feat(rvagent): Hermes-class harness architecture — research, ADRs 273-279, harness repair + review fixes (#752)

Research docs + target architecture for rvagent as a Hermes-class harness (metaharness + ruflo integration), ADRs 273-279, rvAgent harness repair (tool schemas wired, middleware pipeline, subagents, bootstrap, policy genome), PDX vertical-layout benchmark (not adopted), plus full adversarial code-review fix round: symlink/hard-link write-escape confinement in local tools, real HITL gating in both pipeline construction paths, Gemini parallel-tool-call and schema-compatibility fixes, panic/deadlock hardening.

CI note: Tests (vector-index) failure is the pre-existing flaky ruvector-diskann recall_trigger_holds_under_no_drift probabilistic test (untouched crate; passes 3/3 locally on this head, passed on prior run). Tests (core-and-rest) historically exceeds its window and was not required.

🤖 Generated with [claude-flow](https://github.com/ruvnet/claude-flow)
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75 changed files with 11263 additions and 2007 deletions

2
Cargo.lock generated
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@ -11311,6 +11311,7 @@ dependencies = [
"serde_json",
"sha3",
"smallvec 1.15.2",
"tempfile",
"thiserror 2.0.18",
"tokio",
"tracing",
@ -11400,6 +11401,7 @@ dependencies = [
"async-trait",
"criterion 0.5.1",
"glob",
"libc",
"mockall",
"rvagent-backends",
"rvagent-core",

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@ -317,3 +317,7 @@ overly_complex_bool_expr = { level = "allow", priority = 1 }
zombie_processes = { level = "allow", priority = 1 }
repeat_vec_with_capacity = { level = "allow", priority = 1 }
missing_transmute_annotations = { level = "allow", priority = 1 }
[[bench]]
name = "pdx_vs_rowmajor"
harness = false

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@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
//! Row-major batch distance vs PDX vertical layout (ADR-279 §5.1).
//!
//! Both compute the same thing over the same data. The only difference is
//! memory layout and whether a horizontal reduction happens per vector.
use criterion::{black_box, criterion_group, criterion_main, BenchmarkId, Criterion, Throughput};
use ruvector_core::pdx::PdxIndex;
use ruvector_core::simd_intrinsics::batch_euclidean;
fn corpus(n: usize, dim: usize) -> Vec<Vec<f32>> {
(0..n)
.map(|i| {
(0..dim)
.map(|d| ((i * 31 + d * 17) % 101) as f32 / 101.0)
.collect()
})
.collect()
}
fn bench(c: &mut Criterion) {
// 1536 is the OpenAI embedding width; 768 covers most sentence encoders.
// (n, dim) pairs: the first three are cache-resident, the rest stream.
for (n, dim) in [
(256usize, 768usize),
(512, 768),
(1024, 768),
(4096, 768),
(4096, 1536),
] {
let vecs = corpus(n, dim);
let refs: Vec<&[f32]> = vecs.iter().map(|v| v.as_slice()).collect();
let query: Vec<f32> = (0..dim).map(|d| (d % 7) as f32 / 7.0).collect();
let index = PdxIndex::from_rows(&refs);
let mut out = vec![0.0f32; n];
let mut group = c.benchmark_group(format!("batch_euclidean_{n}x{dim}"));
// Bytes of vector data scanned per query — makes the two comparable
// in bandwidth terms rather than just wall time.
group.throughput(Throughput::Bytes((n * dim * 4) as u64));
group.bench_function(BenchmarkId::new("row_major", dim), |b| {
b.iter(|| {
batch_euclidean(black_box(&query), black_box(&refs), black_box(&mut out));
})
});
group.bench_function(BenchmarkId::new("pdx_vertical", dim), |b| {
b.iter(|| {
index.euclidean_sq_into(black_box(&query), black_box(&mut out));
})
});
group.finish();
}
}
criterion_group!(benches, bench);
criterion_main!(benches);

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@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ pub mod distance;
pub mod embeddings;
pub mod error;
pub mod index;
pub mod pdx;
pub mod quantization;
// Storage backends - conditional compilation based on features

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@ -0,0 +1,394 @@
//! PDX-style vertical (dimension-major) layout for bulk distance computation.
//!
//! Implements the layout change measured in *PDX: A Data Layout for Vector
//! Similarity Search* (SIGMOD '25), which beat hand-written SIMD kernels in
//! SimSIMD and FAISS by ~2.0× on average — using **scalar** code — purely by
//! reorganizing memory. See ADR-279 §5.1: layout is the lever, not intrinsics.
//!
//! # Why the row-major batch loop leaves throughput on the table
//!
//! The conventional layout stores each vector contiguously and computes one
//! distance at a time:
//!
//! ```text
//! v0: [d0 d1 d2 … dD] → SIMD across dimensions → horizontal sum → result[0]
//! v1: [d0 d1 d2 … dD] → SIMD across dimensions → horizontal sum → result[1]
//! ```
//!
//! Two costs are structural, not tuning problems:
//!
//! 1. **A horizontal reduction per vector.** Summing a SIMD accumulator into a
//! scalar is a serial dependency chain (`_mm512_reduce_add_ps` is several
//! dependent shuffles and adds) and it happens once per vector.
//! 2. **A tail per vector.** Any dimension count not a multiple of the vector
//! width runs a scalar remainder loop, once per vector.
//!
//! # The vertical layout
//!
//! Store a *block* of `LANES` vectors dimension-major:
//!
//! ```text
//! dim 0: [v0 v1 v2 … v15]
//! dim 1: [v0 v1 v2 … v15]
//! …
//! ```
//!
//! Now one SIMD register holds *one dimension of sixteen different vectors*.
//! Iterating dimensions accumulates sixteen independent distances in parallel:
//!
//! - **No horizontal reduction at all** — lane `i` of the accumulator *is*
//! distance `i` when the loop ends.
//! - **No per-vector tail** — the only remainder is the final partial block.
//! - **Sequential access** across the whole block.
//!
//! The accumulator also has no loop-carried dependency between lanes, so the
//! CPU can keep several FMAs in flight.
//!
//! # Portability
//!
//! Written against `f32` chunks that LLVM autovectorizes, with an explicit
//! AVX-512 path where available. Per ADR-279 this is deliberately *not* C: the
//! same source compiles for x86-64, aarch64, and wasm32.
use std::fmt;
/// Vectors per block. 16 f32 fills one AVX-512 register; on narrower ISAs the
/// compiler splits it into multiple registers, which still vectorizes cleanly.
pub const LANES: usize = 16;
/// A block of up to [`LANES`] vectors stored dimension-major.
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct PdxBlock {
/// `dim * LANES + lane`. Unused lanes hold zeros.
data: Vec<f32>,
dim: usize,
/// How many lanes carry real vectors (≤ `LANES`).
len: usize,
}
impl fmt::Debug for PdxBlock {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
f.debug_struct("PdxBlock")
.field("dim", &self.dim)
.field("len", &self.len)
.finish_non_exhaustive()
}
}
impl PdxBlock {
/// Transpose up to [`LANES`] row-major vectors into one vertical block.
///
/// # Panics
/// If `vectors` is longer than [`LANES`], or any vector's length differs
/// from `dim`. Both are programming errors rather than input errors — a
/// ragged block would silently produce wrong distances.
pub fn from_rows(vectors: &[&[f32]], dim: usize) -> Self {
assert!(
vectors.len() <= LANES,
"block holds at most {LANES} vectors, got {}",
vectors.len()
);
for (i, v) in vectors.iter().enumerate() {
assert_eq!(
v.len(),
dim,
"vector {i} has length {}, expected {dim}",
v.len()
);
}
let mut data = vec![0.0f32; dim * LANES];
for (lane, v) in vectors.iter().enumerate() {
for (d, &value) in v.iter().enumerate() {
data[d * LANES + lane] = value;
}
}
Self {
data,
dim,
len: vectors.len(),
}
}
pub fn dim(&self) -> usize {
self.dim
}
pub fn len(&self) -> usize {
self.len
}
pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
self.len == 0
}
/// Squared euclidean distance from `query` to every vector in the block.
///
/// Writes `self.len()` results. Padding lanes are computed but discarded —
/// branchless, and they hold zeros so they cannot fault or produce NaN.
///
/// # Panics
/// If `query.len() != self.dim()` or `out.len() < self.len()`.
pub fn euclidean_sq_into(&self, query: &[f32], out: &mut [f32]) {
assert_eq!(query.len(), self.dim, "query dimension mismatch");
assert!(out.len() >= self.len, "output buffer too small");
let mut acc = [0.0f32; LANES];
for (d, &q) in query.iter().enumerate() {
let row = &self.data[d * LANES..d * LANES + LANES];
// Fixed-size slice so LLVM knows the trip count and emits a single
// vector op per dimension with no remainder branch.
for lane in 0..LANES {
let diff = row[lane] - q;
acc[lane] = diff.mul_add(diff, acc[lane]);
}
}
out[..self.len].copy_from_slice(&acc[..self.len]);
}
/// Dot product from `query` to every vector in the block.
pub fn dot_into(&self, query: &[f32], out: &mut [f32]) {
assert_eq!(query.len(), self.dim, "query dimension mismatch");
assert!(out.len() >= self.len, "output buffer too small");
let mut acc = [0.0f32; LANES];
for (d, &q) in query.iter().enumerate() {
let row = &self.data[d * LANES..d * LANES + LANES];
for lane in 0..LANES {
acc[lane] = row[lane].mul_add(q, acc[lane]);
}
}
out[..self.len].copy_from_slice(&acc[..self.len]);
}
}
/// A full vector set in PDX layout: a sequence of vertical blocks.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct PdxIndex {
blocks: Vec<PdxBlock>,
dim: usize,
len: usize,
}
impl PdxIndex {
/// Build from row-major vectors.
///
/// # Panics
/// If `vectors` is empty, or any vector's length differs from the first.
pub fn from_rows(vectors: &[&[f32]]) -> Self {
assert!(
!vectors.is_empty(),
"cannot build a PdxIndex from no vectors"
);
let dim = vectors[0].len();
let blocks = vectors
.chunks(LANES)
.map(|chunk| PdxBlock::from_rows(chunk, dim))
.collect();
Self {
blocks,
dim,
len: vectors.len(),
}
}
pub fn dim(&self) -> usize {
self.dim
}
pub fn len(&self) -> usize {
self.len
}
pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
self.len == 0
}
pub fn block_count(&self) -> usize {
self.blocks.len()
}
/// Squared euclidean distance from `query` to every indexed vector.
///
/// This is the bulk API the row-major batch path lacks — the second lever
/// in ADR-279 §5.1, worth 1.853.04× independently of layout, because it
/// amortizes dispatch and lets the prefetcher see a sequential stream.
///
/// # Panics
/// If `out.len() < self.len()`.
pub fn euclidean_sq_into(&self, query: &[f32], out: &mut [f32]) {
assert!(out.len() >= self.len, "output buffer too small");
let mut written = 0;
for block in &self.blocks {
block.euclidean_sq_into(query, &mut out[written..]);
written += block.len();
}
}
/// Dot product from `query` to every indexed vector.
pub fn dot_into(&self, query: &[f32], out: &mut [f32]) {
assert!(out.len() >= self.len, "output buffer too small");
let mut written = 0;
for block in &self.blocks {
block.dot_into(query, &mut out[written..]);
written += block.len();
}
}
/// Convenience allocating wrapper.
pub fn euclidean_sq(&self, query: &[f32]) -> Vec<f32> {
let mut out = vec![0.0; self.len];
self.euclidean_sq_into(query, &mut out);
out
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
/// Reference implementation. Deliberately naive — its job is to be
/// obviously correct, not fast.
fn euclidean_sq_ref(a: &[f32], b: &[f32]) -> f32 {
a.iter().zip(b).map(|(x, y)| (x - y) * (x - y)).sum()
}
fn dot_ref(a: &[f32], b: &[f32]) -> f32 {
a.iter().zip(b).map(|(x, y)| x * y).sum()
}
fn make(n: usize, dim: usize) -> Vec<Vec<f32>> {
(0..n)
.map(|i| {
(0..dim)
.map(|d| ((i * 31 + d * 17) % 101) as f32 / 101.0)
.collect()
})
.collect()
}
#[test]
fn block_matches_reference_euclidean() {
let dim = 128;
let vecs = make(LANES, dim);
let refs: Vec<&[f32]> = vecs.iter().map(|v| v.as_slice()).collect();
let block = PdxBlock::from_rows(&refs, dim);
let query: Vec<f32> = (0..dim).map(|d| (d % 7) as f32 / 7.0).collect();
let mut got = vec![0.0; LANES];
block.euclidean_sq_into(&query, &mut got);
for (i, v) in vecs.iter().enumerate() {
let want = euclidean_sq_ref(&query, v);
assert!(
(got[i] - want).abs() < 1e-4,
"lane {i}: got {}, want {want}",
got[i]
);
}
}
#[test]
fn block_matches_reference_dot() {
let dim = 96;
let vecs = make(LANES, dim);
let refs: Vec<&[f32]> = vecs.iter().map(|v| v.as_slice()).collect();
let block = PdxBlock::from_rows(&refs, dim);
let query: Vec<f32> = (0..dim).map(|d| (d % 5) as f32 / 5.0).collect();
let mut got = vec![0.0; LANES];
block.dot_into(&query, &mut got);
for (i, v) in vecs.iter().enumerate() {
let want = dot_ref(&query, v);
assert!((got[i] - want).abs() < 1e-4, "lane {i}");
}
}
#[test]
fn partial_block_ignores_padding_lanes() {
// The case most likely to produce silently wrong results: a block that
// is not full. Padding lanes must not appear in the output.
let dim = 64;
let vecs = make(5, dim);
let refs: Vec<&[f32]> = vecs.iter().map(|v| v.as_slice()).collect();
let block = PdxBlock::from_rows(&refs, dim);
assert_eq!(block.len(), 5);
let query = vec![0.5f32; dim];
let mut got = vec![f32::NAN; 5];
block.euclidean_sq_into(&query, &mut got);
for (i, v) in vecs.iter().enumerate() {
assert!((got[i] - euclidean_sq_ref(&query, v)).abs() < 1e-4);
}
}
#[test]
fn index_matches_reference_across_block_boundaries() {
// 50 vectors = 3 full blocks + a partial, so boundary handling is
// exercised rather than assumed.
let dim = 129; // deliberately not a multiple of any vector width
let vecs = make(50, dim);
let refs: Vec<&[f32]> = vecs.iter().map(|v| v.as_slice()).collect();
let index = PdxIndex::from_rows(&refs);
assert_eq!(index.len(), 50);
assert_eq!(index.block_count(), 4);
let query: Vec<f32> = (0..dim).map(|d| (d % 11) as f32 / 11.0).collect();
let got = index.euclidean_sq(&query);
assert_eq!(got.len(), 50);
for (i, v) in vecs.iter().enumerate() {
let want = euclidean_sq_ref(&query, v);
assert!(
(got[i] - want).abs() < 1e-3,
"vector {i}: got {}, want {want}",
got[i]
);
}
}
#[test]
fn single_vector_index_works() {
let dim = 32;
let v: Vec<f32> = (0..dim).map(|d| d as f32).collect();
let index = PdxIndex::from_rows(&[v.as_slice()]);
let got = index.euclidean_sq(&v);
assert_eq!(got.len(), 1);
assert!(got[0].abs() < 1e-5, "distance to self must be zero");
}
#[test]
#[should_panic(expected = "expected 4")]
fn ragged_block_is_rejected() {
let a = [1.0f32, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0];
let b = [1.0f32, 2.0];
PdxBlock::from_rows(&[&a[..], &b[..]], 4);
}
#[test]
#[should_panic(expected = "at most")]
fn oversized_block_is_rejected() {
let v = vec![0.0f32; 8];
let refs: Vec<&[f32]> = (0..LANES + 1).map(|_| v.as_slice()).collect();
PdxBlock::from_rows(&refs, 8);
}
#[test]
#[should_panic(expected = "output buffer too small")]
fn undersized_output_is_rejected() {
let dim = 16;
let vecs = make(20, dim);
let refs: Vec<&[f32]> = vecs.iter().map(|v| v.as_slice()).collect();
let index = PdxIndex::from_rows(&refs);
let mut out = vec![0.0; 5];
index.euclidean_sq_into(&vec![0.0; dim], &mut out);
}
}

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@ -50,8 +50,7 @@ let subagent_state = state.clone(); // No deep copy!
| Feature | What It Does | Why It Matters |
|---------|--------------|----------------|
| **O(1) State Cloning** | Clone agent state instantly via Arc | Spawn subagents without copying gigabytes of context |
| **Parallel Tool Execution** | Run multiple tools simultaneously | 5-10x faster than sequential execution |
| **HNSW Semantic Search** | O(log n) memory retrieval | Find relevant context in millions of entries |
| **Parallel Tool Execution** | Bounded-concurrency JoinSet execution | Wall clock = slowest tool, not the sum; failures isolated per call |
| **Single-Allocation Formatting** | Pre-calculated output buffers | No memory fragmentation under load |
### 🔒 Security
@ -120,17 +119,19 @@ How does rvAgent compare to other agent frameworks?
## Architecture
rvAgent is organized as 8 crates within the RuVector workspace:
rvAgent is organized as 10 crates within the RuVector workspace:
```
rvAgent/
rvagent-core Core types, COW state, AGI containers, session encryption
rvagent-backends Backend protocol trait + sandbox security contracts
rvagent-middleware Middleware trait + 14 middleware implementations (incl. SONA, HNSW)
rvagent-tools Tool trait + 8 built-in tools (enum dispatch)
rvagent-core Core types, agent graph, COW state, AGI containers, session encryption
rvagent-backends Backend protocol trait + sandbox security + Anthropic/Gemini clients
rvagent-middleware Middleware trait + async pipeline + 14 middleware implementations
rvagent-tools Tool trait + 9 built-in tools (enum dispatch)
rvagent-subagents SubAgent spec, CRDT merge, result validation, orchestration
rvagent-cli Terminal coding agent (ratatui TUI)
rvagent-acp Agent Communication Protocol server (axum) with auth
rvagent-mcp MCP server/client (JSON-RPC 2.0, stdio + SSE transports)
rvagent-a2a Agent2Agent peer protocol (signed cards, budgets, routing)
rvagent-wasm WASM bindings for browser/Node.js
```
@ -273,8 +274,7 @@ rvAgent solves these with Rust's zero-cost abstractions.
|-----------|---------|-------------------|---------|
| State cloning | <1μs (O(1)) | ~10ms (deep copy) | 10,000x |
| Tool dispatch | No overhead (enum) | ~1ms (vtable lookup) | Direct |
| Parallel tools | True multi-threaded | Async (still serial) | Linear scaling |
| Memory search | O(log n) via HNSW | O(n) linear scan | 100-1000x on large sets |
| Parallel tools | Spawned tasks, bounded concurrency | Async (still serial) | Wall clock = slowest tool |
### Key Optimizations
@ -297,11 +297,11 @@ tools: ["read_file", "grep", "execute", "read_file", "glob"]
let formatted = format_content_with_line_numbers(content);
```
**HNSW Semantic Search** — Find relevant memories in massive datasets
```rust
// O(log n) retrieval instead of scanning everything
let relevant = hnsw.search("authentication bug", top_k=5);
```
**Memory retrieval (experimental)** — The `hnsw` middleware ships a simplified
in-process index with a hash-based embedding placeholder. It is NOT semantic
search yet: integration with real RuVector embeddings is tracked in the
Hermes-class harness roadmap (`docs/research/rvagent-hermes-harness/`), and
no retrieval performance claims are made until it lands.
## Advanced Features

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@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ use rvagent_core::config::RvAgentConfig;
use rvagent_core::error::Result as CoreResult;
use rvagent_core::graph::{AgentGraph, GraphConfig, ToolExecutor};
use rvagent_core::messages::{Message, ToolCall};
use rvagent_core::models::ChatModel;
use rvagent_core::models::{ChatModel, ToolDefinition};
use rvagent_core::state::AgentState;
use crate::types::{
@ -77,7 +77,11 @@ struct StubModel;
#[async_trait]
impl ChatModel for StubModel {
async fn complete(&self, messages: &[Message]) -> CoreResult<Message> {
async fn complete(
&self,
messages: &[Message],
_tools: &[ToolDefinition],
) -> CoreResult<Message> {
// Find the last human message and produce an intelligent echo.
let user_text = messages
.iter()
@ -95,8 +99,12 @@ impl ChatModel for StubModel {
Ok(Message::ai(response))
}
async fn stream(&self, messages: &[Message]) -> CoreResult<Vec<Message>> {
let msg = self.complete(messages).await?;
async fn stream(
&self,
messages: &[Message],
tools: &[ToolDefinition],
) -> CoreResult<Vec<Message>> {
let msg = self.complete(messages, tools).await?;
Ok(vec![msg])
}
}
@ -186,20 +194,48 @@ impl AcpAgent {
let user_msg = Message::human(&user_text);
// Run the prompt through an AgentGraph with a stub model.
// Run the prompt through an AgentGraph with a stub model wrapped in
// the middleware pipeline (P0.3 wiring).
//
// In production, the model would be resolved from `self.config`
// and real tools/middleware would be wired in. The stub model
// allows the server to run without an API key.
// and real tools would be wired in. The stub model allows the
// server to run without an API key.
let graph_config = GraphConfig {
max_iterations: 10,
parallel_tools: false,
..GraphConfig::default()
};
let graph = AgentGraph::with_config(StubModel, AcpToolExecutor, graph_config);
// Resolve the configured middleware names (an unknown name is an
// error); an empty configuration gets the default pipeline.
let pipeline_config = rvagent_middleware::PipelineConfig::default();
let pipeline = if self.config.middleware.is_empty() {
rvagent_middleware::build_default_pipeline(&pipeline_config)
} else {
let names: Vec<&str> = self
.config
.middleware
.iter()
.map(|m| m.name.as_str())
.collect();
rvagent_middleware::build_pipeline_from_names(&names, &pipeline_config)
.map_err(|e| e.to_string())?
};
let pipeline = Arc::new(pipeline);
let mut agent_state = AgentState::new();
agent_state.push_message(user_msg.clone());
// Run before_agent hooks over the initial state.
let mw_runtime = rvagent_middleware::Runtime::new();
let run_config = rvagent_middleware::RunnableConfig::default();
pipeline
.run_before_agent(&mut agent_state, &mw_runtime, &run_config)
.await;
let model = rvagent_middleware::PipelineModel::new(StubModel, Arc::clone(&pipeline));
let graph = AgentGraph::with_config(model, AcpToolExecutor, graph_config);
let final_state = graph
.run(agent_state)
.await

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@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ use tracing::{debug, warn};
use rvagent_core::error::{Result, RvAgentError};
use rvagent_core::messages::{AiMessage, Message, ToolCall};
use rvagent_core::models::{ApiKeySource, ChatModel, ModelConfig};
use rvagent_core::models::{ApiKeySource, ChatModel, ModelConfig, ToolDefinition};
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Constants
@ -65,6 +65,24 @@ enum ContentBlock {
},
}
/// A tool definition in the Anthropic Messages API format.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
struct ApiTool {
name: String,
description: String,
input_schema: serde_json::Value,
}
impl From<&ToolDefinition> for ApiTool {
fn from(def: &ToolDefinition) -> Self {
Self {
name: def.name.clone(),
description: def.description.clone(),
input_schema: def.input_schema.clone(),
}
}
}
/// The request body sent to the Anthropic Messages API.
#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
struct ApiRequest {
@ -75,6 +93,8 @@ struct ApiRequest {
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
system: Option<String>,
messages: Vec<ApiMessage>,
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
tools: Vec<ApiTool>,
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
stream: Option<bool>,
}
@ -85,18 +105,14 @@ struct ApiResponse {
content: Vec<ContentBlock>,
#[allow(dead_code)]
model: String,
#[allow(dead_code)]
stop_reason: Option<String>,
#[allow(dead_code)]
usage: Option<Usage>,
}
/// Token usage information.
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
struct Usage {
#[allow(dead_code)]
input_tokens: u64,
#[allow(dead_code)]
output_tokens: u64,
}
@ -129,7 +145,7 @@ struct ApiErrorDetail {
/// # async fn example() -> rvagent_core::error::Result<()> {
/// let config = resolve_model("anthropic:claude-sonnet-4-20250514");
/// let client = AnthropicClient::new(config)?;
/// let response = client.complete(&[Message::human("Hello!")]).await?;
/// let response = client.complete(&[Message::human("Hello!")], &[]).await?;
/// println!("{}", response.content());
/// # Ok(())
/// # }
@ -168,12 +184,28 @@ impl AnthropicClient {
}
}
/// Build the API request body from rvAgent messages.
fn build_request(&self, messages: &[Message], stream: bool) -> ApiRequest {
/// Build the API request body from rvAgent messages and tool definitions.
fn build_request(
&self,
messages: &[Message],
tools: &[ToolDefinition],
stream: bool,
) -> ApiRequest {
let mut system_text: Option<String> = None;
let mut api_messages: Vec<ApiMessage> = Vec::new();
// Anthropic expects every tool_result answering one assistant turn in
// a single user message; splitting them suppresses parallel tool
// calling. Buffer consecutive tool results and flush them together.
let mut pending_tool_results: Vec<ContentBlock> = Vec::new();
for msg in messages {
if !matches!(msg, Message::Tool(_)) && !pending_tool_results.is_empty() {
api_messages.push(ApiMessage {
role: "user".to_string(),
content: ApiContent::Blocks(std::mem::take(&mut pending_tool_results)),
});
}
match msg {
Message::System(s) => {
// Anthropic uses a top-level `system` field; merge multiple system messages.
@ -219,17 +251,21 @@ impl AnthropicClient {
}
}
Message::Tool(t) => {
api_messages.push(ApiMessage {
role: "user".to_string(),
content: ApiContent::Blocks(vec![ContentBlock::ToolResult {
tool_use_id: t.tool_call_id.clone(),
content: t.content.clone(),
}]),
pending_tool_results.push(ContentBlock::ToolResult {
tool_use_id: t.tool_call_id.clone(),
content: t.content.clone(),
});
}
}
}
if !pending_tool_results.is_empty() {
api_messages.push(ApiMessage {
role: "user".to_string(),
content: ApiContent::Blocks(pending_tool_results),
});
}
ApiRequest {
model: self.config.model_id.clone(),
max_tokens: self.config.max_tokens,
@ -240,6 +276,7 @@ impl AnthropicClient {
},
system: system_text,
messages: api_messages,
tools: tools.iter().map(ApiTool::from).collect(),
stream: if stream { Some(true) } else { None },
}
}
@ -330,6 +367,9 @@ impl AnthropicClient {
}
/// Convert an API response into an rvAgent [`Message`].
///
/// Token usage is attached to the message metadata under the `usage` key
/// so the agent loop and budget layers can account for it.
fn parse_response(response: ApiResponse) -> Message {
let mut text_parts: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
let mut tool_calls: Vec<ToolCall> = Vec::new();
@ -352,23 +392,36 @@ impl AnthropicClient {
let content = text_parts.join("");
if tool_calls.is_empty() {
Message::ai(content)
} else {
Message::Ai(AiMessage {
content,
tool_calls,
metadata: HashMap::new(),
})
let mut metadata = HashMap::new();
if let Some(usage) = &response.usage {
metadata.insert(
"usage".to_string(),
serde_json::json!({
"input_tokens": usage.input_tokens,
"output_tokens": usage.output_tokens,
}),
);
}
if let Some(stop_reason) = &response.stop_reason {
metadata.insert(
"stop_reason".to_string(),
serde_json::Value::String(stop_reason.clone()),
);
}
Message::Ai(AiMessage {
content,
tool_calls,
metadata,
})
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl ChatModel for AnthropicClient {
/// Send messages and receive a complete response.
async fn complete(&self, messages: &[Message]) -> Result<Message> {
let request_body = self.build_request(messages, false);
/// Send messages and the active tool set, receive a complete response.
async fn complete(&self, messages: &[Message], tools: &[ToolDefinition]) -> Result<Message> {
let request_body = self.build_request(messages, tools, false);
let response = self
.send_with_retry(&request_body, ANTHROPIC_API_URL)
.await?;
@ -379,8 +432,8 @@ impl ChatModel for AnthropicClient {
///
/// True SSE streaming is not yet implemented; this method calls the non-streaming
/// endpoint and returns a single-element vector containing the complete message.
async fn stream(&self, messages: &[Message]) -> Result<Vec<Message>> {
let msg = self.complete(messages).await?;
async fn stream(&self, messages: &[Message], tools: &[ToolDefinition]) -> Result<Vec<Message>> {
let msg = self.complete(messages, tools).await?;
Ok(vec![msg])
}
}
@ -452,7 +505,7 @@ mod tests {
Message::system("You are helpful."),
Message::human("Hello!"),
];
let req = client.build_request(&messages, false);
let req = client.build_request(&messages, &[], false);
assert_eq!(req.model, "claude-sonnet-4-20250514");
assert_eq!(req.max_tokens, 1024);
@ -471,7 +524,7 @@ mod tests {
Message::system("Second instruction."),
Message::human("Go."),
];
let req = client.build_request(&messages, false);
let req = client.build_request(&messages, &[], false);
assert_eq!(
req.system,
@ -495,7 +548,7 @@ mod tests {
),
Message::tool("tc_1", "file contents here"),
];
let req = client.build_request(&messages, false);
let req = client.build_request(&messages, &[], false);
assert_eq!(req.messages.len(), 3);
assert_eq!(req.messages[0].role, "user");
@ -511,12 +564,157 @@ mod tests {
}
}
#[test]
fn test_build_request_groups_parallel_tool_results() {
let client =
AnthropicClient::with_http(test_config(), reqwest::Client::new(), "key".to_string());
let messages = vec![
Message::human("Read both files."),
Message::ai_with_tools(
"Reading them.",
vec![
ToolCall {
id: "tc_1".to_string(),
name: "read_file".to_string(),
args: json!({"path": "/tmp/a.txt"}),
},
ToolCall {
id: "tc_2".to_string(),
name: "read_file".to_string(),
args: json!({"path": "/tmp/b.txt"}),
},
],
),
Message::tool("tc_1", "a contents"),
Message::tool("tc_2", "b contents"),
];
let req = client.build_request(&messages, &[], false);
// user + assistant + ONE user message holding both tool_results.
assert_eq!(req.messages.len(), 3);
assert_eq!(req.messages[2].role, "user");
match &req.messages[2].content {
ApiContent::Blocks(blocks) => {
assert_eq!(blocks.len(), 2);
match (&blocks[0], &blocks[1]) {
(
ContentBlock::ToolResult {
tool_use_id: first, ..
},
ContentBlock::ToolResult {
tool_use_id: second,
..
},
) => {
assert_eq!(first, "tc_1");
assert_eq!(second, "tc_2");
}
_ => panic!("expected two tool_result blocks"),
}
}
_ => panic!("expected Blocks content for grouped tool results"),
}
}
#[test]
fn test_build_request_tool_results_flush_before_next_turn() {
let client =
AnthropicClient::with_http(test_config(), reqwest::Client::new(), "key".to_string());
// Results answering distinct assistant turns must stay separate.
let messages = vec![
Message::ai_with_tools(
"",
vec![ToolCall {
id: "tc_1".to_string(),
name: "first".to_string(),
args: json!({}),
}],
),
Message::tool("tc_1", "one"),
Message::ai_with_tools(
"",
vec![ToolCall {
id: "tc_2".to_string(),
name: "second".to_string(),
args: json!({}),
}],
),
Message::tool("tc_2", "two"),
];
let req = client.build_request(&messages, &[], false);
assert_eq!(req.messages.len(), 4);
assert_eq!(req.messages[0].role, "assistant");
assert_eq!(req.messages[1].role, "user");
assert_eq!(req.messages[2].role, "assistant");
assert_eq!(req.messages[3].role, "user");
for idx in [1usize, 3] {
match &req.messages[idx].content {
ApiContent::Blocks(blocks) => assert_eq!(blocks.len(), 1),
_ => panic!("expected Blocks content at index {idx}"),
}
}
}
#[test]
fn test_build_request_with_tool_definitions() {
let client =
AnthropicClient::with_http(test_config(), reqwest::Client::new(), "key".to_string());
let tools = vec![ToolDefinition {
name: "read_file".to_string(),
description: "Read a file from the workspace".to_string(),
input_schema: json!({
"type": "object",
"properties": {"path": {"type": "string"}},
"required": ["path"]
}),
}];
let req = client.build_request(&[Message::human("read it")], &tools, false);
assert_eq!(req.tools.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(req.tools[0].name, "read_file");
// Wire format: tools must serialize with name/description/input_schema.
let json = serde_json::to_value(&req).unwrap();
assert_eq!(json["tools"][0]["name"], "read_file");
assert!(json["tools"][0]["input_schema"]["properties"]["path"].is_object());
// Empty tool set must omit the field entirely.
let req_no_tools = client.build_request(&[Message::human("hi")], &[], false);
let json_no_tools = serde_json::to_value(&req_no_tools).unwrap();
assert!(json_no_tools.get("tools").is_none());
}
#[test]
fn test_parse_response_attaches_usage_metadata() {
let response = ApiResponse {
content: vec![ContentBlock::Text {
text: "hi".to_string(),
}],
model: "claude-sonnet-4-20250514".to_string(),
stop_reason: Some("end_turn".to_string()),
usage: Some(Usage {
input_tokens: 11,
output_tokens: 7,
}),
};
let msg = AnthropicClient::parse_response(response);
if let Message::Ai(ai) = &msg {
let usage = ai.metadata.get("usage").expect("usage metadata");
assert_eq!(usage["input_tokens"], 11);
assert_eq!(usage["output_tokens"], 7);
assert_eq!(ai.metadata["stop_reason"], "end_turn");
} else {
panic!("expected Ai message");
}
}
#[test]
fn test_build_request_stream_flag() {
let client =
AnthropicClient::with_http(test_config(), reqwest::Client::new(), "key".to_string());
let messages = vec![Message::human("Hi")];
let req = client.build_request(&messages, true);
let req = client.build_request(&messages, &[], true);
assert_eq!(req.stream, Some(true));
}
@ -642,14 +840,14 @@ mod tests {
fn test_temperature_serialization() {
let client =
AnthropicClient::with_http(test_config(), reqwest::Client::new(), "key".to_string());
let req = client.build_request(&[Message::human("Hi")], false);
let req = client.build_request(&[Message::human("Hi")], &[], false);
// temperature=0.0 => None (omitted)
assert!(req.temperature.is_none());
let mut config = test_config();
config.temperature = 0.7;
let client2 = AnthropicClient::with_http(config, reqwest::Client::new(), "key".to_string());
let req2 = client2.build_request(&[Message::human("Hi")], false);
let req2 = client2.build_request(&[Message::human("Hi")], &[], false);
assert_eq!(req2.temperature, Some(0.7));
}
@ -664,6 +862,7 @@ mod tests {
role: "user".to_string(),
content: ApiContent::Text("Hello".to_string()),
}],
tools: Vec::new(),
stream: None,
};
let json = serde_json::to_value(&req).expect("serialization failed");
@ -736,7 +935,7 @@ mod tests {
let client = test_client(&server.url());
let url = format!("{}/v1/messages", server.url());
let req = client.build_request(&[Message::human("Hello")], false);
let req = client.build_request(&[Message::human("Hello")], &[], false);
let resp = client.send_with_retry(&req, &url).await;
assert!(resp.is_ok());
@ -768,7 +967,7 @@ mod tests {
let client = test_client(&server.url());
let url = format!("{}/v1/messages", server.url());
let req = client.build_request(&[Message::human("Search for Rust")], false);
let req = client.build_request(&[Message::human("Search for Rust")], &[], false);
let resp = client.send_with_retry(&req, &url).await;
assert!(resp.is_ok());
@ -794,7 +993,7 @@ mod tests {
let client = test_client(&server.url());
let url = format!("{}/v1/messages", server.url());
let req = client.build_request(&[Message::human("Hi")], false);
let req = client.build_request(&[Message::human("Hi")], &[], false);
let result = client.send_with_retry(&req, &url).await;
assert!(result.is_err());
@ -839,7 +1038,7 @@ mod tests {
let client = test_client(&server.url());
let url = format!("{}/v1/messages", server.url());
let req = client.build_request(&[Message::human("Hi")], false);
let req = client.build_request(&[Message::human("Hi")], &[], false);
let result = client.send_with_retry(&req, &url).await;
assert!(result.is_ok());
@ -869,7 +1068,7 @@ mod tests {
let client = test_client(&server.url());
let url = format!("{}/v1/messages", server.url());
let req = client.build_request(&[Message::human("Hi")], false);
let req = client.build_request(&[Message::human("Hi")], &[], false);
let result = client.send_with_retry(&req, &url).await;
assert!(result.is_err());
@ -902,7 +1101,7 @@ mod tests {
let client = test_client(&server.url());
let url = format!("{}/v1/messages", server.url());
let req = client.build_request(&[Message::human("Hi")], false);
let req = client.build_request(&[Message::human("Hi")], &[], false);
let result = client.send_with_retry(&req, &url).await;
assert!(result.is_ok());

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

View file

@ -15,7 +15,10 @@ async fn test_live_anthropic_call() {
let messages = vec![Message::human("What is 2+2? Reply with just the number.")];
let response = client.complete(&messages).await.expect("API call failed");
let response = client
.complete(&messages, &[])
.await
.expect("API call failed");
let content = response.content();
println!("Response: {}", content);
assert!(

View file

@ -10,10 +10,11 @@ use anyhow::{Context, Result};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use tracing::{info, warn};
use rvagent_core::bootstrap::EnvironmentSnapshot;
use rvagent_core::config::{BackendConfig, MiddlewareConfig, RvAgentConfig, SecurityPolicy};
use rvagent_core::graph::{AgentGraph, ToolExecutor};
use rvagent_core::messages::{Message, ToolCall as CoreToolCall};
use rvagent_core::models::{resolve_model, ChatModel};
use rvagent_core::models::{resolve_model, ChatModel, ToolDefinition};
use rvagent_core::prompt::BASE_AGENT_PROMPT;
use rvagent_core::state::AgentState;
@ -36,7 +37,9 @@ const DEFAULT_MIDDLEWARE: &[&str] = &[
"skills",
"filesystem",
"subagent",
"summarization",
// "summarization" removed (ADR-274): observation masking in the agent loop
// is the default compaction strategy. Still available opt-in via
// PipelineConfig::enable_summarization.
"prompt_caching",
"patch_tool_calls",
"witness",
@ -66,7 +69,11 @@ impl StubModel {
#[async_trait]
impl ChatModel for StubModel {
async fn complete(&self, _messages: &[Message]) -> rvagent_core::error::Result<Message> {
async fn complete(
&self,
_messages: &[Message],
_tools: &[ToolDefinition],
) -> rvagent_core::error::Result<Message> {
Ok(Message::ai(format!(
"No API key configured for model '{}'. \
Set the appropriate environment variable (e.g. ANTHROPIC_API_KEY) \
@ -75,8 +82,12 @@ impl ChatModel for StubModel {
)))
}
async fn stream(&self, messages: &[Message]) -> rvagent_core::error::Result<Vec<Message>> {
let msg = self.complete(messages).await?;
async fn stream(
&self,
messages: &[Message],
tools: &[ToolDefinition],
) -> rvagent_core::error::Result<Vec<Message>> {
let msg = self.complete(messages, tools).await?;
Ok(vec![msg])
}
}
@ -95,19 +106,27 @@ enum CliModel {
#[async_trait]
impl ChatModel for CliModel {
async fn complete(&self, messages: &[Message]) -> rvagent_core::error::Result<Message> {
async fn complete(
&self,
messages: &[Message],
tools: &[ToolDefinition],
) -> rvagent_core::error::Result<Message> {
match self {
CliModel::Stub(m) => m.complete(messages).await,
CliModel::Anthropic(m) => m.complete(messages).await,
CliModel::Gemini(m) => m.complete(messages).await,
CliModel::Stub(m) => m.complete(messages, tools).await,
CliModel::Anthropic(m) => m.complete(messages, tools).await,
CliModel::Gemini(m) => m.complete(messages, tools).await,
}
}
async fn stream(&self, messages: &[Message]) -> rvagent_core::error::Result<Vec<Message>> {
async fn stream(
&self,
messages: &[Message],
tools: &[ToolDefinition],
) -> rvagent_core::error::Result<Vec<Message>> {
match self {
CliModel::Stub(m) => m.stream(messages).await,
CliModel::Anthropic(m) => m.stream(messages).await,
CliModel::Gemini(m) => m.stream(messages).await,
CliModel::Stub(m) => m.stream(messages, tools).await,
CliModel::Anthropic(m) => m.stream(messages, tools).await,
CliModel::Gemini(m) => m.stream(messages, tools).await,
}
}
}
@ -125,9 +144,8 @@ struct CliToolExecutor {
impl CliToolExecutor {
fn new(cwd: &Path) -> Self {
let backend: rvagent_tools::BackendRef = Arc::new(LocalFsBackend {
cwd: cwd.to_path_buf(),
});
// Confined to `cwd`: tool-supplied paths cannot escape the workspace.
let backend: rvagent_tools::BackendRef = Arc::new(rvagent_tools::LocalFsBackend::new(cwd));
Self {
tools: rvagent_tools::builtin_tools(),
backend,
@ -151,342 +169,17 @@ impl ToolExecutor for CliToolExecutor {
None => Ok(format!("Error: tool '{}' not found", call.name)),
}
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// LocalFsBackend — adapts the local filesystem for rvagent_tools::Backend
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/// A minimal filesystem backend implementing `rvagent_tools::Backend` for CLI use.
///
/// Provides real filesystem and shell operations rooted at a working directory.
struct LocalFsBackend {
cwd: PathBuf,
}
impl rvagent_tools::Backend for LocalFsBackend {
fn ls_info(&self, path: &str) -> std::result::Result<Vec<rvagent_tools::FileInfo>, String> {
let target = if path.is_empty() || path == "." {
self.cwd.clone()
} else {
PathBuf::from(path)
};
let entries = std::fs::read_dir(&target)
.map_err(|e| format!("ls failed on '{}': {}", target.display(), e))?;
let mut infos = Vec::new();
for entry in entries {
let entry = entry.map_err(|e| format!("read_dir entry error: {}", e))?;
let meta = entry
.metadata()
.map_err(|e| format!("metadata error: {}", e))?;
let file_type = if meta.is_dir() {
"directory"
} else if meta.is_symlink() {
"symlink"
} else {
"file"
};
infos.push(rvagent_tools::FileInfo {
name: entry.file_name().to_string_lossy().into_owned(),
file_type: file_type.to_string(),
permissions: String::new(),
size: meta.len(),
});
}
infos.sort_by(|a, b| a.name.cmp(&b.name));
Ok(infos)
fn definitions(&self) -> Vec<ToolDefinition> {
self.tools
.iter()
.map(|t| ToolDefinition {
name: t.name().to_string(),
description: t.description().to_string(),
input_schema: t.parameters_schema(),
})
.collect()
}
fn read(&self, path: &str, offset: usize, limit: usize) -> std::result::Result<String, String> {
let content =
std::fs::read_to_string(path).map_err(|e| format!("read '{}': {}", path, e))?;
let lines: Vec<&str> = content.lines().collect();
if offset >= lines.len() {
return Ok(String::new());
}
let end = (offset + limit).min(lines.len());
Ok(lines[offset..end].join("\n"))
}
fn write(&self, path: &str, content: &str) -> rvagent_tools::WriteResult {
if std::path::Path::new(path).exists() {
return rvagent_tools::WriteResult {
error: Some(format!(
"Error: file {} already exists. Use force flag to overwrite.",
path
)),
..Default::default()
};
}
if let Some(parent) = std::path::Path::new(path).parent() {
if let Err(e) = std::fs::create_dir_all(parent) {
return rvagent_tools::WriteResult {
error: Some(format!("mkdir failed: {}", e)),
..Default::default()
};
}
}
match std::fs::write(path, content) {
Ok(_) => rvagent_tools::WriteResult::default(),
Err(e) => rvagent_tools::WriteResult {
error: Some(format!("write '{}': {}", path, e)),
..Default::default()
},
}
}
fn edit(
&self,
path: &str,
old_string: &str,
new_string: &str,
replace_all: bool,
) -> rvagent_tools::WriteResult {
let content = match std::fs::read_to_string(path) {
Ok(c) => c,
Err(e) => {
return rvagent_tools::WriteResult {
error: Some(format!("read '{}': {}", path, e)),
..Default::default()
}
}
};
let count = content.matches(old_string).count();
if count == 0 {
return rvagent_tools::WriteResult {
error: Some(format!("Error: old_string not found in {}", path)),
..Default::default()
};
}
if count > 1 && !replace_all {
return rvagent_tools::WriteResult {
error: Some(format!(
"Error: old_string is not unique in {} ({} occurrences). Use replace_all=true.",
path, count
)),
..Default::default()
};
}
let new_content = if replace_all {
content.replace(old_string, new_string)
} else {
content.replacen(old_string, new_string, 1)
};
match std::fs::write(path, &new_content) {
Ok(_) => rvagent_tools::WriteResult {
error: None,
occurrences: Some(if replace_all { count } else { 1 }),
..Default::default()
},
Err(e) => rvagent_tools::WriteResult {
error: Some(format!("write '{}': {}", path, e)),
..Default::default()
},
}
}
fn glob_info(&self, pattern: &str, path: &str) -> std::result::Result<Vec<String>, String> {
let base = if path.is_empty() || path == "." {
self.cwd.clone()
} else {
PathBuf::from(path)
};
// Simple glob: walk directory and match by extension or name suffix.
// This handles common patterns like "*.rs", "**/*.toml" without
// requiring the `glob` crate.
let suffix = pattern
.trim_start_matches('*')
.trim_start_matches('/')
.trim_start_matches('*');
let mut results = Vec::new();
collect_glob_matches(&base, suffix, &mut results);
results.sort();
Ok(results)
}
fn grep_raw(
&self,
pattern: &str,
path: Option<&str>,
_include: Option<&str>,
) -> std::result::Result<Vec<rvagent_tools::GrepMatch>, String> {
// Simple in-process grep implementation.
let search_dir = match path {
Some(p) if !p.is_empty() => PathBuf::from(p),
_ => self.cwd.clone(),
};
let mut matches = Vec::new();
if search_dir.is_file() {
grep_file(&search_dir, pattern, &mut matches)?;
} else if search_dir.is_dir() {
grep_dir(&search_dir, pattern, &mut matches)?;
}
Ok(matches)
}
fn execute(
&self,
command: &str,
timeout_secs: u32,
) -> std::result::Result<rvagent_tools::ExecuteResponse, String> {
use std::process::{Command, Stdio};
use std::time::Duration;
// Security: environment sanitization — strip sensitive variables (SEC-005 / ADR-103 C2).
// Only pass through a safe allowlist of environment variables.
const SAFE_ENV_VARS: &[&str] = &[
"PATH", "HOME", "USER", "SHELL", "LANG", "LC_ALL", "LC_CTYPE", "TERM", "TMPDIR", "TZ",
];
// Patterns that identify sensitive env vars that must never reach child processes.
const SENSITIVE_PATTERNS: &[&str] = &[
"SECRET",
"KEY",
"TOKEN",
"PASSWORD",
"CREDENTIAL",
"AWS_",
"AZURE_",
"GCP_",
"DATABASE_URL",
"PRIVATE",
"API_KEY",
"AUTH",
"BEARER",
"JWT",
"SESSION",
];
let mut cmd = Command::new("sh");
cmd.arg("-c").arg(command).current_dir(&self.cwd);
cmd.env_clear();
for var in SAFE_ENV_VARS {
if let Ok(val) = std::env::var(var) {
let upper = var.to_uppercase();
let sensitive = SENSITIVE_PATTERNS.iter().any(|pat| upper.contains(pat));
if !sensitive {
cmd.env(var, val);
}
}
}
cmd.stdout(Stdio::piped()).stderr(Stdio::piped());
let timeout = if timeout_secs == 0 { 30 } else { timeout_secs };
let deadline = std::time::Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(timeout as u64);
let mut child = cmd.spawn().map_err(|e| format!("execute failed: {}", e))?;
// Poll for completion with a deadline to enforce the timeout.
loop {
match child
.try_wait()
.map_err(|e| format!("wait failed: {}", e))?
{
Some(_) => break,
None => {
if std::time::Instant::now() >= deadline {
let _ = child.kill();
return Ok(rvagent_tools::ExecuteResponse {
output: format!("Command timed out after {} seconds", timeout),
exit_code: -1,
});
}
std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(50));
}
}
}
let output = child
.wait_with_output()
.map_err(|e| format!("output collection failed: {}", e))?;
let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout);
let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
let mut combined = if stderr.is_empty() {
stdout.into_owned()
} else {
format!("{}\n{}", stdout, stderr)
};
// Security: cap output size to 1 MB to prevent memory exhaustion.
const MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES: usize = 1024 * 1024;
if combined.len() > MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES {
combined.truncate(MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES);
combined.push_str("\n... [output truncated at 1 MB]");
}
Ok(rvagent_tools::ExecuteResponse {
output: combined,
exit_code: output.status.code().unwrap_or(-1),
})
}
}
/// Recursively collect files matching a name suffix (simple glob substitute).
fn collect_glob_matches(dir: &Path, suffix: &str, results: &mut Vec<String>) {
let entries = match std::fs::read_dir(dir) {
Ok(e) => e,
Err(_) => return,
};
for entry in entries.flatten() {
let path = entry.path();
let name = path
.file_name()
.map(|n| n.to_string_lossy().to_string())
.unwrap_or_default();
if path.is_file() && name.ends_with(suffix) {
results.push(path.to_string_lossy().into_owned());
} else if path.is_dir() && !name.starts_with('.') {
collect_glob_matches(&path, suffix, results);
}
}
}
/// Grep a single file for a pattern.
fn grep_file(
path: &Path,
pattern: &str,
matches: &mut Vec<rvagent_tools::GrepMatch>,
) -> std::result::Result<(), String> {
let content = match std::fs::read_to_string(path) {
Ok(c) => c,
Err(_) => return Ok(()), // skip binary / unreadable files
};
for (i, line) in content.lines().enumerate() {
if line.contains(pattern) {
matches.push(rvagent_tools::GrepMatch {
file: path.to_string_lossy().into_owned(),
line_number: i + 1,
text: line.to_string(),
});
}
}
Ok(())
}
/// Recursively grep a directory (limited depth).
fn grep_dir(
dir: &Path,
pattern: &str,
matches: &mut Vec<rvagent_tools::GrepMatch>,
) -> std::result::Result<(), String> {
let entries = std::fs::read_dir(dir).map_err(|e| format!("read_dir: {}", e))?;
for entry in entries {
let entry = entry.map_err(|e| format!("entry: {}", e))?;
let path = entry.path();
if path.is_file() {
grep_file(&path, pattern, matches)?;
} else if path.is_dir() {
// Skip hidden directories.
let name = path
.file_name()
.map(|n| n.to_string_lossy().to_string())
.unwrap_or_default();
if !name.starts_with('.') {
grep_dir(&path, pattern, matches)?;
}
}
}
Ok(())
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@ -556,11 +249,18 @@ impl App {
None => Session::new(model),
};
// Environment bootstrap (ADR-273 §3.5): hand the agent the workspace
// facts up front so it does not spend its first turns discovering
// them. Filesystem-only, so this costs nothing measurable.
let snapshot =
EnvironmentSnapshot::collect(cwd, &rvagent_core::bootstrap::BootstrapConfig::default());
let system_prompt = snapshot.augment_prompt(BASE_AGENT_PROMPT);
Ok(Self {
config,
session,
cwd: cwd.to_path_buf(),
system_prompt: BASE_AGENT_PROMPT.to_string(),
system_prompt,
mcp_registry: McpRegistry::new(),
})
}
@ -638,7 +338,8 @@ impl App {
/// Invoke the agent pipeline with the given state.
///
/// Creates the appropriate model (real Anthropic client or stub) and
/// tool executor, builds an `AgentGraph`, and runs it to completion.
/// tool executor, wraps the model in the configured middleware pipeline
/// (`PipelineModel`), builds an `AgentGraph`, and runs it to completion.
/// Returns the final AI message from the completed state.
async fn invoke_agent(&self, initial_state: &AgentState) -> Result<Message> {
info!(
@ -707,9 +408,57 @@ impl App {
CliModel::Stub(StubModel::new(&self.config.model))
};
// Wire the middleware pipeline (P0.3): resolve the configured
// middleware names (DEFAULT_MIDDLEWARE) into instances — an unknown
// name is fatal — and run all model calls through it.
//
// The pipeline config carries the settings the middleware need to be
// built correctly; leaving `interrupt_on` unset gives HITL its
// conservative built-in gate rather than an empty (approve-everything)
// pattern list. The CLI has no interactive approval prompt yet, so
// gated calls fail closed; RVAGENT_AUTO_APPROVE=1 is the explicit,
// logged opt-out for unattended use.
let middleware_names: Vec<&str> = self
.config
.middleware
.iter()
.map(|m| m.name.as_str())
.collect();
let mut pipeline_config = rvagent_middleware::PipelineConfig::default();
if matches!(
std::env::var("RVAGENT_AUTO_APPROVE").as_deref(),
Ok("1") | Ok("true") | Ok("yes")
) {
// Straight to stderr, not just tracing: the TUI installs no
// subscriber and the non-TUI default is ERROR-only, so a `warn!`
// here is invisible in exactly the modes people run. A security
// downgrade the operator cannot see is one they cannot revoke.
eprintln!(
"warning: RVAGENT_AUTO_APPROVE set — HITL approval gate disabled; \
all tool calls (including shell execution and file writes) run unattended"
);
warn!("RVAGENT_AUTO_APPROVE set: HITL approval gate disabled; all tool calls run unattended");
pipeline_config.interrupt_on = Some(Vec::new());
}
let pipeline = Arc::new(
rvagent_middleware::build_pipeline_from_names(&middleware_names, &pipeline_config)
.context("failed to build middleware pipeline")?,
);
info!(middlewares = ?pipeline.names(), "middleware pipeline wired");
// Run before_agent hooks (state patching, context injection).
let mut state = initial_state.clone();
let mw_runtime = rvagent_middleware::Runtime::new();
let run_config = rvagent_middleware::RunnableConfig::default();
pipeline
.run_before_agent(&mut state, &mw_runtime, &run_config)
.await;
let model = rvagent_middleware::PipelineModel::new(model, Arc::clone(&pipeline));
let graph = AgentGraph::new(model, tool_executor);
let completed_state = graph
.run(initial_state.clone())
.run(state)
.await
.map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("agent graph error: {}", e))?;
@ -767,7 +516,18 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn test_default_middleware_count() {
assert_eq!(DEFAULT_MIDDLEWARE.len(), 11);
// 10 since ADR-274 demoted summarization to opt-in.
assert_eq!(DEFAULT_MIDDLEWARE.len(), 10);
}
#[test]
fn test_summarization_is_not_on_the_default_path() {
// The shipped default must match the decided strategy: masking in the
// agent loop, not LLM summarization.
assert!(
!DEFAULT_MIDDLEWARE.contains(&"summarization"),
"summarization is on the default path but ADR-274 decided against it"
);
}
#[test]

View file

@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ sha3 = "0.10"
rand = "0.8"
[dev-dependencies]
tempfile = "3.14"
criterion = { workspace = true }
tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["test-util"] }
proptest = { workspace = true }

View file

@ -0,0 +1,333 @@
//! Environment bootstrap — a workspace snapshot injected before the loop
//! starts (ADR-273 §3.5).
//!
//! Without it the agent spends its first turns discovering what it is looking
//! at: listing the directory, finding the test command, checking whether the
//! build is already broken. Those turns cost tokens, fill context, and produce
//! nothing the harness could not have supplied for free.
//!
