qwen-code/packages/core/src/tools/shell.ts
wenshao dd45e17201 fix(attribution): runGit null-on-failure, versionless v3→v4 migration
z54M (Copilot): runGit returned '' on both successful-empty-output
and silent failure, so a `--name-only` that errored mid-way through
the diff fan-out aliased to a real `--allow-empty` commit. The
empty-commit branch then preserved pending attributions, leaving
the just-committed file's tracked AI edit alive to re-attribute on
the next commit. Switch runGit to `Promise<string | null>`,
distinguishing exit code 0 (any output, including '') from non-zero
(null). The diff-stage fan-out and ancillary probes now treat null
as analysis failure and bail with `return null` instead of falling
into the empty-commit path.

z539 (Copilot): the v3→v4 `shouldMigrate` only fired on
`$version === 3`. A versionless settings file carrying the legacy
`general.gitCoAuthor: false` boolean would skip every migration
(gitCoAuthor isn't in V1_INDICATOR_KEYS — it post-dates V2), get
its `$version` normalized to 4 by the loader, and leave the
boolean in place. The settings dialog then reads the V4
`{commit, pr}` shape, sees missing keys, defaults both to true, and
silently overwrites the user's opt-out on the next save. Also fire
when `$version` is absent AND the value at `general.gitCoAuthor`
is a boolean. Tests cover the new path and confirm the existing
versioned/object-shape paths are untouched.
2026-05-06 08:48:47 +08:00

2817 lines
112 KiB
TypeScript
Raw Blame History

This file contains ambiguous Unicode characters

This file contains Unicode characters that might be confused with other characters. If you think that this is intentional, you can safely ignore this warning. Use the Escape button to reveal them.

