mirror of
https://github.com/ruvnet/RuVector.git
synced 2026-07-09 17:28:42 +00:00
227bb3f876
* fix(ruvector-npm): accurate MCP tool count + reconcile tool lists (0.2.33) The package advertised 103 MCP tools but the server registers 97, and the README listed 12 tools (brain_agi_*, midstream_*) that don't exist. Three independent sources had also drifted: server TOOLS array (97), the cli 'mcp tools' display list (91, missing the 6 decompile_* tools), and the README count (103). - README: 103 → 97; drop the 12 phantom tool bullets; point to 'npx ruvector mcp tools' as the authoritative list - cli.js 'mcp tools': add the missing 'decompile' group (6 tools) → now lists 97, matching the server - mcp-server.js: report version from package.json instead of the hardcoded (and stale) '0.2.30' - bump 0.2.32 → 0.2.33 All three sources now reconcile to 97. Full test suite passes (73 + 7 + 2 + 8 + 2 across the publish-gate files). Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net> * fix(ci): commit optimizer module, ignore RUSTSEC-2026-0190, ship src/optimizer Root-causes three pre-existing CI failures on the ruvector npm package: 1. Optimizer test (Cannot find module src/optimizer/index.js): the module was never committed because .gitignore's bare 'index.js' rule (for napi artifacts) silently ignored this hand-written module. Add a negation exception (as already done for @ruvector/sona) and commit index.js — 8 profiles, detectTaskType, applyProfile. Test: 135/135 pass. 2. cargo deny (advisories FAILED): RUSTSEC-2026-0190 (unsoundness in anyhow's Error::downcast_mut, anyhow 1.0.102, single version in tree). Added to deny.toml ignore list with justification + re-review date, consistent with the existing unsoundness exceptions — we never downcast anyhow::Error to a mismatched mutable type. 3. src/optimizer/ now ships (added to package.json files), so the published package's 'optimize' command works instead of graceful-degrading. Pre-existing failures NOT addressed here (separate infra work; main is also red): Functional smoke / Recall quality / Learning check fail because the npm CI installs with --no-optional, so @ruvector/rvf + the native HNSW addon are absent and the engine runs degraded. dependency-review is already continue-on-error (awaiting a repo Dependency-Graph settings flip). Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
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11 KiB
TOML
235 lines
11 KiB
TOML
# cargo-deny configuration — supply-chain policy for the ruvector
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# workspace. See the supply-chain CI workflow (`.github/workflows/
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# supply-chain.yml`) for how this gets enforced on every PR + on a
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# weekly scheduled scan.
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#
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# Run locally:
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# cargo install --locked cargo-deny
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# cargo deny check
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#
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# Four sub-checks run: advisories, bans, licenses, sources.
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# Each fails the run independently; together they form the crate-graph
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# half of our supply-chain defence (npm side is in the same workflow).
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[graph]
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# Sensible target set so we don't pull in checks for triples we never
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# build day-to-day. wasm32-unknown-unknown is gated per-crate by the
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# `wasm` features and gets its own checks in the wasm CI jobs.
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targets = [
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{ triple = "x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu" },
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{ triple = "aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu" },
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{ triple = "x86_64-apple-darwin" },
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{ triple = "aarch64-apple-darwin" },
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]
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# 1) advisories — RustSec DB scan
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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[advisories]
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db-urls = ["https://github.com/RustSec/advisory-db"]
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version = 2
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# Surface yanked crates as warnings. Promote to `deny` once we've
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# migrated off whichever transitive holds the yanked version.
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yanked = "warn"
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# Whitelist specific RUSTSEC IDs with justification + re-review date.
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# Every entry MUST carry a justification and an explicit re-review
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# date — we revisit on each minor release at minimum. Dependabot will
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# auto-resolve most of these as upstreams publish fixes; this list is
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# meant to shrink over time.
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ignore = [
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# ── Real vulnerabilities (need active migration path) ────────────
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# rsa 0.9.x — Marvin Attack timing sidechannel (RUSTSEC-2023-0071).
