louisgv@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-10 08:55:16 -08:00
A
b039f8868a
refactor: Decompose Koyeb and Vast.ai create_server functions (#189)
Break down the two largest unrefactored create_server functions:
- Koyeb (82 lines -> 10): Extract _koyeb_create_app, _koyeb_create_service,
  _koyeb_wait_for_service, _koyeb_get_instance_id
- Vast.ai (77 lines -> 15): Extract _validate_vastai_params,
  _find_cheapest_offer, _create_vastai_instance

Agent: complexity-hunter

Co-authored-by: A <6723574+louisgv@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-10 08:54:14 -08:00
A
e4052189d2
feat: Add Koyeb serverless container platform support (#185)
Add Koyeb as a new cloud provider with CLI-based provisioning.

Changes:
- Created koyeb/lib/common.sh with provider primitives
- Implemented koyeb/claude.sh
- Implemented koyeb/aider.sh
- Implemented koyeb/openclaw.sh
- Added Koyeb entry to manifest.json clouds section
- Added matrix entries for all 14 agents
- Created koyeb/README.md with setup instructions

Koyeb features:
- Serverless container platform with per-second billing
- Free tier available (no credit card required)
- Fast deployment times
- Automatic scaling
- Global deployment regions

Agent: cloud-scout-2

Co-authored-by: B <6723574+louisgv@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-02-10 08:07:36 -08:00