//! The snapshot is deliberately small and factual. It is *not* a repo map or a
//! summary — those are lossy and expensive. It reports only what is cheap to
//! observe and expensive for the agent to discover.
use std::fmt::Write as _;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
/// A cheap, factual snapshot of the workspace.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct EnvironmentSnapshot {
/// Absolute working directory.
pub cwd: PathBuf,
/// Top-level entries, directories marked with a trailing `/`.
pub entries: Vec<String>,
/// Detected project kind, e.g. "Rust (cargo)".
pub project_kind: Option<String>,
/// Toolchain versions, as `(tool, version)`.
pub toolchain: Vec<(String, String)>,
/// The command to run tests, when it can be determined.
pub test_command: Option<String>,
/// Whether the tree currently builds, when cheaply checkable.
///
/// `None` means "not checked" — never guessed. Reporting a guess here
/// would be worse than reporting nothing, since the agent would trust it.
pub build_ok: Option<bool>,
/// Current VCS branch, when the workspace is a repository.
pub vcs_branch: Option<String>,
}
/// How much work the snapshot is allowed to do.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct BootstrapConfig {
/// Maximum top-level entries to list.
pub max_entries: usize,
/// Whether to include hidden entries.
pub include_hidden: bool,
}
impl Default for BootstrapConfig {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
max_entries: 50,
include_hidden: false,
}
}
}
impl EnvironmentSnapshot {
/// Collect a snapshot of `root`.
///
/// Filesystem-only: nothing here spawns a process, so it is fast and safe
/// to run unconditionally. `build_ok` is left `None` — a build check is a
/// caller decision, since it costs real time.
pub fn collect(root: &Path, config: &BootstrapConfig) -> Self {
let entries = list_entries(root, config);
let project_kind = detect_project_kind(&entries);
let test_command = detect_test_command(&entries);
let vcs_branch = detect_branch(root);
Self {
cwd: root.to_path_buf(),
entries,
project_kind,
toolchain: Vec::new(),
test_command,
build_ok: None,
vcs_branch,
}
}
/// Render as a prompt section.
///
/// Returns `None` when there is nothing worth saying, so an empty or
/// unreadable workspace does not inject a misleading stub.
pub fn to_prompt_section(&self) -> Option<String> {
if self.entries.is_empty() && self.project_kind.is_none() {
return None;
}
let mut out = String::from("<environment>\n");
let _ = writeln!(out, "cwd: {}", self.cwd.display());
if let Some(kind) = &self.project_kind {
let _ = writeln!(out, "project: {kind}");
}
if let Some(branch) = &self.vcs_branch {
let _ = writeln!(out, "branch: {branch}");
}
if let Some(cmd) = &self.test_command {
let _ = writeln!(out, "tests: {cmd}");
}
match self.build_ok {
Some(true) => {
let _ = writeln!(out, "build: passing");
}
Some(false) => {
let _ = writeln!(out, "build: FAILING before any of your changes");
}
// Silence is correct here: an unchecked build must not read as passing.
None => {}
}
for (tool, version) in &self.toolchain {
let _ = writeln!(out, "{tool}: {version}");
}
if !self.entries.is_empty() {
let _ = writeln!(out, "contents: {}", self.entries.join(", "));
}
out.push_str("</environment>");
Some(out)
}
/// Append the environment section to a base system prompt.
///
/// Returns `base` unchanged when there is nothing to report, so callers
/// need no conditional of their own. Kept here rather than at the call site
/// so the composition is covered by tests — the CLI is a binary crate and
/// anything assembled there is unreachable from a test.
pub fn augment_prompt(&self, base: &str) -> String {
match self.to_prompt_section() {
Some(section) => format!("{base}\n\n{section}"),
None => base.to_string(),
}
}
}
fn list_entries(root: &Path, config: &BootstrapConfig) -> Vec<String> {
let Ok(read) = std::fs::read_dir(root) else {
return Vec::new();
};
let mut names: Vec<String> = read
.flatten()
.filter_map(|e| {
let name = e.file_name().to_string_lossy().into_owned();
if !config.include_hidden && name.starts_with('.') {
return None;
}
let is_dir = e.file_type().map(|t| t.is_dir()).unwrap_or(false);
Some(if is_dir { format!("{name}/") } else { name })
})
.collect();
names.sort();
// Say so rather than silently showing a partial list: a truncated listing
// that looks complete invites the agent to conclude a file is absent.
if names.len() > config.max_entries {
let hidden = names.len() - config.max_entries;
names.truncate(config.max_entries);
names.push(format!("… and {hidden} more"));
}
names
}
fn has(entries: &[String], name: &str) -> bool {
entries.iter().any(|e| e == name)
}
fn detect_project_kind(entries: &[String]) -> Option<String> {
if has(entries, "Cargo.toml") {
Some("Rust (cargo)".into())
} else if has(entries, "package.json") {
Some("Node (npm)".into())
} else if has(entries, "pyproject.toml") || has(entries, "setup.py") {
Some("Python".into())
} else if has(entries, "go.mod") {
Some("Go".into())
} else {
None
}
}
fn detect_test_command(entries: &[String]) -> Option<String> {
if has(entries, "Cargo.toml") {
Some("cargo test".into())
} else if has(entries, "package.json") {
Some("npm test".into())
} else if has(entries, "pyproject.toml") || has(entries, "setup.py") {
Some("pytest".into())
} else if has(entries, "go.mod") {
Some("go test ./...".into())
} else {
None
}
}
/// Read the current branch from `.git/HEAD` without shelling out.
fn detect_branch(root: &Path) -> Option<String> {
let head = std::fs::read_to_string(root.join(".git").join("HEAD")).ok()?;
let head = head.trim();
head.strip_prefix("ref: refs/heads/")
.map(str::to_string)
// A detached HEAD is a raw sha; report a short form rather than nothing.
.or_else(|| Some(head.chars().take(12).collect()))
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn write(dir: &Path, name: &str, body: &str) {
std::fs::write(dir.join(name), body).unwrap();
}
#[test]
fn detects_a_rust_project_and_its_test_command() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
write(dir.path(), "Cargo.toml", "[package]");
std::fs::create_dir(dir.path().join("src")).unwrap();
let snap = EnvironmentSnapshot::collect(dir.path(), &BootstrapConfig::default());
assert_eq!(snap.project_kind.as_deref(), Some("Rust (cargo)"));
assert_eq!(snap.test_command.as_deref(), Some("cargo test"));
assert!(snap.entries.contains(&"src/".to_string()));
assert!(snap.entries.contains(&"Cargo.toml".to_string()));
}
#[test]
fn renders_a_prompt_section() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
write(dir.path(), "package.json", "{}");
let snap = EnvironmentSnapshot::collect(dir.path(), &BootstrapConfig::default());
let section = snap.to_prompt_section().unwrap();
assert!(section.starts_with("<environment>"));
assert!(section.ends_with("</environment>"));
assert!(section.contains("project: Node (npm)"));
assert!(section.contains("tests: npm test"));
}
#[test]
fn unchecked_build_is_silent_not_passing() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
write(dir.path(), "Cargo.toml", "[package]");
let snap = EnvironmentSnapshot::collect(dir.path(), &BootstrapConfig::default());
assert_eq!(snap.build_ok, None);
let section = snap.to_prompt_section().unwrap();
assert!(
!section.contains("build:"),
"an unchecked build must not be reported at all: {section}"
);
}
#[test]
fn failing_build_is_stated_plainly() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
write(dir.path(), "Cargo.toml", "[package]");
let mut snap = EnvironmentSnapshot::collect(dir.path(), &BootstrapConfig::default());
snap.build_ok = Some(false);
let section = snap.to_prompt_section().unwrap();
assert!(section.contains("build: FAILING before any of your changes"));
}
#[test]
fn empty_workspace_yields_no_section() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let snap = EnvironmentSnapshot::collect(dir.path(), &BootstrapConfig::default());
assert!(snap.to_prompt_section().is_none());
}
#[test]
fn truncation_is_announced() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
for i in 0..30 {
write(dir.path(), &format!("f{i:02}.txt"), "");
}
let config = BootstrapConfig {
max_entries: 10,
..BootstrapConfig::default()
};
let snap = EnvironmentSnapshot::collect(dir.path(), &config);
assert_eq!(snap.entries.len(), 11);
assert!(snap.entries.last().unwrap().contains("and 20 more"));
}
#[test]
fn hidden_entries_are_excluded_by_default() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
write(dir.path(), ".secret", "");
write(dir.path(), "visible.txt", "");
let snap = EnvironmentSnapshot::collect(dir.path(), &BootstrapConfig::default());
assert!(!snap.entries.iter().any(|e| e.starts_with('.')));
assert!(snap.entries.contains(&"visible.txt".to_string()));
}
#[test]
fn reads_the_branch_from_git_head() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
std::fs::create_dir(dir.path().join(".git")).unwrap();
write(
&dir.path().join(".git"),
"HEAD",
"ref: refs/heads/feature/x\n",
);
let snap = EnvironmentSnapshot::collect(dir.path(), &BootstrapConfig::default());
assert_eq!(snap.vcs_branch.as_deref(), Some("feature/x"));
}
#[test]
fn augment_prompt_appends_the_section() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
write(dir.path(), "Cargo.toml", "[package]");
let snap = EnvironmentSnapshot::collect(dir.path(), &BootstrapConfig::default());
let prompt = snap.augment_prompt("BASE PROMPT");
assert!(prompt.starts_with("BASE PROMPT"));
assert!(prompt.contains("<environment>"));
assert!(prompt.contains("tests: cargo test"));
}
#[test]
fn augment_prompt_is_a_noop_when_there_is_nothing_to_say() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let snap = EnvironmentSnapshot::collect(dir.path(), &BootstrapConfig::default());
// No trailing whitespace, no empty stub — byte-identical to the input.
assert_eq!(snap.augment_prompt("BASE PROMPT"), "BASE PROMPT");
}
#[test]
fn unreadable_workspace_does_not_panic() {
let snap = EnvironmentSnapshot::collect(
Path::new("/nonexistent/path/xyz"),
&BootstrapConfig::default(),
);
assert!(snap.entries.is_empty());
assert!(snap.to_prompt_section().is_none());
}
}

View file

@ -169,6 +169,24 @@ fn default_backend_type() -> String {
"local_shell".into()
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Runnable config (per-run context — canonical definition, ADR-103 A1)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/// Configuration for a single runnable invocation (thread/run IDs, metadata).
///
/// This is the canonical definition shared by the middleware pipeline and any
/// other layer that needs per-run context.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct RunnableConfig {
#[serde(default)]
pub thread_id: Option<String>,
#[serde(default)]
pub run_id: Option<String>,
#[serde(default)]
pub metadata: std::collections::HashMap<String, serde_json::Value>,
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Top-level config
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

View file

@ -2,13 +2,20 @@
//!
//! Implements the core agent loop: Agent → check tool_calls → execute tools → loop.
use std::sync::Arc;
use async_trait::async_trait;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use tracing::{debug, info, instrument, warn};
use crate::error::{Result, RvAgentError};
use crate::masking::{
mask_observations, recall, recall_definition, recall_id_from_args, truncate_tool_result,
MaskConfig, RECALL_TOOL,
};
use crate::messages::{Message, ToolCall};
use crate::models::ChatModel;
use crate::models::{ChatModel, ToolDefinition};
use crate::parallel::parallel_execute_limited;
use crate::state::AgentState;
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@ -47,6 +54,15 @@ pub struct Edge {
pub trait ToolExecutor: Send + Sync {
/// Execute a single tool call and return the result content.
async fn execute(&self, call: &ToolCall, state: &AgentState) -> Result<String>;
/// Schemas for the tools this executor can dispatch.
///
/// These are advertised to the model on every completion. The default is
/// empty (pure-chat agents), but any executor that dispatches real tools
/// MUST override this — otherwise the model can never call them.
fn definitions(&self) -> Vec<ToolDefinition> {
Vec::new()
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@ -60,6 +76,15 @@ pub struct GraphConfig {
pub max_iterations: u32,
/// Whether to execute tool calls in parallel (ADR-103 A2).
pub parallel_tools: bool,
/// Maximum tool calls in flight at once when `parallel_tools` is set.
pub max_parallel_tools: usize,
/// How many times an identical `(tool, args)` pair may repeat
/// consecutively before the call is refused instead of executed.
///
/// Set to 0 to disable loop detection entirely.
pub loop_repeat_threshold: usize,
/// Observation masking and tool-output caps (ADR-274).
pub mask: MaskConfig,
}
impl Default for GraphConfig {
@ -67,10 +92,91 @@ impl Default for GraphConfig {
Self {
max_iterations: 100,
parallel_tools: true,
max_parallel_tools: 8,
loop_repeat_threshold: 3,
mask: MaskConfig::default(),
}
}
}
/// Detects a stuck agent repeating the same tool call.
///
/// A stuck agent repeats one call forever; raising `max_iterations` only makes
/// that more expensive. Refusing the repeat and telling the model *why* is what
/// breaks the cycle.
///
/// Repeats are counted **consecutively**, not across a window. An agent that
/// re-runs `cargo test` between edits is doing legitimate work, and refusing
/// that would be worse than the loop it prevents — so only an unbroken run of
/// identical calls trips the detector.
///
/// Known limitation: alternating cycles (A, B, A, B, ...) are not detected.
/// `max_iterations` remains the backstop for those.
#[derive(Debug)]
struct LoopDetector {
last: Option<u64>,
consecutive: usize,
threshold: usize,
}
impl LoopDetector {
fn new(threshold: usize) -> Self {
Self {
last: None,
consecutive: 0,
threshold,
}
}
fn enabled(&self) -> bool {
self.threshold > 0
}
/// Fingerprint a call by name and arguments.
///
/// Arguments are hashed via their JSON string, which is canonical for key
/// ordering because `serde_json` maps are `BTreeMap` by default — so
/// logically identical calls collide regardless of the order the model
/// emitted the keys in.
fn fingerprint(call: &ToolCall) -> u64 {
use std::hash::{Hash, Hasher};
let mut hasher = std::collections::hash_map::DefaultHasher::new();
call.name.hash(&mut hasher);
call.args.to_string().hash(&mut hasher);
hasher.finish()
}
/// Record a call and report whether it has now repeated too often.
fn observe(&mut self, call: &ToolCall) -> bool {
if !self.enabled() {
return false;
}
let fp = Self::fingerprint(call);
if self.last == Some(fp) {
self.consecutive += 1;
} else {
self.last = Some(fp);
self.consecutive = 1;
}
self.consecutive >= self.threshold
}
}
/// The message substituted for a call that tripped loop detection.
///
/// Tool errors must be actionable rather than opaque — the model has to be
/// told what to do differently, or it repeats the call again.
fn loop_break_message(call: &ToolCall, threshold: usize) -> String {
format!(
"Tool execution refused: this exact call to '{}' with identical \
arguments has already been made {} times without progress, so it was \
not executed again. Repeating it will not produce a different result. \
Change the arguments, use a different tool, or explain what is \
blocking you.",
call.name, threshold
)
}
/// The agent execution graph.
///
/// Implements the core loop:
@ -79,14 +185,16 @@ impl Default for GraphConfig {
/// ├── yes → Tools → Agent (loop)
/// └── no → End
/// ```
pub struct AgentGraph<M: ChatModel, T: ToolExecutor> {
pub struct AgentGraph<M: ChatModel, T: ToolExecutor + 'static> {
model: M,
tool_executor: T,
// Arc so tool calls can be spawned onto the runtime for true parallel
// execution (ADR-103 A2) — spawned futures must be 'static.
tool_executor: Arc<T>,
config: GraphConfig,
edges: Vec<Edge>,
}
impl<M: ChatModel, T: ToolExecutor> AgentGraph<M, T> {
impl<M: ChatModel, T: ToolExecutor + 'static> AgentGraph<M, T> {
/// Create a new agent graph with the given model and tool executor.
pub fn new(model: M, tool_executor: T) -> Self {
Self::with_config(model, tool_executor, GraphConfig::default())
@ -119,7 +227,7 @@ impl<M: ChatModel, T: ToolExecutor> AgentGraph<M, T> {
Self {
model,
tool_executor,
tool_executor: Arc::new(tool_executor),
config,
edges,
}
@ -139,18 +247,24 @@ impl<M: ChatModel, T: ToolExecutor> AgentGraph<M, T> {
pub async fn run(&self, mut state: AgentState) -> Result<AgentState> {
let mut current_node = AgentNode::Start;
let mut iterations: u32 = 0;
// Tool schemas advertised to the model on every completion. Without
// these the model can never emit a tool call.
let mut tool_definitions = self.tool_executor.definitions();
// Masked observations are useless without a way to dereference them,
// so recall is advertised exactly when masking is active (ADR-274 §3.2).
if self.config.mask.masking_enabled() {
tool_definitions.push(recall_definition());
}
// Cumulative token usage across the loop, aggregated from per-message
// usage metadata attached by provider backends.
let mut total_input_tokens: u64 = 0;
let mut total_output_tokens: u64 = 0;
// Spans the whole run: a loop is only visible across iterations.
let mut loop_detector = LoopDetector::new(self.config.loop_repeat_threshold);
info!(node = ?current_node, "graph: starting agent loop");
info!(node = ?current_node, tools = tool_definitions.len(), "graph: starting agent loop");
loop {
if iterations >= self.config.max_iterations {
warn!(iterations, "graph: max iterations reached");
return Err(RvAgentError::timeout(format!(
"agent loop exceeded {} iterations",
self.config.max_iterations
)));
}
match current_node {
AgentNode::Start => {
debug!("graph: Start → Agent");
@ -158,10 +272,38 @@ impl<M: ChatModel, T: ToolExecutor> AgentGraph<M, T> {
}
AgentNode::Agent => {
// The budget is checked here rather than at the top of the
// loop so that reaching End *within* the budget completes
// the run. Checking before every node discarded a finished
// run whose last allowed iteration produced the answer —
// with `max_iterations: 1`, every successful single-turn
// run failed.
if iterations >= self.config.max_iterations {
warn!(iterations, "graph: max iterations reached");
return Err(RvAgentError::timeout(format!(
"agent loop exceeded {} iterations",
self.config.max_iterations
)));
}
iterations += 1;
debug!(iteration = iterations, "graph: invoking model");
let response = self.model.complete(&state.messages).await?;
// The model sees a masked projection; `state.messages`
// stays the complete log so elided content remains
// addressable by tool_call_id (ADR-274).
let outbound = mask_observations(&state.messages, &self.config.mask);
let response = self.model.complete(&outbound, &tool_definitions).await?;
if let Some((input, output)) = usage_from_message(&response) {
total_input_tokens += input;
total_output_tokens += output;
debug!(
input_tokens = input,
output_tokens = output,
total_input_tokens,
total_output_tokens,
"graph: turn usage"
);
}
let has_tool_calls = response.has_tool_calls();
state.push_message(response);
@ -180,31 +322,147 @@ impl<M: ChatModel, T: ToolExecutor> AgentGraph<M, T> {
// Extract tool calls from the last AI message.
let tool_calls = self.extract_tool_calls(&state)?;
if self.config.parallel_tools && tool_calls.len() > 1 {
// Parallel execution (ADR-103 A2).
let mut handles = Vec::with_capacity(tool_calls.len());
for tc in &tool_calls {
let result = self.tool_executor.execute(tc, &state).await;
handles.push((tc.id.clone(), result));
// Refuse calls that are repeating without progress. This
// happens before dispatch so a stuck agent stops burning
// tokens and side effects on the same call.
let mut looping: Vec<Option<String>> = Vec::with_capacity(tool_calls.len());
for tc in &tool_calls {
looping.push(if loop_detector.observe(tc) {
warn!(tool = %tc.name, "graph: loop detected, refusing repeated call");
Some(loop_break_message(tc, self.config.loop_repeat_threshold))
} else {
None
});
}
// Recall is served by the loop from the full log; it never
// reaches the executor, so a workspace tool cannot shadow it.
let mut handled: std::collections::HashMap<String, String> =
std::collections::HashMap::new();
for (tc, refused) in tool_calls.iter().zip(&looping) {
if refused.is_none() && tc.name == RECALL_TOOL {
let content = match recall_id_from_args(&tc.args) {
Ok(id) => recall(&state.messages, id),
Err(e) => e,
};
handled.insert(tc.id.clone(), content);
}
for (id, result) in handles {
let content = result?;
state.push_message(Message::tool(id, content));
}
// Only calls that cleared loop detection and were not
// handled in-loop reach the executor.
let dispatch: Vec<ToolCall> = tool_calls
.iter()
.zip(&looping)
.filter(|(tc, refused)| refused.is_none() && !handled.contains_key(&tc.id))
.map(|(tc, _)| tc.clone())
.collect();
// Tool failures are fed back to the model as tool results
// rather than aborting the loop — the model must see the
// error to recover from it (execution alignment).
let mut executed: std::collections::HashMap<String, String> = handled;
executed.reserve(dispatch.len());
if self.config.parallel_tools && dispatch.len() > 1 {
// True parallel execution (ADR-103 A2): tasks are
// spawned onto the runtime with bounded concurrency;
// results are returned in input order.
let executor = Arc::clone(&self.tool_executor);
let exec_state = state.clone();
let results = parallel_execute_limited(
dispatch,
move |tc: ToolCall| {
let executor = Arc::clone(&executor);
let exec_state = exec_state.clone();
async move {
let id = tc.id.clone();
let name = tc.name.clone();
// Run the tool in its own task so a panicking
// tool surfaces as a tool error instead of
// crashing the whole agent loop.
let result = match tokio::spawn(async move {
executor.execute(&tc, &exec_state).await
})
.await
{
Ok(res) => res,
Err(join_err) => Err(RvAgentError::tool(format!(
"tool '{name}' execution task failed: {join_err}"
))),
};
(id, name, result)
}
},
self.config.max_parallel_tools.max(1),
)
.await;
for (id, _name, result) in results {
executed.insert(
id,
truncate_tool_result(
tool_result_content(result),
self.config.mask.max_tool_result_bytes,
),
);
}
} else {
// Sequential execution.
for tc in &tool_calls {
let content = self.tool_executor.execute(tc, &state).await?;
state.push_message(Message::tool(&tc.id, content));
// Sequential execution. Each call still runs in its own
// task, so a panicking tool becomes a tool error here
// exactly as it does on the parallel path — a panic on
// the single-call path would otherwise take down the
// whole agent loop.
for tc in &dispatch {
let executor = Arc::clone(&self.tool_executor);
let exec_state = state.clone();
let call = tc.clone();
let name = tc.name.clone();
let result = match tokio::spawn(async move {
executor.execute(&call, &exec_state).await
})
.await
{
Ok(res) => res,
Err(join_err) => Err(RvAgentError::tool(format!(
"tool '{name}' execution task failed: {join_err}"
))),
};
executed.insert(
tc.id.clone(),
truncate_tool_result(
tool_result_content(result),
self.config.mask.max_tool_result_bytes,
),
);
}
}
// Emit one tool result per call, in the model's original
// call order, substituting the refusal for looping calls.
for (tc, refused) in tool_calls.iter().zip(looping) {
let content = match refused {
Some(msg) => msg,
None => executed.remove(&tc.id).unwrap_or_else(|| {
// Defensive: a dispatched call must always
// produce a result. Report rather than drop it,
// since a missing tool result desyncs the
// provider's tool_use/tool_result pairing.
format!(
"Tool execution error: no result produced for '{}'",
tc.name
)
}),
};
state.push_message(Message::tool_with_name(&tc.id, content, &tc.name));
}
debug!("graph: Tools → Agent");
current_node = AgentNode::Agent;
}
AgentNode::End => {
info!(iterations, "graph: agent loop complete");
info!(
iterations,
total_input_tokens, total_output_tokens, "graph: agent loop complete"
);
return Ok(state);
}
}
@ -226,6 +484,30 @@ impl<M: ChatModel, T: ToolExecutor> AgentGraph<M, T> {
}
}
/// Convert a tool execution result into tool-message content.
///
/// Errors become visible tool output instead of aborting the loop — feeding
/// the failure back to the model is the recovery path.
fn tool_result_content(result: Result<String>) -> String {
match result {
Ok(content) => content,
Err(e) => format!("Tool execution error: {e}"),
}
}
/// Extract `(input_tokens, output_tokens)` from a message's usage metadata,
/// as attached by provider backends under the `usage` key.
fn usage_from_message(msg: &Message) -> Option<(u64, u64)> {
if let Message::Ai(ai) = msg {
let usage = ai.metadata.get("usage")?;
let input = usage.get("input_tokens").and_then(|v| v.as_u64())?;
let output = usage.get("output_tokens").and_then(|v| v.as_u64())?;
Some((input, output))
} else {
None
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
@ -246,7 +528,11 @@ mod tests {
#[async_trait]
impl ChatModel for MockModel {
async fn complete(&self, _messages: &[Message]) -> Result<Message> {
async fn complete(
&self,
_messages: &[Message],
_tools: &[ToolDefinition],
) -> Result<Message> {
let mut resps = self.responses.lock().unwrap();
if resps.is_empty() {
Ok(Message::ai("done"))
@ -255,8 +541,12 @@ mod tests {
}
}
async fn stream(&self, messages: &[Message]) -> Result<Vec<Message>> {
let msg = self.complete(messages).await?;
async fn stream(
&self,
messages: &[Message],
tools: &[ToolDefinition],
) -> Result<Vec<Message>> {
let msg = self.complete(messages, tools).await?;
Ok(vec![msg])
}
}
@ -308,6 +598,115 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(result.message_count(), 4);
}
/// A tool executor that panics on one tool and succeeds on others.
struct PanickyExecutor;
#[async_trait]
impl ToolExecutor for PanickyExecutor {
async fn execute(&self, call: &ToolCall, _state: &AgentState) -> Result<String> {
if call.name == "boom" {
panic!("tool panicked");
}
Ok(format!("result of {}", call.name))
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_parallel_tool_panic_is_contained() {
let model = MockModel::new(vec![
Message::ai_with_tools(
"",
vec![
ToolCall {
id: "tc1".into(),
name: "boom".into(),
args: serde_json::json!({}),
},
ToolCall {
id: "tc2".into(),
name: "ok_tool".into(),
args: serde_json::json!({}),
},
],
),
Message::ai("done"),
]);
let graph = AgentGraph::new(model, PanickyExecutor);
let state = AgentState::new();
// Must not panic: the panicking tool becomes an error tool-result.
let result = graph.run(state).await.unwrap();
let contents: Vec<&str> = result
.messages
.iter()
.filter_map(|m| match m {
Message::Tool(t) => Some(t.content.as_str()),
_ => None,
})
.collect();
assert_eq!(contents.len(), 2);
assert!(contents[0].contains("Tool execution error"));
assert!(contents[1].contains("result of ok_tool"));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_single_tool_panic_is_contained() {
// The single-call path runs sequentially even with parallel_tools on,
// so it needs its own containment — a panic here used to abort the run.
let model = MockModel::new(vec![
Message::ai_with_tools(
"",
vec![ToolCall {
id: "tc1".into(),
name: "boom".into(),
args: serde_json::json!({}),
}],
),
Message::ai("done"),
]);
let graph = AgentGraph::with_config(
model,
PanickyExecutor,
GraphConfig {
parallel_tools: false,
..GraphConfig::default()
},
);
let result = graph.run(AgentState::new()).await.unwrap();
let contents: Vec<&str> = result
.messages
.iter()
.filter_map(|m| match m {
Message::Tool(t) => Some(t.content.as_str()),
_ => None,
})
.collect();
assert_eq!(contents.len(), 1);
assert!(contents[0].contains("Tool execution error"));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_max_iterations_of_one_allows_a_single_turn() {
// A run that answers on its last allowed iteration has not exceeded the
// budget; discarding it made max_iterations: 1 unusable.
let model = MockModel::new(vec![Message::ai("Hello!")]);
let graph = AgentGraph::with_config(
model,
MockToolExecutor,
GraphConfig {
max_iterations: 1,
..GraphConfig::default()
},
);
let result = graph.run(AgentState::with_system_message("sys")).await;
let state = result.expect("single-turn run within budget must succeed");
assert!(matches!(state.messages.last(), Some(Message::Ai(_))));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_max_iterations() {
// Model always returns tool calls → should hit max iterations.
@ -328,6 +727,7 @@ mod tests {
let config = GraphConfig {
max_iterations: 3,
parallel_tools: false,
..GraphConfig::default()
};
let graph = AgentGraph::with_config(model, executor, config);
@ -336,6 +736,202 @@ mod tests {
assert!(matches!(err, RvAgentError::Timeout(_)));
}
/// Counts how many times the executor was actually invoked.
struct CountingExecutor {
calls: Arc<std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize>,
}
#[async_trait]
impl ToolExecutor for CountingExecutor {
async fn execute(&self, call: &ToolCall, _state: &AgentState) -> Result<String> {
self.calls.fetch_add(1, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst);
Ok(format!("result of {}", call.name))
}
}
fn repeated_call_model(n: usize, args: serde_json::Value) -> MockModel {
let mut responses: Vec<Message> = (0..n)
.map(|i| {
Message::ai_with_tools(
"",
vec![ToolCall {
// Distinct ids, identical name+args — a real stuck loop
// looks exactly like this.
id: format!("tc{i}"),
name: "noop".into(),
args: args.clone(),
}],
)
})
.collect();
responses.push(Message::ai("done"));
MockModel::new(responses)
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_repeated_identical_call_is_refused() {
let calls = Arc::new(std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize::new(0));
let graph = AgentGraph::with_config(
repeated_call_model(5, serde_json::json!({"x": 1})),
CountingExecutor {
calls: Arc::clone(&calls),
},
GraphConfig {
max_iterations: 20,
parallel_tools: false,
loop_repeat_threshold: 3,
..GraphConfig::default()
},
);
let result = graph.run(AgentState::new()).await.unwrap();
// The 3rd identical call and everything after it must be refused, so
// the executor sees exactly 2 invocations.
assert_eq!(
calls.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst),
2,
"loop detection did not stop execution"
);
let tool_msgs: Vec<&str> = result
.messages
.iter()
.filter_map(|m| match m {
Message::Tool(t) => Some(t.content.as_str()),
_ => None,
})
.collect();
// Every call still gets exactly one result — dropping one would desync
// the provider's tool_use/tool_result pairing.
assert_eq!(tool_msgs.len(), 5);
assert!(tool_msgs[0].contains("result of noop"));
assert!(tool_msgs[1].contains("result of noop"));
for refused in &tool_msgs[2..] {
assert!(
refused.contains("Tool execution refused"),
"expected refusal, got: {refused}"
);
// The refusal must tell the model what to do differently.
assert!(refused.contains("Change the arguments"));
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_differing_args_are_not_treated_as_a_loop() {
// Same tool, different arguments each time: legitimate work.
let mut responses: Vec<Message> = (0..5)
.map(|i| {
Message::ai_with_tools(
"",
vec![ToolCall {
id: format!("tc{i}"),
name: "noop".into(),
args: serde_json::json!({ "x": i }),
}],
)
})
.collect();
responses.push(Message::ai("done"));
let calls = Arc::new(std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize::new(0));
let graph = AgentGraph::with_config(
MockModel::new(responses),
CountingExecutor {
calls: Arc::clone(&calls),
},
GraphConfig {
max_iterations: 20,
parallel_tools: false,
..GraphConfig::default()
},
);
graph.run(AgentState::new()).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(calls.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst), 5);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_interleaved_repeats_are_not_refused() {
// The false positive that drove consecutive-only counting: re-running
// the same check between edits is legitimate and must not be blocked.
let check = ToolCall {
id: "c".into(),
name: "run_tests".into(),
args: serde_json::json!({}),
};
let mut responses = Vec::new();
for i in 0..4 {
responses.push(Message::ai_with_tools(
"",
vec![ToolCall {
id: format!("e{i}"),
name: "edit".into(),
args: serde_json::json!({ "line": i }),
}],
));
responses.push(Message::ai_with_tools(
"",
vec![ToolCall {
id: format!("c{i}"),
..check.clone()
}],
));
}
responses.push(Message::ai("done"));
let calls = Arc::new(std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize::new(0));
let graph = AgentGraph::with_config(
MockModel::new(responses),
CountingExecutor {
calls: Arc::clone(&calls),
},
GraphConfig {
max_iterations: 30,
parallel_tools: false,
..GraphConfig::default()
},
);
graph.run(AgentState::new()).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
calls.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst),
8,
"legitimate interleaved re-runs were refused"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_loop_detection_can_be_disabled() {
let calls = Arc::new(std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize::new(0));
let graph = AgentGraph::with_config(
repeated_call_model(4, serde_json::json!({})),
CountingExecutor {
calls: Arc::clone(&calls),
},
GraphConfig {
max_iterations: 20,
parallel_tools: false,
loop_repeat_threshold: 0,
..GraphConfig::default()
},
);
graph.run(AgentState::new()).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(calls.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst), 4);
}
#[test]
fn test_fingerprint_ignores_call_id_and_key_order() {
let a = ToolCall {
id: "one".into(),
name: "t".into(),
args: serde_json::json!({"a": 1, "b": 2}),
};
let b = ToolCall {
id: "two".into(),
name: "t".into(),
args: serde_json::json!({"b": 2, "a": 1}),
};
assert_eq!(LoopDetector::fingerprint(&a), LoopDetector::fingerprint(&b));
}
#[test]
fn test_graph_edges() {
let model = MockModel::new(vec![]);

View file

@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
//! Invariants that survive compaction verbatim (ADR-274 §2.2).
//!
//! Safety constraints and task statements **erode through successive compaction
//! cycles with no failure signal** — a documented mechanism ("governance
//! decay"), not a jailbreak. Each summarization pass paraphrases a little more
//! away until a rule that was explicit at turn 1 is gone by turn 200, and
//! nothing in the transcript marks the moment it disappeared.
//!
//! The fix is cheap and absolute: a small set of invariants is re-emitted
//! **byte-identical** after every compaction. They are never inputs to a
//! summarizer, never masked (ADR-274 §3.1), and never paraphrased.
//!
//! Keep this set small. Everything here is paid for on every turn after a
//! compaction, and a bloated invariant set recreates the context pressure
//! compaction exists to relieve.
use crate::messages::Message;
/// A rule that must never be summarized away.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct Invariant {
/// Short stable label, for debugging and dedup.
pub id: String,
/// The exact text to re-emit. Reproduced byte-for-byte.
pub text: String,
}
impl Invariant {
pub fn new(id: impl Into<String>, text: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
Self {
id: id.into(),
text: text.into(),
}
}
}
/// The set of invariants carried across compaction boundaries.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
pub struct InvariantSet {
invariants: Vec<Invariant>,
}
impl InvariantSet {
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self::default()
}
/// Add an invariant. Re-adding an existing `id` replaces it, so a caller
/// cannot accidentally accumulate near-duplicate copies of a rule.
pub fn insert(&mut self, invariant: Invariant) {
match self.invariants.iter_mut().find(|i| i.id == invariant.id) {
Some(existing) => *existing = invariant,
None => self.invariants.push(invariant),
}
}
pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
self.invariants.is_empty()
}
pub fn len(&self) -> usize {
self.invariants.len()
}
pub fn iter(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item = &Invariant> {
self.invariants.iter()
}
/// Render the block re-emitted after a compaction.
///
/// Returns `None` when empty so callers never inject an empty stub.
pub fn render(&self) -> Option<String> {
if self.invariants.is_empty() {
return None;
}
let mut out = String::from(
"<invariants>\nThese were established earlier and remain in force. \
They are reproduced exactly and are not a summary.\n",
);
for inv in &self.invariants {
out.push('\n');
out.push_str(&inv.text);
out.push('\n');
}
out.push_str("</invariants>");
Some(out)
}
/// Append the invariant block to a compacted history.
///
/// Call this immediately after any operation that drops or rewrites
/// history. Appending at the end — rather than restoring the original
/// position — is deliberate: recency is what survives a long context, and
/// the whole point is that these rules must not be the first thing lost.
pub fn reinject(&self, mut messages: Vec<Message>) -> Vec<Message> {
if let Some(block) = self.render() {
messages.push(Message::system(block));
}
messages
}
}
impl FromIterator<Invariant> for InvariantSet {
fn from_iter<T: IntoIterator<Item = Invariant>>(iter: T) -> Self {
let mut set = Self::new();
for inv in iter {
set.insert(inv);
}
set
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn set() -> InvariantSet {
[
Invariant::new("task", "TASK: Fix the failing parser test."),
Invariant::new("safety", "Never force-push to the default branch."),
]
.into_iter()
.collect()
}
#[test]
fn renders_text_byte_for_byte() {
let block = set().render().unwrap();
// The exact strings must appear untransformed — no wrapping, no
// reflowing, no paraphrase.
assert!(block.contains("TASK: Fix the failing parser test."));
assert!(block.contains("Never force-push to the default branch."));
}
#[test]
fn survives_a_round_trip_unchanged() {
let original = set();
let block = original.render().unwrap();
// Simulate several compaction cycles: each one re-renders from the
// same source, so the text can never drift.
for _ in 0..10 {
assert_eq!(original.render().unwrap(), block);
}
}
#[test]
fn reinject_appends_a_system_message() {
let compacted = vec![Message::system("summary of earlier work")];
let out = set().reinject(compacted);
assert_eq!(out.len(), 2);
match out.last().unwrap() {
Message::System(s) => {
assert!(s.content.contains("TASK: Fix the failing parser test."));
assert!(s.content.contains("not a summary"));
}
other => panic!("expected a system message, got {other:?}"),
}
}
#[test]
fn empty_set_injects_nothing() {
let empty = InvariantSet::new();
assert!(empty.render().is_none());
let msgs = vec![Message::human("hi")];
assert_eq!(empty.reinject(msgs.clone()), msgs);
}
#[test]
fn reinserting_an_id_replaces_rather_than_duplicates() {
let mut s = set();
s.insert(Invariant::new("task", "TASK: Updated objective."));
assert_eq!(s.len(), 2, "an updated rule must not accumulate copies");
let block = s.render().unwrap();
assert!(block.contains("TASK: Updated objective."));
assert!(!block.contains("Fix the failing parser test"));
}
#[test]
fn insertion_order_is_stable() {
let s = set();
let ids: Vec<&str> = s.iter().map(|i| i.id.as_str()).collect();
assert_eq!(ids, vec!["task", "safety"]);
}
}

View file

@ -19,20 +19,25 @@
pub mod agi_container;
pub mod arena;
pub mod bootstrap;
pub mod budget;
pub mod config;
pub mod cow_state;
pub mod error;
pub mod graph;
pub mod invariants;
pub mod masking;
pub mod messages;
pub mod metrics;
pub mod models;
pub mod parallel;
pub mod policy;
pub mod prompt;
pub mod rvf_bridge;
pub mod session_crypto;
pub mod state;
pub mod string_pool;
pub mod subagent;
// Re-export key types at crate root for convenience.
pub use agi_container::{
@ -40,7 +45,7 @@ pub use agi_container::{
OrchestratorConfig, ParsedContainer, SegmentType, SkillDefinition, ToolDefinition,
};
pub use budget::{BudgetEnforcer, BudgetError, BudgetUtilization};
pub use config::{BackendConfig, ResourceBudget, RvAgentConfig, SecurityPolicy};
pub use config::{BackendConfig, ResourceBudget, RunnableConfig, RvAgentConfig, SecurityPolicy};
pub use cow_state::CowStateBackend;
pub use error::{Result, RvAgentError};
pub use graph::{AgentGraph, AgentNode, GraphConfig, ToolExecutor};

View file

@ -0,0 +1,343 @@
//! Observation masking — the default context strategy (ADR-274).
//!
//! Old tool observations are replaced with compact placeholders before the
//! history is sent to the model. Reasoning steps and actions are kept verbatim;
//! only observations are masked.
//!
//! This is deliberately *not* summarization. Measured comparisons put simple
//! masking at or above LLM summarization on solve rate at roughly half the
//! cost, and show that summarization inflates trajectories 1315% by destroying
//! the natural stopping signals an agent uses to notice it has finished. A
//! placeholder that says `[read_file output elided: 2847 bytes, recall id tc7]`
//! preserves the *shape* of history without fabricating its contents.
//!
//! Masking is a projection, not a mutation: `AgentState::messages` remains the
//! complete append-only log, which is what makes the elided content
//! addressable — the `tool_call_id` in each placeholder is the recall handle.
use crate::messages::{Message, ToolMessage};
/// Configuration for the observation-masking projection.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct MaskConfig {
/// How many of the most recent observations to keep in full.
///
/// Set to `usize::MAX` to disable masking.
pub keep_last_observations: usize,
/// Hard cap on a single tool result's size, applied at write time.
///
/// An uncapped tool result can consume the whole context window in one
/// call. Truncation is explicit and marked so the model knows output was
/// cut rather than silently ending.
pub max_tool_result_bytes: usize,
}
impl Default for MaskConfig {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
keep_last_observations: 8,
// ~25k tokens at ~4 bytes/token, matching the industry default.
max_tool_result_bytes: 100_000,
}
}
}
impl MaskConfig {
/// Whether masking is active at all.
pub fn masking_enabled(&self) -> bool {
self.keep_last_observations != usize::MAX
}
}
/// Truncate `content` to at most `max_bytes`, on a character boundary,
/// appending an explicit marker when anything was removed.
///
/// Operates on bytes rather than chars because the cap exists to bound memory
/// and context cost, but never splits a UTF-8 sequence.
pub fn truncate_tool_result(content: String, max_bytes: usize) -> String {
if content.len() <= max_bytes {
return content;
}
// Reserve room for the marker so the result still respects the budget.
let marker = "\n... [output truncated]";
// A cap smaller than the marker itself cannot carry the marker and stay
// within budget. The cap wins: it is what bounds context cost, and
// announcing the truncation is the part that can be given up.
if max_bytes < marker.len() {
return content[..floor_char_boundary(&content, max_bytes)].to_string();
}
let end = floor_char_boundary(&content, max_bytes - marker.len());
let mut out = String::with_capacity(end + marker.len());
out.push_str(&content[..end]);
out.push_str(marker);
out
}
/// Largest index `<= max` that starts a character, so slicing there never
/// splits a multi-byte sequence.
fn floor_char_boundary(s: &str, max: usize) -> usize {
let mut n = max.min(s.len());
while n > 0 && !s.is_char_boundary(n) {
n -= 1;
}
n
}
/// The placeholder substituted for an elided observation.
fn placeholder(msg: &ToolMessage) -> String {
let name = msg.tool_name.as_deref().unwrap_or("tool");
format!(
"[{} output elided: {} bytes, recall id {}]",
name,
msg.content.len(),
msg.tool_call_id
)
}
/// Project `messages` into the view sent to the model, masking all but the
/// most recent `keep_last_observations` tool results.
///
/// Non-tool messages pass through untouched — masking reasoning or actions
/// would destroy exactly the trail the model needs to stay coherent.
pub fn mask_observations(messages: &[Message], config: &MaskConfig) -> Vec<Message> {
if !config.masking_enabled() {
return messages.to_vec();
}
let total_observations = messages
.iter()
.filter(|m| matches!(m, Message::Tool(_)))
.count();
if total_observations <= config.keep_last_observations {
return messages.to_vec();
}
let mask_before = total_observations - config.keep_last_observations;
let mut seen = 0usize;
messages
.iter()
.map(|msg| match msg {
Message::Tool(tool) => {
let index = seen;
seen += 1;
if index < mask_before {
Message::Tool(ToolMessage {
tool_call_id: tool.tool_call_id.clone(),
content: placeholder(tool),
tool_name: tool.tool_name.clone(),
metadata: tool.metadata.clone(),
})
} else {
msg.clone()
}
}
other => other.clone(),
})
.collect()
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Addressable recall (ADR-274 §3.2)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/// The reserved tool name used to dereference a masked observation.
///
/// Handled by the agent loop itself rather than a `ToolExecutor`: recall reads
/// the message log, which executors do not have, and reserving it in the loop
/// means a workspace tool cannot shadow it.
pub const RECALL_TOOL: &str = "recall";
/// Schema for the recall tool, advertised whenever masking is active.
pub fn recall_definition() -> crate::models::ToolDefinition {
crate::models::ToolDefinition {
name: RECALL_TOOL.to_string(),
description:
"Retrieve the full content of an earlier tool result that was elided from the \
conversation. Pass the recall id shown in the placeholder, e.g. \
'[read_file output elided: 2847 bytes, recall id tc7]' -> recall_id \"tc7\"."
.to_string(),
input_schema: serde_json::json!({
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"recall_id": {
"type": "string",
"description": "The recall id from an elided observation placeholder."
}
},
"required": ["recall_id"]
}),
}
}
/// Dereference a recall id against the full message log.
///
/// `messages` must be the complete log, never a masked projection — recalling
/// from a masked view would return the placeholder rather than the content.
pub fn recall(messages: &[Message], recall_id: &str) -> String {
for msg in messages {
if let Message::Tool(t) = msg {
if t.tool_call_id == recall_id {
return t.content.clone();
}
}
}
// Actionable rather than opaque: tell the model where valid ids come from.
format!(
"Error: no observation found with recall id '{recall_id}'. Recall ids appear \
in elided-output placeholders in this conversation; they are not tool names \
or file paths."
)
}
/// Extract the `recall_id` argument from a recall tool call.
pub fn recall_id_from_args(args: &serde_json::Value) -> Result<&str, String> {
args.get("recall_id")
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.ok_or_else(|| {
"Error: recall requires a string 'recall_id' argument, taken from an \
elided-output placeholder."
.to_string()
})
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn tool(id: &str, name: &str, content: &str) -> Message {
Message::tool_with_name(id, content, name)
}
#[test]
fn keeps_everything_when_under_the_limit() {
let msgs = vec![
Message::ai("thinking"),
tool("t1", "read_file", "a"),
tool("t2", "read_file", "b"),
];
let out = mask_observations(&msgs, &MaskConfig::default());
assert_eq!(out, msgs);
}
#[test]
fn masks_all_but_the_last_n_observations() {
let config = MaskConfig {
keep_last_observations: 2,
..MaskConfig::default()
};
let msgs = vec![
tool("t1", "read_file", "oldest"),
tool("t2", "grep", "older"),
tool("t3", "read_file", "recent"),
tool("t4", "ls", "newest"),
];
let out = mask_observations(&msgs, &config);
let contents: Vec<&str> = out
.iter()
.map(|m| match m {
Message::Tool(t) => t.content.as_str(),
_ => unreachable!(),
})
.collect();
assert!(contents[0].contains("read_file output elided"));
assert!(contents[0].contains("recall id t1"));
assert!(contents[1].contains("grep output elided"));
// The most recent two survive verbatim.
assert_eq!(contents[2], "recent");
assert_eq!(contents[3], "newest");
}
#[test]
fn never_masks_reasoning_or_actions() {
let config = MaskConfig {
keep_last_observations: 0,
..MaskConfig::default()
};
let msgs = vec![
Message::system("rules"),
Message::human("do the thing"),
Message::ai("here is my plan"),
tool("t1", "read_file", "contents"),
];
let out = mask_observations(&msgs, &config);
assert_eq!(out[0], msgs[0]);
assert_eq!(out[1], msgs[1]);
assert_eq!(out[2], msgs[2], "AI reasoning must survive masking");
match &out[3] {
Message::Tool(t) => assert!(t.content.contains("elided")),
_ => panic!("expected a tool message"),
}
}
#[test]
fn masking_can_be_disabled() {
let config = MaskConfig {
keep_last_observations: usize::MAX,
..MaskConfig::default()
};
let msgs: Vec<Message> = (0..50)
.map(|i| tool(&format!("t{i}"), "read_file", "body"))
.collect();
assert_eq!(mask_observations(&msgs, &config), msgs);
}
#[test]
fn placeholder_preserves_the_recall_handle() {
let config = MaskConfig {
keep_last_observations: 0,
..MaskConfig::default()
};
let msgs = vec![tool("call-42", "grep", "many matches")];
let out = mask_observations(&msgs, &config);
match &out[0] {
Message::Tool(t) => {
// The id must survive so the full content stays addressable,
// and must still pair with the model's tool_use block.
assert_eq!(t.tool_call_id, "call-42");
assert!(t.content.contains("recall id call-42"));
assert!(t.content.contains("12 bytes"));
}
_ => panic!("expected a tool message"),
}
}
#[test]
fn truncation_marks_what_it_removed() {
let out = truncate_tool_result("x".repeat(1000), 100);
assert!(out.len() <= 100);
assert!(out.ends_with("[output truncated]"));
}
#[test]
fn truncation_leaves_short_content_alone() {
let out = truncate_tool_result("short".into(), 100);
assert_eq!(out, "short");
}
#[test]
fn truncation_never_splits_a_multibyte_char() {
// Every char is 4 bytes, so a naive byte cut would split one.
let content = "🙂".repeat(100);
for cap in [33usize, 50, 77, 99] {
let out = truncate_tool_result(content.clone(), cap);
// The result is valid UTF-8 by construction; the assertion is that
// this did not panic and stayed inside the cap.
assert!(out.ends_with("[output truncated]"), "cap {cap}");
assert!(out.len() <= cap, "cap {cap} exceeded: {} bytes", out.len());
}
}
#[test]
fn truncation_respects_caps_too_small_for_the_marker() {
// The cap bounds context cost, so it wins over announcing the cut.
for cap in [0usize, 1, 5, 10, 22] {
let out = truncate_tool_result("🙂".repeat(100), cap);
assert!(out.len() <= cap, "cap {cap} exceeded: {} bytes", out.len());
}
}
}

View file

@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ pub struct ToolMessage {
pub tool_call_id: String,
/// The tool's output content.
pub content: String,
/// Name of the tool that produced this result (when known).
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub tool_name: Option<String>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "HashMap::is_empty")]
pub metadata: HashMap<String, serde_json::Value>,
}
@ -103,6 +106,21 @@ impl Message {
Self::Tool(ToolMessage {
tool_call_id: tool_call_id.into(),
content: content.into(),
tool_name: None,
metadata: HashMap::new(),
})
}
/// Create a tool result message that records the tool's name.
pub fn tool_with_name(
tool_call_id: impl Into<String>,
content: impl Into<String>,
tool_name: impl Into<String>,
) -> Self {
Self::Tool(ToolMessage {
tool_call_id: tool_call_id.into(),
content: content.into(),
tool_name: Some(tool_name.into()),
metadata: HashMap::new(),
})
}
@ -118,6 +136,17 @@ impl Message {
}
}
/// Get a mutable reference to the text content of any message variant.
#[inline]
pub fn content_mut(&mut self) -> &mut String {
match self {
Self::System(m) => &mut m.content,
Self::Human(m) => &mut m.content,
Self::Ai(m) => &mut m.content,
Self::Tool(m) => &mut m.content,
}
}
/// Returns true if this is an AI message with pending tool calls.
#[inline]
pub fn has_tool_calls(&self) -> bool {

View file

@ -131,17 +131,36 @@ pub fn resolve_model(model_str: &str) -> ModelConfig {
}
}
/// A tool made available to the model for a completion request.
///
/// Providers translate this into their wire format (Anthropic `tools`,
/// Gemini `functionDeclarations`, OpenAI `functions`). Without advertising
/// these schemas the model can never emit a tool call, so every completion
/// on the agent loop passes the active tool set.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
pub struct ToolDefinition {
/// Tool name — must match `ToolCall::name` on the way back.
pub name: String,
/// Human-readable description shown to the model.
pub description: String,
/// JSON Schema for the tool's arguments.
pub input_schema: serde_json::Value,
}
/// Async trait for chat model implementations.
///
/// Provider-specific crates implement this trait (e.g. `rvagent-anthropic`).
#[async_trait]
pub trait ChatModel: Send + Sync {
/// Send messages and receive a complete response.
async fn complete(&self, messages: &[Message]) -> Result<Message>;
/// Send messages and the active tool set, receive a complete response.
///
/// `tools` may be empty for pure-chat completions; providers must omit
/// the tools field from the request in that case.
async fn complete(&self, messages: &[Message], tools: &[ToolDefinition]) -> Result<Message>;
/// Stream a response token-by-token. Returns a vector of incremental messages.
/// The final element is the complete assembled message.
async fn stream(&self, messages: &[Message]) -> Result<Vec<Message>>;
async fn stream(&self, messages: &[Message], tools: &[ToolDefinition]) -> Result<Vec<Message>>;
}
/// Extended trait for models that support chunk-based streaming.
@ -152,7 +171,11 @@ pub trait ChatModel: Send + Sync {
#[async_trait]
pub trait StreamingChatModel: ChatModel {
/// Stream response chunks incrementally.
async fn stream_chunks(&self, messages: &[Message]) -> Result<Vec<StreamChunk>>;
async fn stream_chunks(
&self,
messages: &[Message],
tools: &[ToolDefinition],
) -> Result<Vec<StreamChunk>>;
}
#[cfg(test)]

View file

@ -0,0 +1,471 @@
//! Policy genome and score axes for the promotion flywheel (ADR-278).
//!
//! rvAgent does not implement a promotion engine. `@metaharness/flywheel`
//! already provides a frozen fingerprinted conjunctive gate, a holdout plus a
//! never-optimized-against anchor, Ed25519 receipts, independent replay
//! verification, and a compounding lineage DAG. This module is the Rust half of
//! that seam: the thing being evolved (a [`PolicyGenome`]) and the thing being
//! measured (a [`Score`]).
//!
//! The genome is deliberately shaped as the flywheel's `Policy` —
//! `Record<string, string>` — so there is no adapter impedance. It is also what
//! GEPA-style optimizers consume, whose candidate is likewise a named set of
//! text components.
//!
//! # Why policy and not memory
//!
//! Self-learning splits into two objects with opposite evidence: policy text
//! (positive) and accumulated episodic memory (negative — an inverted-U where
//! utility eventually falls below no-memory). ADR-278 moves new effort here.
use std::collections::BTreeMap;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use crate::graph::GraphConfig;
use crate::masking::MaskConfig;
/// The levers this harness knows how to apply.
///
/// A genome naming anything outside this set is rejected rather than ignored —
/// see [`PolicyGenome::apply_to`].
pub const KNOWN_LEVERS: &[&str] = &[
"max_iterations",
"parallel_tools",
"max_parallel_tools",
"loop_repeat_threshold",
"keep_last_observations",
"max_tool_result_bytes",
"system_prompt_suffix",
"compaction_rubric",
];
/// An operating policy: named string levers, the unit the flywheel evolves.
///
/// `BTreeMap` rather than `HashMap` so serialization is deterministic —
/// iteration order feeds gate fingerprints and replay, and a nondeterministic
/// ordering would make identical genomes hash differently.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(transparent)]
pub struct PolicyGenome {
levers: BTreeMap<String, String>,
}
/// Why a genome could not be applied.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum PolicyError {
/// The genome names a lever this harness does not implement.
///
/// This must be an error, not a silent skip. A mutation to an unapplied
/// lever produces a run identical to baseline, which the flywheel would
/// score as "no effect" and burn generations on — while a scoring artifact
/// could even promote it. Failing loudly keeps the search honest.
UnknownLever(String),
/// The value could not be parsed for that lever's type.
BadValue { lever: String, value: String },
}
impl std::fmt::Display for PolicyError {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
match self {
PolicyError::UnknownLever(name) => write!(
f,
"unknown policy lever '{name}' — this harness would ignore it, so the \
evaluation would be meaningless. Known levers: {}",
KNOWN_LEVERS.join(", ")
),
PolicyError::BadValue { lever, value } => {
write!(f, "lever '{lever}' cannot take value {value:?}")
}
}
}
}
impl std::error::Error for PolicyError {}
impl PolicyGenome {
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self::default()
}
/// Set a lever. Chainable.
pub fn with(mut self, lever: impl Into<String>, value: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
self.levers.insert(lever.into(), value.into());
self
}
pub fn get(&self, lever: &str) -> Option<&str> {
self.levers.get(lever).map(String::as_str)
}
pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
self.levers.is_empty()
}
pub fn len(&self) -> usize {
self.levers.len()
}
pub fn iter(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item = (&String, &String)> {
self.levers.iter()
}
/// Free-text levers, which shape prompts rather than numeric config.
pub fn system_prompt_suffix(&self) -> Option<&str> {
self.get("system_prompt_suffix")
}
pub fn compaction_rubric(&self) -> Option<&str> {
self.get("compaction_rubric")
}
/// Apply the numeric and boolean levers onto a config.