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# No patched version exists; the RustCrypto/RSA team is rewriting
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# to constant-time. Used by `ruvector-kalshi` for Kalshi exchange
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# API signing (RSA-PSS-SHA256, mandated by the exchange). Mitigation
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# per the advisory: "local use on a non-compromised computer is
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# fine" — we sign locally and an attacker would need to observe
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# sub-ms timing across many requests through the network response
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# timing to recover the key. Risk is acceptable for trading-bot
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# use; re-review on 2026-08-01 or when `rsa 0.10` ships with the
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# constant-time fix (track: https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/issues/626).
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"RUSTSEC-2023-0071",
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# ── Unsoundness (no exploit path in our usage) ───────────────────
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# rand 0.8.5 — unsound only when paired with a *custom logger* that
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# logs during random number generation (RUSTSEC-2026-0097). We use
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# `tracing` and never log inside RNG draws; the unsound condition
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# cannot be triggered. Re-review on `rand 0.9` adoption across the
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# workspace.
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"RUSTSEC-2026-0097",
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# imageproc 0.25.0 — three unsoundness advisories around image
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# sampling / bounds checks. Pulled transitively via the scipix
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# examples crate, never reached by the publish artifacts of any
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# crates.io-published member. Unsound != exploitable here: inputs
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# are caller-controlled image buffers in offline experiments.
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# Re-review on 2026-08-01 or when imageproc publishes 0.26 with
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# the fixes.
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"RUSTSEC-2026-0115",
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"RUSTSEC-2026-0116",
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"RUSTSEC-2026-0117",
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# ── Unmaintained transitive deps (informational, no CVE) ─────────
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# proc-macro-error 1.x — unmaintained, transitively required by
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# several proc-macro deps (clap-derive ecosystem). 2.x is API
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# incompatible. Dependabot tracking. Re-review on 2026-07-01.
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"RUSTSEC-2024-0370",
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# proc-macro-error2 — the (also now unmaintained) fork of the above,
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# pulled transitively via validator_derive -> validator (ruvector-scipix
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# example). Same crate family as RUSTSEC-2024-0370, no maintained
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# successor yet. Informational. Re-review on 2026-07-01.
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"RUSTSEC-2026-0173",
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# number_prefix — unmaintained, used transitively by indicatif. No
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# known successor; indicatif itself is still maintained. Informational.
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"RUSTSEC-2025-0119",
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# paste 1.0.x — archived upstream 2024-10. Pulled transitively via
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# nalgebra/simba and several proc-macro deps. No vulnerability,
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# just informational. Re-review on 2026-08-01.
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"RUSTSEC-2024-0436",
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# bincode 1.x — unmaintained, 2.x is API-incompatible. Multiple
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# call sites across rvf + serialization layers; migration queued.
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# Re-review on 2026-07-01.
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"RUSTSEC-2025-0141",
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# instant 0.1.x — unmaintained. Transitive via async-std / wasm
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# adapters. Replacement is `web-time` but several transitives still
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# pin instant directly. Re-review on 2026-07-15.
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"RUSTSEC-2024-0384",
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# rand_os 0.x — unmaintained, replaced by getrandom. Transitive via
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# legacy rand internals; modern paths use getrandom directly.
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"RUSTSEC-2021-0140",
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# core2 0.4.0 — yanked, but pulled transitively via the rav1e/
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# image/imageproc chain (offline-only scipix examples crate).
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# Re-review when imageproc bumps off ravif 0.13.
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"RUSTSEC-2025-0124",
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# rustls-pemfile 1.x — unmaintained, replaced by rustls-pki-types'
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# builtin PEM parser. Transitive via reqwest / tokio-tungstenite.
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# Migration is a transitive bump; Dependabot tracking.
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"RUSTSEC-2025-0134",
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# rusttype 0.9 — unmaintained (RUSTSEC-2026-0105). Used by
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# imageproc's text-rendering path which we don't exercise (scipix
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# offline experiments only). No safe upgrade available. Re-review
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# 2026-08-01.
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"RUSTSEC-2026-0105",
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# memmap2 0.9.x — unsound `Unchecked pointer offset` API (RUSTSEC-2026-0186,
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# "unsound", not an exploitable vuln). Transitive via safetensors/candle
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# mmap loading and other crates; no fixed release on the 0.9 line yet.
