refactor: commands - extract helper functions from cmdImprove

Reduced complexity by extracting:
- isLocalSpawnCheckout(): checks for local spawn repo
- ensureRepoExists(): handles git clone/pull logic

Eliminated nested conditionals and improved readability.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

cli/src/commands.ts

@@ -342,34 +342,39 @@ export async function cmdAgentInfo(agent: string): Promise<void> {
 
 // ── Improve ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
+function isLocalSpawnCheckout(exists: (path: string) => boolean): boolean {
+  return exists("./improve.sh") && exists("./manifest.json");
+}
+
+async function ensureRepoExists(repoDir: string, exists: (path: string) => boolean): Promise<void> {
+  const { join } = await import("path");
+  const { execSync } = await import("child_process");
+
+  if (exists(join(repoDir, ".git"))) {
+    p.log.step("Updating spawn repo...");
+    try {
+      execSync("git pull --ff-only", { cwd: repoDir, stdio: "pipe" });
+    } catch (err) {
+      // Git pull failed (network issue, merge conflict, etc.) - continue with existing repo
+      console.error("Warning: Failed to update repo:", getErrorMessage(err));
+    }
+  } else {
+    p.log.step("Cloning spawn repo...");
+    execSync(`git clone https://github.com/${REPO}.git ${repoDir}`, { stdio: "inherit" });
+  }
+}
+
 export async function cmdImprove(args: string[]): Promise<void> {
   const { existsSync: exists } = await import("fs");
 
-  let repoDir: string;
-
   // Check if we're in a spawn checkout
-  if (exists("./improve.sh") && exists("./manifest.json")) {
-    repoDir = ".";
-  } else {
-    const { join } = await import("path");
-    repoDir = join(CACHE_DIR, "repo");
-
-    if (exists(join(repoDir, ".git"))) {
-      p.log.step("Updating spawn repo...");
-      const { execSync } = await import("child_process");
-      try {
-        execSync("git pull --ff-only", { cwd: repoDir, stdio: "pipe" });
-      } catch (err) {
-        // Git pull failed (network issue, merge conflict, etc.) - continue with existing repo
-        console.error("Warning: Failed to update repo:", getErrorMessage(err));
-      }
-    } else {
-      p.log.step("Cloning spawn repo...");
-      const { execSync } = await import("child_process");
-      execSync(`git clone https://github.com/${REPO}.git ${repoDir}`, { stdio: "inherit" });
-    }
+  if (isLocalSpawnCheckout(exists)) {
+    return spawnBashScript("improve.sh", args, ".");
   }
 
+  const { join } = await import("path");
+  const repoDir = join(CACHE_DIR, "repo");
+  await ensureRepoExists(repoDir, exists);
   return spawnBashScript("improve.sh", args, repoDir);
 }
 

cli/src/security.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+/**
+ * Security validation utilities for spawn CLI
+ * SECURITY-CRITICAL: These functions protect against injection attacks
+ */
+
+// Allowlist pattern for agent and cloud identifiers
+// Only lowercase alphanumeric, hyphens, and underscores allowed
+const IDENTIFIER_PATTERN = /^[a-z0-9_-]+$/;
+
+/**
+ * Validates an identifier (agent or cloud name) against security constraints.
+ * SECURITY-CRITICAL: Prevents path traversal, command injection, and URL injection.
+ *
+ * @param identifier - The agent or cloud identifier to validate
+ * @param fieldName - Human-readable field name for error messages
+ * @throws Error if validation fails
+ */
+export function validateIdentifier(identifier: string, fieldName: string): void {
+  if (!identifier || identifier.trim() === "") {
+    throw new Error(`${fieldName} cannot be empty`);
+  }
+
+  // Check length constraints (prevent DoS via extremely long identifiers)
+  if (identifier.length > 64) {
+    throw new Error(`${fieldName} exceeds maximum length of 64 characters`);
+  }
+
+  // Allowlist validation: only safe characters
+  if (!IDENTIFIER_PATTERN.test(identifier)) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `${fieldName} contains invalid characters. Only lowercase letters, numbers, hyphens, and underscores are allowed.`
+    );
+  }
+
+  // Prevent path traversal patterns (defense in depth)
+  if (identifier.includes("..") || identifier.includes("/") || identifier.includes("\\")) {
+    throw new Error(`${fieldName} contains path traversal characters`);
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Validates a bash script for obvious malicious patterns before execution.
+ * SECURITY-CRITICAL: Last line of defense before executing remote code.
+ *
+ * @param script - The script content to validate
+ * @throws Error if dangerous patterns are detected
+ */
+export function validateScriptContent(script: string): void {
+  // Ensure script is not empty
+  if (!script || script.trim() === "") {
+    throw new Error("Script content is empty");
+  }
+
+  // Check for obviously malicious patterns
+  const dangerousPatterns: Array<{ pattern: RegExp; description: string }> = [
+    { pattern: /rm\s+-rf\s+\/(?!\w)/, description: "destructive filesystem operation (rm -rf /)" },
+    { pattern: /mkfs\./, description: "filesystem formatting command" },
+    { pattern: /dd\s+if=/, description: "raw disk operation" },
+    { pattern: /:(){:|:&};:/, description: "fork bomb pattern" },
+    { pattern: /curl.*\|\s*(bash|sh)/, description: "nested curl|bash execution" },
+    { pattern: /wget.*\|\s*(bash|sh)/, description: "nested wget|bash execution" },
+  ];
+
+  for (const { pattern, description } of dangerousPatterns) {
+    if (pattern.test(script)) {
+      throw new Error(
+        `Script blocked: contains potentially dangerous pattern (${description})`
+      );
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Ensure script starts with shebang
+  if (!script.trim().startsWith("#!")) {
+    throw new Error("Script must start with a valid shebang (e.g., #!/bin/bash)");
+  }
+}