///
/// Rejects unknown levers (see [`PolicyError::UnknownLever`]). Text levers
/// are validated as known but applied by the caller, since they belong to
/// the prompt layer rather than the loop config.
pub fn apply_to(&self, base: GraphConfig) -> Result<GraphConfig, PolicyError> {
let mut config = base;
let mut mask: MaskConfig = config.mask.clone();
for (lever, value) in &self.levers {
match lever.as_str() {
"max_iterations" => config.max_iterations = parse(lever, value)?,
"parallel_tools" => config.parallel_tools = parse(lever, value)?,
"max_parallel_tools" => config.max_parallel_tools = parse(lever, value)?,
"loop_repeat_threshold" => config.loop_repeat_threshold = parse(lever, value)?,
"keep_last_observations" => mask.keep_last_observations = parse(lever, value)?,
"max_tool_result_bytes" => mask.max_tool_result_bytes = parse(lever, value)?,
// Known, but applied at the prompt layer.
"system_prompt_suffix" | "compaction_rubric" => {}
other => return Err(PolicyError::UnknownLever(other.to_string())),
}
}
config.mask = mask;
Ok(config)
}
}
fn parse<T: std::str::FromStr>(lever: &str, value: &str) -> Result<T, PolicyError> {
value
.trim()
.parse::<T>()
.map_err(|_| PolicyError::BadValue {
lever: lever.to_string(),
value: value.to_string(),
})
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Scoring
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/// Cost-per-win when a policy won nothing.
///
/// **Not `f64::INFINITY`.** JSON has no infinity, so serde emits `null`, and the
/// gate's comparison `candidate.costPerWin > baseline.costPerWin` evaluates
/// `null > n` as `false` in JavaScript — meaning a policy that won nothing
/// would silently *pass* the cost clause. The largest finite double is the
/// honest encoding of "unboundedly bad" and compares correctly on both sides.
pub const COST_PER_WIN_NO_WINS: f64 = f64::MAX;
/// The outcome of one evaluated run.
///
/// Serializable so a headless run can emit it as JSON for the flywheel's
/// `Evaluator` to aggregate — that boundary is a process boundary, not a
/// function call.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct RunOutcome {
/// Which suite item this run covers, so an aggregator can detect a
/// missing or duplicated item rather than silently averaging fewer runs.
#[serde(default)]
pub item_id: String,
/// Did the run achieve the task (tests pass, issue resolved)?
pub succeeded: bool,
/// Did the run actually change anything?
///
/// A run that ends without committing any change is a **no-op** even when
/// it reports success — the agent talked itself to a stop. This is the
/// signal `noop_rate` exists to catch.
#[serde(rename = "madeChanges")]
pub made_changes: bool,
/// Total cost in USD.
#[serde(rename = "costUsd")]
pub cost_usd: f64,
/// Hard safety or security regression. Any `true` blocks promotion.
#[serde(default)]
pub regressed: bool,
}
/// The four axes the flywheel's gate decides over.
///
/// Named generically on purpose — the gate is host- and benchmark-agnostic, and
/// projecting rvAgent's meaning onto these axes honestly is the trust boundary
/// for every downstream guarantee.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct Score {
/// Main quality signal — higher is better.
pub primary: f64,
/// Fraction of runs that committed nothing — lower is better.
///
/// The default gate requires this to **strictly** improve: a policy earns
/// promotion by making the executor commit more, not merely score higher.
/// A policy that raises `primary` while leaving the agent more likely to
/// end empty has found a scoring artifact, not an improvement.
#[serde(rename = "noopRate")]
pub noop_rate: f64,
/// Resource cost per success — lower is better.
#[serde(rename = "costPerWin")]
pub cost_per_win: f64,
/// Hard safety/security stop.
pub regressed: bool,
}
impl Score {
/// Aggregate run outcomes into the four axes.
///
/// An empty set scores as maximally bad rather than perfect: zero runs must
/// never look like a clean sweep to the gate.
pub fn from_runs(runs: &[RunOutcome]) -> Self {
if runs.is_empty() {
return Self {
primary: 0.0,
noop_rate: 1.0,
cost_per_win: COST_PER_WIN_NO_WINS,
regressed: false,
};
}
let total = runs.len() as f64;
let wins = runs.iter().filter(|r| r.succeeded).count();
let noops = runs.iter().filter(|r| !r.made_changes).count();
let cost: f64 = runs.iter().map(|r| r.cost_usd).sum();
Self {
primary: wins as f64 / total,
noop_rate: noops as f64 / total,
cost_per_win: if wins == 0 {
COST_PER_WIN_NO_WINS
} else {
cost / wins as f64
},
regressed: runs.iter().any(|r| r.regressed),
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn run(succeeded: bool, made_changes: bool, cost_usd: f64) -> RunOutcome {
RunOutcome {
item_id: String::new(),
succeeded,
made_changes,
cost_usd,
regressed: false,
}
}
#[test]
fn genome_serializes_as_a_flat_string_map() {
let g = PolicyGenome::new()
.with("max_iterations", "50")
.with("system_prompt_suffix", "Be concise.");
let json = serde_json::to_string(&g).unwrap();
// Must match the flywheel's Policy = Record<string, string> exactly.
assert_eq!(
json,
r#"{"max_iterations":"50","system_prompt_suffix":"Be concise."}"#
);
let back: PolicyGenome = serde_json::from_str(&json).unwrap();
assert_eq!(back, g);
}
#[test]
fn serialization_order_is_deterministic() {
let a = PolicyGenome::new().with("zebra", "1").with("alpha", "2");
let b = PolicyGenome::new().with("alpha", "2").with("zebra", "1");
// Identical genomes must serialize identically, or fingerprints and
// replay diverge for no reason.
assert_eq!(
serde_json::to_string(&a).unwrap(),
serde_json::to_string(&b).unwrap()
);
}
#[test]
fn applies_numeric_and_boolean_levers() {
let g = PolicyGenome::new()
.with("max_iterations", "42")
.with("parallel_tools", "false")
.with("loop_repeat_threshold", "5")
.with("keep_last_observations", "3");
let config = g.apply_to(GraphConfig::default()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(config.max_iterations, 42);
assert!(!config.parallel_tools);
assert_eq!(config.loop_repeat_threshold, 5);
assert_eq!(config.mask.keep_last_observations, 3);
}
#[test]
fn unknown_lever_is_rejected_not_ignored() {
let g = PolicyGenome::new().with("nonexistent_knob", "7");
let err = g.apply_to(GraphConfig::default()).unwrap_err();
assert_eq!(err, PolicyError::UnknownLever("nonexistent_knob".into()));
// The message must name the valid set, or the optimizer cannot recover.
assert!(err.to_string().contains("max_iterations"));
}
#[test]
fn bad_value_is_reported_with_the_lever_name() {
let g = PolicyGenome::new().with("max_iterations", "not-a-number");
let err = g.apply_to(GraphConfig::default()).unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, PolicyError::BadValue { .. }));
assert!(err.to_string().contains("max_iterations"));
}
#[test]
fn text_levers_are_accepted_and_readable() {
let g = PolicyGenome::new()
.with("system_prompt_suffix", "Prefer small diffs.")
.with("compaction_rubric", "Preserve failing tests.");
assert!(g.apply_to(GraphConfig::default()).is_ok());
assert_eq!(g.system_prompt_suffix(), Some("Prefer small diffs."));
assert_eq!(g.compaction_rubric(), Some("Preserve failing tests."));
}
#[test]
fn empty_genome_leaves_config_untouched() {
let base = GraphConfig::default();
let applied = PolicyGenome::new().apply_to(base.clone()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(applied.max_iterations, base.max_iterations);
assert_eq!(
applied.mask.keep_last_observations,
base.mask.keep_last_observations
);
}
#[test]
fn score_computes_the_four_axes() {
let runs = vec![
run(true, true, 1.0),
run(true, true, 3.0),
run(false, true, 2.0),
run(false, false, 0.5),
];
let s = Score::from_runs(&runs);
assert_eq!(s.primary, 0.5);
assert_eq!(s.noop_rate, 0.25);
assert_eq!(s.cost_per_win, 6.5 / 2.0);
assert!(!s.regressed);
}
#[test]
fn a_successful_run_that_changed_nothing_still_counts_as_a_noop() {
// The case the axis exists for: the agent reports success but committed
// nothing. Scoring that as a win would reward talking over doing.
let s = Score::from_runs(&[run(true, false, 1.0)]);
assert_eq!(s.primary, 1.0);
assert_eq!(s.noop_rate, 1.0);
}
#[test]
fn zero_wins_gives_maximally_bad_cost_per_win_not_zero() {
let s = Score::from_runs(&[run(false, true, 5.0)]);
assert_eq!(s.cost_per_win, COST_PER_WIN_NO_WINS);
}
#[test]
fn score_never_serializes_a_non_finite_number() {
// JSON has no infinity: serde emits null, and the gate reads `null > n`
// as false in JS, so a zero-win policy would pass the cost clause.
for runs in [
vec![],
vec![run(false, true, 5.0)],
vec![run(true, true, 1.0)],
] {
let json = serde_json::to_value(Score::from_runs(&runs)).unwrap();
let cost = json.get("costPerWin").unwrap();
assert!(
cost.is_number(),
"costPerWin must serialize as a number, got {cost}"
);
assert!(cost.as_f64().unwrap().is_finite());
}
}
#[test]
fn empty_run_set_scores_as_bad_not_perfect() {
let s = Score::from_runs(&[]);
assert_eq!(s.primary, 0.0);
assert_eq!(s.noop_rate, 1.0);
assert_eq!(s.cost_per_win, COST_PER_WIN_NO_WINS);
}
#[test]
fn any_regression_sets_the_hard_stop() {
let mut bad = run(true, true, 1.0);
bad.regressed = true;
let s = Score::from_runs(&[run(true, true, 1.0), bad]);
assert!(s.regressed);
}
#[test]
fn score_serializes_with_the_gate_field_names() {
let s = Score::from_runs(&[run(true, true, 2.0)]);
let json = serde_json::to_value(&s).unwrap();
// These names are the gate's contract; renaming them silently breaks it.
assert!(json.get("primary").is_some());
assert!(json.get("noopRate").is_some());
assert!(json.get("costPerWin").is_some());
assert!(json.get("regressed").is_some());
}
#[test]
fn run_outcome_round_trips_across_the_process_boundary() {
let outcome = RunOutcome {
item_id: "task-7".into(),
succeeded: true,
made_changes: true,
cost_usd: 0.42,
regressed: false,
};
let json = serde_json::to_string(&outcome).unwrap();
// Field names are the contract with the JS evaluator; renaming them
// silently would make every aggregated Score wrong rather than failing.
assert!(json.contains("\"madeChanges\""));
assert!(json.contains("\"costUsd\""));
assert!(json.contains("\"item_id\""));
let back: RunOutcome = serde_json::from_str(&json).unwrap();
assert_eq!(back, outcome);
}
#[test]
fn run_outcome_tolerates_a_missing_regressed_flag() {
// An emitter that has nothing to report should not have to say so.
let json = r#"{"item_id":"a","succeeded":false,"madeChanges":false,"costUsd":0.0}"#;
let back: RunOutcome = serde_json::from_str(json).unwrap();
assert!(!back.regressed);
}
#[test]
fn every_known_lever_is_actually_applicable() {
// Guards against KNOWN_LEVERS drifting out of sync with apply_to.
for lever in KNOWN_LEVERS {
let value = match *lever {
"parallel_tools" => "true",
"system_prompt_suffix" | "compaction_rubric" => "text",
_ => "4",
};
let g = PolicyGenome::new().with(*lever, value);
assert!(
g.apply_to(GraphConfig::default()).is_ok(),
"declared lever '{lever}' is not handled by apply_to"
);
}
}
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
//! Subagent boundary — a tool that spawns an isolated context and returns a
//! String (ADR-275).
//!
//! Deliberately *not* peer agents with a message bus, shared mutable state, or
//! a mergeable state type. One writer, auxiliary intelligence around it, never
//! parallel writes.
//!
//! The evidence for coding tasks is one-directional: at equal token budget,
//! single-agent matches or beats multi-agent on interdependent work, and the
//! team that shipped a parallel-writer architecture walked it back after a year
//! of production data. A CRDT can merge two edits to the same file without
//! textual conflict; it cannot make the *result* coherent. That is the failure
//! this boundary is shaped to make unrepresentable — a subagent that can only
//! return a `String` cannot write, so there is nothing to merge.
use async_trait::async_trait;
use crate::error::Result;
/// What a subagent is for.
///
/// Both adopted roles are read-only. The distinction is what context they get,
/// which is load-bearing rather than cosmetic.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum SubagentRole {
/// Evaluates an artifact with **no inherited conversation** — only the diff
/// and the task statement.
///
/// The lack of shared context is the point, not an optimization: reviewers
/// measurably perform *better* without the parent's history, because a
/// shorter window means less context rot and none of the parent's
/// accumulated rationalizations.
///
/// **Gated, not adopted** (ADR-278 §7). metaharness ADR-226 is a
/// gold-scored null on a closely related design — a read-only strong
/// advisor produced zero marginal resolves at 5.4× cost. That advisor saw
/// the full transcript where this reviewer sees only the diff, so it is not
/// refuted, but this role must demonstrate marginal lift over a
/// no-reviewer control before it reaches the default path.
Reviewer,
/// Explores, reads, greps; returns a summary string.
///
/// Keeps exploration output out of the main window entirely, which is the
/// cleanest lever on wasted-context accumulation — the earliest and most
/// universal long-run failure.
Gatherer,
}
impl SubagentRole {
/// Whether this role may see the parent's conversation.
///
/// Always false. Encoded as a method rather than assumed, so adding a role
/// that inherits context is a visible decision rather than an oversight.
pub fn inherits_parent_context(&self) -> bool {
false
}
/// Whether this role may use state-mutating tools.
///
/// Always false — that is what makes this a single-writer architecture.
pub fn may_write(&self) -> bool {
false
}
/// The model tier this role should run on.
///
/// The gatherer runs cheap on measured grounds: a specialized small model
/// matched a frontier-mini in that slot, and putting a frontier model there
/// bought +0.4 pp at 5.8× cost — corroborated independently by ADR-226's
/// 5.4× null. Model tiering per role is part of the design, not a later
/// optimization.
pub fn model_tier(&self) -> ModelTier {
match self {
SubagentRole::Reviewer => ModelTier::Standard,
SubagentRole::Gatherer => ModelTier::Cheap,
}
}
pub fn as_str(&self) -> &'static str {
match self {
SubagentRole::Reviewer => "reviewer",
SubagentRole::Gatherer => "gatherer",
}
}
}
/// Which model tier a subagent runs on.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum ModelTier {
Cheap,
Standard,
}
/// A subagent invocation: everything it gets, and nothing more.
///
/// There is no parent-state field by construction. A subagent cannot reach the
/// parent's conversation, files, or todos even by accident.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct SubagentRequest {
pub role: SubagentRole,
/// The complete input. For a reviewer this is the diff plus the task
/// statement; for a gatherer, the question to answer.
pub prompt: String,
}
impl SubagentRequest {
pub fn new(role: SubagentRole, prompt: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
Self {
role,
prompt: prompt.into(),
}
}
}
/// The boundary itself: isolated context in, String out.
///
/// The signature is the architecture. A subagent returns text and nothing else
/// — no state update, no file handle, no mergeable value — so a caller cannot
/// wire one up as a concurrent writer even if it wanted to.
#[async_trait]
pub trait Subagent: Send + Sync {
async fn run(&self, request: SubagentRequest) -> Result<String>;
}
/// Cap on a subagent's returned summary, in bytes.
///
/// A subagent exists to *reduce* what reaches the parent's context. One that
/// returns its entire transcript has inverted its own purpose, so the boundary
/// enforces the budget rather than trusting the callee.
pub const MAX_SUMMARY_BYTES: usize = 8_000;
/// Truncate a subagent's return value to the summary budget.
pub fn enforce_summary_budget(summary: String) -> String {
crate::masking::truncate_tool_result(summary, MAX_SUMMARY_BYTES)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
struct EchoSubagent;
#[async_trait]
impl Subagent for EchoSubagent {
async fn run(&self, request: SubagentRequest) -> Result<String> {
Ok(format!("{}: {}", request.role.as_str(), request.prompt))
}
}
#[test]
fn no_role_may_write() {
// The single-writer invariant. If this ever fails, the architecture
// has changed and ADR-275 needs revisiting first.
for role in [SubagentRole::Reviewer, SubagentRole::Gatherer] {
assert!(!role.may_write(), "{} must not write", role.as_str());
}
}
#[test]
fn no_role_inherits_parent_context() {
for role in [SubagentRole::Reviewer, SubagentRole::Gatherer] {
assert!(!role.inherits_parent_context());
}
}
#[test]
fn gatherer_runs_on_the_cheap_tier() {
// A frontier model in this slot measured +0.4 pp at 5.8x cost.
assert_eq!(SubagentRole::Gatherer.model_tier(), ModelTier::Cheap);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn boundary_returns_only_a_string() {
let out = EchoSubagent
.run(SubagentRequest::new(SubagentRole::Gatherer, "where is X?"))
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(out, "gatherer: where is X?");
}
#[test]
fn request_carries_no_parent_state() {
// Compile-time property, asserted structurally: the request is exactly
// a role and a prompt. Adding a parent-state field would break this.
let r = SubagentRequest::new(SubagentRole::Reviewer, "diff");
assert_eq!(r.role, SubagentRole::Reviewer);
assert_eq!(r.prompt, "diff");
}
#[test]
fn oversized_summaries_are_capped() {
let huge = "x".repeat(MAX_SUMMARY_BYTES * 2);
let capped = enforce_summary_budget(huge);
assert!(capped.len() <= MAX_SUMMARY_BYTES);
assert!(capped.ends_with("[output truncated]"));
}
#[test]
fn short_summaries_pass_through_unchanged() {
let s = "found it in src/lib.rs".to_string();
assert_eq!(enforce_summary_budget(s.clone()), s);
}
}

View file

@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ use rvagent_core::config::RvAgentConfig;
use rvagent_core::error::{Result, RvAgentError};
use rvagent_core::graph::{AgentGraph, GraphConfig, ToolExecutor};
use rvagent_core::messages::{Message, ToolCall};
use rvagent_core::models::{ChatModel, Provider};
use rvagent_core::models::{ChatModel, Provider, ToolDefinition};
use rvagent_core::state::AgentState;
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ impl MockModel {
#[async_trait]
impl ChatModel for MockModel {
async fn complete(&self, _messages: &[Message]) -> Result<Message> {
async fn complete(&self, _messages: &[Message], _tools: &[ToolDefinition]) -> Result<Message> {
let mut resps = self.responses.lock().unwrap();
if resps.is_empty() {
Ok(Message::ai("(no more responses)"))
@ -41,8 +41,8 @@ impl ChatModel for MockModel {
}
}
async fn stream(&self, messages: &[Message]) -> Result<Vec<Message>> {
let msg = self.complete(messages).await?;
async fn stream(&self, messages: &[Message], tools: &[ToolDefinition]) -> Result<Vec<Message>> {
let msg = self.complete(messages, tools).await?;
Ok(vec![msg])
}
}
@ -183,6 +183,7 @@ async fn test_agent_graph_with_parallel_tool_calls() {
let config = GraphConfig {
max_iterations: 10,
parallel_tools: true,
..GraphConfig::default()
};
let graph = AgentGraph::with_config(model, executor, config);
@ -255,26 +256,87 @@ fn test_config_to_graph_pipeline() {
assert_eq!(edges.len(), 4);
}
/// Tool execution failure propagates correctly through the graph.
/// Tool execution failure is fed back to the model as a tool result instead
/// of aborting the loop — the model must see the error to recover from it.
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_agent_graph_tool_failure() {
let model = MockModel::new(vec![Message::ai_with_tools(
"",
vec![ToolCall {
id: "tc1".into(),
name: "dangerous_tool".into(),
args: serde_json::json!({}),
}],
)]);
async fn test_agent_graph_tool_failure_feeds_back() {
let model = MockModel::new(vec![
Message::ai_with_tools(
"",
vec![ToolCall {
id: "tc1".into(),
name: "dangerous_tool".into(),
args: serde_json::json!({}),
}],
),
// The model sees the error and answers without the tool.
Message::ai("The tool failed; here is a fallback answer."),
]);
let executor = FailingToolExecutor {
fail_tool: "dangerous_tool".into(),
};
let graph = AgentGraph::new(model, executor);
let state = AgentState::new();
let err = graph.run(state).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, RvAgentError::Tool(_)));
assert!(err.to_string().contains("dangerous_tool failed"));
let result = graph.run(state).await.unwrap();
// The failure surfaced as a tool result, visible to the model.
let tool_msg = result
.messages
.iter()
.find(|m| matches!(m, Message::Tool(_)))
.expect("tool result message must be present");
assert!(tool_msg.content().contains("Tool execution error"));
assert!(tool_msg.content().contains("dangerous_tool failed"));
// The loop continued to a final answer instead of aborting.
assert_eq!(
result.messages.last().unwrap().content(),
"The tool failed; here is a fallback answer."
);
}
/// A failing tool in a parallel batch does not poison the other results.
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_parallel_tool_failure_isolated() {
let model = MockModel::new(vec![
Message::ai_with_tools(
"",
vec![
ToolCall {
id: "ok_call".into(),
name: "safe_tool".into(),
args: serde_json::json!({}),
},
ToolCall {
id: "bad_call".into(),
name: "dangerous_tool".into(),
args: serde_json::json!({}),
},
],
),
Message::ai("done"),
]);
let executor = FailingToolExecutor {
fail_tool: "dangerous_tool".into(),
};
let config = GraphConfig {
max_iterations: 10,
parallel_tools: true,
..GraphConfig::default()
};
let graph = AgentGraph::with_config(model, executor, config);
let result = graph.run(AgentState::new()).await.unwrap();
let tool_results: Vec<&str> = result
.messages
.iter()
.filter(|m| matches!(m, Message::Tool(_)))
.map(|m| m.content())
.collect();
assert_eq!(tool_results.len(), 2);
assert!(tool_results[0].contains("ok: safe_tool"));
assert!(tool_results[1].contains("Tool execution error"));
}
/// State mutations during graph execution use copy-on-write correctly.
@ -336,6 +398,7 @@ async fn test_max_iterations_terminates() {
let config = GraphConfig {
max_iterations: 5,
parallel_tools: false,
..GraphConfig::default()
};
let graph = AgentGraph::with_config(model, executor, config);

View file

@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
use criterion::{black_box, criterion_group, criterion_main, BenchmarkId, Criterion};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use rvagent_core::rvf_bridge::{GovernanceMode, PolicyCheck, TaskOutcome};
use rvagent_middleware::skills::validate_skill_name;
use rvagent_middleware::witness::{compute_arguments_hash, WitnessBuilder};
@ -17,8 +19,10 @@ use rvagent_middleware::{
/// A no-op handler that returns immediately.
struct NoOpHandler;
#[async_trait]
impl ModelHandler for NoOpHandler {
fn call(&self, _request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
async fn call(&self, _request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
ModelResponse::text("ok")
}
}
@ -32,21 +36,26 @@ fn bench_full_pipeline(c: &mut Criterion) {
enable_sona: false,
enable_hnsw: false,
enable_unicode_security: false,
enable_summarization: false,
sona_config: None,
hnsw_config: None,
unicode_security_config: None,
};
let pipeline = build_default_pipeline(&config);
let handler = NoOpHandler;
let rt = tokio::runtime::Builder::new_current_thread()
.enable_time()
.build()
.unwrap();
c.bench_function("full_11_middleware_pipeline", |b| {
b.iter(|| {
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![
Message::user("Hello"),
Message::assistant("Hi there"),
Message::user("Write some code"),
Message::human("Hello"),
Message::ai("Hi there"),
Message::human("Write some code"),
]);
let response = pipeline.run_wrap_model_call(black_box(request), &handler);
let response = rt.block_on(pipeline.run_wrap_model_call(black_box(request), &handler));
black_box(response);
});
});
@ -117,6 +126,7 @@ fn bench_pipeline_modify_request(c: &mut Criterion) {
enable_sona: false,
enable_hnsw: false,
enable_unicode_security: false,
enable_summarization: false,
sona_config: None,
hnsw_config: None,
unicode_security_config: None,
@ -125,7 +135,7 @@ fn bench_pipeline_modify_request(c: &mut Criterion) {
c.bench_function("pipeline_modify_request", |b| {
b.iter(|| {
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::user("test")])
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::human("test")])
.with_system(Some("You are helpful.".into()));
let modified = pipeline.run_modify_request(black_box(request));
black_box(modified);

View file

@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ impl Middleware for FilesystemMiddleware {
"filesystem"
}
fn before_agent(
async fn before_agent(
&self,
_state: &AgentState,
_runtime: &Runtime,
@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ impl Middleware for FilesystemMiddleware {
macro_rules! fs_tool {
($name:ident, $tool_name:expr, $desc:expr, $schema:expr) => {
struct $name;
#[async_trait]
impl Tool for $name {
fn name(&self) -> &str {
$tool_name
@ -84,10 +85,10 @@ macro_rules! fs_tool {
fn description(&self) -> &str {
$desc
}
fn parameters_schema(&self) -> serde_json::Value {
fn input_schema(&self) -> serde_json::Value {
$schema
}
fn invoke(&self, _args: serde_json::Value) -> Result<String, String> {
async fn invoke(&self, _args: serde_json::Value) -> Result<String, String> {
Err("filesystem tool must be invoked through the agent runtime".into())
}
}
@ -225,22 +226,22 @@ mod tests {
assert!(names.contains(&"execute"));
}
#[test]
fn test_before_agent_no_cwd() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_before_agent_no_cwd() {
let mw = FilesystemMiddleware::new();
let state = AgentState::default();
let runtime = Runtime::new();
let config = RunnableConfig::default();
assert!(mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).is_none());
assert!(mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await.is_none());
}
#[test]
fn test_before_agent_with_cwd() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_before_agent_with_cwd() {
let mw = FilesystemMiddleware::with_cwd("/tmp/test");
let state = AgentState::default();
let runtime = Runtime::new();
let config = RunnableConfig::default();
let update = mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config);
let update = mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
assert!(update.is_some());
let ext = &update.unwrap().extensions;
assert_eq!(
@ -249,11 +250,11 @@ mod tests {
);
}
#[test]
fn test_tools_return_error_without_runtime() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_tools_return_error_without_runtime() {
let mw = FilesystemMiddleware::new();
for tool in mw.tools() {
let result = tool.invoke(serde_json::json!({}));
let result = tool.invoke(serde_json::json!({})).await;
assert!(result.is_err());
}
}
@ -262,7 +263,7 @@ mod tests {
fn test_tool_schemas_are_objects() {
let mw = FilesystemMiddleware::new();
for tool in mw.tools() {
let schema = tool.parameters_schema();
let schema = tool.input_schema();
assert_eq!(schema["type"], "object");
}
}

View file

@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
//! HumanInTheLoopMiddleware — intercepts tool calls matching interrupt patterns,
//! pausing execution awaiting human approval.
//! HumanInTheLoopMiddleware — intercepts tool calls matching interrupt
//! patterns and drops them, reporting the block to the model.
//!
//! There is no approval channel yet: a blocked call is not queued for a human
//! and never resumes. The middleware is a gate, not a pause, and the message it
//! injects says so — telling the model to wait for an approval that cannot
//! arrive is what turns a gate into a hang.
use async_trait::async_trait;
@ -15,8 +20,9 @@ pub enum ApprovalDecision {
/// Middleware that intercepts tool calls matching configurable interrupt patterns.
///
/// - `wrap_model_call`: after the model returns, checks if any tool calls match
/// the interrupt patterns. If so, pauses execution awaiting human approval.
/// - `wrap_model_call`: after the model returns, drops any tool calls matching
/// the interrupt patterns and appends a note naming them, so the model can
/// adapt rather than wait.
pub struct HumanInTheLoopMiddleware {
/// Tool name patterns that trigger human approval.
interrupt_patterns: Vec<String>,
@ -48,8 +54,12 @@ impl Middleware for HumanInTheLoopMiddleware {
"hitl"
}
fn wrap_model_call(&self, request: ModelRequest, handler: &dyn ModelHandler) -> ModelResponse {
let mut response = handler.call(request);
async fn wrap_model_call(
&self,
request: ModelRequest,
handler: &dyn ModelHandler,
) -> ModelResponse {
let mut response = handler.call(request).await;
// Filter out tool calls that require approval
let (needs_approval, approved): (Vec<ToolCall>, Vec<ToolCall>) = response
@ -70,11 +80,20 @@ impl Middleware for HumanInTheLoopMiddleware {
pending_names
);
if !response.message.content.is_empty() {
response.message.content.push_str("\n\n");
let content = response.message.content_mut();
if !content.is_empty() {
content.push_str("\n\n");
}
response.message.content.push_str(&format!(
"[HITL] Awaiting approval for: {}",
// State what actually happened: the calls were dropped, not queued.
// "Awaiting approval" implied something would come back for them and
// nothing does, which leaves the model waiting on a resolution that
// never arrives instead of adapting.
content.push_str(&format!(
"[HITL] Blocked tool call(s) requiring approval: {}. No approval \
mechanism is wired in this runtime, so these calls were not \
executed and will not be retried. Configure `interrupt_on` to \
change which tools are gated (or set RVAGENT_AUTO_APPROVE=1 in \
the CLI to run unattended).",
pending_names.join(", ")
));
}
@ -89,8 +108,10 @@ mod tests {
use crate::Message;
struct EchoHandler;
#[async_trait]
impl ModelHandler for EchoHandler {
fn call(&self, _request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
async fn call(&self, _request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
let mut response = ModelResponse::text("response");
response.tool_calls = vec![
ToolCall {
@ -136,28 +157,53 @@ mod tests {
assert!(!mw.should_interrupt("read_file"));
}
#[test]
fn test_wrap_model_call_filters_tool_calls() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_wrap_model_call_filters_tool_calls() {
let mw = HumanInTheLoopMiddleware::new(vec!["execute".into()]);
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::user("do something")]);
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::human("do something")]);
let handler = EchoHandler;
let response = mw.wrap_model_call(request, &handler);
let response = mw.wrap_model_call(request, &handler).await;
assert_eq!(response.tool_calls.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(response.tool_calls[0].name, "read_file");
assert!(response.message.content.contains("[HITL]"));
assert!(response.message.content.contains("execute"));
assert!(response.content().contains("[HITL]"));
assert!(response.content().contains("execute"));
}
#[test]
fn test_wrap_model_call_no_interrupt() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_block_message_states_reality_and_next_step() {
// The message is the model's only signal about what happened; if it
// says "awaiting" when nothing is coming, the model stalls.
let mw = HumanInTheLoopMiddleware::new(vec!["execute".into()]);
let response = mw
.wrap_model_call(ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::human("x")]), &EchoHandler)
.await;
let content = response.content().to_string();
assert!(content.contains("execute"), "must name the blocked call");
assert!(
!content.contains("Awaiting"),
"must not imply a pending approval that never resolves: {content}"
);
assert!(
content.contains("not be retried"),
"must tell the model the call is gone for good: {content}"
);
assert!(
content.contains("interrupt_on"),
"must name the knob that changes gating: {content}"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_wrap_model_call_no_interrupt() {
let mw = HumanInTheLoopMiddleware::new(vec!["dangerous_tool".into()]);
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::user("safe")]);
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::human("safe")]);
let handler = EchoHandler;
let response = mw.wrap_model_call(request, &handler);
let response = mw.wrap_model_call(request, &handler).await;
assert_eq!(response.tool_calls.len(), 2);
assert!(!response.message.content.contains("[HITL]"));
assert!(!response.content().contains("[HITL]"));
}
#[test]

View file

@ -12,12 +12,14 @@
//!
//! # Performance
//!
//! - 150x-12,500x faster than brute-force search
//! - EXPERIMENTAL: uses a hash-based embedding placeholder (not semantic);
//! no retrieval performance claims until real embeddings are integrated
//! - O(log n) search complexity
//! - Sub-millisecond latency for 10k vectors
use crate::{
AgentState, AgentStateUpdate, Middleware, ModelRequest, RunnableConfig, Runtime, ToolDefinition,
AgentState, AgentStateUpdate, Message, Middleware, ModelRequest, RunnableConfig, Runtime,
ToolDefinition,
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use parking_lot::RwLock;
@ -722,7 +724,7 @@ impl HnswMiddleware {
Some(ToolDefinition {
name,
description,
parameters,
input_schema: parameters,
})
})
.collect()
@ -735,7 +737,7 @@ impl Middleware for HnswMiddleware {
"hnsw"
}
fn before_agent(
async fn before_agent(
&self,
state: &AgentState,
_runtime: &Runtime,
@ -750,11 +752,11 @@ impl Middleware for HnswMiddleware {
.messages
.iter()
.rev()
.find(|m| matches!(m.role, crate::Role::User))?;
.find(|m| matches!(m, Message::Human(_)))?;
// Search for relevant memory
let memory_results = self.search_memory(
&last_user.content,
last_user.content(),
self.state.read().config.memory_retrieval_k,
);
@ -794,8 +796,8 @@ impl Middleware for HnswMiddleware {
.messages
.iter()
.rev()
.find(|m| matches!(m.role, crate::Role::User))
.map(|m| m.content.clone());
.find(|m| matches!(m, Message::Human(_)))
.map(|m| m.content().to_string());
if let Some(query) = query {
// Retrieve relevant skills as tools

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

View file

@ -6,10 +6,7 @@
use async_trait::async_trait;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use crate::{
AgentState, AgentStateUpdate, Middleware, ModelHandler, ModelRequest, ModelResponse,
RunnableConfig, Runtime,
};
use crate::{AgentState, AgentStateUpdate, Middleware, ModelRequest, RunnableConfig, Runtime};
/// MCP tool call origin tracking.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
@ -81,7 +78,7 @@ impl Middleware for McpBridgeMiddleware {
"mcp_bridge"
}
fn before_agent(
async fn before_agent(
&self,
_state: &AgentState,
_runtime: &Runtime,
@ -109,10 +106,6 @@ impl Middleware for McpBridgeMiddleware {
request
}
fn wrap_model_call(&self, request: ModelRequest, handler: &dyn ModelHandler) -> ModelResponse {
handler.call(request)
}
fn tools(&self) -> Vec<Box<dyn crate::Tool>> {
if !self.config.enabled {
return vec![];
@ -128,6 +121,7 @@ struct McpStatusTool {
config: McpBridgeConfig,
}
#[async_trait]
impl crate::Tool for McpStatusTool {
fn name(&self) -> &str {
"mcp_bridge_status"
@ -137,7 +131,7 @@ impl crate::Tool for McpStatusTool {
"Returns the current MCP bridge configuration and status"
}
fn parameters_schema(&self) -> serde_json::Value {
fn input_schema(&self) -> serde_json::Value {
serde_json::json!({
"type": "object",
"properties": {},
@ -145,7 +139,7 @@ impl crate::Tool for McpStatusTool {
})
}
fn invoke(&self, _args: serde_json::Value) -> Result<String, String> {
async fn invoke(&self, _args: serde_json::Value) -> Result<String, String> {
Ok(serde_json::json!({
"enabled": self.config.enabled,
"max_concurrent": self.config.max_concurrent,
@ -195,8 +189,8 @@ mod tests {
assert!(!mw.is_transport_allowed("websocket"));
}
#[test]
fn test_mcp_bridge_disabled() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_mcp_bridge_disabled() {
let config = McpBridgeConfig {
enabled: false,
..Default::default()
@ -207,17 +201,18 @@ mod tests {
let runnable_config = RunnableConfig::default();
assert!(mw
.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &runnable_config)
.await
.is_none());
assert!(mw.tools().is_empty());
}
#[test]
fn test_mcp_bridge_enabled_injects_config() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_mcp_bridge_enabled_injects_config() {
let mw = McpBridgeMiddleware::new();
let state = AgentState::default();
let runtime = Runtime::new();
let config = RunnableConfig::default();
let update = mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config);
let update = mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
assert!(update.is_some());
assert!(update.unwrap().extensions.contains_key("mcp_bridge_config"));
}
@ -230,13 +225,13 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(tools[0].name(), "mcp_bridge_status");
}
#[test]
fn test_mcp_status_tool_invoke() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_mcp_status_tool_invoke() {
use crate::Tool;
let tool = McpStatusTool {
config: McpBridgeConfig::default(),
};
let result = tool.invoke(serde_json::json!({}));
let result = tool.invoke(serde_json::json!({})).await;
assert!(result.is_ok());
let json: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&result.unwrap()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(json["enabled"], true);

View file

@ -201,13 +201,13 @@ impl Middleware for MemoryMiddleware {
"memory"
}
fn before_agent(
async fn before_agent(
&self,
state: &AgentState,
_runtime: &Runtime,
_config: &RunnableConfig,
) -> Option<AgentStateUpdate> {
if state.extensions.contains_key("memory_contents") {
if crate::json_extension(state, "memory_contents").is_some() {
return None;
}
@ -231,7 +231,11 @@ impl Middleware for MemoryMiddleware {
Some(update)
}
fn wrap_model_call(&self, request: ModelRequest, handler: &dyn ModelHandler) -> ModelResponse {
async fn wrap_model_call(
&self,
request: ModelRequest,
handler: &dyn ModelHandler,
) -> ModelResponse {
let contents: HashMap<String, String> = request
.extensions
.get("memory_contents")
@ -239,12 +243,12 @@ impl Middleware for MemoryMiddleware {
.unwrap_or_default();
if contents.is_empty() {
return handler.call(request);
return handler.call(request).await;
}
let memory_section = Self::format_agent_memory(&contents);
let new_system = crate::append_to_system_message(&request.system_message, &memory_section);
handler.call(request.with_system(new_system))
handler.call(request.with_system(new_system)).await
}
}
@ -252,9 +256,13 @@ impl Middleware for MemoryMiddleware {
mod tests {
use super::*;
use async_trait::async_trait;
struct PassthroughHandler;
#[async_trait]
impl ModelHandler for PassthroughHandler {
fn call(&self, request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
async fn call(&self, request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
ModelResponse::text(request.system_message.unwrap_or_default())
}
}
@ -338,20 +346,18 @@ mod tests {
assert!(mw.validate_content("any.md", "anything").is_some());
}
#[test]
fn test_before_agent_skip_if_loaded() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_before_agent_skip_if_loaded() {
let mw = MemoryMiddleware::new(vec!["AGENTS.md".into()]);
let mut state = AgentState::default();
state
.extensions
.insert("memory_contents".into(), serde_json::json!({}));
state.set_extension("memory_contents", serde_json::json!({}));
let runtime = Runtime::new();
let config = RunnableConfig::default();
assert!(mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).is_none());
assert!(mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await.is_none());
}
#[test]
fn test_before_agent_loads() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_before_agent_loads() {
let mut preloaded = HashMap::new();
preloaded.insert("AGENTS.md".into(), "Memory content".into());
@ -360,7 +366,7 @@ mod tests {
let runtime = Runtime::new();
let config = RunnableConfig::default();
let update = mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config);
let update = mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
assert!(update.is_some());
assert!(update.unwrap().extensions.contains_key("memory_contents"));
}
@ -375,13 +381,13 @@ mod tests {
assert!(formatted.contains("<memory_guidelines>"));
}
#[test]
fn test_wrap_model_call_no_memory() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_wrap_model_call_no_memory() {
let mw = MemoryMiddleware::new(vec![]);
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![]);
let handler = PassthroughHandler;
let response = mw.wrap_model_call(request, &handler);
assert!(response.message.content.is_empty());
let response = mw.wrap_model_call(request, &handler).await;
assert!(response.content().is_empty());
}
#[test]

View file

@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
use async_trait::async_trait;
use crate::{AgentState, AgentStateUpdate, Message, Middleware, Role, RunnableConfig, Runtime};
use crate::{AgentState, AgentStateUpdate, Message, Middleware, RunnableConfig, Runtime};
/// Maximum length for tool call IDs (ADR-103 C12).
pub const MAX_TOOL_CALL_ID_LENGTH: usize = 128;
@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ impl Middleware for PatchToolCallsMiddleware {
"patch_tool_calls"
}
fn before_agent(
async fn before_agent(
&self,
state: &AgentState,
_runtime: &Runtime,
@ -66,25 +66,25 @@ impl Middleware for PatchToolCallsMiddleware {
for (i, msg) in state.messages.iter().enumerate() {
patched.push(msg.clone());
if msg.role == Role::Assistant && !msg.tool_calls.is_empty() {
for tc in &msg.tool_calls {
if let Message::Ai(ai) = msg {
for tc in &ai.tool_calls {
// Validate tool call ID (ADR-103 C12)
if let Err(err) = validate_tool_call_id(&tc.id) {
tracing::warn!("Invalid tool call ID '{}': {}", tc.id, err);
continue;
}
let has_response = state.messages[i + 1..].iter().any(|m| {
m.role == Role::Tool && m.tool_call_id.as_deref() == Some(&*tc.id)
});
let has_response = state.messages[i + 1..]
.iter()
.any(|m| matches!(m, Message::Tool(t) if t.tool_call_id == tc.id));
if !has_response {
patched.push(Message::tool(
patched.push(Message::tool_with_name(
&tc.id,
format!(
"Tool call {} with id {} was cancelled — another message came in before it could be completed.",
tc.name, tc.id
),
&tc.id,
&tc.name,
));
modified = true;
@ -107,6 +107,13 @@ impl Middleware for PatchToolCallsMiddleware {
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::ToolCall;
use std::sync::Arc;
fn state_with_messages(messages: Vec<Message>) -> AgentState {
let mut state = AgentState::new();
state.messages = Arc::new(messages);
state
}
#[test]
fn test_middleware_name() {
@ -147,109 +154,109 @@ mod tests {
assert!(validate_tool_call_id("call/id").is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_no_patch_needed() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_no_patch_needed() {
let mw = PatchToolCallsMiddleware::new();
let state = AgentState {
messages: vec![Message::user("hi"), Message::assistant("hello")],
..Default::default()
};
let state = state_with_messages(vec![Message::human("hi"), Message::ai("hello")]);
let runtime = Runtime::new();
let config = RunnableConfig::default();
assert!(mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).is_none());
assert!(mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await.is_none());
}
#[test]
fn test_patch_dangling_tool_call() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_patch_dangling_tool_call() {
let mw = PatchToolCallsMiddleware::new();
let mut assistant_msg = Message::assistant("I'll use a tool");
assistant_msg.tool_calls.push(ToolCall {
id: "call-1".into(),
name: "read_file".into(),
args: serde_json::json!({"path": "test.txt"}),
});
let assistant_msg = Message::ai_with_tools(
"I'll use a tool",
vec![ToolCall {
id: "call-1".into(),
name: "read_file".into(),
args: serde_json::json!({"path": "test.txt"}),
}],
);
let state = AgentState {
messages: vec![
Message::user("help me"),
assistant_msg,
Message::user("never mind"),
],
..Default::default()
};
let state = state_with_messages(vec![
Message::human("help me"),
assistant_msg,
Message::human("never mind"),
]);
let runtime = Runtime::new();
let config = RunnableConfig::default();
let update = mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config);
let update = mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
assert!(update.is_some());
let messages = update.unwrap().messages.unwrap();
assert_eq!(messages.len(), 4);
assert_eq!(messages[2].role, Role::Tool);
assert!(messages[2].content.contains("cancelled"));
assert_eq!(messages[2].tool_call_id.as_deref(), Some("call-1"));
match &messages[2] {
Message::Tool(t) => {
assert!(t.content.contains("cancelled"));
assert_eq!(t.tool_call_id, "call-1");
}
other => panic!("expected Tool message, got {:?}", other),
}
}
#[test]
fn test_no_patch_when_response_exists() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_no_patch_when_response_exists() {
let mw = PatchToolCallsMiddleware::new();
let mut assistant_msg = Message::assistant("Using tool");
assistant_msg.tool_calls.push(ToolCall {
id: "call-1".into(),
name: "read_file".into(),
args: serde_json::json!({}),
});
let assistant_msg = Message::ai_with_tools(
"Using tool",
vec![ToolCall {
id: "call-1".into(),
name: "read_file".into(),
args: serde_json::json!({}),
}],
);
let state = AgentState {
messages: vec![
assistant_msg,
Message::tool("file content", "call-1", "read_file"),
let state = state_with_messages(vec![
assistant_msg,
Message::tool_with_name("call-1", "file content", "read_file"),
]);
let runtime = Runtime::new();
let config = RunnableConfig::default();
assert!(mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await.is_none());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_patch_multiple_dangling() {
let mw = PatchToolCallsMiddleware::new();
let assistant_msg = Message::ai_with_tools(
"Using tools",
vec![
ToolCall {
id: "call-1".into(),
name: "read_file".into(),
args: serde_json::json!({}),
},
ToolCall {
id: "call-2".into(),
name: "write_file".into(),
args: serde_json::json!({}),
},
],
..Default::default()
};
);
let state = state_with_messages(vec![assistant_msg]);
let runtime = Runtime::new();
let config = RunnableConfig::default();
assert!(mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).is_none());
}
#[test]
fn test_patch_multiple_dangling() {
let mw = PatchToolCallsMiddleware::new();
let mut assistant_msg = Message::assistant("Using tools");
assistant_msg.tool_calls.push(ToolCall {
id: "call-1".into(),
name: "read_file".into(),
args: serde_json::json!({}),
});
assistant_msg.tool_calls.push(ToolCall {
id: "call-2".into(),
name: "write_file".into(),
args: serde_json::json!({}),
});
let state = AgentState {
messages: vec![assistant_msg],
..Default::default()
};
let runtime = Runtime::new();
let config = RunnableConfig::default();
let update = mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config);
let update = mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
assert!(update.is_some());
let messages = update.unwrap().messages.unwrap();
assert_eq!(messages.len(), 3);
assert_eq!(messages[1].role, Role::Tool);
assert_eq!(messages[2].role, Role::Tool);
assert!(matches!(&messages[1], Message::Tool(_)));
assert!(matches!(&messages[2], Message::Tool(_)));
}
#[test]
fn test_empty_messages() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_empty_messages() {
let mw = PatchToolCallsMiddleware::new();
let state = AgentState::default();
let runtime = Runtime::new();
let config = RunnableConfig::default();
assert!(mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).is_none());
assert!(mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await.is_none());
}
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
//! Middleware pipeline execution (ADR-095) — fully async model-call chain (P0.3).
use std::future::Future;
use std::pin::Pin;
use crate::{
AgentState, Middleware, ModelHandler, ModelRequest, ModelResponse, RunnableConfig, Runtime,
Tool,
};
/// Executes the middleware pipeline in order.
/// Mirrors LangChain's `create_agent` middleware composition.
pub struct MiddlewarePipeline {
middlewares: Vec<Box<dyn Middleware>>,
}
impl MiddlewarePipeline {
/// Create a new pipeline from an ordered list of middlewares.
pub fn new(middlewares: Vec<Box<dyn Middleware>>) -> Self {
Self { middlewares }
}
/// Create an empty pipeline.
pub fn empty() -> Self {
Self {
middlewares: Vec::new(),
}
}
/// Add a middleware to the end of the pipeline.
pub fn push(&mut self, middleware: Box<dyn Middleware>) {
self.middlewares.push(middleware);
}
/// Number of middlewares in the pipeline.
pub fn len(&self) -> usize {
self.middlewares.len()
}
/// Whether the pipeline is empty.
pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
self.middlewares.is_empty()
}
/// Get middleware names in order.
pub fn names(&self) -> Vec<&str> {
self.middlewares.iter().map(|mw| mw.name()).collect()
}
/// Run `before_agent` hooks in order, accumulating state updates.
pub async fn run_before_agent(
&self,
state: &mut AgentState,
runtime: &Runtime,
config: &RunnableConfig,
) {
for mw in &self.middlewares {
if let Some(update) = mw.before_agent(state, runtime, config).await {
update.apply_to(state);
}
}
}
/// Collect all tools from all middlewares.
pub fn collect_tools(&self) -> Vec<Box<dyn Tool>> {
self.middlewares.iter().flat_map(|mw| mw.tools()).collect()
}
/// Run `modify_request` through all middlewares in order.
pub fn run_modify_request(&self, mut request: ModelRequest) -> ModelRequest {
for mw in &self.middlewares {
request = mw.modify_request(request);
}
request
}
/// Run the async `wrap_model_call` chain.
/// Middlewares are chained so the outermost (first) wraps the innermost (last).
pub async fn run_wrap_model_call(
&self,
request: ModelRequest,
base_handler: &dyn ModelHandler,
) -> ModelResponse {
chain_call(&self.middlewares, request, base_handler).await
}
/// Full pipeline run: before_agent, collect tools, modify_request, wrap_model_call.
pub async fn run(
&self,
state: &mut AgentState,
runtime: &Runtime,
config: &RunnableConfig,
mut request: ModelRequest,
handler: &dyn ModelHandler,
) -> ModelResponse {
// 1. Run before_agent hooks
self.run_before_agent(state, runtime, config).await;
// 2. Collect tools from all middlewares
for tool in self.collect_tools() {
request.tools.push(tool.definition());
}
// 3. Run modify_request
request = self.run_modify_request(request);
// 4. Run the async wrap_model_call chain
self.run_wrap_model_call(request, handler).await
}
}
type BoxResponseFuture<'a> = Pin<Box<dyn Future<Output = ModelResponse> + Send + 'a>>;
/// Recursively chain `wrap_model_call` futures from the outside in.
fn chain_call<'a>(
middlewares: &'a [Box<dyn Middleware>],
request: ModelRequest,
handler: &'a dyn ModelHandler,
) -> BoxResponseFuture<'a> {
Box::pin(async move {
match middlewares.split_first() {
None => handler.call(request).await,
Some((first, rest)) => {
let inner = ChainedHandler { rest, handler };
first.wrap_model_call(request, &inner).await
}
}
})
}
/// Handler that forwards to the remainder of the middleware chain.
struct ChainedHandler<'a> {
rest: &'a [Box<dyn Middleware>],
handler: &'a dyn ModelHandler,
}
#[async_trait::async_trait]
impl ModelHandler for ChainedHandler<'_> {
async fn call(&self, request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
chain_call(self.rest, request, self.handler).await
}
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,308 @@
//! `PipelineModel` — a `rvagent_core::models::ChatModel` adapter that runs
//! every model call through a `MiddlewarePipeline` (P0.3 wiring).
//!
//! This lets `AgentGraph` stay unchanged while gaining the full middleware
//! stack: the graph calls `ChatModel::complete`, and this adapter routes the
//! call through `modify_request` and the async `wrap_model_call` chain before
//! delegating to the wrapped inner model.
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use rvagent_core::error::{Result as CoreResult, RvAgentError};
use rvagent_core::models::{ChatModel, ToolDefinition};
use crate::{Message, MiddlewarePipeline, ModelHandler, ModelRequest, ModelResponse};
/// A `ChatModel` that wraps an inner model with a middleware pipeline.
///
/// Notes:
/// - A leading `Message::System` in the input is hoisted into the request's
/// `system_message` slot so middleware can append to it; the base handler
/// reassembles it before calling the inner model.
/// - Inner model errors surface to the chain as a `"error: …"` text response
/// (so e.g. `RetryMiddleware` can retry them); if the *final* inner call
/// still failed, the original error is propagated to the caller.
/// - Middleware-provided tools are NOT auto-advertised here; the tool set is
/// whatever the graph's `ToolExecutor` advertises. Use
/// `MiddlewarePipeline::collect_tools` to register middleware tools with an
/// executor if desired.
pub struct PipelineModel<M: ChatModel> {
inner: M,
pipeline: Arc<MiddlewarePipeline>,
}
impl<M: ChatModel> PipelineModel<M> {
/// Wrap `inner` with the given middleware pipeline.
pub fn new(inner: M, pipeline: Arc<MiddlewarePipeline>) -> Self {
Self { inner, pipeline }
}
/// Access the pipeline.
pub fn pipeline(&self) -> &Arc<MiddlewarePipeline> {
&self.pipeline
}
/// Access the wrapped inner model.
pub fn inner(&self) -> &M {
&self.inner
}
}
/// Innermost handler: calls the real model.
struct BaseHandler<'a, M: ChatModel> {
model: &'a M,
/// Error from the most recent inner call (cleared at the start of each
/// call, so a successful retry clears a previous failure).
last_error: Mutex<Option<RvAgentError>>,
}
#[async_trait]
impl<M: ChatModel> ModelHandler for BaseHandler<'_, M> {
async fn call(&self, request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
*self.last_error.lock().unwrap() = None;
let ModelRequest {
system_message,
mut messages,
tools,
..
} = request;
if let Some(sys) = system_message {
messages.insert(0, Message::system(sys));
}
match self.model.complete(&messages, &tools).await {
Ok(message) => {
let tool_calls = match &message {
Message::Ai(ai) => ai.tool_calls.clone(),
_ => Vec::new(),
};
ModelResponse {
message,
tool_calls,
usage: None,
}
}
Err(e) => {
// Feed the failure into the chain as an "error: …" response so
// retry-style middleware can react; remember it for propagation.
let resp = ModelResponse::text(format!("error: {e}"));
*self.last_error.lock().unwrap() = Some(e);
resp
}
}
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl<M: ChatModel> ChatModel for PipelineModel<M> {
async fn complete(
&self,
messages: &[Message],
tools: &[ToolDefinition],
) -> CoreResult<Message> {
// Hoist a leading system message into the request's system slot.
let mut msgs = messages.to_vec();
let system_message = match msgs.first() {
Some(Message::System(sys)) => {
let content = sys.content.clone();
msgs.remove(0);
Some(content)
}
_ => None,
};
let mut request = ModelRequest::new(msgs).with_system(system_message);
request.tools = tools.to_vec();
let request = self.pipeline.run_modify_request(request);
let handler = BaseHandler {
model: &self.inner,
last_error: Mutex::new(None),
};
let response = self.pipeline.run_wrap_model_call(request, &handler).await;
// If the final inner call failed, propagate the original error.
if let Some(err) = handler.last_error.lock().unwrap().take() {
return Err(err);
}
// Reattach the (possibly middleware-filtered) tool calls to the message.
let ModelResponse {
mut message,
tool_calls,
..
} = response;
if let Message::Ai(ai) = &mut message {
ai.tool_calls = tool_calls;
}
Ok(message)
}
async fn stream(
&self,
messages: &[Message],
tools: &[ToolDefinition],
) -> CoreResult<Vec<Message>> {
let msg = self.complete(messages, tools).await?;
Ok(vec![msg])
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::{append_to_system_message, Middleware};
use rvagent_core::messages::ToolCall;
struct EchoModel;
#[async_trait]
impl ChatModel for EchoModel {
async fn complete(
&self,
messages: &[Message],
_tools: &[ToolDefinition],
) -> CoreResult<Message> {
// Echo the system message content (if any) for inspection.
let sys = messages
.iter()
.find_map(|m| match m {
Message::System(s) => Some(s.content.clone()),
_ => None,
})
.unwrap_or_default();
Ok(Message::ai(format!("sys:[{sys}] n={}", messages.len())))
}
async fn stream(
&self,
messages: &[Message],
tools: &[ToolDefinition],
) -> CoreResult<Vec<Message>> {
Ok(vec![self.complete(messages, tools).await?])
}
}
struct FailingModel;
#[async_trait]
impl ChatModel for FailingModel {
async fn complete(
&self,
_messages: &[Message],
_tools: &[ToolDefinition],
) -> CoreResult<Message> {
Err(RvAgentError::model("boom"))
}
async fn stream(
&self,
messages: &[Message],
tools: &[ToolDefinition],
) -> CoreResult<Vec<Message>> {
Ok(vec![self.complete(messages, tools).await?])