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# We don't pass attacker-controlled offsets to memmap2. Re-review 2026-08-01.
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"RUSTSEC-2026-0186",
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# anyhow 1.0.102 — unsoundness in `Error::downcast_mut()` (RUSTSEC-2026-0190,
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# "unsound", not an exploitable vuln). Triggering it requires downcasting an
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# `anyhow::Error` to a mismatched mutable type — a pattern we never use; our
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# usage is construct/propagate/`Display`/read-only `downcast_ref`. Single
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# version (1.0.102) in the tree. Bump to the patched anyhow once it ships and
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# remove this entry. Re-review 2026-08-01.
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"RUSTSEC-2026-0190",
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]
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# 2) bans — explicit crate-name allow/block list
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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[bans]
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# 136-member workspace pulls both Tokio and async-std families,
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# producing legitimate version skew (e.g. nalgebra 0.32 vs 0.33 across
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# linear-algebra crates). Track for cleanup but `warn`, not `deny`.
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multiple-versions = "warn"
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# Refuse `version = "*"` for crates.io deps in any of our Cargo.tomls
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# — that's how typosquatting + accidental floats land malicious
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# versions. Demoted to `warn` for now because several internal/path
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# wildcards exist in the mcp-brain + consciousness experiment crates
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# (those use `workspace = "*"` for path-only deps which cargo-deny
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# can't always distinguish from registry wildcards). Tracked for
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# tightening to `deny` once those are migrated to explicit version
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# constraints. Re-review on 2026-08-01.
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wildcards = "warn"
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# Highlight transitively-pulled-in deep deps so reviewers can audit
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# tree growth without explicit blessing.
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highlight = "all"
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# Concretely forbidden crates — empty for now. Use this slot to
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# quickly block a compromised package mid-flight without editing the
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# workflow.
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deny = []
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# Allow internal workspace path deps to use `version = "*"` until the
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# tighten-up pass lands. Listed crates have been audited as path-only.
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allow-wildcard-paths = true
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# 3) licenses — what we'll allow in the graph
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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[licenses]
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version = 2
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# Matches `actions/dependency-review-action`'s allow-list in the
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# supply-chain workflow so the two checks agree.
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#
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# Additions vs sublinear-time-solver's allowlist:
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# * BSL-1.0 — Boost Software License (xxhash-rust transitive
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# via rvf-wire → mcp-brain-server + benchmarks)
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# * CDLA-Permissive-2.0 — used by tch-rs / onnxruntime style deps
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# * NCSA — University of Illinois/NCSA Open Source
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# License (LLVM family deps)
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allow = [
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"MIT",
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"Apache-2.0",
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"Apache-2.0 WITH LLVM-exception",
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"BSD-2-Clause",
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"BSD-3-Clause",
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"ISC",
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"Unicode-DFS-2016",
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"Unicode-3.0",
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"MPL-2.0",
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"Zlib",
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"CC0-1.0",
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"BSL-1.0",
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"CDLA-Permissive-2.0",
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"NCSA",
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]
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confidence-threshold = 0.8
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exceptions = []
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# Workspace-internal crates without `license = "..."` set are research
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# / examples crates with `publish = false`. Ignore them rather than
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# failing the run — they're never shipped to crates.io. If one is ever
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# flipped to `publish = true`, the publish flow's `cargo publish` step
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# will refuse it without an explicit license, so this is safe.
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private = { ignore = true }
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# 4) sources — which registries / git remotes the graph can pull from
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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[sources]
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# Default: only the official crates.io registry. Anything else (private
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# mirror, git dep) must be explicitly allowed.
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unknown-registry = "deny"
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# `warn` instead of `deny` for ruvector because the workspace pulls
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# several legitimate git deps (vendored hailo bindings, in-flight
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# upstream fixes pinned to commits). Promote to `deny` once those
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# have crates.io releases. Each unknown-git appearance shows up in
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# the CI log so reviewers can challenge it on a per-PR basis.
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unknown-git = "warn"
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# Allow-list for git remotes — populated on demand. If a future PR
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# needs a git dep, this is where the reviewer adds it with a
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# justification comment.
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allow-git = []
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allow-registry = ["https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"]
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