}
}
struct AppendMw(&'static str);
#[async_trait]
impl Middleware for AppendMw {
fn name(&self) -> &str {
"append"
}
async fn wrap_model_call(
&self,
request: ModelRequest,
handler: &dyn ModelHandler,
) -> ModelResponse {
let sys = append_to_system_message(&request.system_message, self.0);
handler.call(request.with_system(sys)).await
}
}
/// Middleware that drops all tool calls (HITL-style filtering).
struct DropToolCalls;
#[async_trait]
impl Middleware for DropToolCalls {
fn name(&self) -> &str {
"drop_tool_calls"
}
async fn wrap_model_call(
&self,
request: ModelRequest,
handler: &dyn ModelHandler,
) -> ModelResponse {
let mut response = handler.call(request).await;
response.tool_calls.clear();
response
}
}
struct ToolCallingModel;
#[async_trait]
impl ChatModel for ToolCallingModel {
async fn complete(
&self,
_messages: &[Message],
_tools: &[ToolDefinition],
) -> CoreResult<Message> {
Ok(Message::ai_with_tools(
"calling",
vec![ToolCall {
id: "tc1".into(),
name: "ls".into(),
args: serde_json::json!({}),
}],
))
}
async fn stream(
&self,
messages: &[Message],
tools: &[ToolDefinition],
) -> CoreResult<Vec<Message>> {
Ok(vec![self.complete(messages, tools).await?])
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_pipeline_model_appends_system() {
let pipeline = Arc::new(MiddlewarePipeline::new(vec![Box::new(AppendMw("EXTRA"))]));
let model = PipelineModel::new(EchoModel, pipeline);
let messages = vec![Message::system("base"), Message::human("hi")];
let out = model.complete(&messages, &[]).await.unwrap();
assert!(out.content().contains("base"));
assert!(out.content().contains("EXTRA"));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_pipeline_model_propagates_errors() {
let pipeline = Arc::new(MiddlewarePipeline::empty());
let model = PipelineModel::new(FailingModel, pipeline);
let err = model.complete(&[Message::human("hi")], &[]).await;
assert!(err.is_err());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_pipeline_model_middleware_filters_tool_calls() {
let pipeline = Arc::new(MiddlewarePipeline::new(vec![Box::new(DropToolCalls)]));
let model = PipelineModel::new(ToolCallingModel, pipeline);
let out = model.complete(&[Message::human("hi")], &[]).await.unwrap();
assert!(!out.has_tool_calls(), "middleware must filter tool calls");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_pipeline_model_empty_pipeline_passthrough() {
let pipeline = Arc::new(MiddlewarePipeline::empty());
let model = PipelineModel::new(ToolCallingModel, pipeline);
let out = model.complete(&[Message::human("hi")], &[]).await.unwrap();
assert!(out.has_tool_calls());
}
}

View file

@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn test_modify_request_with_system() {
let mw = PromptCachingMiddleware::new();
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::user("hi")])
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::human("hi")])
.with_system(Some("You are helpful.".into()));
let modified = mw.modify_request(request);
@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn test_modify_request_without_system() {
let mw = PromptCachingMiddleware::new();
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::user("hi")]);
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::human("hi")]);
let modified = mw.modify_request(request);
assert!(!modified.cache_control.contains_key("system"));
@ -93,11 +93,11 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn test_modify_request_with_tools() {
let mw = PromptCachingMiddleware::new();
let mut request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::user("hi")]);
let mut request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::human("hi")]);
request.tools.push(crate::ToolDefinition {
name: "test".into(),
description: "test tool".into(),
parameters: serde_json::json!({}),
input_schema: serde_json::json!({}),
});
let modified = mw.modify_request(request);

View file

@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
//! a transient error (e.g., content starts with `"error:"` or is empty).
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering};
use std::thread;
use std::time::Duration;
use async_trait::async_trait;
@ -13,13 +12,23 @@ use crate::{Middleware, ModelHandler, ModelRequest, ModelResponse};
/// Determines whether a `ModelResponse` represents a transient error worth retrying.
///
/// Heuristic: the response is considered an error if its content is empty or
/// starts with the prefix `"error:"` (case-insensitive).
/// Heuristic: the response is considered an error if its content starts with
/// the prefix `"error:"` (case-insensitive), or if it is completely empty —
/// no text AND no tool calls. A response with tool calls but no text is a
/// perfectly valid tool-use turn and must never be retried.
fn is_transient_error(response: &ModelResponse) -> bool {
let content = &response.message.content;
content.is_empty() || content.to_ascii_lowercase().starts_with("error:")
let content = response.content();
(content.is_empty() && response.tool_calls.is_empty())
|| content.to_ascii_lowercase().starts_with("error:")
}
/// Upper bound on a single backoff delay (1 minute).
///
/// Doubling is unbounded by nature, so a caller-supplied `max_retries` of 63
/// yields a sleep of ~584 million years — indistinguishable from a hang. The
/// cap is what makes the backoff recoverable rather than terminal.
pub const MAX_BACKOFF_MS: u64 = 60_000;
/// Retry middleware that wraps model calls with exponential backoff.
///
/// # Configuration
@ -29,7 +38,8 @@ fn is_transient_error(response: &ModelResponse) -> bool {
/// | `max_retries` | 3 | Maximum number of retry attempts |
/// | `initial_delay_ms` | 100 | Delay before the first retry (ms) |
///
/// The delay doubles after each attempt: `initial_delay_ms * 2^attempt`.
/// The delay doubles after each attempt: `initial_delay_ms * 2^attempt`,
/// capped at [`MAX_BACKOFF_MS`].
///
/// # Metrics
///
@ -65,6 +75,16 @@ impl RetryMiddleware {
self.total_retries.load(Ordering::Relaxed)
}
/// Backoff delay before retry `attempt` (0-based), capped and overflow-safe.
///
/// Saturating arithmetic keeps `2^attempt` from panicking in debug builds;
/// the cap is what keeps the resulting sleep finite in practice.
fn backoff_ms(&self, attempt: u32) -> u64 {
self.initial_delay_ms
.saturating_mul(2u64.saturating_pow(attempt))
.min(MAX_BACKOFF_MS)
}
/// Reset all counters to zero.
pub fn reset_metrics(&self) {
self.retry_count.store(0, Ordering::Relaxed);
@ -84,8 +104,12 @@ impl Middleware for RetryMiddleware {
"retry"
}
fn wrap_model_call(&self, request: ModelRequest, handler: &dyn ModelHandler) -> ModelResponse {
let mut response = handler.call(request.clone());
async fn wrap_model_call(
&self,
request: ModelRequest,
handler: &dyn ModelHandler,
) -> ModelResponse {
let mut response = handler.call(request.clone()).await;
if !is_transient_error(&response) {
return response;
@ -95,12 +119,12 @@ impl Middleware for RetryMiddleware {
self.retry_count.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
for attempt in 0..self.max_retries {
let delay_ms = self.initial_delay_ms * 2u64.pow(attempt);
thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(delay_ms));
let delay_ms = self.backoff_ms(attempt);
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(delay_ms)).await;
self.total_retries.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
response = handler.call(request.clone());
response = handler.call(request.clone()).await;
if !is_transient_error(&response) {
return response;
@ -122,6 +146,25 @@ mod tests {
use crate::{Message, ModelRequest, ModelResponse};
use std::sync::atomic::AtomicU32;
#[test]
fn test_backoff_doubles_then_caps() {
let mw = RetryMiddleware::new(3, 100);
assert_eq!(mw.backoff_ms(0), 100);
assert_eq!(mw.backoff_ms(1), 200);
assert_eq!(mw.backoff_ms(2), 400);
// Doubling past the cap flattens instead of running away.
assert_eq!(mw.backoff_ms(20), MAX_BACKOFF_MS);
}
#[test]
fn test_backoff_survives_absurd_attempt_counts() {
// attempt 63 overflows `2^attempt` and, uncapped, sleeps ~584M years.
let mw = RetryMiddleware::new(u32::MAX, u64::MAX);
for attempt in [31u32, 63, 64, u32::MAX] {
assert_eq!(mw.backoff_ms(attempt), MAX_BACKOFF_MS, "attempt {attempt}");
}
}
/// A handler that fails `n` times then succeeds.
struct FailNHandler {
remaining_failures: AtomicU32,
@ -135,8 +178,9 @@ mod tests {
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl ModelHandler for FailNHandler {
fn call(&self, _request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
async fn call(&self, _request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
let remaining = self.remaining_failures.load(Ordering::SeqCst);
if remaining > 0 {
self.remaining_failures.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
@ -149,53 +193,57 @@ mod tests {
/// A handler that always succeeds.
struct SuccessHandler;
#[async_trait]
impl ModelHandler for SuccessHandler {
fn call(&self, _request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
async fn call(&self, _request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
ModelResponse::text("ok")
}
}
/// A handler that always fails with an error response.
struct AlwaysFailHandler;
#[async_trait]
impl ModelHandler for AlwaysFailHandler {
fn call(&self, _request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
async fn call(&self, _request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
ModelResponse::text("error: permanent failure")
}
}
fn make_request() -> ModelRequest {
ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::user("hello")])
ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::human("hello")])
}
#[test]
fn test_no_retry_on_success() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_no_retry_on_success() {
let mw = RetryMiddleware::default();
let handler = SuccessHandler;
let resp = mw.wrap_model_call(make_request(), &handler);
let resp = mw.wrap_model_call(make_request(), &handler).await;
assert_eq!(resp.message.content, "ok");
assert_eq!(resp.content(), "ok");
assert_eq!(mw.retry_count(), 0);
assert_eq!(mw.total_retries(), 0);
}
#[test]
fn test_retry_succeeds_after_failures() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_retry_succeeds_after_failures() {
let mw = RetryMiddleware::new(3, 1); // 1ms delay for fast tests
let handler = FailNHandler::new(2); // fails twice, then succeeds
let resp = mw.wrap_model_call(make_request(), &handler);
let resp = mw.wrap_model_call(make_request(), &handler).await;
assert_eq!(resp.message.content, "success");
assert_eq!(resp.content(), "success");
assert_eq!(mw.retry_count(), 1);
assert_eq!(mw.total_retries(), 2);
}
#[test]
fn test_retries_exhausted() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_retries_exhausted() {
let mw = RetryMiddleware::new(2, 1);
let handler = AlwaysFailHandler;
let resp = mw.wrap_model_call(make_request(), &handler);
let resp = mw.wrap_model_call(make_request(), &handler).await;
assert!(resp.message.content.starts_with("error:"));
assert!(resp.content().starts_with("error:"));
assert_eq!(mw.retry_count(), 1);
assert_eq!(mw.total_retries(), 2);
}
@ -207,11 +255,11 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(mw.initial_delay_ms, 100);
}
#[test]
fn test_reset_metrics() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_reset_metrics() {
let mw = RetryMiddleware::new(3, 1);
let handler = FailNHandler::new(1);
let _ = mw.wrap_model_call(make_request(), &handler);
let _ = mw.wrap_model_call(make_request(), &handler).await;
assert!(mw.retry_count() > 0);
mw.reset_metrics();
@ -237,47 +285,59 @@ mod tests {
assert!(is_transient_error(&resp));
}
#[test]
fn test_is_transient_error_empty_content_with_tool_calls() {
// A tool-use turn often has no text content — it is NOT an error.
let mut resp = ModelResponse::text("");
resp.tool_calls = vec![crate::ToolCall {
id: "tc1".into(),
name: "read_file".into(),
args: serde_json::json!({}),
}];
assert!(!is_transient_error(&resp));
}
#[test]
fn test_is_transient_error_normal_response() {
let resp = ModelResponse::text("Here is the answer.");
assert!(!is_transient_error(&resp));
}
#[test]
fn test_retry_first_attempt_succeeds() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_retry_first_attempt_succeeds() {
// Edge case: handler fails on first call but succeeds on first retry (attempt 0).
let mw = RetryMiddleware::new(5, 1);
let handler = FailNHandler::new(1);
let resp = mw.wrap_model_call(make_request(), &handler);
let resp = mw.wrap_model_call(make_request(), &handler).await;
assert_eq!(resp.message.content, "success");
assert_eq!(resp.content(), "success");
assert_eq!(mw.retry_count(), 1);
assert_eq!(mw.total_retries(), 1);
}
#[test]
fn test_zero_max_retries() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_zero_max_retries() {
// With max_retries = 0, the initial call is made but no retries happen.
let mw = RetryMiddleware::new(0, 1);
let handler = AlwaysFailHandler;
let resp = mw.wrap_model_call(make_request(), &handler);
let resp = mw.wrap_model_call(make_request(), &handler).await;
assert!(resp.message.content.starts_with("error:"));
assert!(resp.content().starts_with("error:"));
assert_eq!(mw.retry_count(), 1);
assert_eq!(mw.total_retries(), 0);
}
#[test]
fn test_metrics_accumulate_across_calls() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_metrics_accumulate_across_calls() {
let mw = RetryMiddleware::new(3, 1);
// First call: 1 failure then success
let handler1 = FailNHandler::new(1);
let _ = mw.wrap_model_call(make_request(), &handler1);
let _ = mw.wrap_model_call(make_request(), &handler1).await;
// Second call: 2 failures then success
let handler2 = FailNHandler::new(2);
let _ = mw.wrap_model_call(make_request(), &handler2);
let _ = mw.wrap_model_call(make_request(), &handler2).await;
assert_eq!(mw.retry_count(), 2); // two calls needed retries
assert_eq!(mw.total_retries(), 3); // 1 + 2 retries

View file

@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ struct RvfToolAdapter {
parameters_schema: serde_json::Value,
}
#[async_trait]
impl Tool for RvfToolAdapter {
fn name(&self) -> &str {
&self.name
@ -124,11 +125,11 @@ impl Tool for RvfToolAdapter {
&self.description
}
fn parameters_schema(&self) -> serde_json::Value {
fn input_schema(&self) -> serde_json::Value {
self.parameters_schema.clone()
}
fn invoke(&self, args: serde_json::Value) -> Result<String, String> {
async fn invoke(&self, args: serde_json::Value) -> Result<String, String> {
// Without rvf-runtime, return a stub response indicating the tool is available
// but actual execution requires the rvf-compat feature.
Ok(format!(
@ -148,7 +149,7 @@ impl Middleware for RvfManifestMiddleware {
"rvf_manifest"
}
fn before_agent(
async fn before_agent(
&self,
_state: &AgentState,
_runtime: &Runtime,
@ -272,14 +273,16 @@ mod tests {
assert!(tools.iter().any(|t| t.name() == "rvf:format"));
}
#[test]
fn test_tool_invoke() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_tool_invoke() {
let mw = RvfManifestMiddleware::new(sample_config());
mw.mount_package(sample_manifest());
let tools = mw.tools();
let lint = tools.iter().find(|t| t.name() == "rvf:lint").unwrap();
let result = lint.invoke(serde_json::json!({"path": "src/main.rs"}));
let result = lint
.invoke(serde_json::json!({"path": "src/main.rs"}))
.await;
assert!(result.is_ok());
assert!(result.unwrap().contains("rvf:lint"));
}
@ -298,8 +301,8 @@ mod tests {
assert!(tools.is_empty());
}
#[test]
fn test_before_agent_injects_state() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_before_agent_injects_state() {
let mw = RvfManifestMiddleware::new(sample_config());
mw.mount_package(sample_manifest());
@ -307,7 +310,7 @@ mod tests {
let runtime = Runtime::new();
let config = RunnableConfig::default();
let update = mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config);
let update = mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
assert!(update.is_some());
let update = update.unwrap();
@ -317,15 +320,15 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(arr[0]["package"], "test-pkg");
}
#[test]
fn test_before_agent_empty_table() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_before_agent_empty_table() {
let mw = RvfManifestMiddleware::new(sample_config());
let state = AgentState::default();
let runtime = Runtime::new();
let config = RunnableConfig::default();
let update = mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config);
let update = mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
assert!(update.is_none());
}

View file

@ -247,13 +247,13 @@ impl Middleware for SkillsMiddleware {
"skills"
}
fn before_agent(
async fn before_agent(
&self,
state: &AgentState,
_runtime: &Runtime,
_config: &RunnableConfig,
) -> Option<AgentStateUpdate> {
if state.extensions.contains_key("skills_metadata") {
if crate::json_extension(state, "skills_metadata").is_some() {
return None;
}
@ -271,7 +271,11 @@ impl Middleware for SkillsMiddleware {
Some(update)
}
fn wrap_model_call(&self, request: ModelRequest, handler: &dyn ModelHandler) -> ModelResponse {
async fn wrap_model_call(
&self,
request: ModelRequest,
handler: &dyn ModelHandler,
) -> ModelResponse {
let skills: Vec<SkillMetadata> = request
.extensions
.get("skills_metadata")
@ -279,7 +283,7 @@ impl Middleware for SkillsMiddleware {
.unwrap_or_default();
if skills.is_empty() {
return handler.call(request);
return handler.call(request).await;
}
let locations = self.format_skills_locations();
@ -289,7 +293,7 @@ impl Middleware for SkillsMiddleware {
.replace("{skills_list}", &skills_list);
let new_system = crate::append_to_system_message(&request.system_message, &section);
handler.call(request.with_system(new_system))
handler.call(request.with_system(new_system)).await
}
}
@ -400,16 +404,14 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(mw.name(), "skills");
}
#[test]
fn test_before_agent_skip_if_loaded() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_before_agent_skip_if_loaded() {
let mw = SkillsMiddleware::new(vec![]);
let mut state = AgentState::default();
state
.extensions
.insert("skills_metadata".into(), serde_json::json!([]));
state.set_extension("skills_metadata", serde_json::json!([]));
let runtime = Runtime::new();
let config = RunnableConfig::default();
assert!(mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).is_none());
assert!(mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await.is_none());
}
#[test]

View file

@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ use ruvector_sona::{
};
use crate::{
AgentState, AgentStateUpdate, AsyncModelHandler, Middleware, ModelHandler, ModelRequest,
ModelResponse, Role, RunnableConfig, Runtime,
AgentState, AgentStateUpdate, Message, Middleware, ModelHandler, ModelRequest, ModelResponse,
RunnableConfig, Runtime,
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use parking_lot::RwLock;
@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ fn estimate_quality(_request: &ModelRequest, response: &ModelResponse) -> f32 {
let mut quality = 0.5f32;
// Longer responses often indicate more thorough answers
let response_len = response.message.content.len();
let response_len = response.content().len();
if response_len > 100 {
quality += 0.1;
}
@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ fn estimate_quality(_request: &ModelRequest, response: &ModelResponse) -> f32 {
}
// Check for error indicators
let content_lower = response.message.content.to_lowercase();
let content_lower = response.content().to_lowercase();
if content_lower.contains("error") || content_lower.contains("failed") {
quality -= 0.2;
}
@ -309,8 +309,8 @@ impl SonaState {
let query_text = request
.messages
.iter()
.filter(|m| matches!(m.role, Role::User))
.map(|m| m.content.as_str())
.filter(|m| matches!(m, Message::Human(_)))
.map(|m| m.content())
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join(" ");
@ -321,8 +321,7 @@ impl SonaState {
let mut builder = TrajectoryBuilder::new(id, query_embedding);
// Add response as a step
let response_embedding =
generate_embedding(&response.message.content, self.config.embedding_dim);
let response_embedding = generate_embedding(response.content(), self.config.embedding_dim);
let quality = estimate_quality(request, response);
builder.add_step(response_embedding, vec![], quality);
@ -630,7 +629,7 @@ impl Middleware for SonaMiddleware {
"sona"
}
fn before_agent(
async fn before_agent(
&self,
state: &AgentState,
_runtime: &Runtime,
@ -653,10 +652,10 @@ impl Middleware for SonaMiddleware {
.messages
.iter()
.rev()
.find(|m| matches!(m.role, Role::User));
.find(|m| matches!(m, Message::Human(_)));
if let Some(msg) = last_user_message {
let patterns = self.state.read().find_similar_patterns(&msg.content);
let patterns = self.state.read().find_similar_patterns(msg.content());
if !patterns.is_empty() {
// Store patterns in extensions for potential use
@ -674,29 +673,10 @@ impl Middleware for SonaMiddleware {
None
}
fn wrap_model_call(&self, request: ModelRequest, handler: &dyn ModelHandler) -> ModelResponse {
if !self.is_enabled() {
return handler.call(request);
}
let start = Instant::now();
// Call the underlying handler
let response = handler.call(request.clone());
// Record trajectory (Loop A - Instant Learning)
let latency = start.elapsed();
self.state
.read()
.record_trajectory(&request, &response, latency);
response
}
async fn awrap_model_call(
async fn wrap_model_call(
&self,
request: ModelRequest,
handler: &dyn AsyncModelHandler,
handler: &dyn ModelHandler,
) -> ModelResponse {
if !self.is_enabled() {
return handler.call(request).await;
@ -781,7 +761,7 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn test_estimate_quality() {
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::user("test")]);
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::human("test")]);
// Short response
let short_response = ModelResponse::text("ok");
@ -835,21 +815,23 @@ mod tests {
}
struct TestHandler;
#[async_trait]
impl ModelHandler for TestHandler {
fn call(&self, _request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
async fn call(&self, _request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
ModelResponse::text("Test response with some content for quality estimation")
}
}
#[test]
fn test_wrap_model_call() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_wrap_model_call() {
let middleware = SonaMiddleware::default_config();
let handler = TestHandler;
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::user("Hello")]);
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::human("Hello")]);
let response = middleware.wrap_model_call(request, &handler);
let response = middleware.wrap_model_call(request, &handler).await;
assert!(response.message.content.contains("Test response"));
assert!(response.content().contains("Test response"));
#[cfg(feature = "sona")]
{
@ -858,17 +840,17 @@ mod tests {
}
}
#[test]
fn test_wrap_model_call_disabled() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_wrap_model_call_disabled() {
let middleware = SonaMiddleware::default_config();
middleware.set_enabled(false);
let handler = TestHandler;
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::user("Hello")]);
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::human("Hello")]);
let response = middleware.wrap_model_call(request, &handler);
let response = middleware.wrap_model_call(request, &handler).await;
assert!(response.message.content.contains("Test response"));
assert!(response.content().contains("Test response"));
// No recording when disabled
let stats = middleware.stats();

View file

@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ impl Middleware for SubAgentMiddleware {
"subagent"
}
fn before_agent(
async fn before_agent(
&self,
_state: &AgentState,
_runtime: &Runtime,
@ -77,14 +77,18 @@ impl Middleware for SubAgentMiddleware {
Some(update)
}
fn wrap_model_call(&self, request: ModelRequest, handler: &dyn ModelHandler) -> ModelResponse {
async fn wrap_model_call(
&self,
request: ModelRequest,
handler: &dyn ModelHandler,
) -> ModelResponse {
if self.specs.is_empty() {
return handler.call(request);
return handler.call(request).await;
}
let descriptions = self.format_subagent_descriptions();
let new_system = crate::append_to_system_message(&request.system_message, &descriptions);
handler.call(request.with_system(new_system))
handler.call(request.with_system(new_system)).await
}
fn tools(&self) -> Vec<Box<dyn Tool>> {
@ -95,6 +99,7 @@ impl Middleware for SubAgentMiddleware {
/// Tool for spawning subagents.
struct TaskTool;
#[async_trait]
impl Tool for TaskTool {
fn name(&self) -> &str {
"task"
@ -104,7 +109,7 @@ impl Tool for TaskTool {
"Spawn a subagent to handle a specific task. The subagent runs independently and returns its result."
}
fn parameters_schema(&self) -> serde_json::Value {
fn input_schema(&self) -> serde_json::Value {
serde_json::json!({
"type": "object",
"properties": {
@ -125,7 +130,7 @@ impl Tool for TaskTool {
})
}
fn invoke(&self, _args: serde_json::Value) -> Result<String, String> {
async fn invoke(&self, _args: serde_json::Value) -> Result<String, String> {
Err("task tool must be invoked through the agent runtime".into())
}
}
@ -148,17 +153,17 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(tools[0].name(), "task");
}
#[test]
fn test_before_agent_no_specs() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_before_agent_no_specs() {
let mw = SubAgentMiddleware::new();
let state = AgentState::default();
let runtime = Runtime::new();
let config = RunnableConfig::default();
assert!(mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).is_none());
assert!(mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await.is_none());
}
#[test]
fn test_before_agent_with_specs() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_before_agent_with_specs() {
let specs = vec![SubAgentSpec {
name: "coder".into(),
description: "A coding agent".into(),
@ -170,7 +175,7 @@ mod tests {
let state = AgentState::default();
let runtime = Runtime::new();
let config = RunnableConfig::default();
let update = mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config);
let update = mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
assert!(update.is_some());
assert!(update.unwrap().extensions.contains_key("subagent_specs"));
}
@ -202,7 +207,7 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn test_task_tool_schema() {
let tool = TaskTool;
let schema = tool.parameters_schema();
let schema = tool.input_schema();
assert_eq!(schema["type"], "object");
let required = schema["required"].as_array().unwrap();
assert!(required.contains(&serde_json::json!("description")));

View file

@ -4,7 +4,21 @@
use async_trait::async_trait;
use uuid::Uuid;
use crate::{Message, Middleware, ModelHandler, ModelRequest, ModelResponse, Role};
use crate::{Message, Middleware, ModelHandler, ModelRequest, ModelResponse};
/// Bytes of each user message kept in a compaction summary preview.
const PREVIEW_BYTES: usize = 100;
/// Largest index `<= max` that starts a character, so slicing there can never
/// split a multi-byte sequence. Conversation content is arbitrary user text,
/// so a byte-index slice is a panic waiting for the first non-ASCII message.
fn floor_char_boundary(s: &str, max: usize) -> usize {
let mut n = max.min(s.len());
while n > 0 && !s.is_char_boundary(n) {
n -= 1;
}
n
}
/// Trigger configuration for auto-compaction.
pub enum TriggerConfig {
@ -44,7 +58,7 @@ impl SummarizationMiddleware {
fn estimate_tokens(messages: &[Message]) -> u64 {
messages
.iter()
.map(|m| (m.content.len() as u64) / 4 + 1)
.map(|m| (m.content().len() as u64) / 4 + 1)
.sum()
}
@ -69,11 +83,14 @@ impl SummarizationMiddleware {
));
for msg in messages {
if msg.role == Role::User {
let preview = if msg.content.len() > 100 {
format!("{}...", &msg.content[..100])
if let Message::Human(h) = msg {
let preview = if h.content.len() > PREVIEW_BYTES {
format!(
"{}...",
&h.content[..floor_char_boundary(&h.content, PREVIEW_BYTES)]
)
} else {
msg.content.clone()
h.content.clone()
};
summary.push_str(&format!("- User: {}\n", preview));
}
@ -91,13 +108,13 @@ impl SummarizationMiddleware {
fn format_for_offload(messages: &[Message]) -> String {
let mut out = String::new();
for msg in messages {
let role = match msg.role {
Role::System => "system",
Role::User => "user",
Role::Assistant => "assistant",
Role::Tool => "tool",
let role = match msg {
Message::System(_) => "system",
Message::Human(_) => "user",
Message::Ai(_) => "assistant",
Message::Tool(_) => "tool",
};
out.push_str(&format!("## {}\n\n{}\n\n---\n\n", role, msg.content));
out.push_str(&format!("## {}\n\n{}\n\n---\n\n", role, msg.content()));
}
out
}
@ -109,7 +126,11 @@ impl Middleware for SummarizationMiddleware {
"summarization"
}
fn wrap_model_call(&self, request: ModelRequest, handler: &dyn ModelHandler) -> ModelResponse {
async fn wrap_model_call(
&self,
request: ModelRequest,
handler: &dyn ModelHandler,
) -> ModelResponse {
let token_count = Self::estimate_tokens(&request.messages);
let threshold = self.threshold();
@ -129,9 +150,9 @@ impl Middleware for SummarizationMiddleware {
let mut compacted = vec![summary];
compacted.extend_from_slice(to_keep);
handler.call(request.with_messages(compacted))
handler.call(request.with_messages(compacted)).await
} else {
handler.call(request)
handler.call(request).await
}
}
}
@ -140,9 +161,13 @@ impl Middleware for SummarizationMiddleware {
mod tests {
use super::*;
use async_trait::async_trait;
struct PassthroughHandler;
#[async_trait]
impl ModelHandler for PassthroughHandler {
fn call(&self, request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
async fn call(&self, request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
ModelResponse::text(format!("messages: {}", request.messages.len()))
}
}
@ -162,7 +187,7 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn test_estimate_tokens() {
let messages = vec![Message::user("hello world")];
let messages = vec![Message::human("hello world")];
let tokens = SummarizationMiddleware::estimate_tokens(&messages);
assert!(tokens > 0);
}
@ -180,31 +205,30 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(mw.keep_count(1), 1);
}
#[test]
fn test_no_compaction_below_threshold() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_no_compaction_below_threshold() {
let mw = SummarizationMiddleware::new(100_000, 0.85, 0.10);
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::user("short")]);
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::human("short")]);
let handler = PassthroughHandler;
let response = mw.wrap_model_call(request, &handler);
assert!(response.message.content.contains("messages: 1"));
let response = mw.wrap_model_call(request, &handler).await;
assert!(response.content().contains("messages: 1"));
}
#[test]
fn test_compaction_above_threshold() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_compaction_above_threshold() {
let mw = SummarizationMiddleware::new(10, 0.5, 0.5);
let mut messages = Vec::new();
for i in 0..20 {
messages.push(Message::user(format!(
messages.push(Message::human(format!(
"message {} with enough content to trigger compaction when counted",
i
)));
}
let request = ModelRequest::new(messages);
let handler = PassthroughHandler;
let response = mw.wrap_model_call(request, &handler);
let response = mw.wrap_model_call(request, &handler).await;
let count: usize = response
.message
.content
.content()
.strip_prefix("messages: ")
.unwrap()
.parse()
@ -224,18 +248,42 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn test_summarize() {
let messages = vec![
Message::user("What is Rust?"),
Message::assistant("Rust is a systems programming language."),
Message::human("What is Rust?"),
Message::ai("Rust is a systems programming language."),
];
let summary = SummarizationMiddleware::summarize(&messages);
assert_eq!(summary.role, Role::System);
assert!(summary.content.contains("2 messages"));
assert!(summary.content.contains("What is Rust?"));
assert!(matches!(summary, Message::System(_)));
assert!(summary.content().contains("2 messages"));
assert!(summary.content().contains("What is Rust?"));
}
#[test]
fn test_summarize_does_not_split_multibyte_chars() {
// Byte 100 lands mid-character for a 3-byte-per-char message, which a
// plain `&content[..100]` would panic on.
let content = "".repeat(200);
let messages = vec![Message::human(content.clone())];
let summary = SummarizationMiddleware::summarize(&messages);
let text = summary.content().to_string();
assert!(text.contains("..."));
// 100 / 3 = 33 whole characters fit.
assert!(text.contains(&"".repeat(33)));
assert!(!text.contains(&"".repeat(34)));
}
#[test]
fn test_summarize_preview_boundary_cases() {
for len in [98usize, 99, 100, 101, 150] {
let messages = vec![Message::human("é".repeat(len))];
// The assertion is that this does not panic and stays valid UTF-8.
let summary = SummarizationMiddleware::summarize(&messages);
assert!(summary.content().contains("User:"));
}
}
#[test]
fn test_format_for_offload() {
let messages = vec![Message::user("test content")];
let messages = vec![Message::human("test content")];
let offloaded = SummarizationMiddleware::format_for_offload(&messages);
assert!(offloaded.contains("## user"));
assert!(offloaded.contains("test content"));

View file

@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ impl Middleware for TodoListMiddleware {
"todolist"
}
fn before_agent(
async fn before_agent(
&self,
state: &AgentState,
_runtime: &Runtime,
@ -67,8 +67,8 @@ fn format_todos(todos: &[TodoItem]) -> String {
TodoStatus::Completed => "completed",
};
out.push_str(&format!(
" <todo id=\"{}\" status=\"{}\">{}</todo>\n",
todo.id, status_str, todo.content
" <todo status=\"{}\">{}</todo>\n",
status_str, todo.content
));
}
out.push_str("</todos>");
@ -78,16 +78,17 @@ fn format_todos(todos: &[TodoItem]) -> String {
/// Tool for writing/updating todo items.
struct WriteTodosTool;
#[async_trait]
impl Tool for WriteTodosTool {
fn name(&self) -> &str {
"write_todos"
}
fn description(&self) -> &str {
"Create or update the todo list. Provide a complete list of todo items with id, content, and status (pending, in_progress, completed)."
"Create or update the todo list. Provide a complete list of todo items with content, status (pending, in_progress, completed), and optional active_form."
}
fn parameters_schema(&self) -> serde_json::Value {
fn input_schema(&self) -> serde_json::Value {
serde_json::json!({
"type": "object",
"properties": {
@ -96,14 +97,14 @@ impl Tool for WriteTodosTool {
"items": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"id": { "type": "string" },
"content": { "type": "string" },
"status": {
"type": "string",
"enum": ["pending", "in_progress", "completed"]
}
},
"active_form": { "type": "string" }
},
"required": ["id", "content", "status"]
"required": ["content", "status"]
}
}
},
@ -111,7 +112,7 @@ impl Tool for WriteTodosTool {
})
}
fn invoke(&self, args: serde_json::Value) -> Result<String, String> {
async fn invoke(&self, args: serde_json::Value) -> Result<String, String> {
let todos = args
.get("todos")
.and_then(|v| v.as_array())
@ -120,10 +121,6 @@ impl Tool for WriteTodosTool {
let count = todos.len();
// Validate each item
for item in todos {
let _id = item
.get("id")
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.ok_or("each todo must have an 'id' string")?;
let _content = item
.get("content")
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
@ -146,6 +143,14 @@ impl Tool for WriteTodosTool {
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn todo(content: &str, status: TodoStatus) -> TodoItem {
TodoItem {
content: content.into(),
status,
active_form: String::new(),
}
}
#[test]
fn test_format_todos_empty() {
let result = format_todos(&[]);
@ -155,16 +160,8 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn test_format_todos() {
let todos = vec![
TodoItem {
id: "1".into(),
content: "Do something".into(),
status: TodoStatus::Pending,
},
TodoItem {
id: "2".into(),
content: "Done".into(),
status: TodoStatus::Completed,
},
todo("Do something", TodoStatus::Pending),
todo("Done", TodoStatus::Completed),
];
let result = format_todos(&todos);
assert!(result.contains("status=\"pending\""));
@ -172,27 +169,23 @@ mod tests {
assert!(result.contains("Do something"));
}
#[test]
fn test_before_agent_empty_todos() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_before_agent_empty_todos() {
let mw = TodoListMiddleware::new();
let state = AgentState::default();
let runtime = Runtime::new();
let config = RunnableConfig::default();
assert!(mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).is_none());
assert!(mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await.is_none());
}
#[test]
fn test_before_agent_with_todos() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_before_agent_with_todos() {
let mw = TodoListMiddleware::new();
let mut state = AgentState::default();
state.todos.push(TodoItem {
id: "1".into(),
content: "Test task".into(),
status: TodoStatus::InProgress,
});
state.push_todo(todo("Test task", TodoStatus::InProgress));
let runtime = Runtime::new();
let config = RunnableConfig::default();
let update = mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config);
let update = mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
assert!(update.is_some());
let update = update.unwrap();
assert!(update.extensions.contains_key("todo_context"));
@ -204,37 +197,37 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(tool.name(), "write_todos");
}
#[test]
fn test_write_todos_invoke_valid() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_write_todos_invoke_valid() {
let tool = WriteTodosTool;
let args = serde_json::json!({
"todos": [
{"id": "1", "content": "task 1", "status": "pending"},
{"id": "2", "content": "task 2", "status": "completed"}
{"content": "task 1", "status": "pending"},
{"content": "task 2", "status": "completed"}
]
});
let result = tool.invoke(args);
let result = tool.invoke(args).await;
assert!(result.is_ok());
assert!(result.unwrap().contains("2 todo items"));
}
#[test]
fn test_write_todos_invoke_invalid_status() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_write_todos_invoke_invalid_status() {
let tool = WriteTodosTool;
let args = serde_json::json!({
"todos": [{"id": "1", "content": "task", "status": "invalid"}]
"todos": [{"content": "task", "status": "invalid"}]
});
let result = tool.invoke(args);
let result = tool.invoke(args).await;
assert!(result.is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_write_todos_invoke_missing_field() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_write_todos_invoke_missing_field() {
let tool = WriteTodosTool;
let args = serde_json::json!({
"todos": [{"id": "1"}]
"todos": [{"status": "pending"}]
});
let result = tool.invoke(args);
let result = tool.invoke(args).await;
assert!(result.is_err());
}

View file

@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
use async_trait::async_trait;
use crate::{Middleware, ModelHandler, ModelRequest, ModelResponse, Role};
use crate::{Message, Middleware, ModelHandler, ModelRequest, ModelResponse};
/// Middleware that sanitizes tool results by wrapping them in XML-like delimiters.
///
@ -51,37 +51,38 @@ impl Middleware for ToolResultSanitizerMiddleware {
"tool_result_sanitizer"
}
fn wrap_model_call(
async fn wrap_model_call(
&self,
mut request: ModelRequest,
handler: &dyn ModelHandler,
) -> ModelResponse {
// Sanitize all tool messages in the request
for msg in &mut request.messages {
if msg.role == Role::Tool {
let tool_name = msg.tool_name.as_deref().unwrap_or("unknown");
let tool_call_id = msg.tool_call_id.as_deref().unwrap_or("unknown");
msg.content = Self::sanitize_tool_result(tool_name, tool_call_id, &msg.content);
if let Message::Tool(t) = msg {
let tool_name = t.tool_name.as_deref().unwrap_or("unknown");
t.content = Self::sanitize_tool_result(tool_name, &t.tool_call_id, &t.content);
}
}
handler.call(request)
handler.call(request).await
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::Message;
use async_trait::async_trait;
struct CaptureHandler;
#[async_trait]
impl ModelHandler for CaptureHandler {
fn call(&self, request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
async fn call(&self, request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
let tool_content = request
.messages
.iter()
.find(|m| m.role == Role::Tool)
.map(|m| m.content.clone())
.find(|m| matches!(m, Message::Tool(_)))
.map(|m| m.content().to_string())
.unwrap_or_default();
ModelResponse::text(tool_content)
}
@ -130,39 +131,41 @@ mod tests {
assert!(result.contains("id=\"id&quot;val\""));
}
#[test]
fn test_wrap_model_call_sanitizes_tool_messages() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_wrap_model_call_sanitizes_tool_messages() {
let mw = ToolResultSanitizerMiddleware::new();
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![
Message::user("help"),
Message::tool("raw tool output", "call-1", "read_file"),
Message::human("help"),
Message::tool_with_name("call-1", "raw tool output", "read_file"),
]);
let handler = CaptureHandler;
let response = mw.wrap_model_call(request, &handler);
let response = mw.wrap_model_call(request, &handler).await;
assert!(response.message.content.contains("<tool_output"));
assert!(response.message.content.contains("raw tool output"));
assert!(response.message.content.contains("</tool_output>"));
assert!(response.content().contains("<tool_output"));
assert!(response.content().contains("raw tool output"));
assert!(response.content().contains("</tool_output>"));
}
#[test]
fn test_wrap_model_call_skips_non_tool_messages() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_wrap_model_call_skips_non_tool_messages() {
let mw = ToolResultSanitizerMiddleware::new();
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![
Message::user("not a tool message"),
Message::assistant("also not a tool"),
Message::human("not a tool message"),
Message::ai("also not a tool"),
]);
struct VerifyHandler;
#[async_trait]
impl ModelHandler for VerifyHandler {
fn call(&self, request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
assert_eq!(request.messages[0].content, "not a tool message");
assert_eq!(request.messages[1].content, "also not a tool");
async fn call(&self, request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
assert_eq!(request.messages[0].content(), "not a tool message");
assert_eq!(request.messages[1].content(), "also not a tool");
ModelResponse::text("ok")
}
}
mw.wrap_model_call(request, &VerifyHandler);
mw.wrap_model_call(request, &VerifyHandler).await;
}
#[test]

View file

@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
//! Middleware request/response types built on the canonical `rvagent-core`
//! type system (P0.1 — unified types).
//!
//! `Message`, `ToolCall`, `AgentState`, `TodoItem`, `TodoStatus`,
//! `RunnableConfig`, and `ToolDefinition` are re-exported from
//! `rvagent_core`; this module only defines the middleware-specific
//! envelope types (`ModelRequest`, `ModelResponse`, `AgentStateUpdate`, …).
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::Arc;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
// Canonical types (single source of truth: rvagent-core).
pub use rvagent_core::config::RunnableConfig;
pub use rvagent_core::messages::{
AiMessage, HumanMessage, Message, SystemMessage, ToolCall, ToolMessage,
};
pub use rvagent_core::models::ToolDefinition;
pub use rvagent_core::state::{AgentState, FileData, TodoItem, TodoStatus};
/// Cache control hint for prompt caching (Anthropic).
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct CacheControl {
pub cache_type: String,
}
/// State update returned by `before_agent`. Merged into `AgentState`.
///
/// Extensions are stored in the typed extension slot of the core
/// `AgentState` as `serde_json::Value` entries.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
pub struct AgentStateUpdate {
pub messages: Option<Vec<Message>>,
pub todos: Option<Vec<TodoItem>>,
pub extensions: HashMap<String, serde_json::Value>,
}
impl AgentStateUpdate {
/// Merge this update into an `AgentState`.
pub fn apply_to(self, state: &mut AgentState) {
if let Some(messages) = self.messages {
state.messages = Arc::new(messages);
}
if let Some(todos) = self.todos {
state.todos = Arc::new(todos);
}
for (k, v) in self.extensions {
state.set_extension(k, v);
}
}
}
/// Read a JSON extension value stored on the core `AgentState`.
pub fn json_extension<'a>(state: &'a AgentState, key: &str) -> Option<&'a serde_json::Value> {
state.get_extension::<serde_json::Value>(key)
}
/// Model request wrapping messages and configuration.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct ModelRequest {
pub system_message: Option<String>,
pub messages: Vec<Message>,
pub tools: Vec<ToolDefinition>,
pub cache_control: HashMap<String, CacheControl>,
pub extensions: HashMap<String, serde_json::Value>,
}
impl ModelRequest {
/// Create a new model request.
pub fn new(messages: Vec<Message>) -> Self {
Self {
system_message: None,
messages,
tools: vec![],
cache_control: HashMap::new(),
extensions: HashMap::new(),
}
}
/// Return a copy with a different system message.
pub fn with_system(mut self, system_message: Option<String>) -> Self {
self.system_message = system_message;
self
}
/// Return a copy with different messages.
pub fn with_messages(mut self, messages: Vec<Message>) -> Self {
self.messages = messages;
self
}
}
/// Model response from an LLM call.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct ModelResponse {
pub message: Message,
pub tool_calls: Vec<ToolCall>,
pub usage: Option<Usage>,
}
impl ModelResponse {
/// Create a simple text response (an AI message).
pub fn text(content: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
Self {
message: Message::ai(content),
tool_calls: vec![],
usage: None,
}
}
/// Text content of the response message.
pub fn content(&self) -> &str {
self.message.content()
}
}
/// Token usage information.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct Usage {
pub input_tokens: u64,
pub output_tokens: u64,
#[serde(default)]
pub cache_read_tokens: u64,
#[serde(default)]
pub cache_creation_tokens: u64,
}
/// Runtime context passed to middleware hooks.
pub struct Runtime {
pub context: serde_json::Value,
pub config: RunnableConfig,
}
impl Runtime {
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self {
context: serde_json::Value::Null,
config: RunnableConfig::default(),
}
}
}
impl Default for Runtime {
fn default() -> Self {
Self::new()
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn test_model_request_with_system() {
let req = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::human("hi")]);
assert!(req.system_message.is_none());
let req2 = req.with_system(Some("system".into()));
assert_eq!(req2.system_message, Some("system".into()));
}
#[test]
fn test_model_response_text() {
let resp = ModelResponse::text("hello");
assert_eq!(resp.content(), "hello");
assert!(matches!(resp.message, Message::Ai(_)));
assert!(resp.tool_calls.is_empty());
}
#[test]
fn test_runtime_default() {
let rt = Runtime::default();
assert_eq!(rt.context, serde_json::Value::Null);
}
#[test]
fn test_agent_state_update_apply() {
let mut state = AgentState::default();
let mut update = AgentStateUpdate::default();
update.messages = Some(vec![Message::human("hi")]);
update.extensions.insert("k".into(), serde_json::json!("v"));
update.apply_to(&mut state);
assert_eq!(state.message_count(), 1);
assert_eq!(json_extension(&state, "k"), Some(&serde_json::json!("v")));
}
}

View file

@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
//! Automatically checks tool inputs and outputs for Unicode-based security threats.
use crate::unicode_security::{UnicodeIssue, UnicodeSecurityChecker, UnicodeSecurityConfig};
use crate::{AgentState, AgentStateUpdate, Message, Middleware, Role, RunnableConfig, Runtime};
use crate::{AgentState, AgentStateUpdate, Message, Middleware, RunnableConfig, Runtime};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use tracing::{debug, warn};
@ -69,11 +69,6 @@ impl UnicodeSecurityMiddleware {
self
}
/// Check a message for Unicode security issues.
fn check_message(&self, msg: &Message) -> Vec<UnicodeIssue> {
self.checker.check(&msg.content)
}
/// Log detected issues.
fn log_issues(&self, issues: &[UnicodeIssue], context: &str) {
if !issues.is_empty() {
@ -95,7 +90,7 @@ impl Middleware for UnicodeSecurityMiddleware {
"unicode_security"
}
async fn abefore_agent(
async fn before_agent(
&self,
state: &AgentState,
_runtime: &Runtime,
@ -104,37 +99,37 @@ impl Middleware for UnicodeSecurityMiddleware {
let mut modified = false;
let mut new_messages = Vec::new();
for msg in &state.messages {
for msg in state.messages.iter() {
let mut msg_copy = msg.clone();
match msg.role {
Role::User if self.check_user_input => {
let issues = self.check_message(msg);
match msg {
Message::Human(h) if self.check_user_input => {
let issues = self.checker.check(&h.content);
if !issues.is_empty() {
self.log_issues(&issues, "user message");
// Sanitize if configured
if self.sanitize_inputs {
msg_copy.content = self.checker.sanitize(&msg.content);
*msg_copy.content_mut() = self.checker.sanitize(&h.content);
modified = true;
debug!("Sanitized user message");
}
}
}
Role::Tool => {
let issues = self.check_message(msg);
Message::Tool(t) => {
let issues = self.checker.check(&t.content);
if !issues.is_empty() {
self.log_issues(
&issues,
&format!(
"tool result: {}",
msg.tool_name.as_deref().unwrap_or("unknown")
t.tool_name.as_deref().unwrap_or("unknown")
),
);
// Sanitize if configured
if self.sanitize_outputs {
msg_copy.content = self.checker.sanitize(&msg.content);
*msg_copy.content_mut() = self.checker.sanitize(&t.content);
modified = true;
debug!("Sanitized tool output");
}
@ -148,8 +143,8 @@ impl Middleware for UnicodeSecurityMiddleware {
new_messages.push(msg_copy);
// Check tool call arguments (in assistant messages)
if msg.role == Role::Assistant {
for tool_call in &msg.tool_calls {
if let Message::Ai(ai) = msg {
for tool_call in &ai.tool_calls {
if let Some(args_str) = tool_call.args.as_str() {
let issues = self.checker.check(args_str);
if !issues.is_empty() {
@ -189,6 +184,13 @@ impl Middleware for UnicodeSecurityMiddleware {
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::{Message, ToolCall};
use std::sync::Arc;
fn state_with_messages(messages: Vec<Message>) -> AgentState {
let mut state = AgentState::new();
state.messages = Arc::new(messages);
state
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_strict_middleware() {
@ -200,30 +202,26 @@ mod tests {
async fn test_detect_bidi_in_tool_result() {
let mw = UnicodeSecurityMiddleware::strict();
let state = AgentState {
messages: vec![Message::tool(
"evil\u{202E}txt.exe", // BiDi override
"tc-1",
"filesystem",
)],
todos: vec![],
extensions: Default::default(),
};
let state = state_with_messages(vec![Message::tool_with_name(
"tc-1",
"evil\u{202E}txt.exe", // BiDi override
"filesystem",
)]);
let runtime = Runtime::new();
let config = RunnableConfig::default();
// Should detect but not modify (sanitize_outputs = false by default)
let update = mw.abefore_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
let update = mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
assert!(update.is_none());
// Enable sanitization
let mw2 = UnicodeSecurityMiddleware::strict().with_output_sanitization(true);
let update2 = mw2.abefore_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
let update2 = mw2.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
assert!(update2.is_some());
let new_msgs = update2.unwrap().messages.unwrap();
assert_eq!(new_msgs[0].content, "eviltxt.exe"); // BiDi stripped
assert_eq!(new_msgs[0].content(), "eviltxt.exe"); // BiDi stripped
}
#[tokio::test]
@ -232,48 +230,39 @@ mod tests {
.with_user_input_check(true)
.with_input_sanitization(true);
let state = AgentState {
messages: vec![Message::user("Hello\u{200B}world")],
todos: vec![],
extensions: Default::default(),
};
let state = state_with_messages(vec![Message::human("Hello\u{200B}world")]);
let runtime = Runtime::new();
let config = RunnableConfig::default();
let update = mw.abefore_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
let update = mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
assert!(update.is_some());
let new_msgs = update.unwrap().messages.unwrap();
assert_eq!(new_msgs[0].content, "Helloworld");
assert_eq!(new_msgs[0].content(), "Helloworld");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_check_tool_call_arguments() {
let mw = UnicodeSecurityMiddleware::strict();
let state = AgentState {
messages: vec![{
let mut msg = Message::assistant("");
msg.tool_calls = vec![ToolCall {
id: "tc-1".to_string(),
name: "write_file".to_string(),
args: serde_json::json!({
"path": "test.txt",
"content": "evil\u{202E}txt.exe"
}),
}];
msg
let state = state_with_messages(vec![Message::ai_with_tools(
"",
vec![ToolCall {
id: "tc-1".to_string(),
name: "write_file".to_string(),
args: serde_json::json!({
"path": "test.txt",
"content": "evil\u{202E}txt.exe"
}),
}],
todos: vec![],
extensions: Default::default(),
};
)]);
let runtime = Runtime::new();
let config = RunnableConfig::default();
// Should detect (logs warning) but not modify
let update = mw.abefore_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
let update = mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
assert!(update.is_none());
}
@ -282,16 +271,16 @@ mod tests {
// Without output sanitization, should only log warnings
let mw = UnicodeSecurityMiddleware::strict().with_output_sanitization(false);
let state = AgentState {
messages: vec![Message::tool("pаypal.com", "tc-1", "browser")], // Cyrillic 'а'
todos: vec![],
extensions: Default::default(),
};
let state = state_with_messages(vec![Message::tool_with_name(
"tc-1",
"pаypal.com", // Cyrillic 'а'
"browser",
)]);
let runtime = Runtime::new();
let config = RunnableConfig::default();
let update = mw.abefore_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
let update = mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
// Should detect confusable and log, but not modify (sanitize_outputs = false)
assert!(update.is_none());
}
@ -302,19 +291,15 @@ mod tests {
.with_user_input_check(true)
.with_input_sanitization(true);
let state = AgentState {
messages: vec![
Message::user("Hello world"),
Message::tool("OK", "tc-1", "test"),
],
todos: vec![],
extensions: Default::default(),
};
let state = state_with_messages(vec![
Message::human("Hello world"),
Message::tool_with_name("tc-1", "OK", "test"),
]);
let runtime = Runtime::new();
let config = RunnableConfig::default();
let update = mw.abefore_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
let update = mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
assert!(update.is_none()); // No modification needed
}
@ -324,16 +309,12 @@ mod tests {
.with_user_input_check(true)
.with_input_sanitization(true);
let state = AgentState {
messages: vec![Message::system("System\u{202E}message")],
todos: vec![],
extensions: Default::default(),
};
let state = state_with_messages(vec![Message::system("System\u{202E}message")]);
let runtime = Runtime::new();
let config = RunnableConfig::default();
let update = mw.abefore_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
let update = mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
assert!(update.is_none()); // System messages are never modified
}
@ -342,26 +323,22 @@ mod tests {
let mw = UnicodeSecurityMiddleware::new(UnicodeSecurityConfig::permissive())
.with_output_sanitization(true);
let state = AgentState {
messages: vec![
Message::tool("pаypal.com", "tc-1", "test"), // Confusable (should pass)
Message::tool("evil\u{202E}txt.exe", "tc-2", "test"), // BiDi (should be caught)
],
todos: vec![],
extensions: Default::default(),
};
let state = state_with_messages(vec![
Message::tool_with_name("tc-1", "pаypal.com", "test"), // Confusable (should pass)
Message::tool_with_name("tc-2", "evil\u{202E}txt.exe", "test"), // BiDi (should be caught)
]);
let runtime = Runtime::new();
let config = RunnableConfig::default();
let update = mw.abefore_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
let update = mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
assert!(update.is_some());
let new_msgs = update.unwrap().messages.unwrap();
// First message unchanged (confusables not checked in permissive mode)
assert_eq!(new_msgs[0].content, "pаypal.com");
assert_eq!(new_msgs[0].content(), "pаypal.com");
// Second message sanitized (BiDi always checked)
assert_eq!(new_msgs[1].content, "eviltxt.exe");
assert_eq!(new_msgs[1].content(), "eviltxt.exe");
}
#[tokio::test]
@ -371,26 +348,22 @@ mod tests {
.with_input_sanitization(true)
.with_output_sanitization(true);
let state = AgentState {
messages: vec![
Message::user("Hello\u{200B}world"),
Message::assistant("Response"),
Message::tool("evil\u{202E}txt.exe", "tc-1", "filesystem"),
],
todos: vec![],
extensions: Default::default(),
};
let state = state_with_messages(vec![
Message::human("Hello\u{200B}world"),
Message::ai("Response"),
Message::tool_with_name("tc-1", "evil\u{202E}txt.exe", "filesystem"),
]);
let runtime = Runtime::new();
let config = RunnableConfig::default();
let update = mw.abefore_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
let update = mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
assert!(update.is_some());
let new_msgs = update.unwrap().messages.unwrap();
assert_eq!(new_msgs.len(), 3);
assert_eq!(new_msgs[0].content, "Helloworld"); // User message sanitized
assert_eq!(new_msgs[1].content, "Response"); // Assistant unchanged
assert_eq!(new_msgs[2].content, "eviltxt.exe"); // Tool result sanitized
assert_eq!(new_msgs[0].content(), "Helloworld"); // User message sanitized
assert_eq!(new_msgs[1].content(), "Response"); // Assistant unchanged
assert_eq!(new_msgs[2].content(), "eviltxt.exe"); // Tool result sanitized
}
}

View file

@ -298,8 +298,12 @@ impl Middleware for WitnessMiddleware {
"witness"
}
fn wrap_model_call(&self, request: ModelRequest, handler: &dyn ModelHandler) -> ModelResponse {
let response = handler.call(request);
async fn wrap_model_call(
&self,
request: ModelRequest,
handler: &dyn ModelHandler,
) -> ModelResponse {
let response = handler.call(request).await;
// Log each tool call to the witness chain
if !response.tool_calls.is_empty() {
@ -318,11 +322,15 @@ mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::{Message, ToolCall};
use async_trait::async_trait;
struct ToolCallHandler {
tool_calls: Vec<ToolCall>,
}
#[async_trait]
impl ModelHandler for ToolCallHandler {
fn call(&self, _request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
async fn call(&self, _request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
let mut response = ModelResponse::text("done");
response.tool_calls = self.tool_calls.clone();
response
@ -362,8 +370,8 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(builder.entries()[1].sequence, 1);
}
#[test]
fn test_wrap_model_call_records_tool_calls() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_wrap_model_call_records_tool_calls() {
let mw = WitnessMiddleware::new();
let handler = ToolCallHandler {
tool_calls: vec![
@ -380,8 +388,8 @@ mod tests {
],
};
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::user("test")]);
let _response = mw.wrap_model_call(request, &handler);
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::human("test")]);
let _response = mw.wrap_model_call(request, &handler).await;
let builder = mw.builder().lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(builder.len(), 2);
@ -389,20 +397,20 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(builder.entries()[1].tool_name, "execute");
}
#[test]
fn test_wrap_model_call_no_tool_calls() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_wrap_model_call_no_tool_calls() {
let mw = WitnessMiddleware::new();
let handler = ToolCallHandler { tool_calls: vec![] };
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![]);
let _response = mw.wrap_model_call(request, &handler);
let _response = mw.wrap_model_call(request, &handler).await;
let builder = mw.builder().lock().unwrap();
assert!(builder.is_empty());
}
#[test]
fn test_thread_safety() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_thread_safety() {
let builder = Arc::new(Mutex::new(WitnessBuilder::new()));
let mw1 = WitnessMiddleware::with_builder(builder.clone());
let mw2 = WitnessMiddleware::with_builder(builder.clone());
@ -424,8 +432,8 @@ mod tests {
let req1 = ModelRequest::new(vec![]);
let req2 = ModelRequest::new(vec![]);
mw1.wrap_model_call(req1, &handler1);
mw2.wrap_model_call(req2, &handler2);
mw1.wrap_model_call(req1, &handler1).await;
mw2.wrap_model_call(req2, &handler2).await;
let builder = builder.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(builder.len(), 2);

View file

@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
//! Integration tests for the Human-in-the-Loop (HITL) middleware.
use async_trait::async_trait;
use rvagent_middleware::hitl::{ApprovalDecision, HumanInTheLoopMiddleware};
use rvagent_middleware::{
Message, Middleware, ModelHandler, ModelRequest, ModelResponse, ToolCall,
@ -33,8 +34,9 @@ impl ToolCallHandler {
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl ModelHandler for ToolCallHandler {
fn call(&self, _request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
async fn call(&self, _request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
let mut response = ModelResponse::text("model response");
response.tool_calls = self.tool_calls.clone();
response
@ -131,13 +133,13 @@ fn test_empty_patterns_interrupts_nothing() {
// Tests: wrap_model_call
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
#[test]
fn test_wrap_filters_matching_tool_calls() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_wrap_filters_matching_tool_calls() {
let mw = HumanInTheLoopMiddleware::new(vec!["execute".into()]);
let handler = ToolCallHandler::with_names(&["execute", "read_file"]);
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::user("do something")]);
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::human("do something")]);
let response = mw.wrap_model_call(request, &handler);
let response = mw.wrap_model_call(request, &handler).await;
// Only read_file should remain
assert_eq!(response.tool_calls.len(), 1);
@ -145,90 +147,92 @@ fn test_wrap_filters_matching_tool_calls() {
// HITL message should be appended
assert!(
response.message.content.contains("[HITL]"),
response.content().contains("[HITL]"),
"should contain HITL marker"
);
assert!(
response.message.content.contains("execute"),
response.content().contains("execute"),
"should mention the interrupted tool"
);
}
#[test]
fn test_wrap_no_matching_tools_passes_all_through() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_wrap_no_matching_tools_passes_all_through() {
let mw = HumanInTheLoopMiddleware::new(vec!["dangerous_tool".into()]);
let handler = ToolCallHandler::with_names(&["read_file", "ls", "glob"]);
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::user("safe operation")]);
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::human("safe operation")]);
let response = mw.wrap_model_call(request, &handler);
let response = mw.wrap_model_call(request, &handler).await;
assert_eq!(response.tool_calls.len(), 3);
assert!(
!response.message.content.contains("[HITL]"),
!response.content().contains("[HITL]"),
"should not contain HITL marker when nothing is interrupted"
);
}
#[test]
fn test_wrap_all_tools_interrupted() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_wrap_all_tools_interrupted() {
let mw = HumanInTheLoopMiddleware::new(vec!["*".into()]);
let handler = ToolCallHandler::with_names(&["execute", "write_file"]);
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::user("do things")]);
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::human("do things")]);
let response = mw.wrap_model_call(request, &handler);
let response = mw.wrap_model_call(request, &handler).await;
assert!(
response.tool_calls.is_empty(),
"all tool calls should be intercepted"
);
assert!(response.message.content.contains("[HITL]"));
assert!(response.message.content.contains("execute"));
assert!(response.message.content.contains("write_file"));
assert!(response.content().contains("[HITL]"));
assert!(response.content().contains("execute"));
assert!(response.content().contains("write_file"));
}
#[test]
fn test_wrap_no_tool_calls_from_handler() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_wrap_no_tool_calls_from_handler() {
let mw = HumanInTheLoopMiddleware::new(vec!["execute".into()]);
struct NoToolHandler;
#[async_trait]
impl ModelHandler for NoToolHandler {
fn call(&self, _request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
async fn call(&self, _request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
ModelResponse::text("just text, no tools")
}
}
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::user("question")]);
let response = mw.wrap_model_call(request, &NoToolHandler);
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::human("question")]);
let response = mw.wrap_model_call(request, &NoToolHandler).await;
assert!(response.tool_calls.is_empty());
assert!(
!response.message.content.contains("[HITL]"),
!response.content().contains("[HITL]"),
"should not add HITL marker when no tool calls"
);
}
#[test]
fn test_wrap_preserves_original_response_content() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_wrap_preserves_original_response_content() {
let mw = HumanInTheLoopMiddleware::new(vec!["dangerous".into()]);
let handler = ToolCallHandler::with_names(&["read_file"]);
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::user("hi")]);
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::human("hi")]);
let response = mw.wrap_model_call(request, &handler);
let response = mw.wrap_model_call(request, &handler).await;
assert!(
response.message.content.contains("model response"),
response.content().contains("model response"),
"should preserve original model response content"
);
}
#[test]
fn test_wrap_prefix_pattern_filters_correctly() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_wrap_prefix_pattern_filters_correctly() {
let mw = HumanInTheLoopMiddleware::new(vec!["write_*".into()]);
let handler =
ToolCallHandler::with_names(&["write_file", "write_todos", "read_file", "execute"]);
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::user("do writes")]);
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::human("do writes")]);
let response = mw.wrap_model_call(request, &handler);
let response = mw.wrap_model_call(request, &handler).await;
assert_eq!(
response.tool_calls.len(),

View file

@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
//! Integration tests for the MCP bridge middleware.
use async_trait::async_trait;
use rvagent_middleware::mcp_bridge::{McpBridgeConfig, McpBridgeMiddleware};
use rvagent_middleware::{
AgentState, Message, Middleware, ModelHandler, ModelRequest, ModelResponse, RunnableConfig,
@ -12,8 +13,9 @@ use rvagent_middleware::{
struct PassthroughHandler;
#[async_trait]
impl ModelHandler for PassthroughHandler {
fn call(&self, request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
async fn call(&self, request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
ModelResponse::text(format!("handled:{}", request.messages.len()))
}
}
@ -109,14 +111,14 @@ fn test_middleware_name() {
assert_eq!(mw.name(), "mcp_bridge");
}
#[test]
fn test_before_agent_when_enabled_injects_config() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_before_agent_when_enabled_injects_config() {
let mw = McpBridgeMiddleware::new();
let state = AgentState::default();
let runtime = Runtime::new();
let config = RunnableConfig::default();
let update = mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config);
let update = mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
assert!(
update.is_some(),
"enabled bridge should produce state update"
@ -129,8 +131,8 @@ fn test_before_agent_when_enabled_injects_config() {
);
}
#[test]
fn test_before_agent_when_disabled_returns_none() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_before_agent_when_disabled_returns_none() {
let config = McpBridgeConfig {
enabled: false,
..Default::default()
@ -140,7 +142,7 @@ fn test_before_agent_when_disabled_returns_none() {
let runtime = Runtime::new();
let runnable_config = RunnableConfig::default();
let update = mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &runnable_config);
let update = mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &runnable_config).await;
assert!(
update.is_none(),
"disabled bridge should not produce update"
@ -150,7 +152,7 @@ fn test_before_agent_when_disabled_returns_none() {
#[test]
fn test_modify_request_when_enabled_sets_flag() {
let mw = McpBridgeMiddleware::new();
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::user("hello")]);
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::human("hello")]);
let modified = mw.modify_request(request);
assert_eq!(
@ -167,7 +169,7 @@ fn test_modify_request_when_disabled_does_not_set_flag() {
..Default::default()
};
let mw = McpBridgeMiddleware::with_config(config);
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::user("hello")]);
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::human("hello")]);
let modified = mw.modify_request(request);
assert!(
@ -176,14 +178,14 @@ fn test_modify_request_when_disabled_does_not_set_flag() {
);
}
#[test]
fn test_wrap_model_call_passes_through() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_wrap_model_call_passes_through() {
let mw = McpBridgeMiddleware::new();
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::user("hi")]);
let response = mw.wrap_model_call(request, &PassthroughHandler);
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::human("hi")]);
let response = mw.wrap_model_call(request, &PassthroughHandler).await;
assert!(
response.message.content.contains("handled:1"),
response.content().contains("handled:1"),
"wrap_model_call should pass through to handler"
);
}
@ -211,13 +213,13 @@ fn test_tools_when_disabled_provides_no_tools() {
assert!(tools.is_empty());
}
#[test]
fn test_status_tool_returns_config_values() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_status_tool_returns_config_values() {
let mw = McpBridgeMiddleware::new();
let tools = mw.tools();
let status_tool = &tools[0];
let result = status_tool.invoke(serde_json::json!({}));
let result = status_tool.invoke(serde_json::json!({})).await;
assert!(result.is_ok());
let json: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&result.unwrap()).unwrap();
@ -230,7 +232,7 @@ fn test_status_tool_returns_config_values() {
fn test_status_tool_schema() {
let mw = McpBridgeMiddleware::new();
let tools = mw.tools();
let schema = tools[0].parameters_schema();
let schema = tools[0].input_schema();
assert!(schema.is_object());
assert!(schema["properties"].is_object());
}

View file

@ -3,9 +3,8 @@
use async_trait::async_trait;
use rvagent_middleware::{
append_to_system_message, AgentState, AgentStateUpdate, Message, Middleware,
MiddlewarePipeline, ModelHandler, ModelRequest, ModelResponse, Role, RunnableConfig, Runtime,
Tool, ToolDefinition,
append_to_system_message, json_extension, AgentState, AgentStateUpdate, Message, Middleware,
MiddlewarePipeline, ModelHandler, ModelRequest, ModelResponse, RunnableConfig, Runtime, Tool,
};
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@ -33,7 +32,7 @@ impl Middleware for RecordingMiddleware {
&self.label
}
fn before_agent(
async fn before_agent(
&self,
_state: &AgentState,
_runtime: &Runtime,
@ -68,9 +67,13 @@ impl Middleware for SystemAppender {
&self.label
}
fn wrap_model_call(&self, request: ModelRequest, handler: &dyn ModelHandler) -> ModelResponse {
async fn wrap_model_call(
&self,
request: ModelRequest,
handler: &dyn ModelHandler,
) -> ModelResponse {
let new_sys = append_to_system_message(&request.system_message, &self.text);
handler.call(request.with_system(new_sys))
handler.call(request.with_system(new_sys)).await
}
}
@ -93,6 +96,7 @@ struct NamedTool {
name: String,
}
#[async_trait]
impl Tool for NamedTool {
fn name(&self) -> &str {
&self.name
@ -100,10 +104,10 @@ impl Tool for NamedTool {
fn description(&self) -> &str {
"test tool"
}
fn parameters_schema(&self) -> serde_json::Value {
fn input_schema(&self) -> serde_json::Value {
serde_json::json!({"type": "object"})
}
fn invoke(&self, _args: serde_json::Value) -> Result<String, String> {
async fn invoke(&self, _args: serde_json::Value) -> Result<String, String> {
Ok("ok".into())
}
}
@ -124,21 +128,13 @@ impl Middleware for ToolInjectorMw {
/// Handler that captures the final system message.
struct CaptureSystemHandler;
#[async_trait]
impl ModelHandler for CaptureSystemHandler {
fn call(&self, request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
async fn call(&self, request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
ModelResponse::text(request.system_message.unwrap_or_default())
}
}
/// Handler that returns the number of tool definitions.
struct CountToolsHandler;
impl ModelHandler for CountToolsHandler {
fn call(&self, request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
ModelResponse::text(format!("tools:{}", request.tools.len()))
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Tests
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@ -174,35 +170,37 @@ async fn test_pipeline_before_agent_chain() {
// All three middlewares should have set their extension key.
assert_eq!(
state.extensions.get("visited_first"),
json_extension(&state, "visited_first"),
Some(&serde_json::json!(true)),
"first middleware should have run"
);
assert_eq!(
state.extensions.get("visited_second"),
json_extension(&state, "visited_second"),
Some(&serde_json::json!(true)),
"second middleware should have run"
);
assert_eq!(
state.extensions.get("visited_third"),
json_extension(&state, "visited_third"),
Some(&serde_json::json!(true)),
"third middleware should have run"
);
}
#[test]
fn test_pipeline_wrap_model_call_chain() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_pipeline_wrap_model_call_chain() {
// Two appenders: "A" then "B". Both should appear in the final system message.
let pipeline = MiddlewarePipeline::new(vec![
Box::new(SystemAppender::new("appender_a", "<<A>>")),
Box::new(SystemAppender::new("appender_b", "<<B>>")),
]);
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::user("hi")]).with_system(Some("base".into()));
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::human("hi")]).with_system(Some("base".into()));
let response = pipeline.run_wrap_model_call(request, &CaptureSystemHandler);
let response = pipeline
.run_wrap_model_call(request, &CaptureSystemHandler)
.await;
let sys = response.message.content;
let sys = response.content();
assert!(sys.contains("base"), "should preserve base system message");
assert!(sys.contains("<<A>>"), "should include appender A");
assert!(sys.contains("<<B>>"), "should include appender B");

View file

@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ fn test_middleware_name() {
fn test_default_cache_type_is_ephemeral() {
let mw = PromptCachingMiddleware::new();
let request =
ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::user("hi")]).with_system(Some("system prompt".into()));
ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::human("hi")]).with_system(Some("system prompt".into()));
let modified = mw.modify_request(request);
assert_eq!(modified.cache_control["system"].cache_type, "ephemeral");
@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ fn test_default_cache_type_is_ephemeral() {
fn test_custom_cache_type() {
let mw = PromptCachingMiddleware::with_cache_type("persistent");
let request =
ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::user("hi")]).with_system(Some("system prompt".into()));
ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::human("hi")]).with_system(Some("system prompt".into()));
let modified = mw.modify_request(request);
assert_eq!(modified.cache_control["system"].cache_type, "persistent");
@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ fn test_default_trait_implementation() {
#[test]
fn test_adds_cache_control_for_system_message() {
let mw = PromptCachingMiddleware::new();
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::user("hello")])
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::human("hello")])
.with_system(Some("You are a helpful assistant.".into()));
let modified = mw.modify_request(request);
@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ fn test_adds_cache_control_for_system_message() {
#[test]
fn test_no_cache_control_without_system_message() {
let mw = PromptCachingMiddleware::new();
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::user("hello")]);
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::human("hello")]);
let modified = mw.modify_request(request);
@ -78,11 +78,11 @@ fn test_no_cache_control_without_system_message() {
#[test]
fn test_adds_cache_control_for_tools() {
let mw = PromptCachingMiddleware::new();
let mut request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::user("hello")]);
let mut request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::human("hello")]);
request.tools.push(ToolDefinition {
name: "read_file".into(),
description: "Read a file".into(),
parameters: serde_json::json!({"type": "object"}),
input_schema: serde_json::json!({"type": "object"}),
});
let modified = mw.modify_request(request);
@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ fn test_adds_cache_control_for_tools() {
#[test]
fn test_no_cache_control_without_tools() {
let mw = PromptCachingMiddleware::new();
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::user("hello")]);
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::human("hello")]);
let modified = mw.modify_request(request);
@ -115,11 +115,11 @@ fn test_no_cache_control_without_tools() {
fn test_both_system_and_tools_get_cache_control() {
let mw = PromptCachingMiddleware::new();
let mut request =
ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::user("hello")]).with_system(Some("system".into()));
ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::human("hello")]).with_system(Some("system".into()));
request.tools.push(ToolDefinition {
name: "ls".into(),
description: "List files".into(),
parameters: serde_json::json!({}),
input_schema: serde_json::json!({}),
});
let modified = mw.modify_request(request);
@ -144,11 +144,11 @@ fn test_neither_system_nor_tools_no_cache_control() {
#[test]
fn test_custom_cache_type_applies_to_both() {
let mw = PromptCachingMiddleware::with_cache_type("long_lived");
let mut request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::user("hi")]).with_system(Some("sys".into()));
let mut request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::human("hi")]).with_system(Some("sys".into()));
request.tools.push(ToolDefinition {
name: "tool".into(),
description: "desc".into(),
parameters: serde_json::json!({}),
input_schema: serde_json::json!({}),
});
let modified = mw.modify_request(request);
@ -160,14 +160,14 @@ fn test_custom_cache_type_applies_to_both() {
#[test]
fn test_messages_are_preserved_after_modify() {
let mw = PromptCachingMiddleware::new();
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::user("first"), Message::assistant("second")])
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::human("first"), Message::ai("second")])
.with_system(Some("sys".into()));
let modified = mw.modify_request(request);
assert_eq!(modified.messages.len(), 2);
assert_eq!(modified.messages[0].content, "first");
assert_eq!(modified.messages[1].content, "second");
assert_eq!(modified.messages[0].content(), "first");
assert_eq!(modified.messages[1].content(), "second");
assert_eq!(modified.system_message, Some("sys".to_string()));
}
@ -178,12 +178,12 @@ fn test_multiple_tools_get_single_cache_entry() {
request.tools.push(ToolDefinition {
name: "tool_a".into(),
description: "a".into(),
parameters: serde_json::json!({}),
input_schema: serde_json::json!({}),
});
request.tools.push(ToolDefinition {
name: "tool_b".into(),
description: "b".into(),
parameters: serde_json::json!({}),
input_schema: serde_json::json!({}),
});
let modified = mw.modify_request(request);

View file

@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use rvagent_middleware::memory::{
compute_sha3_256, MemoryMiddleware, SecurityPolicy, TrustManifest, TrustVerification,
MAX_MEMORY_FILE_SIZE,
@ -20,8 +21,8 @@ use rvagent_middleware::skills::{parse_skill_metadata, validate_skill_name, MAX_
use rvagent_middleware::tool_sanitizer::ToolResultSanitizerMiddleware;
use rvagent_middleware::witness::{WitnessBuilder, WitnessMiddleware};
use rvagent_middleware::{
AgentState, Message, Middleware, ModelHandler, ModelRequest, ModelResponse, Role,
RunnableConfig, Runtime, ToolCall,
AgentState, Message, Middleware, ModelHandler, ModelRequest, ModelResponse, RunnableConfig,
Runtime, ToolCall,
};
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@ -30,14 +31,16 @@ use rvagent_middleware::{
/// Handler that captures the model request for inspection.
struct CaptureHandler;
#[async_trait]
impl ModelHandler for CaptureHandler {
fn call(&self, request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
async fn call(&self, request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
// Return the first tool message's content (for sanitizer tests)
let tool_content = request
.messages
.iter()
.find(|m| m.role == Role::Tool)
.map(|m| m.content.clone())
.find(|m| matches!(m, Message::Tool(_)))
.map(|m| m.content().to_string())
.unwrap_or_default();
ModelResponse::text(tool_content)
}
@ -47,8 +50,10 @@ impl ModelHandler for CaptureHandler {
struct ToolCallResponseHandler {
tool_calls: Vec<ToolCall>,
}
#[async_trait]
impl ModelHandler for ToolCallResponseHandler {
fn call(&self, _request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
async fn call(&self, _request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
let mut response = ModelResponse::text("done");
response.tool_calls = self.tool_calls.clone();
response
@ -59,20 +64,20 @@ impl ModelHandler for ToolCallResponseHandler {
// test_tool_result_sanitizer_wraps_output
// ===========================================================================
#[test]
fn test_tool_result_sanitizer_wraps_output() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_tool_result_sanitizer_wraps_output() {
let mw = ToolResultSanitizerMiddleware::new();
// Build a request with a tool message
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![
Message::user("read the file"),
Message::tool("fn main() { println!(\"hello\"); }", "call-42", "read_file"),
Message::human("read the file"),
Message::tool_with_name("call-42", "fn main() { println!(\"hello\"); }", "read_file"),
]);
let response = mw.wrap_model_call(request, &CaptureHandler);
let response = mw.wrap_model_call(request, &CaptureHandler).await;
// The tool message content should now be wrapped in <tool_output> tags
let content = &response.message.content;
let content = response.content();
assert!(
content.starts_with("<tool_output"),
"Sanitized output must start with <tool_output tag"
@ -111,8 +116,8 @@ fn test_tool_result_sanitizer_wraps_output() {
// test_witness_middleware_logs_tool_calls
// ===========================================================================
#[test]
fn test_witness_middleware_logs_tool_calls() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_witness_middleware_logs_tool_calls() {
let builder = Arc::new(Mutex::new(WitnessBuilder::new()));
let mw = WitnessMiddleware::with_builder(builder.clone());
@ -131,8 +136,8 @@ fn test_witness_middleware_logs_tool_calls() {
],
};
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::user("build the project")]);
let _response = mw.wrap_model_call(request, &handler);
let request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::human("build the project")]);
let _response = mw.wrap_model_call(request, &handler).await;
// Verify witness chain recorded both calls
let chain = builder.lock().unwrap();
@ -237,54 +242,58 @@ fn test_skill_file_size_limit() {
// test_patch_tool_calls_validates_ids
// ===========================================================================
#[test]
fn test_patch_tool_calls_validates_ids() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_patch_tool_calls_validates_ids() {
let mw = PatchToolCallsMiddleware::new();
let runtime = Runtime::new();
let config = RunnableConfig::default();
fn state_with_messages(messages: Vec<Message>) -> AgentState {
let mut state = AgentState::new();
state.messages = std::sync::Arc::new(messages);
state
}
// Scenario 1: Valid tool call ID with no response → should be patched
let mut msg_valid = Message::assistant("Using tool");
msg_valid.tool_calls.push(ToolCall {
id: "call-abc123".into(),
name: "read_file".into(),
args: serde_json::json!({"path": "test.txt"}),
});
let msg_valid = Message::ai_with_tools(
"Using tool",
vec![ToolCall {
id: "call-abc123".into(),
name: "read_file".into(),
args: serde_json::json!({"path": "test.txt"}),
}],
);
let state = AgentState {
messages: vec![
Message::user("help"),
msg_valid,
Message::user("changed my mind"),
],
..Default::default()
};
let state = state_with_messages(vec![
Message::human("help"),
msg_valid,
Message::human("changed my mind"),
]);
let update = mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config);
let update = mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
assert!(update.is_some(), "Dangling tool call must be patched");
let messages = update.unwrap().messages.unwrap();
// Should have: user, assistant, synthetic tool response, user
assert_eq!(messages.len(), 4);
assert_eq!(messages[2].role, Role::Tool);
assert!(messages[2].content.contains("cancelled"));
assert!(matches!(&messages[2], Message::Tool(_)));
assert!(messages[2].content().contains("cancelled"));
// Scenario 2: Tool call with existing response → no patching needed
let mut msg_with_response = Message::assistant("Using tool");
msg_with_response.tool_calls.push(ToolCall {
id: "call-xyz".into(),
name: "read_file".into(),
args: serde_json::json!({}),
});
let msg_with_response = Message::ai_with_tools(
"Using tool",
vec![ToolCall {
id: "call-xyz".into(),
name: "read_file".into(),
args: serde_json::json!({}),
}],
);
let state2 = AgentState {
messages: vec![
msg_with_response,
Message::tool("file contents", "call-xyz", "read_file"),
],
..Default::default()
};
let state2 = state_with_messages(vec![
msg_with_response,
Message::tool_with_name("call-xyz", "file contents", "read_file"),
]);
let update2 = mw.before_agent(&state2, &runtime, &config);
let update2 = mw.before_agent(&state2, &runtime, &config).await;
assert!(
update2.is_none(),
"Tool call with existing response must not be patched"
@ -292,15 +301,15 @@ fn test_patch_tool_calls_validates_ids() {
// Scenario 3: Empty messages → no update
let state3 = AgentState::default();
assert!(mw.before_agent(&state3, &runtime, &config).is_none());
assert!(mw.before_agent(&state3, &runtime, &config).await.is_none());
}
// ===========================================================================
// test_memory_trust_verification
// ===========================================================================
#[test]
fn test_memory_trust_verification() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_memory_trust_verification() {
// 1. Compute hash of known content
let trusted_content = "# Agent Instructions\nBe helpful and accurate.";
let hash = compute_sha3_256(trusted_content.as_bytes());
@ -345,7 +354,7 @@ fn test_memory_trust_verification() {
let state = AgentState::default();
let runtime = Runtime::new();
let config = RunnableConfig::default();
let update = mw_loaded.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config);
let update = mw_loaded.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
assert!(update.is_some());
// 7. Test content size limit
@ -356,7 +365,7 @@ fn test_memory_trust_verification() {
.with_security_policy(SecurityPolicy::Permissive)
.with_preloaded(oversized_preloaded);
let update_big = mw_big.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config);
let update_big = mw_big.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
// The update should exist but the oversized content should be filtered out
assert!(update_big.is_some());
let ext = &update_big.unwrap().extensions;

View file

@ -5,8 +5,9 @@
//! - UUID-based offload filenames (SEC-015)
//! - File permission expectations (0600)
use async_trait::async_trait;
use rvagent_middleware::summarization::SummarizationMiddleware;
use rvagent_middleware::{Message, Middleware, ModelHandler, ModelRequest, ModelResponse, Role};
use rvagent_middleware::{Message, Middleware, ModelHandler, ModelRequest, ModelResponse};
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Helpers
@ -14,8 +15,10 @@ use rvagent_middleware::{Message, Middleware, ModelHandler, ModelRequest, ModelR
/// Handler that captures the number of messages in the request.
struct MessageCountHandler;
#[async_trait]
impl ModelHandler for MessageCountHandler {
fn call(&self, request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
async fn call(&self, request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
ModelResponse::text(format!("count={}", request.messages.len()))
}
}
@ -23,7 +26,7 @@ impl ModelHandler for MessageCountHandler {
/// Generate N user messages with enough content to exceed a token threshold.
fn generate_messages(n: usize, content_size: usize) -> Vec<Message> {
(0..n)
.map(|i| Message::user(format!("Message {} {}", i, "x".repeat(content_size))))
.map(|i| Message::human(format!("Message {} {}", i, "x".repeat(content_size))))
.collect()
}
@ -31,8 +34,8 @@ fn generate_messages(n: usize, content_size: usize) -> Vec<Message> {
// test_auto_compact_triggers
// ===========================================================================
#[test]
fn test_auto_compact_triggers() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_auto_compact_triggers() {
// Create middleware with very low threshold: max_tokens=10, trigger at 50%
// so trigger at 5 tokens. Even a single message will exceed this.
let mw = SummarizationMiddleware::new(10, 0.5, 0.5);
@ -54,9 +57,9 @@ fn test_auto_compact_triggers() {
// With many messages that exceed the threshold, compaction should reduce count
let messages = generate_messages(20, 100);
let request = ModelRequest::new(messages);
let response = mw.wrap_model_call(request, &MessageCountHandler);
let response = mw.wrap_model_call(request, &MessageCountHandler).await;
let count_str = response.message.content.clone();
let count_str = response.content().to_string();
let count: usize = count_str.strip_prefix("count=").unwrap().parse().unwrap();
assert!(
count < 20,
@ -68,19 +71,25 @@ fn test_auto_compact_triggers() {
// With a single short message below threshold, no compaction
let mw_high = SummarizationMiddleware::new(100_000, 0.85, 0.10);
let short_request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::user("hello")]);
let short_response = mw_high.wrap_model_call(short_request, &MessageCountHandler);
let short_request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::human("hello")]);
let short_response = mw_high
.wrap_model_call(short_request, &MessageCountHandler)
.await;
assert_eq!(
short_response.message.content, "count=1",
short_response.content(),
"count=1",
"Short conversation must not be compacted"
);
// Edge case: single message above threshold should not compact (need >1 messages)
let mw_tiny = SummarizationMiddleware::new(1, 0.1, 0.5);
let single_request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::user("a long message that exceeds")]);
let single_response = mw_tiny.wrap_model_call(single_request, &MessageCountHandler);
let single_request = ModelRequest::new(vec![Message::human("a long message that exceeds")]);
let single_response = mw_tiny
.wrap_model_call(single_request, &MessageCountHandler)
.await;
assert_eq!(
single_response.message.content, "count=1",
single_response.content(),
"count=1",
"Single message should not be compacted even above threshold"
);
}
@ -182,8 +191,8 @@ fn test_offload_uses_uuid_filename() {
// test_file_permissions
// ===========================================================================
#[test]
fn test_file_permissions() {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_file_permissions() {
// This test validates the permission model at the design level.
// The SummarizationMiddleware is expected to write offloaded history
// with mode 0600 (owner read/write only) per SEC-015.
@ -204,14 +213,16 @@ fn test_file_permissions() {
// Use a handler that returns the first message's role info
struct FirstMessageHandler;
#[async_trait]
impl ModelHandler for FirstMessageHandler {
fn call(&self, request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
async fn call(&self, request: ModelRequest) -> ModelResponse {
if let Some(first) = request.messages.first() {
let role = match first.role {
Role::System => "system",
Role::User => "user",
Role::Assistant => "assistant",
Role::Tool => "tool",
let role = match first {
Message::System(_) => "system",
Message::Human(_) => "user",
Message::Ai(_) => "assistant",
Message::Tool(_) => "tool",
};
ModelResponse::text(format!("first_role={}", role))
} else {
@ -221,13 +232,15 @@ fn test_file_permissions() {
}
let request = ModelRequest::new(messages);
let response = mw_compact.wrap_model_call(request, &FirstMessageHandler);
let response = mw_compact
.wrap_model_call(request, &FirstMessageHandler)
.await;
// When compaction triggers, the first message should be the summary (System role)
assert!(
response.message.content.contains("first_role=system"),
response.content().contains("first_role=system"),
"Compacted conversation must start with a system summary message, got: {}",
response.message.content
response.content()
);
// Verify that keep_fraction and trigger_fraction are clamped

View file

@ -3,9 +3,16 @@
//! Demonstrates comprehensive security checks against Unicode-based attacks.
use rvagent_middleware::{
AgentState, Message, Middleware, PipelineConfig, RunnableConfig, Runtime, ToolCall,
UnicodeSecurityChecker, UnicodeSecurityConfig, UnicodeSecurityMiddleware,
AgentState, Message, Middleware, RunnableConfig, Runtime, ToolCall, UnicodeSecurityChecker,
UnicodeSecurityConfig, UnicodeSecurityMiddleware,
};
use std::sync::Arc;
fn state_with_messages(messages: Vec<Message>) -> AgentState {
let mut state = AgentState::new();
state.messages = Arc::new(messages);
state
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_real_world_bidi_attack() {
@ -14,29 +21,25 @@ async fn test_real_world_bidi_attack() {
.with_input_sanitization(true)
.with_output_sanitization(true);
let state = AgentState {
messages: vec![
// Attacker tries to disguise evil.exe as safe.txt
Message::tool(
"Downloaded: safe\u{202E}exe.txt", // Displays as "safeexe.txt" (reversed)
"tc-1",
"filesystem",
),
],
todos: vec![],
extensions: Default::default(),
};
let state = state_with_messages(vec![
// Attacker tries to disguise evil.exe as safe.txt
Message::tool_with_name(
"tc-1",
"Downloaded: safe\u{202E}exe.txt", // Displays as "safeexe.txt" (reversed)
"filesystem",
),
]);
let runtime = Runtime::new();
let config = RunnableConfig::default();
let update = mw.abefore_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
let update = mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
assert!(update.is_some());
let new_msgs = update.unwrap().messages.unwrap();
// BiDi should be stripped
assert!(!new_msgs[0].content.contains('\u{202E}'));
assert_eq!(new_msgs[0].content, "Downloaded: safeexe.txt");
assert!(!new_msgs[0].content().contains('\u{202E}'));
assert_eq!(new_msgs[0].content(), "Downloaded: safeexe.txt");
}
#[tokio::test]
@ -70,23 +73,19 @@ async fn test_real_world_zero_width_steganography() {
.with_input_sanitization(true);
// User input with hidden zero-width characters encoding secret data
let state = AgentState {
messages: vec![Message::user(
"Innocent\u{200B}text\u{200C}with\u{200D}hidden\u{200B}data",
)],
todos: vec![],
extensions: Default::default(),
};
let state = state_with_messages(vec![Message::human(
"Innocent\u{200B}text\u{200C}with\u{200D}hidden\u{200B}data",
)]);
let runtime = Runtime::new();
let config = RunnableConfig::default();
let update = mw.abefore_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
let update = mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
assert!(update.is_some());
let new_msgs = update.unwrap().messages.unwrap();
// All zero-width should be stripped
assert_eq!(new_msgs[0].content, "Innocenttextwithhiddendata");
assert_eq!(new_msgs[0].content(), "Innocenttextwithhiddendata");
}
#[tokio::test]
@ -94,37 +93,32 @@ async fn test_tool_call_argument_sanitization() {
// Test that tool call arguments are checked for Unicode attacks
let mw = UnicodeSecurityMiddleware::strict();
let state = AgentState {
messages: vec![{
let mut msg = Message::assistant("");
msg.tool_calls = vec![
ToolCall {
id: "tc-1".to_string(),
name: "write_file".to_string(),
args: serde_json::json!({
"path": "safe\u{202E}exe.txt",
"content": "malicious content"
}),
},
ToolCall {
id: "tc-2".to_string(),
name: "browser_navigate".to_string(),
args: serde_json::json!({
"url": "pаypal.com" // Cyrillic 'а'
}),
},
];
msg
}],
todos: vec![],
extensions: Default::default(),
};
let state = state_with_messages(vec![Message::ai_with_tools(
"",
vec![
ToolCall {
id: "tc-1".to_string(),
name: "write_file".to_string(),
args: serde_json::json!({
"path": "safe\u{202E}exe.txt",
"content": "malicious content"
}),
},
ToolCall {
id: "tc-2".to_string(),
name: "browser_navigate".to_string(),
args: serde_json::json!({
"url": "pаypal.com" // Cyrillic 'а'
}),
},
],
)]);
let runtime = Runtime::new();
let config = RunnableConfig::default();
// Should detect issues in tool call arguments (logs warnings)
let update = mw.abefore_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
let update = mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
// With sanitize_inputs = true by default, this should be None
// because sanitize() is only applied to message content, not tool args
assert!(update.is_none());
@ -152,20 +146,16 @@ async fn test_safe_multilingual_content_unmodified() {
let mw = UnicodeSecurityMiddleware::new(UnicodeSecurityConfig::permissive())
.with_output_sanitization(false);
let state = AgentState {
messages: vec![Message::tool(
"Hello, 世界! Привет! مرحبا", // Multi-script greeting
"tc-1",
"translator",
)],
todos: vec![],
extensions: Default::default(),
};
let state = state_with_messages(vec![Message::tool_with_name(
"tc-1",
"Hello, 世界! Привет! مرحبا", // Multi-script greeting
"translator",
)]);
let runtime = Runtime::new();
let config = RunnableConfig::default();
let update = mw.abefore_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
let update = mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
// Permissive mode doesn't check mixed scripts or confusables
assert!(update.is_none());
}
@ -193,30 +183,26 @@ async fn test_comprehensive_attack_scenario() {
.with_user_input_check(true)
.with_input_sanitization(true);
let state = AgentState {
messages: vec![
Message::user("Visit pаypal.com\u{200B}now!"), // Homoglyph + zero-width
Message::tool(
"Downloaded: evil\u{202E}txt.exe", // BiDi override
"tc-1",
"filesystem",
),
],
todos: vec![],
extensions: Default::default(),
};
let state = state_with_messages(vec![
Message::human("Visit pаypal.com\u{200B}now!"), // Homoglyph + zero-width
Message::tool_with_name(
"tc-1",
"Downloaded: evil\u{202E}txt.exe", // BiDi override
"filesystem",
),
]);
let runtime = Runtime::new();
let config = RunnableConfig::default();
let update = mw.abefore_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
let update = mw.before_agent(&state, &runtime, &config).await;
assert!(update.is_some());
let new_msgs = update.unwrap().messages.unwrap();
// User message: zero-width stripped
assert_eq!(new_msgs[0].content, "Visit pаypal.comnow!"); // Confusable remains
// Tool message: BiDi stripped
assert_eq!(new_msgs[1].content, "Downloaded: eviltxt.exe");
assert_eq!(new_msgs[0].content(), "Visit pаypal.comnow!"); // Confusable remains
// Tool message: BiDi stripped
assert_eq!(new_msgs[1].content(), "Downloaded: eviltxt.exe");
}
#[test]

View file

@ -26,18 +26,20 @@ pub use crdt_merge::{merge_subagent_results, CrdtState, MergeError, VectorClock}
pub use orchestrator::{spawn_parallel, SpawnError, SubAgentOrchestrator};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::Duration;
use rvagent_core::messages::Message;
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// AgentState (simplified, JSON-based for cross-crate compatibility)
// AgentState — canonical typed state from rvagent-core (ADR-103 A1)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/// Agent state represented as a JSON map.
/// Agent state — the canonical typed `rvagent_core::state::AgentState`.
///
/// Matches `HashMap<String, serde_json::Value>` from ADR-097.
/// Future work (ADR-103 A1) will replace this with a typed struct.
pub type AgentState = HashMap<String, serde_json::Value>;
/// Replaces the former `HashMap<String, serde_json::Value>` alias (ADR-097)
/// per ADR-103 A1 / roadmap P0.1.
pub use rvagent_core::state::AgentState;
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// RvAgentConfig
@ -226,39 +228,33 @@ pub const EXCLUDED_STATE_KEYS: &[&str] = &[
/// Prepare a filtered state for subagent invocation.
///
/// Strips excluded keys from the parent state, then injects a single
/// human message containing the task description.
/// State-isolation semantics (ADR-097) on the typed state: parent
/// `messages`, `todos`, `memory_contents`, and `skills_metadata` are
/// excluded; `files` pass through (O(1) Arc clone); a single human message
/// containing the task description is injected.
pub fn prepare_subagent_state(parent_state: &AgentState, task_description: &str) -> AgentState {
let mut state: AgentState = parent_state
.iter()
.filter(|(k, _)| !EXCLUDED_STATE_KEYS.contains(&k.as_str()))
.map(|(k, v)| (k.clone(), v.clone()))
.collect();
state.insert(
"messages".to_string(),
serde_json::json!([{"type": "human", "content": task_description}]),
);
let mut state = AgentState::new();
// Files are not in EXCLUDED_STATE_KEYS — they pass through to the child.
state.files = Arc::clone(&parent_state.files);
state.push_message(Message::human(task_description));
state
}
/// Extract the final message from a subagent's result state.
pub fn extract_result_message(result_state: &AgentState) -> Option<String> {
let messages = result_state.get("messages")?;
let arr = messages.as_array()?;
let last = arr.last()?;
last.get("content")
.and_then(|c| c.as_str())
.map(|s| s.trim_end().to_string())
result_state
.messages
.last()
.map(|m| m.content().trim_end().to_string())
}
/// Merge non-excluded state from subagent result back into parent state.
///
/// Only non-excluded state merges back: `files` (subagent wins on path
/// conflict). Parent `messages` and `todos` are never overwritten.
pub fn merge_subagent_state(parent: &mut AgentState, subagent_result: &AgentState) {
for (k, v) in subagent_result {
if !EXCLUDED_STATE_KEYS.contains(&k.as_str()) {
parent.insert(k.clone(), v.clone());
}
for (path, data) in subagent_result.files.iter() {
parent.set_file(path.clone(), data.clone());
}
}
@ -309,48 +305,53 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(back.tools.len(), 2);
}
use rvagent_core::state::{FileData, TodoItem, TodoStatus};
fn file(content: &str) -> FileData {
FileData {
content: content.into(),
encoding: "utf-8".into(),
modified_at: None,
}
}
#[test]
fn test_state_isolation_prepare() {
let mut parent = AgentState::new();
parent.insert(
"messages".into(),
serde_json::json!([{"type": "ai", "content": "secret"}]),
);
parent.insert("remaining_steps".into(), serde_json::json!(5));
parent.insert("task_completion".into(), serde_json::json!(false));
parent.insert("custom_key".into(), serde_json::json!("visible"));
parent.insert("todos".into(), serde_json::json!([]));
parent.push_message(Message::ai("secret"));
parent.push_todo(TodoItem {
content: "parent todo".into(),
status: TodoStatus::Pending,
active_form: String::new(),
});
parent.set_file("/src/main.rs", file("fn main() {}"));
parent.memory_contents = Some(std::sync::Arc::new(
[("AGENTS.md".to_string(), "secret memory".to_string())]
.into_iter()
.collect(),
));
let child = prepare_subagent_state(&parent, "Do X");
// Parent messages must NOT leak
let msgs = child.get("messages").unwrap().as_array().unwrap();
assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(msgs[0]["content"], "Do X");
assert_eq!(msgs[0]["type"], "human");
// Parent messages must NOT leak — child gets exactly one human message.
assert_eq!(child.message_count(), 1);
assert_eq!(child.messages[0].content(), "Do X");
assert!(matches!(child.messages[0], Message::Human(_)));
// Excluded keys must not appear (except messages which is replaced)
assert!(child.get("remaining_steps").is_none());
assert!(child.get("task_completion").is_none());
assert!(child.get("todos").is_none());
// Excluded state must not appear.
assert!(child.todos.is_empty());
assert!(child.memory_contents.is_none());
assert!(child.skills_metadata.is_none());
// Non-excluded keys must pass through
assert_eq!(
child.get("custom_key").unwrap(),
&serde_json::json!("visible")
);
// Files pass through (non-excluded state).
assert!(child.files.contains_key("/src/main.rs"));
}
#[test]
fn test_extract_result_message() {
let mut state = AgentState::new();
state.insert(
"messages".into(),
serde_json::json!([
{"type": "human", "content": "do X"},
{"type": "ai", "content": "Done with X. "}
]),
);
state.push_message(Message::human("do X"));
state.push_message(Message::ai("Done with X. "));
let msg = extract_result_message(&state).unwrap();
assert_eq!(msg, "Done with X.");
}
@ -358,25 +359,28 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn test_merge_subagent_state() {
let mut parent = AgentState::new();
parent.insert("messages".into(), serde_json::json!([]));
parent.insert("existing".into(), serde_json::json!(1));
parent.push_message(Message::human("parent message"));
parent.set_file("/existing.rs", file("existing"));
let mut child_result = AgentState::new();
child_result.insert(
"messages".into(),
serde_json::json!([{"type": "ai", "content": "hi"}]),
);
child_result.insert("new_key".into(), serde_json::json!("added"));
child_result.insert("todos".into(), serde_json::json!(["leaked"]));
child_result.push_message(Message::ai("hi"));
child_result.push_todo(TodoItem {
content: "leaked".into(),
status: TodoStatus::Pending,
active_form: String::new(),
});
child_result.set_file("/new.rs", file("added"));
merge_subagent_state(&mut parent, &child_result);
// messages should NOT be overwritten (excluded)
assert_eq!(parent.get("messages").unwrap(), &serde_json::json!([]));
assert_eq!(parent.message_count(), 1);
assert_eq!(parent.messages[0].content(), "parent message");
// todos should NOT leak
assert!(parent.get("todos").is_none());
// new non-excluded keys should merge
assert_eq!(parent.get("new_key").unwrap(), &serde_json::json!("added"));
assert!(parent.todos.is_empty());
// new non-excluded state (files) should merge
assert!(parent.files.contains_key("/new.rs"));
assert!(parent.files.contains_key("/existing.rs"));
}
#[test]

View file

@ -1,14 +1,22 @@
//! Integration tests for rvAgent subagents.
use std::collections::HashMap;
use rvagent_core::messages::Message;
use rvagent_core::state::{FileData, TodoItem, TodoStatus};
use rvagent_subagents::builder::compile_subagents;
use rvagent_subagents::orchestrator::{spawn_parallel, SubAgentOrchestrator};
use rvagent_subagents::{
extract_result_message, merge_subagent_state, prepare_subagent_state, AgentState,
CompiledSubAgent, RvAgentConfig, SubAgentSpec, EXCLUDED_STATE_KEYS,
CompiledSubAgent, RvAgentConfig, SubAgentSpec,
};
fn file_data(content: &str) -> FileData {
FileData {
content: content.into(),
encoding: "utf-8".into(),
modified_at: None,
}
}
fn test_config() -> RvAgentConfig {
RvAgentConfig {
default_model: Some("anthropic:claude-sonnet-4-20250514".into()),
@ -28,24 +36,14 @@ fn mock_compiled(name: &str) -> CompiledSubAgent {
}
fn parent_state_with_data() -> AgentState {
let mut state = AgentState::new();
state.insert(
"messages".into(),
serde_json::json!([
{"type": "system", "content": "You are helpful."},
{"type": "human", "content": "Do something."},
]),
);
state.insert("remaining_steps".into(), serde_json::json!(10));
state.insert(
"task_completion".into(),
serde_json::json!({"status": "in_progress"}),
);
state.insert(
"files".into(),
serde_json::json!({"main.rs": "fn main() {}"}),
);
state.insert("custom_data".into(), serde_json::json!("value"));
let mut state = AgentState::with_system_message("You are helpful.");
state.push_message(Message::human("Do something."));
state.push_todo(TodoItem {
content: "parent task".into(),
status: TodoStatus::InProgress,
active_form: String::new(),
});
state.set_file("main.rs", file_data("fn main() {}"));
state
}
@ -73,39 +71,22 @@ fn test_state_isolation() {
let parent = parent_state_with_data();
let child = prepare_subagent_state(&parent, "Do a subtask");
// remaining_steps and task_completion should be excluded
assert!(
!child.contains_key("remaining_steps"),
"remaining_steps leaked"
);
assert!(
!child.contains_key("task_completion"),
"task_completion leaked"
);
// Parent todos should be excluded
assert!(child.todos.is_empty(), "todos leaked");
// messages is re-created with the task description, not the parent's messages
let child_msgs = child.get("messages").unwrap().as_array().unwrap();
assert_eq!(child_msgs.len(), 1);
assert!(child_msgs[0]["content"]
.as_str()
.unwrap()
.contains("subtask"));
assert_eq!(child.message_count(), 1);
assert!(child.messages[0].content().contains("subtask"));
// Non-excluded keys should be present
assert!(child.contains_key("files"));
assert!(child.contains_key("custom_data"));
// Non-excluded state (files) should be present
assert!(child.files.contains_key("main.rs"));
}
#[test]
fn test_extract_result_message() {
let mut state = AgentState::new();
state.insert(
"messages".into(),
serde_json::json!([
{"type": "ai", "content": "Working..."},
{"type": "ai", "content": "Done! Here is the result."}
]),
);
state.push_message(Message::ai("Working..."));
state.push_message(Message::ai("Done! Here is the result."));
let result = extract_result_message(&state);
assert!(result.is_some());
@ -115,24 +96,18 @@ fn test_extract_result_message() {
#[test]
fn test_merge_preserves_parent_messages() {
let mut parent = parent_state_with_data();
let parent_msgs = parent.get("messages").cloned();
let parent_msg_count = parent.message_count();
let mut child_result = AgentState::new();
child_result.insert(
"messages".into(),
serde_json::json!([{"type": "ai", "content": "child"}]),
);
child_result.insert("new_key".into(), serde_json::json!("from child"));
child_result.push_message(Message::ai("child"));
child_result.set_file("child.rs", file_data("from child"));
merge_subagent_state(&mut parent, &child_result);
// Parent messages must not be overwritten
assert_eq!(parent.get("messages"), parent_msgs.as_ref());
// New keys from child should be merged
assert_eq!(
parent.get("new_key"),
Some(&serde_json::json!("from child"))
);
assert_eq!(parent.message_count(), parent_msg_count);
// New files from child should be merged
assert!(parent.files.contains_key("child.rs"));
}
#[test]
@ -184,8 +159,4 @@ fn test_compilation_respects_capabilities() {
fn test_extract_result_empty_messages() {
let state = AgentState::new();
assert!(extract_result_message(&state).is_none());
let mut state2 = AgentState::new();
state2.insert("messages".into(), serde_json::json!([]));
assert!(extract_result_message(&state2).is_none());
}

View file

@ -6,14 +6,24 @@
//! - Result validation (max length, injection detection)
//! - Parallel spawning
use rvagent_core::messages::Message;
use rvagent_core::state::{FileData, SkillMetadata, TodoItem, TodoStatus};
use rvagent_subagents::builder::compile_subagents;
use rvagent_subagents::orchestrator::{spawn_parallel, SubAgentOrchestrator};
use rvagent_subagents::validator::{SubAgentResultValidator, DEFAULT_MAX_RESPONSE_LENGTH};
use rvagent_subagents::{
merge_subagent_state, prepare_subagent_state, AgentState, CompiledSubAgent, RvAgentConfig,
SubAgentSpec, EXCLUDED_STATE_KEYS,
SubAgentSpec,
};
fn file_data(content: &str) -> FileData {
FileData {
content: content.into(),
encoding: "utf-8".into(),
modified_at: None,
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Helpers
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@ -42,38 +52,26 @@ fn mock_compiled(name: &str) -> CompiledSubAgent {
}
fn parent_state_with_secrets() -> AgentState {
let mut state = AgentState::new();
state.insert(
"messages".into(),
serde_json::json!([
{"type": "system", "content": "You are a helpful assistant."},
{"type": "human", "content": "Help me refactor main.rs"},
{"type": "ai", "content": "I'll help you refactor."},
]),
);
state.insert("remaining_steps".into(), serde_json::json!(42));
state.insert("task_completion".into(), serde_json::json!({"done": false}));
state.insert(
"todos".into(),
serde_json::json!([
{"id": "1", "content": "Fix bug", "status": "in_progress"}
]),
);
state.insert(
"structured_response".into(),
serde_json::json!({"format": "markdown"}),
);
state.insert(
"skills_metadata".into(),
serde_json::json!([{"name": "coder"}]),
);
state.insert(
"memory_contents".into(),
serde_json::json!({"AGENTS.md": "secret"}),
);
// Non-excluded keys
state.insert("cwd".into(), serde_json::json!("/home/user/project"));
state.insert("project_config".into(), serde_json::json!({"lang": "rust"}));
let mut state = AgentState::with_system_message("You are a helpful assistant.");
state.push_message(Message::human("Help me refactor main.rs"));
state.push_message(Message::ai("I'll help you refactor."));
state.push_todo(TodoItem {
content: "Fix bug".into(),
status: TodoStatus::InProgress,
active_form: String::new(),
});
state.skills_metadata = Some(std::sync::Arc::new(vec![SkillMetadata {
name: "coder".into(),
description: "Writes code".into(),
parameters: serde_json::json!({}),
}]));
state.memory_contents = Some(std::sync::Arc::new(
[("AGENTS.md".to_string(), "secret".to_string())]
.into_iter()
.collect(),
));
// Non-excluded state
state.set_file("/home/user/project/main.rs", file_data("fn main() {}"));
state
}
@ -147,85 +145,62 @@ fn test_state_isolation() {
// Prepare child state
let child = prepare_subagent_state(&parent, "Refactor the auth module");
// ALL excluded keys must not appear in child state (except messages which is replaced)
for key in EXCLUDED_STATE_KEYS {
if *key == "messages" {
// Messages is replaced, not excluded entirely
continue;
}
assert!(
!child.contains_key(*key),
"Excluded key '{}' must not appear in child state",
key
);
}
// Verify specific excluded keys
assert!(!child.contains_key("remaining_steps"));
assert!(!child.contains_key("task_completion"));
assert!(!child.contains_key("todos"));
assert!(!child.contains_key("structured_response"));
assert!(!child.contains_key("skills_metadata"));
assert!(!child.contains_key("memory_contents"));
// Excluded state must not appear in child state
assert!(child.todos.is_empty(), "todos must not leak");
assert!(
child.skills_metadata.is_none(),
"skills_metadata must not leak"
);
assert!(
child.memory_contents.is_none(),
"memory_contents must not leak"
);
// Messages must be replaced with task description
let child_msgs = child.get("messages").unwrap().as_array().unwrap();
assert_eq!(child_msgs.len(), 1, "Child must have exactly 1 message");
assert_eq!(child_msgs[0]["type"], "human");
assert!(child_msgs[0]["content"]
.as_str()
.unwrap()
assert_eq!(
child.message_count(),
1,
"Child must have exactly 1 message"
);
assert!(matches!(
child.messages[0],
rvagent_core::messages::Message::Human(_)
));
assert!(child.messages[0]
.content()
.contains("Refactor the auth module"));
// Non-excluded keys must pass through
assert_eq!(
child.get("cwd").unwrap(),
&serde_json::json!("/home/user/project")
);
assert_eq!(
child.get("project_config").unwrap(),
&serde_json::json!({"lang": "rust"})
);
// Non-excluded state (files) must pass through
assert!(child.files.contains_key("/home/user/project/main.rs"));
// Verify merge doesn't leak excluded keys back
// Verify merge doesn't leak excluded state back
let mut parent_copy = parent_state_with_secrets();
let parent_msgs_before = parent_copy.get("messages").cloned();
let parent_msgs_before = parent_copy.message_count();
let parent_todo_before = parent_copy.todos[0].content.clone();
let mut child_result = AgentState::new();
child_result.insert(
"messages".into(),
serde_json::json!([
{"type": "ai", "content": "Refactoring complete."}
]),
);
child_result.insert(
"todos".into(),
serde_json::json!([
{"id": "child-1", "content": "leaked todo"}
]),
);
child_result.insert("new_discovery".into(), serde_json::json!("found a bug"));
child_result.push_message(Message::ai("Refactoring complete."));
child_result.push_todo(TodoItem {
content: "leaked todo".into(),
status: TodoStatus::Pending,
active_form: String::new(),
});
child_result.set_file("/new_discovery.md", file_data("found a bug"));
merge_subagent_state(&mut parent_copy, &child_result);
// Parent messages must NOT be overwritten by child
assert_eq!(parent_copy.get("messages"), parent_msgs_before.as_ref());
assert_eq!(parent_copy.message_count(), parent_msgs_before);
// Child's todos must NOT leak to parent
let parent_todos = parent_copy.get("todos").unwrap();
assert!(
parent_todos.as_array().unwrap()[0]["content"]
.as_str()
.unwrap()
.contains("Fix bug"),
assert_eq!(parent_copy.todos.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(
parent_copy.todos[0].content, parent_todo_before,
"Parent todos must not be overwritten by child"
);
// New non-excluded keys should merge
assert_eq!(
parent_copy.get("new_discovery"),
Some(&serde_json::json!("found a bug"))
);
// New non-excluded state should merge
assert!(parent_copy.files.contains_key("/new_discovery.md"));
}
// ===========================================================================

View file

@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ use rvagent_subagents::{
spawn_parallel, AgentState, CompiledSubAgent, SpawnError, SubAgentOrchestrator, SubAgentSpec,
ValidationConfig, ValidationError,
};
use std::collections::HashMap;
fn create_test_orchestrator() -> SubAgentOrchestrator {
let spec = SubAgentSpec::new("test-agent", "Do the thing");
@ -33,7 +32,7 @@ fn create_test_orchestrator_with_config(config: ValidationConfig) -> SubAgentOrc
}
fn create_empty_state() -> AgentState {
HashMap::new()
AgentState::new()
}
#[test]

View file

@ -20,6 +20,11 @@ async-trait = "0.1"
glob = "0.3"
walkdir = "2.5"
# Killing a timed-out command's whole process group needs kill(2) on a
# negative pid, which std does not expose.
[target.'cfg(unix)'.dependencies]
libc = "0.2"
[dev-dependencies]
criterion = { workspace = true }
tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["test-util"] }

View file

@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
//! Diagnostics for failed string edits (ADR-273 §3.1, §3.3).
//!
//! "Error: old_string not found" is the single highest-frequency tool failure
//! in an editing agent, and it is nearly useless on its own: the model already
//! believed the string was there, so restating that it isn't gives it nothing
//! to change. It then retries a near-identical call, which is the input
//! condition for loop detection.
//!
//! Edit-tool ergonomics are load-bearing rather than incidental — in the
//! published reproductions, only the flavor with real failure diagnostics moved
//! the benchmark number; a plain `edit`/`write_file` pair gave no improvement
//! at all. So this module works out *why* a match failed and says so.
/// Maximum characters of a candidate line echoed back in a diagnostic.
const SNIPPET_LEN: usize = 160;
/// Explain why `old_string` did not match anything in `content`.
///
/// Returns an actionable message naming the likely cause. Ordered by how
/// common the cause is in practice, so the first plausible explanation is the
/// most likely one.
pub fn diagnose_edit_failure(content: &str, old_string: &str, path: &str) -> String {
let base = format!("Error: old_string not found in {path}.");
// 1. Line endings. Invisible, and it defeats an otherwise exact match.
if content.contains("\r\n") && !old_string.contains("\r\n") {
let normalized = old_string.replace('\n', "\r\n");
if content.contains(&normalized) {
return format!(
"{base} The file uses CRLF line endings but old_string uses LF. \
The text is present re-read the file and copy the exact bytes."
);
}
}
// 2. Whitespace. Indentation drift is the classic cause: the model
// reconstructs the line from memory and gets the leading spaces wrong.
let squeeze = |s: &str| -> String { s.split_whitespace().collect::<Vec<_>>().join(" ") };
let squeezed_old = squeeze(old_string);
if !squeezed_old.is_empty() && squeeze(content).contains(&squeezed_old) {
return format!(
"{base} A match exists when whitespace is ignored, so the difference is \
indentation, trailing spaces, or tabs-vs-spaces. Re-read the file and \
copy the exact leading whitespace."
);
}
// 3. Case.
if content.to_lowercase().contains(&old_string.to_lowercase()) {
return format!(
"{base} A match exists ignoring case — the difference is capitalization only."
);
}
// 4. Partial match: locate the anchor line and show what is actually there.
// This is the most useful case, because it hands the model the real text.
if let Some(hint) = nearest_line_hint(content, old_string) {
return format!("{base} {hint}");
}
format!(
"{base} No similar text was found. The file may not contain this code at all — \
read the file before editing it, rather than assuming its contents."
)
}
/// Find the line in `content` most similar to the first line of `old_string`,
/// and describe the mismatch.
fn nearest_line_hint(content: &str, old_string: &str) -> Option<String> {
let needle = old_string.lines().next()?.trim();
if needle.len() < 4 {
// Too short to attribute a near-match to anything meaningful.
return None;
}
let mut best: Option<(usize, usize, &str)> = None; // (score, line_no, text)
for (i, line) in content.lines().enumerate() {
let score = shared_prefix_len(line.trim(), needle);
if score >= 4 && best.map(|(b, _, _)| score > b).unwrap_or(true) {
best = Some((score, i + 1, line));
}
}
let (_, line_no, text) = best?;
Some(format!(
"The closest line in the file is line {line_no}: {:?}. \
Copy it exactly, including whitespace.",
truncate(text.trim_end(), SNIPPET_LEN)
))
}
/// Length of the common prefix of two strings, in characters.
fn shared_prefix_len(a: &str, b: &str) -> usize {
a.chars().zip(b.chars()).take_while(|(x, y)| x == y).count()
}
/// Truncate on a character boundary, marking the cut.
fn truncate(s: &str, max: usize) -> String {
if s.chars().count() <= max {
return s.to_string();
}
let cut: String = s.chars().take(max).collect();
format!("{cut}")
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn detects_indentation_mismatch() {
let content = "fn main() {\n let x = 1;\n}\n";
// Wrong indentation, not missing: matching is substring-based, so an
// omitted indent still matches and never reaches this diagnostic.
let msg = diagnose_edit_failure(content, " let x = 1;", "a.rs");
assert!(msg.contains("whitespace is ignored"), "got: {msg}");
assert!(msg.contains("exact leading whitespace"));
}
#[test]
fn detects_tabs_versus_spaces() {
let content = "fn main() {\n\tlet x = 1;\n}\n";
let msg = diagnose_edit_failure(content, " let x = 1;", "a.rs");
assert!(msg.contains("tabs-vs-spaces"), "got: {msg}");
}
#[test]
fn detects_crlf_mismatch() {
let content = "line one\r\nline two\r\n";
let msg = diagnose_edit_failure(content, "line one\nline two", "a.txt");
assert!(msg.contains("CRLF"), "got: {msg}");
assert!(msg.contains("The text is present"));
}
#[test]
fn detects_case_mismatch() {
let content = "let Value = 1;\n";
let msg = diagnose_edit_failure(content, "let value = 1;", "a.rs");
assert!(msg.contains("capitalization"), "got: {msg}");
}
#[test]
fn shows_the_nearest_line_when_content_drifted() {
let content = "fn compute(a: u32, b: u32) -> u32 {\n a + b\n}\n";
// Same opening but a different signature — the most common real case.
let msg = diagnose_edit_failure(content, "fn compute(a: u32) -> u32 {", "a.rs");
assert!(
msg.contains("closest line in the file is line 1"),
"got: {msg}"
);
assert!(msg.contains("fn compute(a: u32, b: u32)"), "got: {msg}");
}
#[test]
fn says_so_plainly_when_nothing_is_close() {
let content = "completely unrelated file contents\n";
let msg = diagnose_edit_failure(content, "fn transmogrify() {", "a.rs");
assert!(msg.contains("No similar text was found"), "got: {msg}");
assert!(msg.contains("read the file before editing"));
}
#[test]
fn always_names_the_path() {
let msg = diagnose_edit_failure("x", "y", "src/lib.rs");
assert!(msg.contains("src/lib.rs"));
}
#[test]
fn handles_multibyte_content_without_panicking() {
let content = "let s = \"héllo 🙂 wörld\";\n";
let msg = diagnose_edit_failure(content, "let s = \"hello world\";", "a.rs");
assert!(!msg.is_empty());
}
#[test]
fn does_not_guess_from_a_trivially_short_needle() {
let content = "aaaa bbbb\ncccc dddd\n";
// A 2-char needle would "nearly match" almost any line; it must not
// produce a confident and wrong nearest-line claim.
let msg = diagnose_edit_failure(content, "xy", "a.txt");
assert!(msg.contains("No similar text was found"), "got: {msg}");
}
#[test]
fn truncates_a_very_long_candidate_line() {
let long = "x".repeat(500);
let content = format!("prefix_{long}\n");
let msg = diagnose_edit_failure(&content, &format!("prefix_{}", "y".repeat(20)), "a.txt");
assert!(
msg.len() < 400,
"diagnostic should stay compact: {}",
msg.len()
);
}
}

View file

@ -3,10 +3,12 @@
//! Provides the `Tool` trait, `BuiltinTool`/`AnyTool` enum dispatch,
//! `ToolRuntime` context, and parallel execution (ADR-103 A2).
pub mod edit_diag;
pub mod edit_file;
pub mod execute;
pub mod glob;
pub mod grep;
pub mod local;
pub mod ls;
pub mod read_file;
pub mod task;
@ -19,10 +21,12 @@ use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::fmt;
use std::sync::Arc;
pub use edit_diag::diagnose_edit_failure;
pub use edit_file::EditFileTool;
pub use execute::ExecuteTool;
pub use glob::GlobTool;
pub use grep::GrepTool;
pub use local::LocalFsBackend;
pub use ls::LsTool;
pub use read_file::ReadFileTool;
pub use task::TaskTool;
@ -475,16 +479,35 @@ pub fn format_content_with_line_numbers(content: &str, start_line: usize) -> Str
if i > 0 {
out.push('\n');
}
let truncated = &line[..line.len().min(MAX_LINE_LEN)];
use std::fmt::Write;
write!(
out,
"{:>width$}\t{}",
start_line + i,
truncated,
width = LINE_NUMBER_WIDTH
)
.unwrap();
if line.len() <= MAX_LINE_LEN {
write!(
out,
"{:>width$}\t{}",
start_line + i,
line,
width = LINE_NUMBER_WIDTH
)
.unwrap();
} else {
// Walk back to a character boundary: slicing at a fixed byte offset
// panics when a multi-byte character straddles it.
let mut end = MAX_LINE_LEN;
while end > 0 && !line.is_char_boundary(end) {
end -= 1;
}
// Mark the cut. Silent truncation leaves the model believing it has
// seen the whole line, which is worse than showing less.
write!(
out,
"{:>width$}\t{}… [line truncated, {} more bytes]",
start_line + i,
&line[..end],
line.len() - end,
width = LINE_NUMBER_WIDTH
)
.unwrap();
}
}
out
}
@ -549,7 +572,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests_common {
if offset >= lines.len() {
return Ok(String::new());
}
let end = (offset + limit).min(lines.len());
let end = offset.saturating_add(limit).min(lines.len());
Ok(lines[offset..end].join("\n"))
}
None => Err(format!("File not found: {}", path)),
@ -944,9 +967,31 @@ mod tests {
let result = format_content_with_line_numbers(&long_line, 1);
let lines: Vec<&str> = result.lines().collect();
assert_eq!(lines.len(), 1);
// Extract the content after the line number and tab
let content = lines[0].split('\t').nth(1).unwrap();
assert_eq!(content.len(), MAX_LINE_LEN);
// The cut must be visible: silent truncation leaves the model believing
// it saw the whole line.
assert!(content.starts_with(&"a".repeat(MAX_LINE_LEN)));
assert!(content.contains("[line truncated, 100 more bytes]"));
}
#[test]
fn test_format_line_truncation_is_char_boundary_safe() {
// A multi-byte character straddling the cut point used to panic on a
// raw byte slice.
let mut line = "a".repeat(MAX_LINE_LEN - 1);
line.push('é'); // 2 bytes, spanning MAX_LINE_LEN
line.push_str(&"b".repeat(50));
let result = format_content_with_line_numbers(&line, 1);
assert!(result.contains("[line truncated"));
}
#[test]
fn test_format_multibyte_line_does_not_panic() {
for pad in 0..4 {
let mut line = "a".repeat(MAX_LINE_LEN - pad);
line.push_str(&"🙂".repeat(10));
let _ = format_content_with_line_numbers(&line, 1);
}
}
#[test]

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

View file

@ -0,0 +1,790 @@
//! Phase 0 exit gate: end-to-end tool calling.
//!
//! These tests wire the *shipped* pieces together — the real builtin tool
//! registry, the real `LocalFsBackend`, and the real `AgentGraph` loop — against
//! a scripted model. Everything except the network call to the provider is
//! production code, so the gate fails if the loop, the schemas, or the tools
//! regress.
//!
//! What each P0 claim is verified by:
//! * P0.2 (schemas reach the model) — `schemas_reach_the_model`
//! * P0.4 (errors feed back, not abort) — `tool_error_feeds_back_and_loop_continues`
//! * P0.4 (parallel exec preserves order) — `parallel_tool_calls_preserve_order`
//! * P0.4 (usage accounting) — `usage_metadata_is_aggregated`
//! * real side effects on disk — `write_then_read_roundtrip_through_the_loop`
//! * confinement holds through the loop — `path_escape_is_refused_through_the_loop`
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use rvagent_core::error::Result;
use rvagent_core::graph::{AgentGraph, GraphConfig, ToolExecutor};
use rvagent_core::messages::{Message, ToolCall};
use rvagent_core::models::{ChatModel, ToolDefinition};
use rvagent_core::state::AgentState;
use rvagent_tools::Tool as _;
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Test harness: the real tool executor, wired exactly as the CLI wires it
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/// Mirrors `CliToolExecutor`: real builtin tools over a real confined backend.
struct RealToolExecutor {
tools: Vec<rvagent_tools::AnyTool>,
backend: rvagent_tools::BackendRef,
}
impl RealToolExecutor {
fn new(root: &std::path::Path) -> Self {
Self {
tools: rvagent_tools::builtin_tools(),
backend: Arc::new(rvagent_tools::LocalFsBackend::new(root)),
}
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl ToolExecutor for RealToolExecutor {
async fn execute(&self, call: &ToolCall, _state: &AgentState) -> Result<String> {
let runtime = rvagent_tools::ToolRuntime::new(Arc::clone(&self.backend));
match rvagent_tools::resolve_tool(&call.name, &self.tools) {
Some(tool) => Ok(tool.invoke(call.args.clone(), &runtime).to_string()),
None => Ok(format!("Error: tool '{}' not found", call.name)),
}
}
fn definitions(&self) -> Vec<ToolDefinition> {
self.tools
.iter()
.map(|t| ToolDefinition {
name: t.name().to_string(),
description: t.description().to_string(),
input_schema: t.parameters_schema(),
})
.collect()
}
}
/// A scripted model that records what the loop actually sent it.
struct ScriptedModel {
responses: Mutex<Vec<Message>>,
/// Tool schemas observed on each `complete` call.
seen_tools: Mutex<Vec<Vec<ToolDefinition>>>,
/// Message history observed on the most recent `complete` call.
last_messages: Mutex<Vec<Message>>,
}
impl ScriptedModel {
fn new(responses: Vec<Message>) -> Self {
Self {
responses: Mutex::new(responses),
seen_tools: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
last_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
}
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl ChatModel for ScriptedModel {
async fn complete(&self, messages: &[Message], tools: &[ToolDefinition]) -> Result<Message> {
self.seen_tools.lock().unwrap().push(tools.to_vec());
*self.last_messages.lock().unwrap() = messages.to_vec();
let mut resps = self.responses.lock().unwrap();
if resps.is_empty() {
Ok(Message::ai("done"))
} else {
Ok(resps.remove(0))
}
}
async fn stream(&self, messages: &[Message], tools: &[ToolDefinition]) -> Result<Vec<Message>> {
Ok(vec![self.complete(messages, tools).await?])
}
}
fn call(id: &str, name: &str, args: serde_json::Value) -> ToolCall {
ToolCall {
id: id.into(),
name: name.into(),
args,
}
}
/// Collect tool-result message contents, in order.
fn tool_results(state: &AgentState) -> Vec<String> {
state
.messages
.iter()
.filter_map(|m| match m {
Message::Tool(t) => Some(t.content.clone()),
_ => None,
})
.collect()
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// P0.2 — tool schemas reach the model
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
#[tokio::test]
async fn schemas_reach_the_model() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let model = ScriptedModel::new(vec![Message::ai("hi")]);
let graph = AgentGraph::new(model, RealToolExecutor::new(dir.path()));
let state = graph.run(AgentState::with_system_message("sys")).await;
assert!(state.is_ok(), "loop failed: {:?}", state.err());
// The graph owns the model, so re-derive the expectation from the registry:
// every builtin tool must have been advertised with a usable schema.
let executor = RealToolExecutor::new(dir.path());
let defs = executor.definitions();
assert_eq!(defs.len(), rvagent_tools::builtin_tools().len());
assert!(defs.iter().any(|d| d.name == "read_file"));
assert!(defs.iter().any(|d| d.name == "write_file"));
for def in &defs {
assert!(
!def.description.is_empty(),
"{} has no description",
def.name
);
assert_eq!(
def.input_schema.get("type").and_then(|v| v.as_str()),
Some("object"),
"{} schema is not a JSON-Schema object: {}",
def.name,
def.input_schema
);
assert!(
def.input_schema.get("properties").is_some(),
"{} schema has no properties",
def.name
);
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn schemas_are_sent_on_every_turn_including_after_tools() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
std::fs::write(dir.path().join("f.txt"), "content").unwrap();
let model = Arc::new(ScriptedModel::new(vec![
Message::ai_with_tools(
"reading",
vec![call(
"t1",
"read_file",
serde_json::json!({"file_path": "f.txt"}),
)],
),
Message::ai("read it"),
]));
let graph = AgentGraph::new(
SharedModel(Arc::clone(&model)),
RealToolExecutor::new(dir.path()),
);
graph.run(AgentState::new()).await.unwrap();
let seen = model.seen_tools.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(seen.len(), 2, "expected two model turns");
for (turn, tools) in seen.iter().enumerate() {
assert!(
!tools.is_empty(),
"turn {turn} was sent no tool schemas — the model could not call a tool"
);
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Real side effects on disk
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
#[tokio::test]
async fn write_then_read_roundtrip_through_the_loop() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let model = ScriptedModel::new(vec![
Message::ai_with_tools(
"writing",
vec![call(
"t1",
"write_file",
serde_json::json!({"file_path": "out.txt", "content": "hello from the agent"}),
)],
),
Message::ai_with_tools(
"reading back",
vec![call(
"t2",
"read_file",
serde_json::json!({"file_path": "out.txt"}),
)],
),
Message::ai("verified"),
]);
let graph = AgentGraph::new(model, RealToolExecutor::new(dir.path()));
let state = graph.run(AgentState::new()).await.unwrap();
// The file must actually exist on disk — this is the end-to-end claim.
let written = std::fs::read_to_string(dir.path().join("out.txt"))
.expect("agent's write_file did not produce a real file");
assert_eq!(written, "hello from the agent");
let results = tool_results(&state);
assert_eq!(results.len(), 2, "expected one result per tool call");
assert!(
results[1].contains("hello from the agent"),
"read_file did not return the written content: {}",
results[1]
);
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// P0.4 — tool errors feed back as results instead of aborting
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
#[tokio::test]
async fn tool_error_feeds_back_and_loop_continues() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let model = ScriptedModel::new(vec![
Message::ai_with_tools(
"reading a file that isn't there",
vec![call(
"t1",
"read_file",
serde_json::json!({"file_path": "does-not-exist.txt"}),
)],
),
// The model gets to see the failure and recover.
Message::ai_with_tools(
"creating it instead",
vec![call(
"t2",
"write_file",
serde_json::json!({"file_path": "does-not-exist.txt", "content": "now it does"}),
)],
),
Message::ai("recovered"),
]);
let graph = AgentGraph::new(model, RealToolExecutor::new(dir.path()));
// The run must succeed: a failing tool is not a failing agent.
let state = graph
.run(AgentState::new())
.await
.expect("a tool error must not abort the loop");
let results = tool_results(&state);
assert_eq!(results.len(), 2);
assert!(
results[0].to_lowercase().contains("error")
|| results[0].to_lowercase().contains("no such file"),
"the failure was not reported back to the model: {}",
results[0]
);
assert!(
dir.path().join("does-not-exist.txt").exists(),
"the recovery turn did not run"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn unknown_tool_is_reported_not_fatal() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let model = ScriptedModel::new(vec![
Message::ai_with_tools("", vec![call("t1", "no_such_tool", serde_json::json!({}))]),
Message::ai("ok"),
]);
let graph = AgentGraph::new(model, RealToolExecutor::new(dir.path()));
let state = graph.run(AgentState::new()).await.unwrap();
let results = tool_results(&state);
assert_eq!(results.len(), 1);
assert!(results[0].contains("not found"), "got: {}", results[0]);
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// P0.4 — parallel execution
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
#[tokio::test]
async fn parallel_tool_calls_preserve_order() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
for i in 0..6 {
std::fs::write(dir.path().join(format!("f{i}.txt")), format!("body-{i}")).unwrap();
}
let calls: Vec<ToolCall> = (0..6)
.map(|i| {
call(
&format!("t{i}"),
"read_file",
serde_json::json!({"file_path": format!("f{i}.txt")}),
)
})
.collect();
let model = ScriptedModel::new(vec![
Message::ai_with_tools("reading all", calls),
Message::ai("done"),
]);
let config = GraphConfig {
parallel_tools: true,
max_parallel_tools: 3,
..GraphConfig::default()
};
let graph = AgentGraph::with_config(model, RealToolExecutor::new(dir.path()), config);
let state = graph.run(AgentState::new()).await.unwrap();
let results = tool_results(&state);
assert_eq!(results.len(), 6);
// Results must come back in call order even though execution is concurrent
// and the concurrency limit is lower than the number of calls.
for (i, r) in results.iter().enumerate() {
assert!(
r.contains(&format!("body-{i}")),
"result {i} out of order or wrong: {r}"
);
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn parallel_and_sequential_agree() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
for i in 0..4 {
std::fs::write(dir.path().join(format!("f{i}.txt")), format!("body-{i}")).unwrap();
}
let calls: Vec<ToolCall> = (0..4)
.map(|i| {
call(
&format!("t{i}"),
"read_file",
serde_json::json!({"file_path": format!("f{i}.txt")}),
)
})
.collect();
let mut outputs = Vec::new();
for parallel in [true, false] {
let model = ScriptedModel::new(vec![
Message::ai_with_tools("", calls.clone()),
Message::ai("done"),
]);
let config = GraphConfig {
parallel_tools: parallel,
max_parallel_tools: 2,
..GraphConfig::default()
};
let graph = AgentGraph::with_config(model, RealToolExecutor::new(dir.path()), config);
let state = graph.run(AgentState::new()).await.unwrap();
outputs.push(tool_results(&state));
}
assert_eq!(
outputs[0], outputs[1],
"parallel and sequential execution disagree"
);
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// P0.4 — usage accounting
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
#[tokio::test]
async fn usage_metadata_is_aggregated() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
// Two turns carrying provider usage metadata, as the backends attach it.
let mut first =
Message::ai_with_tools("", vec![call("t1", "ls", serde_json::json!({"path": "."}))]);
let mut second = Message::ai("done");
for (msg, input, output) in [(&mut first, 100u64, 20u64), (&mut second, 150u64, 30u64)] {
if let Message::Ai(ai) = msg {
ai.metadata.insert(
"usage".into(),
serde_json::json!({"input_tokens": input, "output_tokens": output}),
);
}
}
let model = ScriptedModel::new(vec![first, second]);
let graph = AgentGraph::new(model, RealToolExecutor::new(dir.path()));
let state = graph.run(AgentState::new()).await.unwrap();
// Usage metadata must survive on the messages so a caller can total it.
let totals: (u64, u64) = state
.messages
.iter()
.filter_map(|m| match m {
Message::Ai(ai) => ai.metadata.get("usage"),
_ => None,
})
.fold((0, 0), |(i, o), usage| {
(
i + usage
.get("input_tokens")
.and_then(|v| v.as_u64())
.unwrap_or(0),
o + usage
.get("output_tokens")
.and_then(|v| v.as_u64())
.unwrap_or(0),
)
});
assert_eq!(totals, (250, 50), "usage metadata was lost or miscounted");
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// ADR-274 — observation masking reaches the model
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/// Shares one `ScriptedModel` so its recorded observations outlive the graph.
struct SharedModel(Arc<ScriptedModel>);
#[async_trait]
impl ChatModel for SharedModel {
async fn complete(&self, messages: &[Message], tools: &[ToolDefinition]) -> Result<Message> {
self.0.complete(messages, tools).await
}
async fn stream(&self, messages: &[Message], tools: &[ToolDefinition]) -> Result<Vec<Message>> {
self.0.stream(messages, tools).await
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn old_observations_are_masked_before_reaching_the_model() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
for i in 0..5 {
std::fs::write(
dir.path().join(format!("f{i}.txt")),
format!("UNIQUE-BODY-{i}"),
)
.unwrap();
}
// Five sequential read turns, then a final answer.
let mut responses: Vec<Message> = (0..5)
.map(|i| {
Message::ai_with_tools(
"",
vec![call(
&format!("t{i}"),
"read_file",
serde_json::json!({ "file_path": format!("f{i}.txt") }),
)],
)
})
.collect();
responses.push(Message::ai("done"));
let model = Arc::new(ScriptedModel::new(responses));
let config = GraphConfig {
parallel_tools: false,
mask: rvagent_core::masking::MaskConfig {
keep_last_observations: 2,
..Default::default()
},
..GraphConfig::default()
};
let graph = AgentGraph::with_config(
SharedModel(Arc::clone(&model)),
RealToolExecutor::new(dir.path()),
config,
);
let state = graph.run(AgentState::new()).await.unwrap();
// What the model saw on the final turn: only the last 2 observations in
// full, the rest elided but still addressable.
let seen = model.last_messages.lock().unwrap().clone();
let seen_tools: Vec<&Message> = seen
.iter()
.filter(|m| matches!(m, Message::Tool(_)))
.collect();
assert_eq!(seen_tools.len(), 5, "every call still has a paired result");
for (i, msg) in seen_tools.iter().enumerate() {
let Message::Tool(t) = msg else {
unreachable!()
};
if i < 3 {
assert!(
t.content.contains("output elided"),
"observation {i} should have been masked: {}",
t.content
);
assert!(
t.content.contains(&format!("recall id t{i}")),
"masked observation {i} lost its recall handle: {}",
t.content
);
assert!(
!t.content.contains(&format!("UNIQUE-BODY-{i}")),
"masked observation {i} still carried its full body"
);
} else {
assert!(
t.content.contains(&format!("UNIQUE-BODY-{i}")),
"recent observation {i} must survive verbatim: {}",
t.content
);
}
}
// The stored log keeps everything — masking is a projection, not a
// mutation, which is what makes the elided content recoverable.
let stored = tool_results(&state);
assert_eq!(stored.len(), 5);
for (i, content) in stored.iter().enumerate() {
assert!(
content.contains(&format!("UNIQUE-BODY-{i}")),
"stored observation {i} was destroyed by masking: {content}"
);
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn recall_returns_the_full_content_of_a_masked_observation() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
for i in 0..4 {
std::fs::write(
dir.path().join(format!("f{i}.txt")),
format!("SECRET-BODY-{i}"),
)
.unwrap();
}
let mut responses: Vec<Message> = (0..4)
.map(|i| {
Message::ai_with_tools(
"",
vec![call(
&format!("t{i}"),
"read_file",
serde_json::json!({ "file_path": format!("f{i}.txt") }),
)],
)
})
.collect();
// t0 has been masked out of the model's view by now; dereference it.
responses.push(Message::ai_with_tools(
"",
vec![call(
"r1",
"recall",
serde_json::json!({ "recall_id": "t0" }),
)],
));
responses.push(Message::ai("done"));
let model = Arc::new(ScriptedModel::new(responses));
let config = GraphConfig {
parallel_tools: false,
mask: rvagent_core::masking::MaskConfig {
keep_last_observations: 2,
..Default::default()
},
..GraphConfig::default()
};
let graph = AgentGraph::with_config(
SharedModel(Arc::clone(&model)),
RealToolExecutor::new(dir.path()),
config,
);
let state = graph.run(AgentState::new()).await.unwrap();
// The recall tool must have been advertised, or the model could not call it.
let seen = model.seen_tools.lock().unwrap();
assert!(
seen.last().unwrap().iter().any(|d| d.name == "recall"),
"recall was not advertised while masking was active"
);
drop(seen);
// The recall result carries the content that was elided from the view.
let results = tool_results(&state);
let recalled = results.last().unwrap();
assert!(
recalled.contains("SECRET-BODY-0"),
"recall did not return the elided content: {recalled}"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn failed_edit_explains_why_it_failed() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
std::fs::write(
dir.path().join("code.rs"),
"fn main() {\n let total = 1;\n}\n",
)
.unwrap();
let model = ScriptedModel::new(vec![
Message::ai_with_tools(
"",
vec![call(
"t1",
"edit_file",
// Wrong indentation (8 spaces, file has 4). Omitting the
// indent entirely would still match as a substring; supplying
// the wrong amount is the failure that actually happens.
serde_json::json!({
"file_path": "code.rs",
"old_string": " let total = 1;",
"new_string": " let total = 2;"
}),
)],
),
Message::ai("done"),
]);
let graph = AgentGraph::new(model, RealToolExecutor::new(dir.path()));
let state = graph.run(AgentState::new()).await.unwrap();
let results = tool_results(&state);
assert_eq!(results.len(), 1);
// "not found" alone is useless — the model already believed it was there.
assert!(
results[0].contains("whitespace is ignored"),
"edit failure was not diagnosed: {}",
results[0]
);
assert!(results[0].contains("exact leading whitespace"));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn recall_with_an_unknown_id_is_actionable_not_fatal() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let model = ScriptedModel::new(vec![
Message::ai_with_tools(
"",
vec![call(
"r1",
"recall",
serde_json::json!({ "recall_id": "nope" }),
)],
),
Message::ai("done"),
]);
let graph = AgentGraph::new(model, RealToolExecutor::new(dir.path()));
let state = graph.run(AgentState::new()).await.unwrap();
let results = tool_results(&state);
assert_eq!(results.len(), 1);
assert!(results[0].contains("no observation found"));
// Must tell the model where valid ids come from, not just that it failed.
assert!(results[0].contains("placeholders"));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn oversized_tool_output_is_capped() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
// Many lines, so the total far exceeds the cap. (A single very long line
// would not: read_file truncates individual lines at its own limit.)
let body: String = (0..20_000).map(|i| format!("line {i}\n")).collect();
std::fs::write(dir.path().join("big.txt"), body).unwrap();
let model = ScriptedModel::new(vec![
Message::ai_with_tools(
"",
vec![call(
"t1",
"read_file",
serde_json::json!({"file_path": "big.txt", "limit": 100_000}),
)],
),
Message::ai("done"),
]);
let config = GraphConfig {
mask: rvagent_core::masking::MaskConfig {
max_tool_result_bytes: 4_000,
..Default::default()
},
..GraphConfig::default()
};
let graph = AgentGraph::with_config(model, RealToolExecutor::new(dir.path()), config);
let state = graph.run(AgentState::new()).await.unwrap();
let results = tool_results(&state);
assert_eq!(results.len(), 1);
assert!(
results[0].len() <= 4_000,
"tool output was not capped: {} bytes",
results[0].len()
);
assert!(
results[0].ends_with("[output truncated]"),
"truncation must be explicit so the model knows output was cut; got {} bytes: {:?}",
results[0].len(),
&results[0][..results[0].len().min(200)]
);
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Confinement holds through the full loop
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
#[tokio::test]
async fn path_escape_is_refused_through_the_loop() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let model = ScriptedModel::new(vec![
Message::ai_with_tools(
"exfiltrating",
vec![
call(
"t1",
"read_file",
serde_json::json!({"file_path": "/etc/passwd"}),
),
call(
"t2",
"read_file",
serde_json::json!({"file_path": "../../../../etc/passwd"}),
),
],
),
Message::ai("done"),
]);
let graph = AgentGraph::new(model, RealToolExecutor::new(dir.path()));
let state = graph.run(AgentState::new()).await.unwrap();
for (i, result) in tool_results(&state).iter().enumerate() {
assert!(
!result.contains("root:"),
"escape {i} leaked /etc/passwd contents: {result}"
);
// Must be refused *by the confinement check* specifically — a generic
// error (bad param, missing file) would pass vacuously and hide a
// regression in the boundary itself.
assert!(
result.contains("outside the workspace root"),
"escape {i} was not refused by path confinement: {result}"
);
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn write_escape_does_not_touch_the_filesystem() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let outside = dir.path().parent().unwrap().join("rvagent-e2e-escape.txt");
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&outside);
let model = ScriptedModel::new(vec![
Message::ai_with_tools(
"",
vec![call(
"t1",
"write_file",
serde_json::json!({"file_path": outside.to_string_lossy(), "content": "pwned"}),
)],
),
Message::ai("done"),
]);
let graph = AgentGraph::new(model, RealToolExecutor::new(dir.path()));
graph.run(AgentState::new()).await.unwrap();
assert!(
!outside.exists(),
"a write outside the workspace root reached the filesystem"
);
}

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@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
---
adr: 273
title: "rvAgent Harness Reliability Floor"
status: accepted
date: 2026-08-01
authors: [Reuven Cohen]
project: "rvAgent Harness"
related: [ADR-103, ADR-139, ADR-274, ADR-275, ADR-276, ADR-277]
tags: [rvagent, harness, reliability, agent-loop, tools, error-recovery, sota]
---
# ADR-273 — rvAgent Harness Reliability Floor
## Status
**Accepted.** Owner: Reuven Cohen. Project: rvAgent Harness. Date: 2026-08-01.
Evidence base: `docs/research/rvagent-hermes-harness/04-sota-landscape.md`.
## 1. Decision
**Sequence harness work by measured reliability impact, not by architectural
ambition.** A defined "reliability floor" of seven mechanisms ships before
event-streaming, cache-tiering, evolution, or any other Phase 1+ item.
This ADR reorders `03-roadmap.md` Phase 1. It does not remove any item from it.
## 2. Context
The cleanest harness ablation available (Claw-SWE-Bench, Jun 2026) rebuilds a
harness from bare model-emits-diff to full scaffolding: **19.1% → 73.4%,
+54.3 points**. Nearly all of that delta is patch-apply failures falling from
69.1% to under 1.5%.
That result generalizes across the technique literature: **the dominant wins
come from eliminating mechanical failure modes, not from better reasoning.**
Patches that don't apply, tool-call loops, context rot, flaky tests.
Two structural qualifiers:
- **Harness value scales inversely with model strength.** Same harness set:
12.5-point spread on GLM-5.1, 27.4-point spread on Qwen-3.6-flash. Targeting
frontier models only should be expected to yield roughly half the ROI the
literature reports.
- **Effect sizes are mostly single-source preprints.** The figures below are
hypotheses to re-measure in our own harness, not constants. What is
multiply-corroborated is the *direction* and the *ranking*.
This also settles the project's positioning argument. The case for Rust is not
speed — it is that the failure modes dominating these ablations can be made
**type-unrepresentable** rather than merely rare. See ADR-277.
## 3. The floor
Seven mechanisms, ordered by measured effect per unit of effort.
| # | Mechanism | Reported effect | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Reliable patch application | +54.3 pp | Partial |
| 2 | Observation-window management | +3 pp, prevents long-run collapse | Planned (ADR-274) |
| 3 | Loop / stuck detection | Removes most common catastrophic failure | **Done** |
| 4 | Actionable tool errors + response size caps | Part of the reliability delta | Partial |
| 5 | Tool surface held to 815 tools | Avoids 16 to 23 pt routing collapse | Holding at 9 |
| 6 | Environment bootstrap injection | Meta-Harness @ 76.4% TB2.0 | Planned |
| 7 | Persisted thinking across tool calls | +2.2 pp coding | Planned |
### 3.1 Reliable patch application
Real workspace, file-based edits, git-based diff extraction, and
**verify-after-write** — re-read the file and confirm the edit landed before
reporting success. Offer `str_replace` with fuzzy-failure diagnostics and
`write_file` side by side; **do not** offer unified diff, where line numbers,
hunk headers, and trailing newlines dominate apply failures.
Edit-tool ergonomics are load-bearing, not incidental: in the Qwen-3.6
reproduction only the SWE-agent `str_replace_editor` flavor moved the number,
while a different `edit`/`write_file` pair gave *zero* improvement.
Post-edit gate: run `cargo check` (not a full build) inline. This is the
analogue of SWE-agent's linter guardrail, which its ablations found essential
for recovering from bad edits.
### 3.2 Loop / stuck detection — **implemented**
Fingerprint each tool call by `(name, args)`; refuse it once it repeats
consecutively past a threshold (default 3), substituting an actionable message.
**Counting is consecutive, not windowed.** An agent re-running the same check
between edits is doing legitimate work; a windowed counter refuses it. Only an
unbroken run of identical calls trips the detector. Alternating cycles are not
caught — `max_iterations` remains the backstop, and the limitation is
documented on the type.
Raising `max_iterations` does **not** fix loops; it makes them more expensive.
`max_iterations` is a cost cap, not a loop guard.
Refused calls still emit exactly one tool result each, in the model's original
call order, so provider `tool_use`/`tool_result` pairing stays in sync.
### 3.3 Actionable errors and output caps
Tool errors must state what failed *and what to do differently*. An opaque
error code causes the model to retry the identical call, which is the input
condition for §3.2.
Cap tool responses (~25k tokens, matching Claude Code's default) with explicit
truncation markers. An uncapped tool result can consume the context window in
one call.
### 3.4 Tool surface budget
**Hold the builtin surface at 815 tools.** Routing accuracy degrades 1623
points across large catalogs; vendors document degradation past 3050 tools.
We currently ship 9 builtins — this is a constraint to *defend*, not a target
to grow toward.
MCP servers must therefore be gated behind explicit per-session enablement.
Exposing an MCP firehose directly into the tool list forfeits this.
### 3.5 Environment bootstrap injection
Before the loop starts, snapshot the workspace and inject it into the initial
prompt: cwd, file listing, toolchain versions, `cargo metadata` summary,
workspace members, the test command, and whether `cargo check` currently
passes. This eliminates early exploration turns. ~100 lines of code.
### 3.6 Persisted thinking
Do not strip prior-turn thinking blocks from history. Pure protocol plumbing;
+2.2 pp on coding (the smallest of the reported deltas — coding benefits least
because tool results are self-explanatory — but free).
## 4. Explicitly not in the floor
Rejected for v1 on evidence, not on effort:
- **Few-shot demonstrations and explicit CoT instructions** for reasoning
models — zero-shot ≥ few-shot; exemplars can contradict native reasoning.
- **Ungrounded self-reflection loops** — can degrade already-correct answers.
Only execution-grounded critique ("tests failed, here is the output") works.
- **Semantic/embedding code index** — vendor-only evidence, high maintenance,
and stale by construction on a repo the agent is actively editing. Layer
ripgrep → structural search → semantic, and only if a conceptual query
demands it.
- **Elaborate system-prompt frameworks** — the widely-quoted "2030%
improvement" claims have no published methodology. Keep rulebooks under ~60
lines.
- **Context windows beyond ~128k** — sweeps plateau around 114k; documented
ceilings sit at 96112k. Buying more window buys nothing.
- **Learned/RL-trained components** — the hand-written 80% is available for 5%
of the effort.
## 5. Consequences
**Positive.** The largest measured deltas land first. Five of seven mechanisms
are days of work. The floor is testable end-to-end without a live provider,
which is how the P0 exit gate is already structured.
**Negative.** Phase 1's architectural items (event-streaming loop, cache-first
prompt tiers) are deferred behind less glamorous work. This is deliberate: the
evidence does not support them being the biggest lever.
**Risk.** Effect sizes are largely single-source. Mitigation: §6.
## 6. Measurement obligation
Before trusting any A/B of a harness change, **verify test determinism** — run
F2P/P2P repeatedly under gold and base patches. Weak tests inflate resolve
rates by ~6.4 pp, and 1 in 5 "solved" patches on a saturated benchmark are
semantically incorrect. A 3-point improvement sits inside the flaky-test noise
band and means nothing.
Invest in eval-loop speed. Validation that cannot run in minutes will not get
run, and every mechanism in §3 needs it.
## 7. Implementation status
- §3.2 loop detection — **shipped** (`rvagent-core/src/graph.rs`, commit `e709e1a`)
- §3.1 partial — tools write real files; verify-after-write and git diff
extraction outstanding
- §3.4 — holding at 9 builtins
- §3.3, §3.5, §3.6 — outstanding

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@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
---
adr: 274
title: "rvAgent Context Management: Masking over Summarization"
status: accepted
date: 2026-08-01
authors: [Reuven Cohen]
project: "rvAgent Harness"
related: [ADR-103, ADR-252, ADR-273, ADR-275, ADR-276]
supersedes_parts_of: [ADR-252]
tags: [rvagent, harness, context, compaction, masking, long-horizon, sota]
---
# ADR-274 — rvAgent Context Management: Masking over Summarization
## Status
**Accepted.** Owner: Reuven Cohen. Project: rvAgent Harness. Date: 2026-08-01.
Evidence base: `docs/research/rvagent-hermes-harness/04-sota-landscape.md` §4.
**This ADR reverses a standing design bet.** `03-roadmap.md` Phase 1.3
(middle-turn summarization), Phase 2.5 (ADR-252 coherence-weighted
compaction), and the shipped default middleware pipeline all rely on LLM
summarization as the primary context strategy. The evidence says that is close
to the worst available option.
## 1. Decision
1. **Observation masking is the default** context strategy, not summarization.
2. **Masked observations keep a dereferenceable ID** (addressable recall).
3. **Programmatic tool calling** is added as a first-class capability.
4. **Invariants are re-injected verbatim after every compaction**, never
summarized.
5. **Context features are capability-gated per model tier.**
6. LLM summarization is retained only as a **rubric-guided fallback**.
## 2. Why the reversal
**Observation masking matches or beats LLM summarization at roughly half the
cost** (JetBrains, 250-turn SWE-bench trajectories, NeurIPS 2025 workshop:
+2.6% solve rate at 52% lower cost on Qwen3-Coder 480B).
The mechanism matters more than the number: **LLM summarization extended
trajectories 1315%** by destroying natural stopping signals. The agent loses
the cue that it already finished something and keeps working. A hybrid cut
cost 7% below pure masking.
A placeholder reading `[test output, 2,847 tokens, exit 1, elided]` is more
useful than a mediocre summary, because it preserves the *shape* of history
without fabricating its contents.
**Addressable Recall Compaction** (arXiv 2607.25066) improves on plain masking
by leaving an ID the agent can dereference on demand. It beat full-context,
sliding window, LLM summary, structured state, *and* RAG memory — NIAH 99.40%
vs 88.12% for the best baseline. This removes the main objection to masking
(irreversible loss).
### 2.1 The largest lever is not compaction at all
On LOCA-bench, six context strategies were compared across four frontier
models at 128k context. **Programmatic tool calling — the model writes code
that orchestrates tools, so intermediate outputs never enter context — was the
only strategy positive on every model tested** (+6.0 to +13.3 points).
Summarize-and-continue compaction was the *weakest* of the obvious strategies
(+2.6 points on the model where it helped most).
This is absent from the current roadmap and is the single highest-value
context item.
### 2.2 Compaction silently erases invariants
"Governance Decay" (arXiv 2606.22528) shows safety constraints and
system-prompt instructions **erode through successive compaction cycles with no
failure signal.** This is not jailbreaking — it emerges from the compression
architecture itself.
Therefore: the task statement, acceptance criteria, safety constraints, and
system prompt are **re-emitted byte-identical** after each compaction. They are
never inputs to a summarizer. Cheap, and directly counters a documented
mechanism.
### 2.3 Context features can make weaker models worse
On LOCA-bench, giving DeepSeek-V3.2 a memory tool dropped it from 10.7% to
**8.0%**, and telling it its remaining context budget dropped it to **4.0%**
while both features *helped* GPT-5.2 and Gemini-3-Flash.
Per-model-tier feature flags are therefore mandatory, not optional. A feature
that helps the frontier tier must not be enabled by default for weaker models.
## 3. Design
### 3.1 Masking
Replace old tool observations with typed placeholders carrying: tool name,
elided byte/token count, exit status where applicable, and a recall ID.
**Reasoning steps and actions are kept verbatim** — only observations are
masked. Keep the last N observations in full.
### 3.2 Addressable recall
Append-only, ID-addressable log of full observations. The placeholder carries
the handle; a `recall` tool dereferences it. No re-execution, no similarity
search, no embedding index.
### 3.3 Thresholds
Compact at **7080% of nominal context**, not 95%. Treat nominal window as
roughly **2× the reliable working budget** — degradation begins well under half
the advertised window, and it is silent. Anthropic's own API default compacts
at 150k on a 200k-class window, which is the most useful real-world datapoint.
Do not pursue larger context windows as a substitute: sweeps plateau ~114k and
documented ceilings sit at 96112k (ADR-273 §4).
### 3.4 Fallback summarization
When summarization is used, the **rubric is the load-bearing part**, not the
tool. Preserve explicitly: task statement, files touched, failing tests,
decisions made, unresolved issues. Offering a compaction tool without rubric
guidance produces uneven behavior; a paragraph of guidance closes the gap.
Guard against recursive summarization of summaries — a documented and fixed bug
in Codex's rewrite.
### 3.5 Prompt-cache interaction
Compaction invalidates every cached prefix downstream of the break. Keep a
byte-stable system prefix and place cache breakpoints *before* the volatile
region. Design for 10+ compaction cycles per session.
## 4. Retrieval policy
Layered escalation, not a choice between grep and semantic:
1. **ripgrep** — known symbol, exact identifier, error string
2. **Structural search** (ast-grep / LSP / `syn`) — callers of X, impls of Y
3. **Semantic** — only for conceptual cross-cutting queries
**Never route a short keyword query to a dense retriever.** CoREB (arXiv
2605.04615) shows short keyword queries — "auth flow", "user service", exactly
the shape agents emit — collapse essentially every embedding model to near-zero
nDCG@10. This explains the 2025 industry migration away from vector search in
coding agents mechanistically.
Summarize search output by default: return paths and match counts, require a
second call to read contents.
Any index over code the agent is editing is **stale by construction**. If one
is added later it needs invalidation-on-write or explicit staleness bounds.
## 5. What breaks first in long runs
Design priority follows the observed failure order:
1. **Wasted-context accumulation → attention dilution** — earliest, universal,
invisible. Unaided coding agents waste ~1-in-3 file reads.
2. **History error accumulation** — the largest single driver. Process-level
failures are **72.5%** of long-horizon failures (HORIZON, arXiv 2604.11978).
Errors compound *between* steps. Non-linear: sharp collapse past a
domain-specific threshold.
3. **Compaction-induced loss** — self-inflicted by the mitigation for #1.
4. **Goal / identity drift***downstream* of 13, not independent.
5. **Hallucinated state** — what #3 looks like when the summary is confidently
wrong rather than merely lossy.
The evidence does **not** support treating goal drift as the primary problem.
It is the observable end-stage of context and error problems, which is why
this ADR targets 13 and ADR-273 targets error compounding.
## 6. Consequences
**Positive.** Cheaper and faster than summarization (no model call on the hot
path). Deterministic, so it does not itself become a source of nondeterminism
in replay (ADR-277). No fabrication risk. Preserves stopping signals.
**Negative.** ADR-252 (coherence-weighted compaction) is demoted from the
default path to a fallback. Work already done there is not wasted — it becomes
the rubric-guided fallback of §3.4 — but it is no longer the primary strategy.
The `summarization` middleware currently in the shipped default pipeline must
be reordered behind masking, or removed from the default set.
**Risk.** Masking loses information that a good summary would have retained.
Mitigated by §3.2 addressable recall: the information is still there and still
reachable.
## 7. Implementation order
1. Observation masking with last-N-in-full (ADR-273 floor item 2)
2. Verbatim invariant re-injection (§2.2) — cheap, high consequence
3. Addressable recall log + `recall` tool (§3.2)
4. Programmatic tool calling (§2.1) — highest value, largest effort
5. Capability gating (§2.3)
6. Demote `summarization` middleware to fallback (§3.4)

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---
adr: 275
title: "rvAgent Subagent Topology: Single Writer with Auxiliary Intelligence"
status: accepted
date: 2026-08-01
authors: [Reuven Cohen]
project: "rvAgent Harness"
related: [ADR-103, ADR-107, ADR-273, ADR-274, ADR-277]
tags: [rvagent, harness, subagents, multi-agent, concurrency, sota]
---
# ADR-275 — rvAgent Subagent Topology: Single Writer with Auxiliary Intelligence
## Status
**Accepted.** Owner: Reuven Cohen. Project: rvAgent Harness. Date: 2026-08-01.
Evidence base: `docs/research/rvagent-hermes-harness/04-sota-landscape.md` §3.
**This ADR reverses a standing design bet.** `03-roadmap.md` Phase 1.6
specifies "real subagents (JoinSet spawn, semaphore, CoW fork/merge, CRDT
join)". CoW fork plus CRDT join *is* parallel-writer architecture — the one
multi-agent pattern with strong negative evidence for coding specifically.
## 1. Decision
**One writer. Auxiliary intelligence around it. Never parallel writes.**
The subagent boundary is modelled as **a tool that spawns an isolated context
and returns a String** — not as peer agents with a message bus, shared mutable
state, or a mergeable state type.
Two subagent roles are adopted; a third is deferred.
| Role | Status | Shares context? | Writes? |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fresh-context reviewer | **Gated** (amended, see §3.1) | **No** — deliberately | No |
| Read-only context-gatherer | Adopt | No | No |
| Coordinator / manager | Defer | — | No |
| Parallel writers | **Rejected** | — | — |
## 2. Why
### 2.1 The positive multi-agent result does not transfer to coding
Anthropic's multi-agent research system reports **+90.2%** over single-agent —
and simultaneously that **token usage alone explains 80% of the performance
variance** (95% with tool-call count and model added). Much of the gain is
*buying more compute*, not coordination; the missing control arm is a single
agent at the same 15× budget.
Anthropic states directly that the architecture suits **breadth-first**
questions with independent paths and is **less effective for tightly
interdependent tasks such as coding.**
### 2.2 The skeptical position was revised, not refuted
Cognition's "Don't Build Multi-Agents" (Jun 2025) argued for single-threaded
linear agents because "actions carry implicit decisions" that conflict when
parallelized.
Their April 2026 revision — after a year of production data — did not reverse
this. It refined it:
- **One writer, augmented by auxiliary intelligence. Never parallel writes.**
- Code review loop works: Devin Review catches ~**2 bugs per PR, 58% severe**.
- **Reviewers perform better with NO shared context.** Shorter context → less
context rot → deeper analysis. This inverts the usual "share everything"
instinct and is the most actionable finding here.
- Manager delegation ships but "requires extensive context engineering;
managers default to over-prescription without deep codebase knowledge."
### 2.3 At equal budget, single-agent wins on coding
The 2026 consensus across sources: at **equal token budget**, single-agent
matches or beats multi-agent on multi-hop reasoning. Multi-agent earns its
overhead only on breadth-first, parallel-decomposable, low-state-sharing tasks.
Coding is the canonical *bad* fit — it is the case where sub-results are
interdependent and merge conflicts are semantic, not textual.
A CRDT can merge two edits to the same file without conflict. It cannot make
the *result* coherent. That is precisely the failure Cognition describes.
## 3. Adopted patterns
### 3.1 Fresh-context reviewer — **GATED** (amended 2026-08-01, ADR-278 §7)
Spawns with **no inherited conversation** — only the diff and the task
statement. Returns findings as a string. Does not write.
The counterintuitive part is load-bearing: do **not** pass the parent's
context. The reviewer's value comes from evaluating the artifact without the
parent's accumulated rationalizations, and from having a short, clean window.
> **Amendment.** This was originally written as *adopted* on the strength of
> Cognition's production data (~2 bugs/PR, 58% severe). That overstated the
> evidence: **metaharness ADR-226 is a gold-scored null on a closely related
> design** — a read-only strong advisor produced **zero marginal resolves at
> 5.4× cost**, while being genuinely active (33 advisories, 3 vetoes). It was
> not considered when this section was written.
>
> The distinction that may preserve this design: ADR-226's advisor received the
> **full transcript**, whereas this reviewer receives **only the diff** — and the
> Cognition finding is precisely that reviewers do better *without* shared
> context. So ADR-226 does not refute §3.1, but it is the strongest nearby
> negative result and cannot be ignored.
>
> **Status is therefore downgraded from adopted to gated.** The reviewer must
> show marginal lift over a no-reviewer control on the same instances before it
> reaches the default path, and ADR-226's configuration is the specific null it
> must beat. §3.2 below is unaffected — ADR-226 independently corroborates it.
### 3.2 Read-only context-gatherer
Explores, reads, greps; returns a summary string. No shared mutable state, no
write tools in its surface.
Measured (SWE-Edit, Viewer + Editor split): **+2.1 pp resolve, 17.9% cost,
34.5% main-agent input tokens.**
**Use a cheap model here.** A specialized Qwen3-8B editor matched GPT-5-nano;
putting GPT-5 in that slot gave **+0.4 pp at 5.8× cost.** Model tiering per
subagent role is part of the design, not an optimization.
This is now corroborated internally: metaharness ADR-226 measured **zero
marginal lift at 5.4× cost** for a frontier model in a read-only slot. Two
independent measurements, near-identical cost multiple — treat "no expensive
model in a read-only slot" as established, not provisional.
This is also the cleanest lever on ADR-274 §5 failure #1 (wasted-context
accumulation): exploration output never enters the main window.
### 3.3 Deferred: coordinator
Only after single-agent is solid. Requires heavy context engineering to avoid
over-prescription.
## 4. Rejected: parallel writers, CoW fork/merge, CRDT join
Rejected on evidence for the coding domain. No rigorous positive coding result
exists; the negative evidence is production-scale and from a team that shipped
the architecture and walked it back.
**What is kept from Phase 1.6:** `JoinSet` spawning and semaphore-bounded
concurrency remain — they are how §3.1 and §3.2 subagents run concurrently with
each other. What is dropped is CoW state forking and CRDT merge, because
nothing writes concurrently and therefore nothing needs merging.
This is a substantial simplification: it removes a mergeable state type, the
merge-conflict semantics, and the entire class of bugs where two subagents
make locally-valid but jointly-incoherent edits.
## 5. Concurrency model
Retained from the existing loop and unchanged by this ADR:
- **Read-only tools run concurrently; state-mutating tools run sequentially.**
This is the industry-convergent split and matches MCP's `readOnlyHint`.
- Bounded concurrency via semaphore; results returned in call order.
- Each tool runs in its own task so a panicking tool surfaces as a tool error
rather than crashing the loop (already shipped).
## 6. Consequences
**Positive.** Removes the most complex unbuilt subsystem in the roadmap. Buys
nearly all demonstrated multi-agent upside — the reviewer and gatherer are the
two patterns with real production numbers — at a fraction of the complexity.
A `Fn(prompt) -> String` boundary is trivially testable and trivially
replayable (ADR-277).
**Negative.** Forecloses the "swarm of coders on one repo" demo. That demo has
no supporting evidence for coding tasks and would likely produce incoherent
results, so this is a cost worth paying — but it is a visible capability we are
choosing not to build.
**Interaction with ADR-107** (rvagent native swarm/WASM): swarm topology
remains valid for *independent* tasks across separate workspaces. This ADR
constrains concurrent writers **within a single workspace on a single task**,
which is the case the evidence covers.
## 7. Implementation
1. Subagent-as-tool trait: isolated context in, String out
2. Fresh-context reviewer (no inherited history)
3. Read-only gatherer with a write-free tool surface and cheap-tier model
4. Per-role model override
5. Remove CoW fork/merge and CRDT join from the Phase 1.6 scope

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---
adr: 276
title: "rvAgent Learning Loop: Gating, Trust Tiers and Measurement"
status: accepted
date: 2026-08-01
authors: [Reuven Cohen]
project: "rvAgent Harness"
related: [ADR-271, ADR-273, ADR-274, ADR-275, ADR-277, ADR-323]
tags: [rvagent, harness, memory, reasoningbank, sona, self-improvement, evaluation, security, sota]
---
# ADR-276 — rvAgent Learning Loop: Gating, Trust Tiers and Measurement
## Status
**Accepted.** Owner: Reuven Cohen. Project: rvAgent Harness. Date: 2026-08-01.
Evidence base: `docs/research/rvagent-hermes-harness/04-sota-landscape.md` §56.
**This ADR constrains a standing design bet.** `03-roadmap.md` Phase 2.4 puts
"SONA on the default path". The 2026 literature turned substantially against
this class of system. The component is not cancelled — it is gated behind
measurement it must earn.
## 1. Decision
1. **Trajectory-learning memory ships feature-gated OFF by default.**
2. **The measurement apparatus is a precondition for enabling it**, not a
follow-up.
3. **A permanent memory-off control arm** runs for the life of the system.
4. **Episodic storage is immutable**; distilled artifacts are derived.
5. **Consolidation is gated and delta-only** — never end-to-end rewrites.
6. **Trust tiers by verifier**, with untrusted-derived memories barred from
influencing permission or destructive-action decisions.
7. **Promotion uses anytime-valid sequential testing**, never greedy
accept-if-better.
## 2. Why the constraint
The case *for* is real and peer-reviewed: ReasoningBank reports +4.6 to +8.3
points on WebArena across three backbones (ICLR 2026); ACE reports +10.6% on
agents. Distilling from *failures* as well as successes is a genuine
contribution over success-only baselines.
The case *against* is now stronger:
- **The gains are confound-sized.** MemDelta (arXiv 2606.29914): swapping the
embedding model alone shifts accuracy **±6.2 pp** — comparable to
ReasoningBank's entire headline gain. Without controlled ablation you cannot
distinguish "our memory design works" from "we picked a better embedder." In
the same work, **agent self-memory (42%) underperformed plain retrieval
(47%)**, and one system reached parity with cloud RAG at **50× the cost**.
- **Memory utility is an inverted U.** "Useful Memories Become Faulty"
(arXiv 2605.12978): utility rises, then degrades *below* the no-memory
baseline. GPT-5.4 failed **54% of previously-solved ARC-AGI problems** when
using consolidated memory. **Episodic-only management doubled accuracy** vs
forced consolidation — the consolidation step is the bug, not the storage.
- **Gains are benchmark-local.** MemoryArena specifically names ReasoningBank's
procedural memory as performing poorly on interdependent multi-session tasks
— the setting closest to real work.
- **No automatic self-evolution method sustains positive gain across settings**
(EvoAgentBench, arXiv 2607.05202). *Curated* ability content transfers across
model families; *automatic extraction* is the failure point.
- **Greedy acceptance is uncontrolled multiple testing.** PACE (arXiv
2606.08106): "keep it if the score improved" committed **3042% false
edits**, and made 1321 spurious modifications when *no true gains existed*,
degrading one agent by 4.9 points.
Meanwhile **Live-SWE-agent reaches 79.2% on SWE-bench Verified with zero
persistent memory** — on-the-fly tool synthesis from the current trajectory,
discarded after use. It sidesteps every failure mode above. That is not a
coincidence: nothing persistent means nothing to poison, stale, or collapse.
**Conclusion.** Trajectory-learning memory is a nice-to-have with fragile
upside, not a differentiator (see ADR-277 for what the differentiators are).
## 3. Design
### 3.1 Two-tier storage
**Episodic is immutable.** Append-only raw trajectory store; never rewritten,
never overwritten. Distilled playbook items are *derived artifacts* carrying
pointers back to their source episodes.
Rationale: consolidation is the documented failure point, and episodic-only
management doubled accuracy against forced consolidation. Raw episodes remain
primary evidence.
### 3.2 Gated, delta-only consolidation
Never run consolidation automatically after each task. Never rewrite the
playbook end-to-end. Append or amend individual items with structured deltas.
Hard per-item length cap (~1,500 chars) and a hard total cap. ACE documents a
single end-to-end rewrite collapsing **18,282 tokens → 122**, dropping
performance *below* the no-adaptation baseline. Production experience
independently shows unconstrained growth past 5,000 chars overfits, and that
length regularization is nearly free (4× compression for 0.8%).
More data made it worse: 500 samples grew prompt length +75% and *dropped*
performance 2% versus a 20100 sample sweet spot.
### 3.3 Trust tiers
Every candidate memory carries provenance: source episode, verdict source,
verifier type, timestamp.
| Tier | Backed by | Retrieval |
|---|---|---|
| **A — active** | Programmatic verifier: tests pass, type check, schema validation, invariant assertion | Full weight |
| **B — quarantine** | LLM-judge verdict only | Reduced weight, or withheld until promoted |
| **C — tainted** | Derived from untrusted content: fetched pages, tool output, user-supplied text | Separate namespace. **Never** allowed to influence tool-permission or destructive-action decisions |
Tier C is a security boundary, not a quality heuristic. See §5.
### 3.4 Promotion by sequential testing
Promotion B → A, and any prompt or scaffold edit, requires a **paired
anytime-valid sequential test** (e-process / testing-by-betting) against the
current version on identical held-out instances. Commit only when evidence is
decisive.
PACE achieved comparable accuracy at **~18% lower evaluation cost** than greedy
acceptance while eliminating the false-commit rate. This is the single
highest-value component of the learning loop.
### 3.5 Retrieval discipline
- Inject retrieved memories framed explicitly as **"references, not rules"**.
Nearly free, and drops attack success **20.6% → 13.1%** while raising the
refusal rate 54.4% → 66.9%.
- Relevance-gated top-k with a threshold. **Never concatenate the whole bank**
ExpeL's documented scaling failure.
- Hard token budget on injected memory; over budget, drop lowest-trust first.
- TTL, decay, and eviction on realized contribution.
## 4. Measurement — the precondition
The gate does not open until these run.
**Primary metric — paired net lift:**
`lift = P(success | memory) P(success | no memory)` on *the same instances*,
with PACE's e-process providing the stopping rule. Report a confidence
interval, not a point estimate.
**The regression metric that matters most:** rate of **previously-solved tasks
that now fail with memory on**. This is the 54%-on-ARC-AGI signal and it is the
earliest warning that consolidation has gone bad. Track per consolidation
event; above threshold, roll back and quarantine the items it produced.
**Permanent control arm.** A fraction of traffic — or a shadow run on a frozen
held-out suite — always executes with memory disabled. Not a one-time
ablation: without a live control the inverted-U crossover is undetectable.
**Confound controls (run before believing any result):**
- Hold the embedding model **fixed** across arms; report sensitivity separately.
A ±6.2 pp swing from the embedder alone masquerades as an architecture win.
- Hold the backbone LLM fixed; re-verify on a second backbone.
- **Log refusal rates per arm.** A 63%-refusal arm is not comparable to a 5% one.
- Always include a **plain-retrieval baseline** (BM25 or vanilla embedding RAG
over raw episodes). Failing to beat it is a 50×-cost parity result, not a win.
**Cost-normalized:** tokens and dollars per *additional* success, not raw
accuracy.
**Transfer holdout:** a task set from a *different distribution* than the
memories were written from. In-distribution gain is expected and tells you
almost nothing.
**Per-item attribution:** track retrieval count and conditional lift when
retrieved; evict items with negative or non-significant contribution. This
makes the bank self-pruning and gives an audit trail when something poisons it.
## 5. Security: the shared brain is the highest-risk surface
Cross-agent shared memory multiplies the blast radius. Measured
memory-poisoning work reports **~50% attack success and ~41% relapse success**,
with **contextual assimilation** as the primary vector — poisoned entries work
best when they look like ordinary preferences, constraints, or workflow
requirements. Reported >90% of tested agents vulnerable, with **100% relapse**
when teams tried to fix it conversationally.
Implications:
- Tier C (§3.3) is mandatory and must be enforced structurally, not by prompt.
- Never write raw credentials, PHI, or secrets to shared memory (already policy).
- Sleeper entries may lie dormant until triggered — per-item attribution (§4)
is the detection mechanism.
- "Misevolution" affects top-tier models; the cheapest known mitigation is the
references-not-rules framing of §3.5.
## 6. Verifier quality is the binding constraint
Any learning loop is only as good as its verdict signal, and LLM-as-judge
evidence is poor: a judge surfaced **under 25%** of human-confirmed systematic
problems and **flagged zero** issues in a batch where humans confirmed 23
distinct defects — implying a **36× undercount**. Blind spots are structural:
it catches turn-local problems and is severely blind to cross-turn state.
Calibration drifts — one judge at 0.91 agreement shifted four points after a
model update.
**Rules:**
- Programmatic and execution-grounded signals first (tests, type checks, schema
validation, invariants).
- LLM judge is a **secondary, quarantined** signal only (Tier B).
- Treat the judge as a **regression floor, never a promotion authority.**
- Re-anchor against a rolling human-labeled sample after **every** model update.
## 7. Consequences
**Positive.** The component ships honestly. If it works we can prove it; if it
degrades we detect the crossover instead of shipping a silent regression. The
measurement apparatus (§4) is reusable for every other harness change and
overlaps with the eval-loop investment ADR-273 §6 already requires.
**Negative.** Slower to enable than "SONA on the default path". Significant
work lands before any measured benefit. This is the correct trade given §2 —
the alternative is enabling a component whose own literature says it may go
below baseline.
**Relationship to ADR-271.** ADR-271's Darwin/SONA self-improvement direction
remains valid as *mechanism*. This ADR supplies the gating and acceptance
criteria it lacked, and replaces greedy fitness acceptance with §3.4.
## 8. Implementation order
1. Episodic append-only store (immutable, §3.1)
2. Measurement harness: paired lift, previously-solved regression rate, control
arm, plain-retrieval baseline (§4)
3. Trust tiers with structural Tier-C enforcement (§3.3, §5)
4. Retrieval discipline with references-not-rules framing (§3.5)
5. Gated delta-only consolidation with caps (§3.2)
6. PACE-style sequential-test promotion (§3.4)
7. Only then: consider default-on, if and only if §4 shows sustained positive
paired lift on the transfer holdout

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---
adr: 277
title: "rvAgent Positioning, Protocols and Benchmark Claims"
status: accepted
date: 2026-08-01
authors: [Reuven Cohen]
project: "rvAgent Harness"
related: [ADR-159, ADR-267, ADR-273, ADR-274, ADR-275, ADR-276]
tags: [rvagent, harness, positioning, mcp, acp, replay, benchmarks, sota, honesty]
---
# ADR-277 — rvAgent Positioning, Protocols and Benchmark Claims
## Status
**Accepted.** Owner: Reuven Cohen. Project: rvAgent Harness. Date: 2026-08-01.
Evidence base: `docs/research/rvagent-hermes-harness/04-sota-landscape.md` §2, §7.
**This ADR invalidates a premise.** The roadmap's implicit positioning — that a
Rust-native harness is itself differentiating — was true when the research
began and is false as of July 2026.
## 1. Decision
1. **Do not position on "Rust is fast."** That ground is taken.
2. **Position on two open gaps:** a stable embeddable **library API with open
governance**, and **deterministic replay** as a core primitive.
3. **Migrate to MCP 2026-07-28** before building further on the tool protocol.
4. **Treat ACP as a first-class target.**
5. **Retire SWE-bench Verified as a claim target.**
6. **No claim ships without harness disclosure.**
## 2. The field is crowded at the top
Three of the major 2026 harnesses are already Rust:
| Harness | Scale | License | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Codex CLI** (OpenAI) | ~7080 crates | Apache 2.0 | Rewritten *from* TypeScript |
| **Grok Build** (xAI) | ~844k LOC | Apache 2.0 | Open-sourced **2026-07-15** |
| **Goose** (Block) | — | Apache 2.0 | MCP-native |
OpenAI's stated reasons for the rewrite are exactly our positioning:
zero-dependency install (Node 22+ blocked enterprise and air-gapped
deployments), no GC pauses in long-running agentic processes, memory-safe
sandbox bindings without FFI shims.
**Tool-surface novelty is also unavailable.** Grok Build's tools are documented
ports — `apply_patch`, `grep_files`, `list_dir`, `read_file` from Codex;
`bash`, `edit`, `glob`, `grep`, `read`, `skill`, `todowrite`, `write` from
opencode. A frontier lab with a million lines of Rust ported the tool surface
rather than designing one. Convergence is complete.
## 3. What remains open
### 3.1 No Rust harness is usable as a library
- Codex's own `AGENTS.md` **discourages** adding to `codex-core` — it is an
app, not a published SDK.
- **Grok Build has issues and PRs disabled.** Contributions explicitly
rejected; xAI develops internally and syncs a mirror. This is *source
transparency, not open governance.*
- Goose is app-first.
- **Anthropic's Agent SDK is Python and TypeScript only** — the docs instruct
other languages to shell out to the CLI with `-p --output-format json`.
A stable, semver'd, embeddable harness crate with open governance is
unoccupied. This is the primary position.
### 3.2 Deterministic replay
A named gap in the Rust agent ecosystem and thin everywhere. Our existing
append-only witness/segment infrastructure is most of the way there, and
ADR-274's deterministic masking (no model call on the compaction path) and
ADR-275's `Fn(prompt) -> String` subagent boundary both make it tractable.
**Honesty constraint — this is binding.** Even at temperature 0, hosted
inference is not reproducible: floating-point non-associativity and
batch-size-dependent kernels produce run-to-run variation, with reported
accuracy swings up to 15% across runs.
Therefore the claim is **replay of the harness, not of the model**, and the
reported metric is **action-match rate**, never "reproducible" without
qualification. Record every LLM call, tool response, and timestamp; replay to
reproduce harness behavior; promote incidents to test fixtures.
Claiming byte-exact reproducibility would be false and would be caught.
### 3.3 Why Rust, restated honestly
Not speed. The defensible argument is ADR-273's: the failure modes that
dominate every harness ablation — patch-apply failures, tool-call loops,
desynced `tool_use`/`tool_result` pairing, unbounded tool output — can be made
**type-unrepresentable** rather than merely rare. Plus structured concurrency
(`JoinSet` + `CancellationToken`) making mid-run interrupt and subagent
lifecycle nearly free, where they are hard in Python.
**Where Rust is a liability — state these plainly:**
- **Provider coverage.** LiteLLM's 100+ providers is a moat. Rust's best is
~20. Permanent maintenance tax.
- **Iteration speed on what matters most.** Prompts, tool descriptions, and
compaction rubrics are where harness performance lives, and they want a
REPL. Mitigation: keep prompts and templates in **hot-reloadable external
files**, never `const &str`.
- **The eval ecosystem is Python.** We will shell out for evaluation.
- **Compile times** on a large workspace are a daily cost.
- **Extension authors don't write Rust.** Mitigation: **the extension language
is MCP, not Rust** — Goose's key insight. Pi has 2,143 third-party extensions
because they are TypeScript.
## 4. Protocols
### 4.1 MCP 2026-07-28 — migrate now
Landed 2026-07-28 and is breaking:
- **Stateless core.** Protocol-level sessions and `Mcp-Session-Id` **removed**.
- Protocol version, client info, and capabilities now travel in `_meta` on
**every** request.
- New `server/discover` method.
- **Tasks extension:** `tools/call` returns a task handle driven via
`tasks/get` / `tasks/update` / `tasks/cancel`. `tasks/list` removed.
- **Deprecated:** Roots, Sampling, Logging; HTTP+SSE reclassified deprecated.
- Auth aligns with real OAuth 2.0/OIDC; clients must validate `iss` per
RFC 9207 (mix-up attack mitigation).
Building against the 2025-11-25 shape means a rewrite within months. The
official Rust SDK (`rmcp`) already implements the new spec while remaining
compatible with older ones — start there rather than hand-rolling.
MCP servers remain gated behind per-session enablement (ADR-273 §3.4): the
tool-count ceiling is not negotiable for protocol convenience.
### 4.2 ACP — first-class
ACP went from Zed-only (Jun 2025) to headline feature of Zed 1.0 (2026-04-29),
built into JetBrains since Dec 2025, a public registry (2026-01-28), and 25+
agents by March 2026. **Its reference implementation is Rust.**
We already have an `rvagent-acp` crate. Being ACP-native rather than
ACP-bolted-on is closer than it looks and is the natural distribution channel
for a library-shaped harness.
Division of labor as settled in 2026: **MCP = tools, A2A = agent discovery,
ACP = editor↔agent, AG-UI = agent↔UI.** ADR-159's A2A work sits in the third
slot and remains valid.
## 5. Benchmark claims
### 5.1 SWE-bench Verified is retired as a claim target
- **UTBoost (ACL 2025):** resolve rates inflated **~6.4 pp** by weak tests;
**1 in 5** "solved" patches semantically incorrect; augmenting tests changed
leaderboard ranks in **24.4%** of Verified submissions (40.9% on Lite).
- **OpenAI's own audit:** **59.4%** of the hardest unsolved Verified problems
had flawed test cases. OpenAI stopped reporting Verified in early 2026.
`03-roadmap.md` Phase 4's exit gate (`≥70% on a 350-instance fixed-model set`)
is stated against a benchmark whose **noise band exceeds the effect sizes we
would be claiming.** It is withdrawn pending replacement.
Verified may still be used as an internal regression signal — with test
determinism verified per ADR-273 §6 — but not as a published claim.
### 5.2 Claim conformance
Two 2026 papers establish that harness choices substantially determine
benchmark results (arXiv 2605.23950) and that harnesses induce systematically
different agent *beliefs* on logically equivalent tasks (arXiv 2607.04528).
Therefore every published claim must disclose: environment setup, tool
implementations, the full harness configuration, and the evaluation procedure.
**A result without harness disclosure is not a result.**
Retain the existing honesty apparatus (ADR-267): fixed-model comparison,
conformant packaged submissions, Wilson confidence intervals, and retraction
discipline. Given §5.1, retraction discipline is a feature.
### 5.3 Differentiator claims
Claim the axes from §3, not throughput:
- Stable embeddable library API with open governance (§3.1)
- Harness replay with **action-match rate** reported (§3.2)
- Startup latency, memory footprint, single-binary distribution — real, but
**already claimed by Codex and Grok Build.** Supporting evidence, not the
headline.
## 6. Consequences
**Positive.** Positioning now rests on gaps that are actually open and on
claims that survive scrutiny. The library-API framing also improves the
internal architecture — it forces a clean core/app split that ADR-275's
subagent-as-tool boundary and §3.2's replay both need.
**Negative.** The "first fast Rust harness" story is gone. Phase 4's headline
gate is withdrawn without a replacement in hand (§7).
**Risk — Grok Build's governance may change.** If xAI opens PRs, the "no
community Rust harness" gap closes quickly. The moat must be the library API
and replay, **not merely that a Rust harness exists.**
## 7. The Phase 4 exit gate (resolved 2026-08-01)
§5.1 withdrew the SWE-bench-Verified gate without a replacement. This section
supplies one.
**The obvious successor is also gone.** SWE-bench **Pro** was **retracted by
OpenAI on 2026-07-08**: an audit of its 731 public tasks flagged **27.4%
broken** automatically and **34.1%** by five independent human reviewers, the
dominant failure being over-strict hidden tests enforcing unspecified
implementation details. Two benchmark retractions in six months is the context
every claim we publish now lands in.
Also dead or unusable: SWE-Lancer (archived 2025-07-18), Aider polyglot (frozen
2025-11-20, no 2026 models), LiveCodeBench (a *model* benchmark — a harness
contributes nothing), OSWorld (self-reported rows, meeting-gated verification),
bare GAIA (a documented **3050 point** spread on identical tasks purely from
scaffolding).
### The gate — all four must pass
**Gate 1 — Terminal-Bench 2.1 absolute.**
**≥ 78.0% pass rate, 5 trials, bootstrap 95% CI half-width ≤ 1.5 pp, on a
mid-tier model, team-verified.**
Terminal-Bench 2.1 is the only board that is simultaneously team-verified,
CI-reporting, adversarially audited during construction, and *structurally a
harness comparison* (Claude Code, Codex, Terminus 2, Cursor CLI and
mini-SWE-agent all appear on shared models).
78.0% is deliberate. It sits mid-board and CI-disjoint above the weakest
entries while explicitly **not** claiming to beat the leader at 83.8% ± 1.2.
**78% on a mid-tier model is a stronger result than 84% on a frontier model**,
and it is the honest version of our story. Claiming ≥84% would be overreach
given the CI widths and the reward-hackability base rate.
**Gate 2 — Fixed-model cross-harness delta.** *This is the actual harness claim.*
**≥ +4.0 pp over Terminus 2 on the identical model, CI-disjoint, replicated on
≥3 models spanning ≥2 vendors.**
Absolute pass rate is a joint model×harness measurement; only the fixed-model
delta is attributable to us. Cross-vendor is required — a single-vendor result
is indistinguishable from prompt-fitting to one tokenizer.
Baselines: **Terminus 2** (the reference scaffold) and **mini-SWE-agent** (the
minimal-scaffold control). Both are on the current board, so the delta is
directly auditable.
Report per-task pass rates, bootstrap CIs, and a **variance decomposition
separating harness-induced from model-induced variance** (arXiv 2605.23950,
which documents model-ranking *reversals* under different harnesses).
**Publish the falsification:** the model tier where our delta vanishes or
inverts. A harness result with no stated inversion point reads as
cherry-picked, and per §2 of ADR-273 the effect should shrink as model
capability rises — if it does not, that is evidence something is wrong.
**Gate 3 — Cost-normalized Pareto.** *Our differentiator.*
**Match or beat the best open-scaffold entry's pass rate at ≤ 40% of its
$/task; publish $/task, input+output tokens/task, and wall-clock/task for every
cell of the fixed-model matrix.**
Terminal-Bench publishes **no cost column at all**, and HAL — the only board
that treats cost as a first-class axis — has **paused submissions**. There is
currently *no* operating cost-normalized agentic-coding leaderboard. Publishing
one in HAL's format is uncontested ground and is the natural claim for a Rust
harness.
The framing anchor is HAL's own finding: *agents can be 100× more expensive
while being 1% better.* On SWE-bench-Verified-Mini its frontier runs from a
$65.31 cost-efficient knee to a $1,351 point that scores **11 points lower**.
A good harness on a cheap model dominating a mediocre harness on an expensive
one is an existence proof, not a hope.
**Gate 4 — Contamination-resistant corroboration.**
**A SWE-rebench run on the current rolling window (not a frozen split),
reporting resolved% ± CI and pass@5 on ≥2 of the fixed models.**
The rolling window makes memorization structurally impossible. This proves the
Terminal-Bench result is neither terminal-specific nor contaminated.
### Required caveat language
Every headline number ships with: model, harness, trial count, CI, verification
status, and the fixed-model delta vs Terminus 2 — plus an explicit statement
that absolute pass rate is a joint model×harness measurement and only the delta
is attributable to the harness. Cite arXiv 2605.23950.
This is cheap, and it is the single thing separating a defensible claim from
the pattern that got two benchmarks retracted inside six months.
### Data hygiene
SEO aggregators are publishing leaderboard numbers that do not appear on
primary boards (e.g. inflated Terminal-Bench and SWE-bench figures). Some use
real model names, which makes them more dangerous rather than less. **Cite only
primary leaderboards.**
## 8. Still open
Read `codex-rs/core/src/` directly before adopting its `Op`/`EventMsg`
submit/event design — the survey's account is third-party. Note this session
cannot attach `openai/codex` (cross-owner adds unsupported); fetch the files
directly or read them in a session rooted on that repo.

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---
adr: 278
title: "rvAgent Self-Learning: Adopt the metaharness Flywheel; Shift from Memory to Policy"
status: accepted
date: 2026-08-01
authors: [Reuven Cohen]
project: "rvAgent Harness"
related: [ADR-271, ADR-273, ADR-275, ADR-276, ADR-277]
external: [metaharness ADR-226, metaharness ADR-228, metaharness ADR-236]
tags: [rvagent, self-learning, flywheel, gepa, policy-evolution, metaharness, promotion, sota]
---
# ADR-278 — rvAgent Self-Learning: Adopt the metaharness Flywheel; Shift from Memory to Policy
## Status
**Accepted.** Owner: Reuven Cohen. Project: rvAgent Harness. Date: 2026-08-01.
Sources: `@metaharness/flywheel@0.1.7` (`/workspace/metaharness/packages/flywheel`),
metaharness ADR-226 / ADR-228 / ADR-236, and
`docs/research/rvagent-hermes-harness/04-sota-landscape.md`.
## 1. Decision
1. **Adopt `@metaharness/flywheel` as rvAgent's promotion engine.** Do not build
one. Do not port it to Rust.
2. **Shift self-learning investment from memory accumulation to policy
evolution.** ReasoningBank/SONA stays gated per ADR-276; GEPA-style policy
evolution becomes the primary self-learning mechanism.
3. **Adopt `noopRate` as a first-class score axis.**
4. **Contribute anytime-valid sequential testing back to the flywheel gate**
rather than only consuming it.
5. **Record the metaharness ADR-226 null as a binding constraint** on rvAgent's
subagent design (see ADR-275 amendment).
## 2. Why not build our own
ADR-276 §3.4 specified a promotion apparatus from scratch. `@metaharness/flywheel`
already implements it, and more rigorously.
It is deliberately host-agnostic — a stated design rule forbids any host, model,
or benchmark from leaking into the package. Its entire vocabulary is
`Policy = Record<string, string>`, `Score`, `PromotionEvidence`, and a
`PromotionRule`; everything rvAgent-specific enters through an injected
`Evaluator`. There is no adapter impedance to pay.
What it already provides that ADR-276 was specifying:
| ADR-276 requirement | Flywheel |
|---|---|
| Promotion gate | `meetsPromotionRule`**frozen, conjunctive**, every clause load-bearing |
| Proof the gate did not move | `gateFingerprint()` — SHA-256 over the rule source |
| Transfer holdout | `HoldoutSuite` **plus** a frozen `AnchorSuite` never optimized against |
| Audit trail | Ed25519 `PromotionReceipt` + `verifyReceipt()` |
| Independent verification | `verifyReplayBundle()` — reviewer trusts the signature, not us |
| Compounding, not scattering | Lineage DAG re-basing on the promoted winner; `computeLiftCurve()` |
The anchor deserves emphasis: ADR-276 §4 asked only for a transfer holdout. The
flywheel requires a candidate to clear a holdout **and** a frozen suite it is
never optimized against. That is a strictly stronger anti-Goodhart guard than we
specified.
`verifyReplayBundle()` is also, in substance, the replay-verification story
ADR-277 §3.2 positions on — working, in JS, today.
## 3. The `noopRate` clause
The default gate's second clause requires the no-op rate to **strictly** improve:
> a policy earns a promotion by making the executor COMMIT more, not just score higher
This is non-obvious and load-bearing. A policy that raises the primary metric
while leaving the executor more likely to end empty has not improved the agent;
it has found a scoring artifact.
**Adopt this axis in rvAgent's own scoring.** It pairs naturally with ADR-273's
reliability framing — "never end empty" is a reliability property, and the
+54.3-point patch-application result is the same phenomenon measured a different
way.
## 4. Memory versus policy — the reframe
These are different objects with different evidence:
| | Object | 2026 evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Flywheel / GEPA | **Policy text** — a genome of named string levers | Positive; GEPA is the best-evidenced optimizer in the sweep |
| ReasoningBank / SONA | **Episodic memory** — accumulated trajectories | Negative; inverted-U, confound-sized gains, self-memory underperforming plain retrieval |
RuVector's self-learning weight currently sits on the memory side, which is the
side the evidence argues against. **Move the weight to policy evolution.**
metaharness ADR-228 reaches the same conclusion from its own measurements:
redirect strong-model judgment *offline into the executor's standing operating
policy* rather than injecting it as runtime advice. It notes GEPA's candidate is
a `dict[str,str]` of named text components, matching the flywheel's `Policy`
exactly — the same shape rvAgent would supply.
ADR-276 is not repealed. Its gating, trust tiers, and inverted-U regression
metric remain the conditions under which memory may ever be enabled. This ADR
changes where *new* effort goes.
## 5. Two nulls we must respect
### 5.1 ADR-226 — the read-only advisor is dead
A frontier read-only advisor over a cheap executor produced **zero marginal
gold-scored resolves at 5.4× cost**. The advisor was genuinely active — 33
advisories and 3 vetoes across the slice — not silently disabled. The track was
killed.
This **independently corroborates** the figure in ADR-275 §3.2 from the public
literature (a frontier model in the read-only slot: +0.4 pp at 5.8× cost). Two
independent measurements, near-identical cost multiple. Treat the conclusion as
established rather than provisional: **do not put an expensive model in a
read-only slot.**
It also constrains ADR-275 §3.1 — see §7.
### 5.2 ADR-236 — a promotion engine cannot rescue a weak loop
The flywheel mechanism was proven end-to-end on real SWE-bench and still
produced **no compounding lift, because the base solver was too weak.** Recorded
as an honest null rather than buried.
**Consequence for sequencing:** adopting the flywheel does not shorten ADR-273.
The reliability floor comes first; the flywheel amplifies a loop that already
works and does nothing for one that does not. This validates the ordering
ADR-273 already set.
## 6. What we contribute back
The flywheel's gate is a **single-shot** conjunctive comparison. Running many
generations against the same holdout is uncontrolled multiple testing — the
regime where PACE (arXiv 2606.08106) measured **3042% false commits**, and 1321
spurious modifications even when no true gains existed.
The conjunctive gate plus frozen anchor mitigates this with multiple hurdles,
which is real but is not anytime-valid. **Frozen conjunctive gate ∧ anytime-valid
sequential test is strictly stronger than either**, and PACE reported ~18% lower
evaluation cost as a side effect.
This is an upstream contribution to `ruvnet/metaharness`, offered as an optional
`PromotionRule` plus a sequential-evidence accumulator — not a change to the
default gate, whose stability is itself the product.
## 7. Amendment to ADR-275
ADR-275 §3.1 adopted a fresh-context reviewer subagent on the strength of
Cognition's production data (~2 bugs/PR, 58% severe). ADR-226 is the closest
*measured null* to that design and was not considered when §3.1 was written.
The distinction that may preserve it: **ADR-226's advisor received the full
transcript**, whereas the fresh-context reviewer receives only the diff — and the
Cognition finding is specifically that reviewers perform *better* without shared
context. ADR-226 therefore does not refute §3.1, but it is the strongest nearby
negative result.
**ADR-275 §3.1 is downgraded from adopted to gated.** The reviewer must
demonstrate marginal lift over a no-reviewer control on the same instances
before it goes on the default path, and ADR-226's design is the specific null it
must beat. §3.2 (read-only gatherer on a cheap model) is unaffected and is in
fact strengthened by §5.1.
## 8. Integration
**No Rust port.** Promotion is offline; the flywheel is not on the hot path.
- Run it in CI at the existing ruflo/metaharness seam (roadmap Phase 3).
- rvAgent supplies an `Evaluator` mapping a run onto the four `Score` axes, and
a `Proposer` for the mutation seam.
- rvAgent's policy genome is the natural `Policy`: system-prompt components,
compaction rubric (ADR-274 §3.4), `loop_repeat_threshold`, masking
`keep_last_observations`, tool-surface composition, per-role model tiers.
- metaharness ships `crates/kernel-napi` as the in-process bridge pattern if we
later need it. We do not need it now.
**Gap this closes:** ADR-271 (`metaharness-darwin-sona-self-improvement`) does
not reference the flywheel at all. This seam was previously unrecorded on our
side.
## 9. Consequences
**Positive.** Deletes the largest unbuilt subsystem in ADR-276 — we consume a
maintained engine instead. Inherits an audit and replay story that already
exists. Moves self-learning onto the side of the evidence. Turns a
one-directional dependency into a two-way exchange (§6).
**Negative.** A cross-repo dependency on a package at `0.1.x`. Mitigated because
the flywheel is thin, runtime-dependency-free (Node `crypto` only), fully typed,
and — being offline — a version pin is low-risk.
**Risk.** rvAgent's four `Score` axes must be projected honestly. `primary`,
`noopRate`, `costPerWin`, and `regressed` are where all host meaning lands, and
a dishonest projection defeats every downstream guarantee. The Evaluator is the
trust boundary.
## 10. Implementation order
1. Record the ADR-275 §3.1 downgrade (§7) — documentation only
2. Add `noopRate` to rvAgent's score axes (§3)
3. Define the rvAgent policy genome (§8)
4. Evaluator mapping a headless run onto the four axes
5. Wire `runFlywheelGenerations` into CI at the ruflo seam
6. Upstream the sequential-testing `PromotionRule` to metaharness (§6)

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---
adr: 279
title: "No C in the Core; and the 2026 SOTA Program for Vector Search"
status: accepted
date: 2026-08-02
authors: [Reuven Cohen]
project: "RuVector Core"
related: [ADR-264, ADR-267, ADR-268, ADR-272]
supersedes_parts_of: [ADR-267]
tags: [ruvector, performance, simd, ffi, wasm, ann, quantization, benchmarks, sota]
---
# ADR-279 — No C in the Core; and the 2026 SOTA Program
## Status
**Accepted.** Owner: Reuven Cohen. Date: 2026-08-02.
Answers two questions asked together: *would adding C improve RuVector's
performance and capabilities?* and *what would actually make it state of the
art?* The answers turn out to be independent — and the second is far more
consequential than the first.
## 1. Decisions
1. **No C/C++ in the default build graph.** The premise does not survive 2026
evidence, and the costs land precisely where RuVector is most exposed.
2. **Retarget the SOTA harness from ann-benchmarks to VIBE, and add
`1/Ratio@k`.** This is the highest-priority item in this ADR and blocks
every performance claim.
3. **Adopt a ranked SOTA program** (§5), led by 8-bit rotational quantization
and a SymphonyQG-class packed quantized graph.
4. **Bind, don't rewrite, for GPU.** `cuvs-sys` for CAGRA build; no pure-Rust
CAGRA.
5. **Differentiate on streaming stability**, which is the least crowded
frontier and happens to be our actual workload.
## 2. The C question: no
### 2.1 The premise fails
Every capability commonly cited as C-only has a production Rust path in 2026:
| Claimed C-only | 2026 reality |
|---|---|
| io_uring | `io-uring` crate is pure Rust; `bindgen` optional, bindings checked in |
| CUDA | `cudarc` defaults to dynamic loading — no toolkit at build time |
| BLAS/LAPACK | `faer` matches or surpasses OpenBLAS/LAPACK/Eigen |
| AVX-512 | Stable in `std::arch` since Rust **1.89**; **FP16 since 1.94** (Mar 2026) |
| NUMA / hugepages | Syscalls via `libc` — FFI *declarations*, not compiled C |
| RocksDB | Qdrant **removed** it |
| FAISS / hnswlib | Binding it forecloses filtered-search-inside-traversal |
| simdjson | `simd-json` supports AVX2/SSE4.2/NEON **and wasm simd128** natively |
Two results are decisive rather than merely suggestive:
- **`zlib-rs` is faster than zlib-ng in C on native, and is the fastest WASM
zlib in existence** (2× miniz-oxide). A direct counterexample to "C is
faster", on exactly the axis proposed.
- **Qdrant — the closest analogue to RuVector — spent two minor versions
removing its one C++ dependency**, naming *"interoperating with C++ slowed us
down"*, plus compaction latency spikes and tuning burden. The comparable
project went the opposite direction from the proposal.
### 2.2 The cost lands on WASM, which is our largest commitment
37 of 166 crates are WASM. The rustc platform-support book states plainly that
`wasm32-unknown-unknown` **has no C/C++ toolchain** — not "awkward", absent by
design. Consequences:
- Any unconditional `cc::Build` in the graph breaks the browser build.
- Escape hatches don't help: emscripten produces an app, not a
`wasm-bindgen` library; `wasm32-wasip1` gives edge/server but not browser.
- The `extern "C"` ABI on wasm is *mid-migration* (future-incompat warning
since Rust 1.87), so any FFI boundary there stands on changing ground.
Rust-to-Rust is unaffected.
- Every C feature must be reimplemented in Rust for the browser anyway. **You
pay for each feature twice and get behavioral divergence for free.**
### 2.3 Costs beyond WASM
- **Miri cannot execute across an FFI boundary.** For a database with
concurrent index structures, losing Miri on the hot paths is a real
regression in verification capability.
- A 320-bug study of bindgen/cbindgen/CXX (ACM TOSEM, Feb 2026) found the
dominant failure mode is **not** crashes but *silently generating code
unfaithful to intent*, rooted in data-layout mismodeling.
- `cargo-audit`/`cargo-vet` give **no meaningful coverage of vendored C**
(cf. RUSTSEC-2023-0061, libwebp).
- The FFI boundary is a *pessimization* on fine-grained work: call overhead and
lost cross-module inlining make a C distance kernel slower than the
equivalent `std::arch` kernel. Distance kernels are the definition of
fine-grained.
### 2.4 The headline "C is faster" number is a datatype artifact
SimSIMD/NumKong is the most-cited evidence for C kernels, claiming **20118×**
over autovectorized code. Decomposed, that table compares **NumKong f16 against
GCC's f32** — there is no f32-vs-f32 row, and the README states outright that
GCC "struggles with `_Float16`". Against the compiler's competent f32 output the
real effect is **1.15×2.1×**. The 3200× figures elsewhere are against
SciPy/NumPy Python, not compiled code.
It is also independently contradicted. **PDX (SIGMOD '25) beat SimSIMD's and
FAISS's hand-written kernels by 2.0× on average using plain scalar C++ with no
intrinsics at all**, purely by changing data layout — 310× at low dimension.
And an independent harness found NumKong *loses* bulk scoring by **1.853.04×**,
because it has no bulk API and cannot hide memory latency.
**The lever is layout and API shape, not the language the intrinsics are typed
in.** Two expert C teams differ from each other by more (0.721.20×) than Rust
differs from C.
### 2.5 Qdrant ships zero C
A code search for `simsimd` in `qdrant/qdrant` returns **0 hits**. Qdrant has
AVX-512 `vpopcntq`, `pshufb`/`maddubs`/`VPDPBUSD`, and NEON `SDOT` quantization
kernels — all in Rust `std::arch` — and shipped an ICLR-2026 quantizer
(TurboQuant, v1.18, May 2026) before most C++ engines had it. FAISS, in C++,
still lacks AVX-512 FastScan.
Separately: plain **23-line Rust with no intrinsics beat the `simsimd` C crate
on Hamming distance** across three machines — autovectorization winning over
manual SIMD on precisely the binary-quantization inner loop.
### 2.6 The one real gap closes in 18 days
The largest historically-measured Rust-vs-C gap in this workload was **f32
reduction reassociation: 8.4×** (84 µs vs 10 µs with Clang fast-math).
`float_algebraic` (`f32::algebraic_add`/`algebraic_mul`) stabilized in PR
#157029, **shipping in Rust 1.98 on 2026-08-20**. Adopt it the day it lands.
What remains genuinely blocked on stable Rust is narrower than assumed:
**f16/bf16 arithmetic** (tracking #116909) and **ARM SVE/SME** (#145052).
Note that even LanceDB — the one major Rust vector DB linking C — uses it for
three files, and **two of them are pragma-autovectorized C, not hand-written
intrinsics**. What C bought Lance was `_Float16` and fast-math, and one of those
two arrives on 2026-08-20.
For f16 the cheaper answer is to store f16 and upconvert with stable
`_mm512_cvtph_ps`/`vcvt_f32_f16`, accumulating in f32 at ~1.152.1× — or skip
f16 entirely for int8/binary quantization, which is faster *and* smaller.
### 2.7 The existence proof is already in this repo
`ruvector-rabitq/src/scan.rs` performs RaBitQ scanning with
`_mm512_popcnt_epi64` and `_mm512_xor_si512`, runtime-detected via
`avx512vpopcntdq`, with an AVX2 fallback — hand-written Rust `std::arch`. That
is precisely the work C would have been imported to do, already done, and it
compiles for WASM.
Note a correction to an earlier survey of this repo: an initial pass concluded
there were "no binary/hamming popcount kernels". That was wrong — it
generalized from one file (`ruvector-core/simd_intrinsics.rs`) across a
166-crate workspace. The kernel exists.
### 2.8 The narrow exceptions
C is acceptable **only** when all hold: behind a non-default feature; in a
separate crate the core does not depend on; with a correctness-equivalent
pure-Rust fallback under differential test; genuinely unreachable in Rust; and
with WASM CI proving the core still builds `--no-default-features`.
Realistically that means **FIPS-validated crypto** (a compliance case, not a
performance one) and **vendor accelerator SDKs**. `hailort-sys` is already
exactly this, correctly isolated. `cuvs-sys` (§5) qualifies under the same rule.
## 3. The finding that matters more than C
**`ruvector-sota-bench` measures against `ann-benchmarks.com`, which is
deprecated.** Its README now reads: *"no longer actively maintained… consider
submitting your work to different benchmarks, such as VIBE."* Our dataset list
is SIFT-128, GloVe-25/100, Deep-image-96 — precisely the sets VIBE was built
because they are *"no longer representative of the current applications of ANN
search."*
ADR-267 (SOTA Validation Protocol) does not mention VIBE.
So: **every SOTA claim RuVector could make today rests on an unmaintained
artifact and non-representative data.** The instrument is pointed at the wrong
thing, and no amount of kernel work fixes that. This is the same failure mode as
withdrawing the SWE-bench-Verified gate in ADR-277 §5.1 — a benchmark can retire
underneath you, and continuing to cite it is how retractions happen.
### 3.1 Recall@k is itself under credible attack
Two 2026 papers argue the field has optimized the wrong objective. *ANN Search:
Recall What Matters* (arXiv:2606.04522) proposes **`1/Ratio@k`** and measures
**1.86×9.36× fewer distance computations** to reach equal downstream quality
versus optimizing Recall@0.95. Downstream validation: image-classification
label precision held at 0.9430.978 while Recall fell 1.0 → 0.4, and RAG answer
quality varied ≤5% across the same Recall range — `1/Ratio@k` tracked with MAD
0.52.6% against Recall's ~29%.
If that reproduces, a large fraction of tuning effort industry-wide is spent
recovering near-equidistant, semantically irrelevant neighbors.
## 4. What a defensible claim requires
Adopted as an amendment to ADR-267:
- **VIBE datasets, including the out-of-distribution splits.** OOD is a
first-class axis; HNSW's OOD gap is one of its known weaknesses.
- **Both `Recall@k` and `1/Ratio@k`.**
- **QPS at fixed recall on the Pareto frontier**, never single points.
- **Index build time and peak RSS**, reported alongside.
- **Full hardware disclosure** — exact CPU, cores, ISA level. AVX-512 vs AVX2
vs NEON *changes rankings*.
- **Single-thread and multi-thread separately.**
- **Hyperparameter search budget disclosed for all baselines**, not just ours.
- **Self-published gists and unreproduced blog numbers are not evidence**
including our own. The research sweep explicitly excluded ruvnet-authored
gists on SymphonyQG/MUVERA/RVQ for this reason, and that discipline stands.
- **Do not headline SIFT1M/GIST1M.** Leading there proves nothing in 2026.
## 5. The SOTA program, ranked
| # | Item | Measured effect | Effort | Needs C/CUDA |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | **Retarget to VIBE + `1/Ratio@k`** | Prerequisite for every claim; 1.869.36× wasted compute at stake | 23 wks | No |
| 2 | **8-bit rotational quantization** as default codec | >99% recall10@10, 4× compression, ~2.3× faster, **zero training** | **Days** | No |
| 3 | **SymphonyQG-class packed quantized graph** | 1.54.5× QPS vs best baselines, 3.517× vs hnswlib @95%; best hard-query robustness in VIBE | 23 mo | No — `std::arch` VPSHUFB |
| 4 | **Streaming-stable quantizer + dual hot/stable index** | Constant recall under drift vs progressive decay | 610 wks | No |
| 5 | **Adaptive filtered-query router** | Specialized-vs-general gap up to 10×, and it *inverts* with scale | 46 wks | No |
| 6 | **MUVERA FDE for multi-vector** | ~10% higher recall at 90% lower latency vs PLAID; 32× FDE compression | 34 wks | No |
| 7 | **CAGRA build → HNSW serve** via `cuvs-sys` | 12.3× build speedup; no GPU at serve time | 2 wks | **Bind cuVS** |
**Item 2 has by far the best ratio in this document** — a rotation plus scalar
quantization, no clustering, no training, days of work. Do it while item 3 is
in flight.
**Item 4 is where we can lead rather than catch up.** Every incumbent is weak:
SPFresh cannot update stably under contention, FreshDiskANN *"fails to maintain
a graph of great quality because streaming data destroys the navigability of the
original index"*, and **all** data-dependent quantizers — PQ, LVQ, RaBitQ,
ScaNN — are trained on a snapshot and go stale. For an agent memory database
this is not a nice-to-have, it is the workload. The relevant papers are from
Dec 2025 Jun 2026 and none are reproduced.
### 5.1 Kernel build order (where the SIMD evidence lands)
Two independent research threads converged on the same conclusion: **layout is
the lever, not intrinsics.** PDX got 2.0× from layout alone with no intrinsics;
SymphonyQG's win is also fundamentally a layout change (RaBitQ codes
co-located with neighbor IDs, FastScan-packed). Order accordingly:
1. **PDX-style vertical/blocked layout** — 2.0× average, 310× at low dimension
2. **Bulk kernel APIs** (1 query × N vectors) that amortize dispatch and hide
memory latency — worth 1.853.04× on its own, and the specific reason
NumKong loses bulk scoring despite better single-pair kernels
3. **Binary/int8 quantized kernels** in Rust `std::arch` (`vpopcntq`, `pshufb`,
`VPDPBUSD`, `SDOT`) — all stable since 1.89
4. **`algebraic_*` f32 paths** — adopt on 2026-08-20
5. **SVE** only if and when Rust stabilizes it
Adding C appears nowhere in that list.
### 5.2 Explicitly deprioritized
- **TurboQuant** — deprioritized *as a RaBitQ replacement*: theoretically
dominated (bits scale `log log(1/δ)` vs `log(1/δ)`), with reported
quantization times ~2 orders of magnitude optimistic.
**Caveat, stated because the two research threads are in apparent tension:**
a separate thread reports Qdrant shipped TurboQuant in v1.18 (May 2026, ICLR
2026) beating *binary quantization* by 924 pp recall at 16× compression.
These are different comparisons — TurboQuant-vs-RaBitQ on theory, and
TurboQuant-vs-BQ on measured recall — and conflating them would be an error.
The RaBitQ comparison is what governs this decision; the BQ result does not
contradict it.
- **LVQ / LeanVec** — closed-source, Intel-hardware-only, and measured as the
*worst* modern method on quantization error.
- **Pure-Rust CAGRA rewrite** — ~zero gain over binding `cuvs-sys`.
- **SAQ** — the measured frontier (1.85.4× lower error than Extended RaBitQ)
but unreproduced and same-community-authored. Revisit after item 1 makes it
measurable.
## 6. Consequences
**Positive.** Closes a live risk: we were positioned to publish claims against
a dead benchmark. The program is entirely Rust-native, so it composes with the
WASM story rather than fighting it. Items 2 and 7 are cheap and land early.
**Negative.** Item 1 delays visible performance work by 23 weeks. That
sequencing is deliberate and matches the harness lesson in ADR-273 §6: a
measurement you cannot trust makes every subsequent optimization unfalsifiable.
**Risk.** Several headline numbers (SAQ, CoDEQ, OctopusANN) are single-source
and unreproduced. They are treated as hypotheses to re-measure under item 1,
not as constants — the same evidence discipline applied in ADR-273.
## 6.1 Measured: PDX layout did NOT reproduce (2026-08-02)
A first implementation of the PDX vertical layout (`ruvector-core::pdx`) was
built and benchmarked against the existing row-major batch path on this host
(AVX-512, 4 cores). **The paper's ~2.0× did not reproduce.** Measured, both
paths compiled with `-C target-cpu=native`, 4096 vectors:
| n × dim | working set | row-major | PDX vertical | ratio |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 256 × 768 | 0.75 MB | 13.73 µs | 19.52 µs | **0.70×** |
| 512 × 768 | 1.5 MB | 29.78 µs | 45.59 µs | **0.65×** |
| 1024 × 768 | 3 MB | 123.5 µs | 140.4 µs | 0.88× |
| 4096 × 768 | 12 MB | 650.2 µs | 505.4 µs | 1.29× |
| 4096 × 1536 | 25 MB | 1158 µs | 1065 µs | 1.09× |
PDX **loses** on cache-resident working sets and wins only when streaming.
Three caveats, stated because they bound what this measurement proves:
1. **The first run was invalid.** It showed PDX 1418× slower, because the
row-major path runtime-dispatches to AVX-512 via `is_x86_feature_detected!`
while the new code compiled for baseline x86-64 (SSE2). That was an ISA
comparison wearing a layout comparison's clothes. Fixed by building both
with `target-cpu=native`.
2. **The remaining comparison is still confounded.** The row-major path takes
`Vec<&[f32]>` derived from `Vec<Vec<f32>>` — 4096 separate heap allocations,
so it pointer-chases — while `PdxIndex` is a single contiguous buffer. The
streaming win may be *allocation contiguity*, not vertical layout. A clean
experiment needs a contiguous row-major baseline.
3. **The PDX kernel is autovectorized generic Rust**, competing against
hand-written AVX-512 intrinsics. That the naive version reaches parity at
all is notable, but it is not a like-for-like layout test.
**Conclusion for now: do not adopt PDX layout on this evidence.** The honest
reading is that at f32 precision these workloads are bandwidth-bound, so layout
cannot help much — which *strengthens* the case for §5 item 2 (8-bit rotational
quantization), since 4× less data to stream attacks the actual bottleneck.
Revisit PDX for quantized codes, where the working set shrinks enough to become
compute-bound.
This is recorded rather than discarded because a negative result that cost a
day is worth more written down than repeated.
## 7. Open
- Third research thread (SIMD kernel evidence across FAISS/SimSIMD/usearch)
outstanding; it refines kernel specifics — VNNI int8, f16/bf16 now that
AVX-512 FP16 is stable — not the decisions above.
- Pull VIBE's `results/summary.parquet` to calibrate against the field before
writing index code.
- Audit whether `ruvector-rabitq` implements 1-bit only or extended/multi-bit
RaBitQ, and whether `rotation.rs` uses a fast Hadamard/Kac's walk or an
O(d²) dense rotation.

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# Findings: Hermes, rvAgent, MetaHarness, RuFlo
Research conducted 2026-08-01 across four parallel investigations:
web research on the Hermes harness, and deep code audits of
`crates/rvAgent/` (this repo), `ruvnet/metaharness`, and `ruvnet/ruflo`.
---
## 1. The Hermes Harness (NousResearch/hermes-agent)
MIT-licensed Python harness from Nous Research, released Feb 2026; ~175K
GitHub stars in four months, the most-used agent on OpenRouter by mid-2026.
Fully model-agnostic (18+ providers, 3 API modes, mid-session failover).
Sources: [repo](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent) ·
[architecture docs](https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/developer-guide/architecture) ·
[self-evolution companion](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent-self-evolution).
### Architecture
- **Loop:** one synchronous `AIAgent` class (`run_agent.py`) serves CLI,
messaging gateway, ACP, batch, and API-server modes. Task ID → prompt
build → preflight compression check → provider resolution → API call →
tool dispatch loop → SQLite persistence.
- **Cache-first prompts:** ordered tiers `stable` (identity, tool guidance,
skill summaries) → `context` (user context files) → `volatile`
(memory/profile/timestamp). Invariant: *the system prompt never changes
mid-conversation*. Only model switch or memory/context file change breaks
the prefix cache → **9197% measured cache hit rates**.
- **Tools:** 70+ tools/28 toolsets, self-registering; MCP for extension.
Benchmark configs run well with **only `terminal` + `file` enabled**.
- **Sandboxing:** 7 terminal backends (local, Docker, SSH, Singularity,
Modal, Daytona, Vercel) behind one interface; Docker defaults to
read-only root FS + dropped capabilities. Zero telemetry.
- **Context management:** a sentinel triggers compaction *before* hard
limits; an auxiliary model extracts durable facts into memory (hard
3,575-char budget) and **summarizes middle turns instead of dropping
them**; compressed sessions keep parent/child **lineage** in SQLite.
- **Memory, four separated layers:**
1. *Prompt*: MEMORY.md / USER.md, always injected, hard char budget
2. *Episodic*: SQLite + FTS5 over all past sessions, retrieved on demand
3. *Procedural*: **skills** — markdown in `~/.hermes/skills/`
(agentskills.io standard), progressive disclosure
4. *User model*: optional passively-built profile
- **The learning loop (signature feature):** skill creation triggers on 5+
tool calls, error recovery, or user correction → trajectory distilled
into a named skill; skills self-patch during use (string-patch default);
offline, GEPA (Genetic-Pareto, ICLR 2026 Oral, ~35× fewer rollouts than
GRPO) rewrites underperforming skills from execution traces.
- **Subagents:** `delegate_tool.py` spawns isolated subagents, multi-model
routing per subtask, programmatic tool-calling via `execute_code`.
### Benchmark evidence
- **Claw-SWE-Bench** (arXiv 2606.12344): harness choice alone swings pass@1
by **12.5 pts** (strong model) to **27.4 pts** (weak model). Hermes 71.1%
with GLM 5.1.
- **Harness-Bench** (arXiv 2605.27922): Hermes 71.2% overall, 100% security;
paper's conclusion — "execution alignment" (model beliefs ↔ workspace
state ↔ tool feedback ↔ verification) is the dominant success factor.
- **Learning-loop payoff:** agents with 20+ self-created skills complete
similar tasks **~40% faster / 40% fewer tokens** (Nous internal,
independently corroborated; domain-specific).
- **Agentic Harness Engineering** (arXiv 2604.25850): *structure transfers,
prose doesn't* — tools, middleware, memory architecture generalize across
models; prompt wording tweaks don't. An observability-driven self-evolving
harness beat human-designed Codex-CLI on Terminal-Bench 2 (77.0% vs 71.9%).
Hermes's reputation rests on **amortized performance via the learning loop
and ecosystem dominance**, not one-shot leaderboard wins — it is top-tier
but not #1 on frozen single-run benchmarks.
---
## 2. rvAgent Current State (crates/rvAgent/, ~45K LoC, 10 crates)
Declared as a 100%-fidelity Rust port of LangChain DeepAgents (ADR-093..103),
extended with MCP (ADR-104/105/112), A2A (ADR-159), RVF (ADR-106), WASM.
### Production-grade parts
- **`rvagent-a2a`** — the best crate: Ed25519-signed AgentCards, global
rolling budgets, per-task policy, peer routing with EWMA + circuit
breaker, recursion guard, W3C trace context, typed/versioned artifacts,
SSE + signed webhooks. 24 integration test files. *But no real runner —
`InMemoryRunner` echoes; not connected to the agent loop.*
- **`rvagent-mcp`** — complete JSON-RPC 2.0 MCP server/client, stdio/SSE,
tool groups, skills bridge (Claude Code + Codex formats). Implemented
per ADR-112.
- **Security primitives** — path confinement (`virtual_mode`), env
sanitization, Unicode/BiDi/homoglyph detection, tool-output sanitizer,
AES-256-GCM session encryption, SHA3-256 witness chains.
### Blocking defects (the loop is scaffold-grade)
| # | Defect | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| D1 | **Tool schemas are never sent to the model.** `ChatModel::complete(&[Message])` has no tools param; Anthropic/Gemini request structs have no `tools`/`functionDeclarations` field. The loop's `Tools` node is unreachable in production — rvagent is currently a chat client, not an agent. | `rvagent-core/src/models.rs:140`, `rvagent-backends/src/anthropic.rs:69-80`, `gemini.rs:32-35` |
| D2 | **The 19-module middleware pipeline is never wired into the loop.** `build_default_pipeline` is called only from benches/tests; the CLI constructs `AgentGraph::new(model, tools)` directly. Memory, skills, summarization, prompt caching, witness, HITL, SONA, HNSW all dormant. | `rvagent-cli/src/app.rs:643-728` |
| D3 | **Three incompatible type systems.** `AgentState`, `Message`, `Tool`, `TodoItem`, `RunnableConfig` each defined 23× (core enum `Message` vs middleware struct vs subagents `HashMap<String, Value>`), no conversion layer. This is the structural blocker for D2. | `core/src/state.rs:81`, `middleware/src/lib.rs:130`, `subagents/src/lib.rs:39` |
| D4 | **Subagents, parallelism, streaming are stubs.** `spawn_sync` returns a formatted string; "parallel" tool execution awaits sequentially in a loop (README's "true concurrency" claim is false); `stream()` returns "not yet implemented"; middleware hooks are sync (can't make an HTTP call without blocking). | `subagents/src/orchestrator.rs:44-110`, `core/src/graph.rs:183-193`, `anthropic.rs:378-385` |
Additional gaps: tool errors abort the loop via `?` instead of feeding back
as tool results (the single most important recovery behavior); session
persistence is messages-only (no todos/files/middleware state); no hooks
infrastructure at all; HITL has no approval transport; the "HNSW" middleware
uses **hash-based pseudo-embeddings with no semantic properties** and no
connection to real RuVector crates; prompt caching types exist but nothing
is emitted to the API; docs claim capabilities the code doesn't have.
ADR-139 (decompiled Claude Code intelligence: async-generator loop yielding
13 event types, 6 permission modes, per-subagent model override) and ADR-107
(`rvagent-swarm`) are proposed but unimplemented.
---
## 3. MetaHarness (ruvnet/metaharness)
A **harness factory + evolution lab**, not a harness runtime. Node/TS
(~50K LoC) + a small Rust kernel (2,259 LoC → WASM/NAPI). 19 published
`@metaharness/*` packages, 223 ADRs, exemplary CI/release engineering.
- **Generator:** `npx metaharness` mints branded harnesses for **nine hosts**
— Claude Code, Codex, pi.dev, **Hermes**, OpenClaw, RVM, Copilot,
OpenCode, GitHub Actions — via a `HostAdapter.generateConfig(spec) →
{path: contents}` interface. The Hermes adapter is verified against the
real `cli-config.yaml` and mirrors ruflo's `scrubReasoningBlocks`.
**Generated harnesses contain no agent loop** (`init` + `doctor` only) —
the loop is provided by the host.
- **Rust kernel (`crates/kernel`):** MCP spec validation + `ToolRegistry`,
claim-checked `dispatch()`, **10-event hook taxonomy with
Allow/Deny/Ask/Defer decision-merge** (modeled on Claude Code), 3-tier
routing heuristic, Ed25519 witness, cost, federation. `#![forbid(unsafe_code)]`,
serde-typed, no async/no I/O — a library rvagent could consume or mirror.
(Memory module is a 34-line stub; real memory delegates to `@ruvector/*`.)
- **Darwin Mode (the credible asset):** a real DI-tested ReAct loop
(`bench/swebench/agentic-loop.mjs`: text-JSON and native function-calling
variants, anti-thrash state hashing, observation caps, escalation
cascades) plus the full measurement apparatus — official SWE-bench Docker
gold eval (**Verified 55.6%**, Lite 51.3%, conformant packaged
submissions), Terminal-Bench, LiveCodeBench, GAIA/FRAMES, DRACO, with
Wilson CIs and documented retractions of its own failed claims.
- **The flywheel policy seam:** `SWE_POLICY_SYSTEM` env appends an evolved
operating policy to the solver's system prompt without touching loop code
— the template for how Darwin should drive rvagent.
- **Key structural fact:** the marketed control plane (`@metaharness/harness`
`HarnessKernel`, ADR-047, still Proposed) and the loop that produced every
measured number (`agentic-loop.mjs`) **share no code**. The runtime slot
is open.
RuVector's own ADR-256 already ruled: **borrow metaharness concepts, do not
take it as a runtime dependency** — and ruflo's ADR-150 enforces the same
invariant in the other direction (metaharness must stay removable).
---
## 4. RuFlo (ruvnet/ruflo = claude-flow v3, TS, ~173K LoC in the CLI)
Self-described *"agent meta-harness for Claude Code and Codex … Ruflo is the
harness — the execution layer around Claude Code."* `Agent = Model + Harness`.
- **The execution split:** ruflo **coordinates; Claude Code executes.**
`agent_spawn` is registry metadata; multi-turn tool-use execution is
delegated to Claude Code's Task tool or `claude -p` subprocesses. Ruflo
itself executes only: single-turn LLM calls with bandit-fed model routing
(`agent-execute-core.ts`), headless Claude subprocesses (worker daemon,
fable-harness LLM-judge), and — the one real in-house turn loop —
**rvagent's WASM build** via `@ruvector/rvagent-wasm`
(`ruvector/agent-wasm.ts`, 27 `wasm_agent_*`/`wasm_gallery_*` MCP tools).
- **Memory substrate (battle-tested):** `.swarm/memory.db` (SQLite/AgentDB),
`.swarm/hnsw.index`, `.rvf` containers; hybrid retrieval (BM25 +
cross-encoder rerank + RaBitQ + graph edges); **ADR-323 provenance typing**
(`user_claim|agent_output|system_observation|tool_result`) that any
co-writing runtime must honor; ReasoningBank with HNSW-backed pattern
promotion; SONA/EWC++/LoRA distillation pipeline
(RETRIEVE→JUDGE→DISTILL→CONSOLIDATE).
- **Hooks bus:** all 8 Claude Code lifecycle events funnel through
`.claude/helpers/hook-handler.cjs` — a subprocess contract a Rust binary
could shim or replace. 17 hooks + 14 background workers.
- **Model routing:** 3-tier (codemods $0 / Haiku / Sonnet-Opus) with a
persisted Thompson-sampling bandit closed-loop from execution outcomes.
- **MCP:** hand-rolled stdio JSON-RPC server, 305 tools; the **Capability
Brain** (typed maturity/authority/risk/health metadata per domain) is the
best-designed integration seam for advertising a new runtime.
- **Governance:** `.harness/mcp-policy.json` default-deny; ADR-150's
invariant — metaharness may augment, never be required.
- **Honesty:** ruflo's docs audit their own claims (e.g. "150x-12,500x NOT
reproduced — was brute-force fallback"). Its IMPROVEMENT-ROADMAP names
**"skill synthesis vs Hermes-class agents"** the highest-leverage missing
capability — DISTILL exists but never emits shareable SKILL.md artifacts.
- **rvagent is already first-class:** `plugins/ruflo-agent` wires WASM
rvagent + `wasm_agent_compose` hands agents a **safety-gated allowlist of
ruflo MCP tools** (destructive-tool gate included); plugins opt in via a
`rvagent.exposeSkillsAsTools` manifest field.
---
## 5. Synthesis: the opening
| Harness | Loop | Learning loop | Evolution apparatus | Coordination plane | Native speed / WASM |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hermes | ✅ mature | ✅ (skills+GEPA) | partial (offline) | ❌ | ❌ (Python) |
| Claude Code | ✅ mature | partial (manual skills) | ❌ | partial (Task tool) | ❌ |
| metaharness | ❌ (bench-only) | ❌ | ✅ (Darwin/flywheel) | ❌ | kernel only |
| ruflo | ❌ (delegates) | partial (DISTILL, no skills) | partial (harness-loop) | ✅ (305 tools, memory, swarm) | via rvagent-wasm |
| **rvagent today** | ❌ broken | ❌ | ❌ | via A2A (no runner) | ✅ (Rust+WASM+NAPI) |
| **rvagent target** | ✅ Hermes-class | ✅ (skills+SONA+witness) | ✅ (via metaharness) | ✅ (via ruflo) | ✅ |
Every column of the target row has real code behind it somewhere in the
rUv ecosystem. The work is repair (rvagent's loop) plus wiring (the seams),
not greenfield invention. See [02-target-architecture.md](02-target-architecture.md).

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# Target Architecture: rvAgent as a Hermes-Class, Self-Evolving Rust Harness
Design principle (from the benchmark literature): **structure transfers,
prose doesn't**. Everything below is structural — tools, loop mechanics,
memory layers, seams — not prompt wording.
---
## 1. The Loop (rvagent-core)
Replace today's blocking 4-node state machine with an **event-streaming
loop** (the ADR-139 direction, matching Claude Code's decompiled design and
Hermes's single-class-many-modes pattern):
```rust
// One loop, many frontends (CLI, TUI, ACP, A2A runner, WASM, headless)
pub trait AgentLoop {
fn run(&mut self, input: LoopInput) -> impl Stream<Item = AgentEvent>;
}
pub enum AgentEvent {
TurnStart { .. }, ModelDelta { text: String }, // streaming
ToolCallStart { id, name, args }, ToolCallEnd { id, result },
PermissionRequest { .. }, // HITL surfaces here
CompactionStart { .. }, CompactionEnd { lineage: SessionLineage },
SubagentSpawned { .. }, SubagentResult { .. },
Checkpoint { id }, TurnEnd { usage: Usage }, Done { state: AgentState },
Error { recoverable: bool, .. },
}
```
Non-negotiable loop behaviors (each maps to a measured Hermes/Harness-Bench
lesson):
1. **Tools go to the model.** `ChatModel::complete(&[Message], &[ToolDefinition])`
and `tools` on the Anthropic/Gemini request bodies. (Fixes D1.)
2. **Tool errors are tool results.** Never `?`-abort the loop on a failed
tool; feed the error text back as a `Message::tool` so the model can
recover. ("Execution alignment" — the dominant Harness-Bench factor.)
3. **Real parallel tool execution** via the existing (unused)
`parallel_execute` JoinSet+Semaphore path. (Fixes D4.)
4. **Real streaming**: SSE parsing in the backends, `impl Stream<Item =
StreamChunk>`, incremental TUI render.
5. **Few, high-fidelity core tools.** Keep the 9 built-ins; Hermes wins
benchmarks with `terminal` + `file` only. Everything else arrives via
MCP (rvagent-mcp client) and ruflo's `wasm_agent_compose` allowlist —
never as bespoke tool sprawl.
6. **One canonical type system.** `rvagent-core`'s `AgentState`/`Message`/
`Tool` become the only definitions; middleware and subagents consume
them. (Fixes D3 — the blocker for everything else.)
7. **Async middleware.** `Middleware::wrap_model_call` becomes async; the
default pipeline is constructed and wired in every entrypoint. (Fixes D2.)
## 2. Cache-First Prompt Assembly (new: `prompt_builder` in rvagent-core)
Hermes's 9197% cache hit rate comes from a discipline, not a feature:
```
[stable] identity + tool guidance + skill summaries ← changes only on config change
[context] AGENTS.md / project context files ← changes only on file change
[volatile] memory digest + todos + timestamp ← the ONLY tier that moves
```
- The stable tier is emitted with `cache_control` breakpoints (the existing
`PromptCachingMiddleware` + a new `cache_control` field on `ApiRequest`).
- Enumerate cache-breaking events (model switch, memory-file change,
context-file change) and log them — cache hit rate becomes a first-class
metric in `Metrics`.
- The system prompt never mutates mid-conversation; volatile data rides in
the tier boundary, and compaction respects the cache boundary.
## 3. Compaction with Lineage (wire + upgrade `SummarizationMiddleware`)
- Sentinel triggers **before** the hard limit (Hermes pattern): summarize
middle turns, keep head (stable prompt) and tail (recent turns) intact.
- Durable facts extracted to the memory layer under a **hard char budget**
(forcing curation, per Hermes's 3,575-char discipline).
- **Lineage**: compacted sessions record parent/child chains in the session
store so summaries trace back to raw turns (enables replay + Darwin's
trajectory harvesting).
- Upgrade path: ADR-252 coherence-weighted compaction
(`ruvector-agent-memory`) replaces naive char-window summarization — a
RuVector-native capability Hermes doesn't have.
- Replace the chars/4 token estimate with a real tokenizer + per-model
context-window table.
## 4. Four-Layer Memory (mirror Hermes, back with RuVector/ruflo substrate)
| Layer | Hermes | rvagent implementation |
|---|---|---|
| Prompt | MEMORY.md/USER.md, hard budget | `MemoryMiddleware` (AGENTS.md, exists) + write-back with budget enforcement |
| Episodic | SQLite+FTS5 over sessions | session store + **ruflo's `.swarm/memory.db`** via AgentDB bindings; honor ADR-323 provenance (`agent_output`, `tool_result`) and the WAL-sidecar guard |
| Procedural | skills (markdown, agentskills.io) | `SkillsMiddleware` + `skills_bridge` (exists; already speaks Claude Code + Codex formats) with progressive disclosure at runtime |
| User model | Honcho profile | optional; defer |
**Kill the fake HNSW.** The current hash-based pseudo-embedding middleware
is worse than nothing (locality-insensitive, unfounded perf claims). Replace
with real `ruvector-core`/`@ruvector` embeddings behind the existing feature
gate, or use ruflo's hybrid retrieval over MCP. FTS-first, ANN-second — the
Hermes lesson is that deterministic local search beats a vector DB for a
local-first harness.
## 5. Skills + The Learning Loop (the differentiator)
This is where the three systems interlock, and it directly closes ruflo's
self-identified top gap ("DISTILL never emits shareable SKILL.md"):
```
witnessed trajectory (rvagent witness chain, SHA3-256 tool-call entries)
│ trigger: 5+ tool calls / error recovery / user correction
skill synthesis (auxiliary model distills trajectory → SKILL.md)
│ progressive disclosure: summary in [stable] tier, body on demand
in-use self-patching (string-patch edits, skill_manage tool)
▼ offline
metaharness Darwin/flywheel: GEPA-style evolution of skills + policy genome
- fitness from rvagent headless runs (SWE-bench/Terminal-Bench/TBLite)
- promotion via harness-loop gates (OBSERVE→QUALIFY→BENCHMARK→VERIFY→CANARY→ACCEPT)
- Ed25519-signed champion manifests (out-of-loop signing)
SONA/ReasoningBank consolidation (EWC++, ADR-271 genome recipe)
+ optional weight-eft: SFT/DPO distillation of gold trajectories into cheap-tier LoRA
```
The **policy genome seam** is metaharness's `SWE_POLICY_SYSTEM` pattern:
rvagent accepts an evolved operating policy as an appended stable-tier
block (`--policy-file` / env), so Darwin mutates behavior without touching
loop code. Genome surfaces: policy text, temperature schedule, compaction
thresholds, tool config, skill set, `EwcConfig` (ADR-271).
## 6. Subagents (make ADR-097 real)
- `TaskTool``SubAgentOrchestrator` actually spawns `AgentLoop` instances
via JoinSet with a concurrency semaphore; results stream back as
`SubagentResult` events; CRDT merge + validators (already written) run on
join.
- Per-subagent model override (ADR-139's `CLAUDE_CODE_SUBAGENT_MODEL`
equivalent) — routing decision can come from ruflo's Thompson bandit via
MCP, or the local 3-tier heuristic.
- Subagent state isolation via the existing `CowStateBackend` fork/merge.
- Cross-*process/machine* delegation is already solved: the A2A crate.
Plug the real loop in as the A2A `TaskRunner` (replacing `InMemoryRunner`)
and rvagent instances federate with budgets, policy, recursion guards,
and signed identity for free — a capability Hermes does not have.
## 7. Hooks, Permissions, Checkpoints
- **Hooks:** adopt metaharness `crates/kernel`'s 10-event taxonomy +
`Allow/Deny/Ask/Defer` decision-merge (it's `#![forbid(unsafe_code)]`,
serde-typed, no-I/O — mirror it per ADR-256 "borrow concepts", or take it
as an *optional* dep consistent with ADR-150 symmetry). External hook
processes use the ruflo `hook-handler.cjs` subprocess contract so one
hook ecosystem serves both.
- **Permissions:** wire `HumanInTheLoopMiddleware` to the event stream
(`PermissionRequest` event ↔ approval reply), add permission modes and
per-tool allow/deny rules (ADR-139's 6-mode model).
- **Checkpoints:** full-state (messages + todos + files + middleware state +
in-flight tool calls) using the AGI container's unused
`SegmentType::Checkpoint`; resume/fork from any checkpoint. This is what
makes Darwin's population runs cheap (metaharness measured 39.3% cost
saved on resume, synthetic).
- **Sandbox depth:** keep env-sanitized local shell as the fast path, add a
Docker backend (read-only root, dropped caps — Hermes's secure default)
and honor ADR-140's WASM double-sandbox for untrusted agents. The
`SandboxBackend` trait already models this; it needs implementations.
## 8. Headless Mode (the benchmark/evolution contract)
`rvagent run -p "<prompt>" --output-format json|stream-json --max-budget-usd
--policy-file --checkpoint-dir` — a stateless one-shot invocation emitting
the event stream as JSONL + a final result envelope (cost, tokens, tool
calls, patch). This single interface is what lets:
- metaharness Darwin use rvagent as a solver backend (exactly how
`handoff-solver.mjs` shells out to `claude -p` today),
- ruflo's worker daemon spawn rvagent instead of headless Claude,
- CI run frozen-eval gates.
## 9. Integration Seams (explicit contracts)
### rvagent ⇄ ruflo
| Seam | Mechanism | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Turn loop hosting | `@ruvector/rvagent-wasm` (`WasmAgent`, `JsModelProvider`) + a NAPI sibling for native speed | WASM exists; NAPI new |
| Tool surface | `wasm_agent_compose` safe-allowlist of ruflo's 305 MCP tools (destructive gate) | exists |
| Memory | shared `.swarm/memory.db` / `.rvf`; ADR-323 provenance mandatory | bindings exist (AgentDB/ruvector are Rust-origin) |
| Lifecycle | hook-handler.cjs subprocess contract; Capability Brain entry with maturity/authority/risk metadata | contract exists |
| Routing | consume `[TASK_MODEL_RECOMMENDATION]` signals; report outcomes to the bandit | signal exists |
### rvagent ⇄ metaharness
| Seam | Mechanism | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Host adapter | `host-rvagent` (10th host): `generateConfig(spec)` emits rvagent config + skills + policy | new (adapter interface is trivial) |
| Evolution | headless JSON contract as Darwin solver; policy-genome env/file seam; flywheel promotion gates | pattern exists (`SWE_POLICY_SYSTEM`, `claude -p` precedent) |
| Governance | Ed25519 witness formats aligned (kernel witness ↔ rvagent witness chain ↔ RVF witness per ADR-106 Phase 4) | partial |
| Kernel reuse | mirror hooks/claims/dispatch types (ADR-256: concepts, not required dependency) | new |
Both directions preserve the ADR-150 invariant: **every integration is
optional and degrades gracefully**. rvagent must run standalone; ruflo must
run without rvagent; metaharness must stay removable.
## 10. What "best SOTA harness" concretely means here
1. **Beat the Claw-SWE-Bench harness spread**: rvagent + a fixed open model
scores within the Hermes/OpenClaw band (≥70% on the 350-instance set),
validated with metaharness's conformant apparatus (Wilson CIs, gold
Docker eval, packaged submissions — no self-graded claims).
2. **Beat Hermes where it's weak**: native-speed kernel (startup, token
throughput, parallel tools), in-browser WASM deployment, federated
multi-agent execution with cryptographic identity/budgets (A2A), and
coherence-weighted compaction (ADR-252) instead of char windows.
3. **Match Hermes where it's strong**: the closed learning loop — measured
as ≥30% token reduction on repeat-task suites after 20+ synthesized
skills, with Darwin-evolved skill populations as the upgrade Hermes
only gets offline.

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# Implementation Roadmap
Ordering rule: nothing in P1+ lands until P0 is green, because every
feature in P1+ is blocked by the type unification and the tools-to-model
fix. Each phase has a falsifiable exit gate.
---
## Phase 0 — Foundation Repair (rvagent-core/backends/middleware)
The loop must become a real agent before it can become a great harness.
1. **Unify types.** `rvagent-core`'s `AgentState`/`Message`/`Tool`/
`TodoItem`/`RunnableConfig` become canonical; delete the middleware and
subagents duplicates; add conversion impls only at the WASM/serde
boundary. (Blocks everything.)
2. **Send tools to the model.** `ChatModel::complete(&[Message],
&[ToolDefinition])`; `tools` field on Anthropic `ApiRequest`;
`functionDeclarations` for Gemini; parse `tool_use` into the canonical
`ToolCall`.
3. **Async middleware + wiring.** `wrap_model_call` → async;
`build_default_pipeline()` constructed and installed in CLI, ACP, and
the future A2A runner. Delete the CLI's duplicate `LocalFsBackend`
grep/glob/execute in favor of `rvagent-backends`.
4. **Loop correctness.** Tool errors feed back as tool results (no `?`
abort); real parallel execution via `parallel_execute`; per-turn `Usage`
flows into `BudgetEnforcer` and `Metrics`.
5. **Honest docs.** Remove unsupported claims (parallel exec, HNSW speedups,
streaming) from README/architecture.md until true; docs list all 10
crates.
**Exit gate:** `rvagent run "create and run a failing test, then fix it"`
completes end-to-end against the live Anthropic API with ≥2 tool round
trips, budget accounting, and a green `cargo test` across the workspace.
## Phase 1 — Hermes-Class Loop Mechanics
1. **Event-streaming loop** (`AgentEvent` stream; ADR-139 direction) with
SSE streaming backends and incremental TUI render.
2. **Cache-first prompt builder** (stable/context/volatile tiers,
`cache_control` emission, cache-hit-rate metric).
3. **Compaction with lineage** (sentinel pre-limit, middle-turn
summarization, durable-fact extraction under hard budget, parent/child
session chains, real tokenizer).
4. **Full-state checkpoints** (`SegmentType::Checkpoint`), resume/fork.
5. **Hooks + permissions** (10-event taxonomy with Allow/Deny/Ask/Defer
merge mirrored from metaharness kernel; HITL wired to
`PermissionRequest` events; permission modes; per-tool rules).
6. **Real subagents** (JoinSet spawn, semaphore, CoW fork/merge, CRDT join,
per-subagent model override).
7. **Headless contract** (`-p --output-format stream-json
--max-budget-usd --policy-file`).
8. **Docker sandbox backend** (read-only root, dropped caps) alongside the
local shell.
**Exit gate:** rvagent completes a 20-instance SWE-bench-Lite smoke slice
via the headless contract inside metaharness's runner, with measured cache
hit rate >85% and zero loop aborts on tool errors.
## Phase 2 — Memory & The Learning Loop
1. **Kill fake HNSW**; episodic memory = session store + FTS, with real
`ruvector` embeddings behind the feature gate; optional shared
`.swarm/memory.db` (AgentDB bindings, ADR-323 provenance, WAL guard).
2. **Prompt-memory write-back** with hard char budget + periodic curation
nudges.
3. **Skill synthesis**: trajectory triggers (5+ tool calls / error recovery
/ user correction) → SKILL.md emission via auxiliary model; progressive
disclosure; `skill_manage` tool with string-patch default. (Closes
ruflo's #1 roadmap gap; skills interop with Claude Code/Codex via the
existing `skills_bridge`.)
4. **SONA on the default path** (feature-gated on, trajectories from the
witness chain feeding ReasoningBank; ADR-271 EwcConfig as genome).
5. **ADR-252 coherence-weighted compaction** as the summarization upgrade.
**Exit gate:** on a 3×-repeated task suite, the skilled agent shows ≥30%
token reduction vs a fresh instance (Hermes's measured ~40% is the bar).
## Phase 3 — Ecosystem Integration
1. **ruflo:** NAPI package (`@ruvector/rvagent-native`) as a sibling to
`rvagent-wasm` behind `agent-wasm.ts`; `wasm_agent_compose` tool
allowlist honored; Capability Brain registration; hook-handler
subprocess shim; bandit outcome reporting. ruflo's worker daemon gains
an `rvagent` executor option beside headless Claude.
2. **metaharness:** `packages/host-rvagent` adapter; rvagent registered as
a Darwin solver backend via the headless contract; witness format
alignment (kernel ↔ rvagent ↔ RVF per ADR-106 Phase 4).
3. **A2A goes live:** real `TaskRunner` backed by the loop replaces
`InMemoryRunner`; `rvagent a2a serve` advertises real skills; federated
rvagent↔rvagent task delegation demo with budgets + recursion guards.
4. **Eval in CI:** TBLite-style smoke slice + frozen-eval gate on PRs
(metaharness harness-loop gates: QUALIFY→BENCHMARK→VERIFY→CANARY).
**Exit gate:** one command (`npx ruflo swarm ... --executor rvagent` or
equivalent) runs a swarm where rvagent instances execute, ruflo
coordinates/remembers, and the run emits signed witness manifests.
## Phase 4 — Evolution & SOTA Claims
1. **Policy-genome evolution**: Darwin mutates policy text, temperature
schedules, compaction thresholds, tool configs; flywheel promotion with
held-out benchmarks and signed champion manifests.
2. **Skill-population evolution** (GEPA-style over execution traces).
3. **weight-eft distillation** of gold trajectories into cheap-tier LoRA
(ADR-271's SFT/DPO on/off-policy recipe) → escalate to frontier models
less often; cost-Pareto tracking.
4. **Publish**: Claw-SWE-Bench-style fixed-model comparison vs Hermes/
OpenClaw, Terminal-Bench 2.0, with conformant packaged submissions and
Wilson CIs. No claim ships without the metaharness honesty apparatus
(the ecosystem's retraction discipline is a feature — keep it).
**Exit gate:** rvagent within the Hermes/OpenClaw band (≥70%) on the
350-instance fixed-model set, and demonstrably ahead on ≥2 of: startup
latency, token throughput, parallel-tool wall clock, federated multi-agent
tasks, in-browser deployment.
---
## Proposed ADRs
| ADR | Title | Decides |
|---|---|---|
| A | rvAgent Harness Core Repair (supersedes parts of ADR-095/097) | canonical types, tools-to-model, async middleware, loop recovery semantics |
| B | rvAgent Event-Streaming Loop & Headless Contract (implements ADR-139) | `AgentEvent` taxonomy, stream-json format, budget/policy flags |
| C | rvAgent Cache-First Prompts, Compaction & Lineage | prompt tiers, cache_control, sentinel compaction, session lineage |
| D | rvAgent Skills & Learning Loop | synthesis triggers, SKILL.md interop, SONA/witness wiring, char budgets |
| E | rvAgent ⇄ ruflo Execution Seam | NAPI sibling, memory co-tenancy rules (ADR-323/WAL), hook shim, Capability Brain entry |
| F | rvAgent ⇄ metaharness Evolution Seam | host adapter, Darwin solver contract, policy genome surfaces, witness alignment |
## Risks
- **Scope gravity.** The ecosystem's pattern (documented in all three
audits) is protocol/ADR surface outrunning the loop. Mitigation: P0/P1
exit gates are executable, not documentary; no new crate until the gate
passes.
- **Type unification churn** touches every crate at once. Mitigation: land
as one PR series with the workspace green at each step; WASM API kept
stable via serde boundary.
- **Benchmark credibility.** Any SOTA claim without the gold-eval +
Wilson-CI + packaged-submission discipline damages the whole ecosystem's
(currently strong) honesty record. Mitigation: Phase 4 gates are
metaharness-conformant by construction.
- **Optionality invariants** (ADR-150/256) must hold in both directions or
the three projects become a distributed monolith. Mitigation: CI runs
each project's `--ignore-optional` path with rvagent absent/present.

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# SOTA Landscape (August 2026) — and what it changes
Research sweep across five areas: benchmarks and credible-claim criteria,
harness technique literature with effect sizes, competing harness
architectures, long-horizon context methods, and self-improving harnesses.
This document exists to correct the roadmap, not to decorate it. Where the
evidence contradicts `03-roadmap.md`, the contradiction is stated plainly and
the roadmap change is specified.
**Evidence discipline.** Most 2026 material is single-source arXiv preprints
or vendor blogs. Individual percentage-point figures are hypotheses to
re-measure in our own harness, not constants. The findings below are ranked by
corroboration, and single-source claims are marked. Four findings are
multiply-corroborated and safe to build on:
1. Harness choice moves results 1030 points at fixed model.
2. Harness value scales *inversely* with model strength.
3. Context **management** beats context **size**.
4. Parallel writer agents fail on coding tasks specifically.
---
## 1. The headline: most of the delta is reliability, not intelligence
The cleanest ablation available (Claw-SWE-Bench, Jun 2026) strips a harness to
bare model-emits-diff and rebuilds it: **19.1% → 73.4%, +54.3 points**. Nearly
all of that is patch-apply failures going from 69.1% to under 1.5%.
That reframes the entire project. The biggest measured wins in every ablation
come from eliminating mechanical failure modes — patches that don't apply,
tool-call loops, context rot, flaky tests — not from smarter reasoning.
**This is the strongest argument for building the harness in Rust**, and it is
not the argument we have been making. The case is not "Rust is fast." It is
that the failure modes which dominate these ablations can be made
*type-unrepresentable* rather than merely rare.
Two structural findings that should shape sequencing:
- **Harness variance is larger for weaker models.** Same harness set, GLM-5.1:
12.5-point spread. Qwen-3.6-flash: 27.4-point spread. If we target frontier
models only, we should expect roughly *half* the harness ROI the literature
reports.
- **The harness is now a disclosed experimental variable.** Two 2026 papers
(arXiv 2605.23950, 2607.04528) argue benchmark results are substantially
determined by undisclosed harness choices, and that harnesses induce
systematically different agent *beliefs* on logically equivalent tasks. Any
claim we publish must disclose the harness or it is not a claim.
---
## 2. Competitive position: the Rust field is crowded at the top
The premise that a Rust harness is differentiating is **false as of July 2026**.
Three of the major harnesses are already Rust:
| Harness | Scale | License | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Codex CLI** (OpenAI) | ~7080 crates | Apache 2.0 | Rewritten *from* TypeScript for single-binary distribution + native sandbox bindings |
| **Grok Build** (xAI) | ~844k LOC | Apache 2.0 | Open-sourced **2026-07-15**. ACP, checkpoints, TUI |
| **Goose** (Block) | — | Apache 2.0 | MCP-native, subagents via `Agent::new()` |
OpenAI's stated reasons for the Rust rewrite are exactly the ones in our
positioning: zero-dependency install (Node 22+ blocked enterprise/air-gapped),
no GC pauses in long-running processes, memory-safe sandbox bindings without
FFI shims. That ground is taken.
**Two positions remain genuinely open:**
1. **No Rust harness is usable as a library.** Codex's own `AGENTS.md`
discourages extending `codex-core`; Grok Build has issues and PRs
*disabled* (source-visible, not open governance); Goose is app-first; and
Anthropic's Agent SDK is Python/TypeScript only — the docs instruct other
languages to shell out to the CLI. A stable, semver'd, embeddable harness
crate with open governance is unoccupied.
2. **Deterministic replay is a named gap** in the Rust agent ecosystem and
thin everywhere. Our append-only witness/segment infrastructure is already
most of the way there.
**Honesty constraint on the replay claim.** Even at temperature 0, hosted
inference is not reproducible — floating-point non-associativity and
batch-size-dependent kernels produce run-to-run variation. The defensible
claim is *replay of the harness*, with **action-match rate** reported, not
byte-exact reproduction of the model.
**Convergence warning.** Grok Build's tool implementations are documented ports
`apply_patch`, `grep_files`, `list_dir`, `read_file` from Codex; `bash`,
`edit`, `glob`, `grep`, `read`, `skill`, `todowrite`, `write` from opencode. A
frontier lab with a million lines of Rust chose to port the tool surface rather
than design one. **Tool-surface novelty is not available as a differentiator.**
---
## 3. Ranked technique priorities
Ordered by measured effect per unit of engineering effort. Tier 1 items are
days of work each and carry the largest deltas in the literature.
### Tier 1 — do first
| # | Technique | Effect | Status in rvagent |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Reliable patch application (real workspace, file-based edits, git diff extraction, verify-after-write) | **+54.3 pp** | Partial — tools write real files; no verify-after-write, no git extraction |
| 2 | Observation-window management (keep last N tool outputs in full, elide older) | +3 pp, prevents long-run collapse | **Missing** |
| 3 | Loop/stuck detection (3-strike tool-call fingerprint → inject warning, skip) | Removes most common catastrophic failure | **Missing** |
| 4 | Actionable structured tool errors + response size caps (~25k tokens) | Part of the reliability delta | Partial — errors feed back (P0.4), uncapped |
| 5 | Tool surface held to 815 tools | Avoids 16 to 23 pt routing collapse | **OK** — 9 builtins. Protect this. |
| 6 | Environment bootstrap injection (cwd, tree, toolchain, test command, current check status) | Stanford Meta-Harness @ 76.4% TB2.0 | **Missing** |
| 7 | Persist thinking blocks across tool calls | +2.2 pp coding | **Missing** |
Item 3 deserves emphasis: raising max-iteration counts does **not** fix loops,
it makes them more expensive. Our `max_iterations: 100` is a cost cap, not a
loop guard.
### Tier 2 — clear ROI, ~12 weeks each
- **`str_replace` edit tool with fuzzy-failure diagnostics + `cargo check` lint
gate.** +10 to +23 pp for mid-tier models, ~05 pp frontier. The specific
ergonomics matter: in the Qwen reproduction only the SWE-agent
`str_replace_editor` flavor moved the number; a different `edit`/`write_file`
pair gave *zero* improvement. Offer `write_file` alongside (+2.1 pp, 17.9%
cost). Skip unified diff — apply failures dominate.
- **Reproduction-test-first loop** (+8 to +13% relative). Critical caveat:
adding "write tests first" to the prompt *without* targeted context made
regressions **worse** (6.08% → 9.94%). The gain is in *executing*
reproduction tests, not the TDD ritual.
- **Summarized grep/glob** — return paths + match counts, require a second call
for contents. `ripgrep` as a library crate.
- **Fresh-context reviewer subagent** — ~2 bugs/PR, 58% severe, in Cognition
production. Counterintuitively, reviewers perform **better with no shared
context**: shorter context, less rot, deeper analysis.
- **Read-only context-gathering subagent** returning a summary string. +2.1 pp,
34.5% main-agent input tokens. Use a *cheap* model here — a frontier model
in this slot gave +0.4 pp at 5.8× cost.
### Tier 3 — real but expensive or conditional
Rubric-guided compaction (the rubric is load-bearing, not the tool);
best-of-N with test-based filtering then deterministic patch fusion (+7 to
+9.4 pp at N≈8, ≈8× cost); shadow-git checkpointing; coordinator delegation
(only after single-agent is solid).
### Skip list — evidence says no
- **Parallel writer swarms** for coding
- **Few-shot demos / explicit CoT instructions** for reasoning models — zero-shot ≥ few-shot; exemplars can contradict native reasoning
- **Ungrounded self-reflection loops** — can degrade already-correct answers; only execution-grounded critique works
- **Unified-diff edit format**
- **Semantic/embedding code index in v1** — vendor-only evidence, high maintenance, stale-by-construction on a repo the agent is editing
- **Elaborate system-prompt frameworks** — the "2030% improvement" claims have no methodology; keep rulebooks under ~60 lines
- **Context windows beyond ~128k** — sweeps plateau ~114k; documented ceiling ~96112k
- **Learned/RL-trained components** (adaptive edit-format selectors, RL compaction) — the hand-written 80% is available for 5% of the effort
---
## 4. Long-horizon execution: what actually breaks
Ranked by when it bites in a multi-hour run:
1. **Wasted-context accumulation → attention dilution.** Earliest, most
universal, invisible. Unaided coding agents waste ~1-in-3 file reads.
2. **History error accumulation.** The largest single failure driver —
process-level failures are **72.5%** of long-horizon failures (HORIZON,
arXiv 2604.11978). Errors compound *between* steps, not within them.
Non-linear: sharp collapse past a domain-specific threshold.
3. **Compaction-induced information loss** — self-inflicted, caused by the
mitigation for #1.
4. **Goal/identity drift***downstream* of 13, not an independent disease.
5. **Hallucinated state** — phantom invoices, fabricated history.
6. **Memory staleness / negative transfer.**
The 2026 evidence does **not** support treating goal drift as the primary
problem. It is the observable end-stage of context and error problems.
### The compaction finding that contradicts our plan
**Simple observation masking matches or beats LLM summarization at roughly
half the cost** (JetBrains, 250-turn SWE-bench trajectories, NeurIPS 2025
workshop). Mechanism: LLM summarization **extended trajectories 1315%** by
destroying natural stopping signals — the agent loses the cue that it already
finished something.
Better still, **Addressable Recall Compaction** (arXiv 2607.25066): mask the
observation but leave an ID the agent can dereference on demand. Beat
full-context, sliding window, LLM summary, structured state, *and* RAG memory
(NIAH 99.40% vs 88.12% best baseline).
And the single highest-leverage technique found anywhere in this sweep:
**programmatic tool calling** — the model writes code that orchestrates tools,
so intermediate outputs never enter context. On LOCA-bench it was the **only**
strategy positive across all four models tested (+6 to +13.3 points). It is
absent from our roadmap entirely.
Two further hard requirements:
- **Re-inject invariants verbatim after every compaction; never summarize
them.** "Governance Decay" (arXiv 2606.22528) shows safety constraints and
system-prompt instructions erode through successive compaction cycles with
no failure signal. This is architectural, not jailbreaking.
- **Capability-gate context features.** On LOCA-bench a memory tool made a
weaker model *worse* (10.7% → 8.0%), and context-budget awareness made it
much worse (10.7% → 4.0%), while both helped stronger models. Multi-model
support makes per-tier feature flags mandatory.
---
## 5. Self-improvement: the literature turned against us
RuVector already has ReasoningBank-style trajectory learning and a shared
brain. The 2026 evidence on this class of system is substantially negative.
**The case for** is real: ReasoningBank reports +4.6 to +8.3 points on WebArena
across three backbones (ICLR 2026); ACE reports +10.6% on agents. Distilling
from *failures* as well as successes is a genuine contribution.
**The case against is now stronger:**
- **The gains are confound-sized.** MemDelta (arXiv 2606.29914) shows swapping
the embedding model alone shifts accuracy ±6.2pp — comparable to
ReasoningBank's entire headline gain. In the same work, **agent self-memory
(42%) underperformed plain retrieval (47%)**, and one system reached parity
with cloud RAG at **50× the cost**.
- **Memory utility is an inverted U.** "Useful Memories Become Faulty"
(arXiv 2605.12978): utility rises, then degrades *below* the no-memory
baseline. GPT-5.4 failed **54% of previously-solved ARC-AGI problems** when
using consolidated memory. Episodic-only management **doubled** accuracy vs
forced consolidation — **the consolidation step is the bug, not the storage.**
- **Benchmark-local.** MemoryArena specifically names ReasoningBank's
procedural memory as performing poorly on interdependent multi-session tasks
— the setting closest to real work.
- **No automatic self-evolution method sustains positive gain across settings**
(EvoAgentBench, arXiv 2607.05202). *Curated* ability content transfers
across model families; *automatic extraction* is the failure point.
- **Greedy acceptance is uncontrolled multiple testing.** PACE
(arXiv 2606.08106): "keep it if the score improved" committed **3042% false
edits**, and made 1321 spurious modifications when *no true gains existed*,
degrading one agent by 4.9 points.
Meanwhile **Live-SWE-agent reaches 79.2% on SWE-bench Verified with zero
persistent memory** — on-the-fly tool synthesis from the current trajectory,
discarded after use. It sidesteps every failure mode above, which is not a
coincidence.
**Verdict:** trajectory-learning memory is a nice-to-have with fragile upside,
not a differentiator. It must ship as a **gated optimization with a measured
contribution**, never on the default path unmeasured.
Minimum viable discipline if we keep it:
- Two-tier storage: **episodic immutable**, distilled artifacts *derived* with
pointers back to source episodes.
- Gated, delta-only consolidation with hard length caps. Never end-to-end
rewrites (ACE documents a single step collapsing 18,282 tokens → 122).
- Trust tiers by verifier: programmatic (tests/typecheck) = active;
LLM-judge-only = quarantined; **derived from untrusted content = never
allowed to influence tool-permission or destructive-action decisions.**
- **PACE-style anytime-valid sequential testing for promotion**, never greedy.
- Retrieved memories framed as **"references, not rules"** — nearly free, and
drops attack success 20.6% → 13.1%.
- **A permanent memory-off control arm.** Not a one-time ablation — without a
live control we cannot detect the inverted-U crossover.
Primary metric: **paired net lift on the same instances**, with the regression
metric that matters most being *rate of previously-solved tasks that now fail
with memory on*.
**Shared-brain caveat.** Cross-agent shared memory multiplies the poisoning
blast radius. Measured memory-poisoning work reports ~50% attack success and
~41% *relapse* success, with contextual assimilation as the primary vector —
poisoned entries work best when they look like ordinary preferences. The
shared brain needs the strongest gates in the system, not the weakest.
---
## 6. Verifier quality is the binding constraint
Any self-improving loop is only as good as its verdict signal, and the 2026
evidence on LLM-as-judge is poor:
- A judge surfaced **under 25%** of human-confirmed systematic problems, and
**flagged zero** issues in a batch where humans confirmed 23 distinct
defects. Implied **36× undercount** of true defect rates.
- Blind-spot structure is systematic: catches **turn-local** problems, severely
blind to **cross-turn state**.
- Calibration drifts: one judge at 0.91 agreement shifted four points after a
model update — the signal stopped meaning what it meant.
**Design rule:** programmatic and execution-grounded signals first (tests, type
checks, schema validation, invariants). LLM judge as a *secondary, quarantined*
signal only. Treat the judge as a **regression floor, never a promotion
authority**. Re-anchor against a rolling human-labeled sample after every model
update.
---
## 7. Benchmark hygiene
**SWE-bench Verified is saturated and unreliable as a claim target.**
- UTBoost (ACL 2025): resolve rates inflated **~6.4 pp** by weak tests; **1 in
5** "solved" patches semantically incorrect; augmenting tests changed
leaderboard ranks in **24.4%** of Verified submissions.
- OpenAI's own audit found **59.4%** of the hardest unsolved Verified problems
had flawed test cases, and OpenAI stopped reporting Verified in early 2026.
This directly threatens our Phase 4 exit gate (`≥70% on a 350-instance
fixed-model set`) — the gate is stated against a saturated benchmark whose
noise band exceeds the effect sizes we would be claiming.
**Consequence for our own A/B testing:** before trusting any measurement of a
harness change, verify test determinism (run F2P/P2P repeatedly under gold and
base patches). A 3-point "improvement" sits inside the flaky-test noise band.
Invest in eval-loop speed — validation that cannot run in minutes will not get
run.
---
## 8. Roadmap corrections
Specific, and each traceable to a finding above.
### Phase 1 — reorder and add
**Add a new Phase 1a "reliability floor" ahead of everything else**, comprising
Tier 1 items 17 (§3). These are days of work with the largest measured
deltas, and five of seven are currently missing. The present Phase 1 leads with
event-streaming, cache-first prompts, and compaction — all defensible, none of
them the biggest lever.
**Add programmatic tool calling** (§4). Highest-leverage single technique in
the sweep; absent from the plan.
### Phase 1.3 / Phase 2.5 — change the compaction bet
Both currently bet on summarization (middle-turn summarization; ADR-252
coherence-weighted compaction). Evidence says summarization is close to the
*worst* measured option and inflates trajectories 1315%.
**Replace with:** observation masking as the default, plus addressable recall
(masked entries keep a dereferenceable ID). Keep summarization as a fallback
behind a rubric. Add mandatory verbatim invariant re-injection post-compaction.
Note this also affects the shipped default pipeline, which currently includes a
`summarization` middleware.
### Phase 1.6 — subagents: drop the CRDT merge
Currently "CoW fork/merge, CRDT join." This is parallel-writer architecture,
which is the one multi-agent pattern with strong negative evidence for coding.
Cognition's 2026 revision — after a year of production data — is **one writer,
augmented by auxiliary intelligence; never parallel writes.**
**Replace with** the two patterns that have production evidence: a
**fresh-context reviewer** (no shared context — it performs *better* without
it) and a **read-only context-gatherer** returning a summary string. Model the
subagent boundary as *a tool that spawns an isolated context and returns a
String*, not as peers with a message bus. That buys nearly all demonstrated
upside at a fraction of the complexity.
**Amended (ADR-278 §7).** The reviewer is **gated, not adopted**. metaharness
ADR-226 is a gold-scored null on a closely related design. It gave its advisor
the *full transcript* where this reviewer sees *only the diff*, so it does not
refute the pattern — but it is the specific null the reviewer must beat before
reaching the default path. The gatherer is unaffected and corroborated.
### Phase 2 — gate the learning loop, and shift memory → policy
"SONA on the default path" contradicts §5. Move behind a feature gate with the
measurement apparatus (paired lift, previously-solved regression rate, control
arm) as the *precondition* for enabling it, not a follow-up.
The existing exit gate (≥30% token reduction on a repeated task suite) is
well-formed — keep it, and add the control arm.
**Update (ADR-278).** The promotion apparatus does not need building:
`@metaharness/flywheel` already implements a frozen fingerprinted conjunctive
gate, holdout **plus** a never-optimized-against anchor, Ed25519 receipts,
independent replay verification, and a compounding lineage DAG. Adopt it.
More consequentially, metaharness's own measurements reframe the target.
Self-learning splits into two objects with opposite evidence: **policy text**
(GEPA-style; positive) and **episodic memory** (ReasoningBank/SONA; negative,
per §5). RuVector's weight currently sits on the memory side. Move new effort to
policy evolution.
Two internal nulls to respect:
- **ADR-226** — a read-only frontier advisor produced *zero* marginal
gold-scored resolves at **5.4× cost** while genuinely firing (33 advisories,
3 vetoes). Independently corroborates this document's +0.4 pp / 5.8× figure.
- **ADR-236** — the flywheel mechanism was proven end-to-end on real SWE-bench
and still produced no compounding lift, because the base solver was too weak.
**A promotion engine cannot rescue an unreliable loop**, which confirms the
reliability-floor-first ordering above.
### Phase 3 — MCP spec migration is now urgent
MCP **2026-07-28** landed days ago and is breaking: protocol-level sessions and
`Mcp-Session-Id` removed, `_meta` on every request, `server/discover` added,
Tasks extension replaces long-running `tools/call`, and Roots/Sampling/Logging
deprecated. Building against the 2025-11-25 shape means a rewrite within
months. The official Rust SDK (`rmcp`) already implements the new spec.
**Also add ACP as a first-class target.** It went from Zed-only to headline
feature of Zed 1.0, built into JetBrains, a public registry, and 25+ agents —
and its reference implementation is Rust. We have an `rvagent-acp` crate
already; this is closer than it looks.
### Phase 4 — re-ground the SOTA claim
Drop the SWE-bench-Verified-based gate. Retarget to non-saturated benchmarks
and to the axes where we can actually win. The differentiator claims should be
**library API + deterministic replay** (§2), not speed.
Report action-match rate for replay, not reproducibility. Keep the honesty
apparatus — given §7, retraction discipline is the feature.
---
## 9. Open items
- ~~Benchmark/leaderboard sweep~~ **Resolved 2026-08-01.** Headline: **SWE-bench
Pro was retracted by OpenAI on 2026-07-08** (27.4% of public tasks flagged
broken automatically, 34.1% by human reviewers) — the obvious successor to
Verified is also gone. Terminal-Bench 2.1 is the only credible harness board;
no operating leaderboard reports cost, which makes a cost-normalized Pareto
uncontested ground. Full gate in ADR-277 §7.
- `codex-rs` internals in §2 come from a third-party architecture writeup, not
the repo. Worth reading `codex-rs/core/src/` directly before copying the
`Op`/`EventMsg` design.
- Grok Build's governance may change. If xAI opens PRs, the "no community Rust
harness" gap closes fast — the moat must be the library API and replay, not
merely that a Rust harness exists.

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@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
# rvAgent as a Hermes-Class Harness — Research & Architecture Proposal
**Date:** 2026-08-01
**Status:** Research complete, implementation proposed
**Related:** ADR-093..107 (rvAgent), ADR-139 (Claude Code intelligence), ADR-150 (ruflo metaharness surfaces), ADR-159 (A2A), ADR-211/252 (agent memory), ADR-256 (metaharness concepts), ADR-260/266/271 (Darwin evolution)
## The Question
> How can we implement rvagent more like the Hermes harness, integrated with
> ruvnet/metaharness and ruvnet/ruflo, to create the best SOTA harness in the world?
## The Answer in One Paragraph
The Hermes agent (NousResearch/hermes-agent, MIT, ~175K stars) proved two things:
(1) **the harness is worth up to 27 points of SWE-bench pass@1** — more than most
model upgrades — and (2) the winning differentiator is not one-shot benchmark
score but a **closed learning loop**: trajectories distilled into self-patching
skills, evolved offline by GEPA, yielding ~40% faster/cheaper repeat tasks.
RuVector already believes this thesis — ADR-260/266/271's "freeze the model,
evolve the harness" is the same idea Hermes ships. What no one ships yet is a
**native-speed, memory-safe, WASM-portable harness kernel with an evolutionary
optimizer and a swarm coordination plane attached**. That is exactly the seam
where rvagent (Rust execution kernel) + metaharness (Darwin evolution + eval
apparatus + governance) + ruflo (memory substrate, hooks bus, MCP surface,
model routing, swarm) combine into something none of the incumbent harnesses
— Hermes included — can match. The catch: rvagent's core loop is currently
scaffold-grade (it cannot even send tool schemas to the model), so the path
starts with foundation repair, not features.
## Ecosystem Fit (who does what)
```
┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ metaharness — the harness FACTORY & EVOLVER │
│ mints harnesses (9 hosts incl. Hermes), Darwin/flywheel evolves │
│ policy genomes, Ed25519 witness governance, SWE/Terminal-Bench │
│ apparatus. Generated harnesses ship NO agent loop today. │
└───────────────▲────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
│ evolves genome / benchmarks / signs
┌───────────────┴────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ rvagent — the EXECUTION KERNEL (this proposal) │
│ Rust agent loop: tools, streaming, compaction+lineage, skills, │
│ subagents, checkpoints, hooks, budget, witness. Ships as native │
│ CLI + NAPI + WASM. Fills the loop-shaped hole both siblings │
│ currently outsource to Claude Code. │
└───────────────▲────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
│ memory / hooks / routing / tool surface via MCP
┌───────────────┴────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ ruflo — the COORDINATION PLANE │
│ .swarm/memory.db + hnsw.index + .rvf substrate (ADR-323 │
│ provenance), 305 MCP tools, hooks lifecycle bus, Thompson-bandit │
│ model router, swarm/hive-mind. Already hosts rvagent via │
@ruvector/rvagent-wasm (27 wasm_agent_* tools). │
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```
## Documents
| File | Contents |
|---|---|
| [01-findings.md](01-findings.md) | What we found: Hermes architecture & benchmark evidence; rvagent current-state audit (4 blocking defects); metaharness & ruflo capability maps |
| [02-target-architecture.md](02-target-architecture.md) | The Hermes-class rvagent design: loop, prompt tiers, memory layers, skills, subagents, and the exact integration seams into metaharness and ruflo |
| [03-roadmap.md](03-roadmap.md) | Phased implementation plan (P0 foundations → P4 evolution/SOTA), success gates, proposed ADRs |
## Headline Findings
1. **rvagent's protocol layers are production-grade; its loop is not.**
`rvagent-a2a` (signed cards, budgets, circuit breakers, recursion guards),
`rvagent-mcp`, and the security primitives are real and well-tested. But the
agent loop never sends tool schemas to the model (the `Tools` node is
unreachable in production), the 19-module middleware pipeline is never wired
into the CLI, subagents are stubs, streaming does not exist, and three
incompatible `AgentState`/`Message`/`Tool` type systems block assembly.
2. **Hermes's edge is structural, and every piece has a RuVector-native analog.**
Cache-first tiered prompts → unwired `PromptCachingMiddleware`; layered
memory → AGENTS.md + ruflo's memory substrate + ADR-211/252; skills as
procedural memory → `SkillsMiddleware` + `skills_bridge`; trajectory→skill
distillation → SONA/ReasoningBank + witness chains; GEPA offline evolution →
metaharness Darwin/flywheel. The parts exist; nothing is connected.
3. **Both siblings have a loop-shaped hole rvagent should fill.** metaharness
generates harness *configuration* for nine hosts but no runtime loop; ruflo
explicitly delegates multi-turn execution to Claude Code (`CLAUDE.md:908`)
and its only in-house turn loop is… rvagent's WASM build. ruflo's own
roadmap names "skill synthesis vs Hermes-class agents" its top gap.
4. **The benchmark literature says invest here.** Harness choice swings
SWE-bench pass@1 by 12.527.4 points (Claw-SWE-Bench); "execution
alignment" and few high-fidelity tools beat sprawling toolsets
(Harness-Bench); structure transfers across models, prompt wording doesn't
(Agentic Harness Engineering). A Rust kernel + Darwin evolution attacks all
three levers at once.

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@ -1,6 +1,11 @@
# rvAgent Architecture
This document describes the internal architecture of the rvAgent crate family, covering the crate dependency graph, agent lifecycle, middleware pipeline, backend protocol hierarchy, security model, and performance characteristics.
This document describes the internal architecture of the rvAgent crate family (10 crates, including `rvagent-mcp` and `rvagent-a2a`), covering the crate dependency graph, agent lifecycle, middleware pipeline, backend protocol hierarchy, security model, and performance characteristics.
> Current gaps (tracked in `docs/research/rvagent-hermes-harness/03-roadmap.md`):
> SSE streaming is not implemented (providers fall back to non-streaming
> completion); subagent orchestration spawning is stubbed; the `hnsw`
> middleware uses a hash-based embedding placeholder, not semantic search.
## Crate Dependency Graph
@ -28,6 +33,14 @@ rvagent-acp
|-- rvagent-tools
|-- rvagent-subagents
|
rvagent-mcp
|-- rvagent-core
|-- rvagent-middleware (skills bridge)
|
rvagent-a2a
|-- rvagent-core
|-- rvagent-middleware
|
rvagent-wasm
|-- (standalone, no workspace deps except serde/wasm-bindgen)
```

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@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
#!/usr/bin/env node
// rvAgent's Evaluator for @metaharness/flywheel (ADR-278).
//
// The flywheel is deliberately host-agnostic — it knows only candidates,
// scores, gates, receipts, and lineage. Everything rvAgent-specific enters
// through this one seam, which is also the trust boundary: the four Score axes
// are where all host meaning lands, and a dishonest projection defeats every
// downstream guarantee the gate provides.
//
// Usage as a library:
// import { makeRvagentEvaluator } from './rvagent-flywheel-evaluator.mjs';
// const evaluator = makeRvagentEvaluator({ runItem });
//
// `runItem(policy, item) -> RunOutcome` is injected so this file stays
// testable without spawning real agent runs.
/** Cost-per-win when a policy won nothing.
*
* Must match rvagent_core::policy::COST_PER_WIN_NO_WINS. NOT Infinity: JSON has
* no infinity, so it serializes to null, and the gate's
* `candidate.costPerWin > baseline.costPerWin` reads `null > n` as false
* meaning a policy that won nothing would silently pass the cost clause.
*/
export const COST_PER_WIN_NO_WINS = Number.MAX_VALUE;
/**
* Aggregate per-item run outcomes into the flywheel's four Score axes.
*
* @param {Array<{itemId?: string, succeeded: boolean, madeChanges: boolean, costUsd: number, regressed?: boolean}>} outcomes
* @returns {{primary: number, noopRate: number, costPerWin: number, regressed: boolean}}
*/
export function scoreFromOutcomes(outcomes) {
// Zero runs must never look like a clean sweep to the gate.
if (!Array.isArray(outcomes) || outcomes.length === 0) {
return { primary: 0, noopRate: 1, costPerWin: COST_PER_WIN_NO_WINS, regressed: false };
}
const total = outcomes.length;
const wins = outcomes.filter((o) => o.succeeded).length;
// A run that reports success while committing nothing is still a no-op —
// that is the whole point of the axis. A policy must not earn promotion by
// making the agent talk rather than act.
const noops = outcomes.filter((o) => !o.madeChanges).length;
const cost = outcomes.reduce((sum, o) => sum + (Number(o.costUsd) || 0), 0);
return {
primary: wins / total,
noopRate: noops / total,
costPerWin: wins === 0 ? COST_PER_WIN_NO_WINS : cost / wins,
regressed: outcomes.some((o) => o.regressed === true),
};
}
/** Levers rvAgent knows how to apply. Must match rvagent_core::policy::KNOWN_LEVERS. */
export const KNOWN_LEVERS = [
'max_iterations',
'parallel_tools',
'max_parallel_tools',
'loop_repeat_threshold',
'keep_last_observations',
'max_tool_result_bytes',
'system_prompt_suffix',
'compaction_rubric',
];
/**
* Reject a policy naming a lever rvAgent does not apply.
*
* Throwing is deliberate. A mutation to an unapplied lever produces a run
* identical to baseline; the optimizer would read that as "no effect" and burn
* generations proposing more of them. Failing loudly keeps the search honest.
*/
export function assertKnownLevers(policy) {
const unknown = Object.keys(policy ?? {}).filter((k) => !KNOWN_LEVERS.includes(k));
if (unknown.length > 0) {
throw new Error(
`policy names levers rvAgent does not apply: ${unknown.join(', ')}. ` +
`Known levers: ${KNOWN_LEVERS.join(', ')}`,
);
}
}
/**
* Build an Evaluator for `runFlywheelGenerations`.
*
* @param {{runItem: (policy: object, item: unknown) => Promise<object>}} deps
* @returns {(policy: object, suite: {id: string, items: unknown[]}) => Promise<object>}
*/
export function makeRvagentEvaluator({ runItem }) {
if (typeof runItem !== 'function') {
throw new TypeError('makeRvagentEvaluator requires a runItem function');
}
return async function evaluate(policy, suite) {
assertKnownLevers(policy);
const items = suite?.items ?? [];
const outcomes = [];
for (const item of items) {
// Sequential on purpose: concurrent runs contend for the same workspace
// and would make cost and wall-clock unattributable per item.
outcomes.push(await runItem(policy, item));
}
// A dropped item would silently shrink the denominator and inflate every
// axis. Refuse rather than score a partial suite as if it were complete.
if (outcomes.length !== items.length) {
throw new Error(
`evaluator produced ${outcomes.length} outcomes for ${items.length} items`,
);
}
return scoreFromOutcomes(outcomes);
};
}