/**
* @license
* Copyright 2025 Google LLC
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*/
import fs from 'node:fs';
import path from 'node:path';
import os from 'node:os';
import crypto from 'node:crypto';
import * as childProcess from 'node:child_process';
import type { Config } from '../config/config.js';
import { ToolNames, ToolDisplayNames } from './tool-names.js';
import { ToolErrorType } from './tool-error.js';
import type {
ToolInvocation,
ToolResult,
ToolResultDisplay,
ToolCallConfirmationDetails,
ToolExecuteConfirmationDetails,
ToolConfirmationPayload,
ToolConfirmationOutcome,
} from './tools.js';
import type { PermissionDecision } from '../permissions/types.js';
import { BaseDeclarativeTool, BaseToolInvocation, Kind } from './tools.js';
import { getErrorMessage } from '../utils/errors.js';
import { truncateToolOutput } from '../utils/truncation.js';
import {
CommitAttributionService,
type StagedFileInfo,
} from '../services/commitAttribution.js';
import { buildGitNotesCommand } from '../services/attributionTrailer.js';
import type {
ShellExecutionConfig,
ShellOutputEvent,
} from '../services/shellExecutionService.js';
import { ShellExecutionService } from '../services/shellExecutionService.js';
import type { BackgroundShellEntry } from '../services/backgroundShellRegistry.js';
import stripAnsi from 'strip-ansi';
import { formatMemoryUsage } from '../utils/formatters.js';
import type { AnsiOutput } from '../utils/terminalSerializer.js';
import { isSubpaths } from '../utils/paths.js';
import {
getCommandRoot,
getCommandRoots,
getShellConfiguration,
splitCommands,
stripShellWrapper,
} from '../utils/shell-utils.js';
import { parse } from 'shell-quote';
import { createDebugLogger } from '../utils/debugLogger.js';
import {
isShellCommandReadOnlyAST,
extractCommandRules,
} from '../utils/shellAstParser.js';
const debugLogger = createDebugLogger('SHELL');
/**
* Strip a single bare trailing `&` (bash background operator) from a
* command string. Returns the input unchanged if the trailing form is
* `&&` (logical AND), `\&` (escaped literal `&`), or there is no `&`
* at the end at all. Linear time, no regex backtracking risk.
*/
function stripTrailingBackgroundAmp(command: string): string {
const trimmed = command.trimEnd();
if (!trimmed.endsWith('&')) return command;
if (trimmed.endsWith('&&')) return command;
if (trimmed.endsWith('\\&')) return command;
return trimmed.slice(0, -1).trimEnd();
}
/**
* Escape `s` so it is safe to interpolate inside a bash double-quoted
* string. Inside `"..."`, bash still interprets `$`, backtick, `\`, and
* `"`; escape those four. Newlines and other characters are literal.
*/
function escapeForBashDoubleQuote(s: string): string {
return s.replace(/[\\"$`]/g, '\\$&');
}
/**
* Escape `s` so it is safe to interpolate inside a bash single-quoted
* string. Bash single quotes have no escape mechanism — the standard
* trick is to close the quote, emit a backslash-escaped `'`, and reopen.
*/
function escapeForBashSingleQuote(s: string): string {
return s.replace(/'/g, "'\\''");
}
/**
* Return the LAST match from a RegExp.matchAll iterator, or `null` if
* the iterator is empty. Used to find the final `-m` / `--body` flag
* in a command segment: git/gh both honour the LAST occurrence when
* multiple are passed, so the trailer has to land in that match to be
* picked up by the actual commit / PR body.
*/
function lastMatchOf<T extends RegExpMatchArray>(
matches: IterableIterator<T>,
): T | null {
let result: T | null = null;
for (const m of matches) result = m;
return result;
}
/**
* Tokenise a single shell-command segment via `shell-quote`. Returns
* the parsed string tokens with leading env-var assignments and a
* small allowlist of safe wrappers (`sudo`, `command`, with their
* flag block consumed) stripped. Returns `null` if the segment
* doesn't parse — the caller should then skip the segment.
*
* Using `shell-quote.parse` (rather than a regex scan) is what makes
* quoted env values (`FOO="a b" cmd`) tokenise correctly and avoids
* the polynomial regex behaviour CodeQL flagged on the previous
* `\S*\s+`-based slicing loop.
*/
function tokeniseSegment(segment: string): string[] | null {
let tokens: string[];
try {
tokens = parse(segment).filter((t): t is string => typeof t === 'string');
} catch (e) {
debugLogger.warn(
`tokeniseSegment: parse failed for "${segment.slice(0, 80)}": ${
e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e)
}`,
);
return null;
}
let i = 0;
// Skip env-var assignments (KEY=value).
while (i < tokens.length && /^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*=/.test(tokens[i]!)) {
i++;
}
// Strip a single safe wrapper, then any leading flag tokens it
// took. Sudo's value-taking flags (`-u user`, `-g group`,
// `-h host`, `-D path`, `-r role`, `-t type`) consume the next
// argv slot, so without explicitly knowing which take values we'd
// leave e.g. `user` standing in for the program in
// `sudo -u user git commit ...`. `command` doesn't take any flag
// values. `env` accepts both flags (`-i`, `-S`, `-u name`) AND
// `KEY=VALUE` argv entries before the program — both need
// skipping so `env GIT_COMMITTER_DATE=now git commit ...` resolves
// to `git`.
if (tokens[i] === 'sudo' || tokens[i] === 'command' || tokens[i] === 'env') {
const wrapper = tokens[i];
i++;
while (i < tokens.length && tokens[i]!.startsWith('-')) {
const flag = tokens[i]!;
i++;
// Value-taking flag tables, per wrapper: `sudo -u user`,
// `env -u NAME` (unset), `env -S string` (split-string args).
// `command` has no value-taking options in this allowlist.
// Without skipping the value, `env -u FOO git commit ...`
// would leave `FOO` as `tokens[0]` and the parser would treat
// it as the program — masking the real `git commit`.
const takesValue =
(wrapper === 'sudo' && SUDO_FLAGS_WITH_VALUE.has(flag)) ||
(wrapper === 'env' && ENV_FLAGS_WITH_VALUE.has(flag));
if (takesValue && i < tokens.length) {
i++;
}
}
// `env` puts KEY=VALUE pairs between its flags and the real
// program, so skip those too. Doing this only after the wrapper
// detection (rather than universally) avoids accidentally
// consuming what the user actually wrote.
if (wrapper === 'env') {
while (i < tokens.length && /^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*=/.test(tokens[i]!)) {
i++;
}
}
}
return tokens.slice(i);
}
const SUDO_FLAGS_WITH_VALUE = new Set([
'-u',
'-g',
'-h',
'-D',
'-r',
'-t',
'-C',
'--user',
'--group',
'--host',
'--chdir',
'--role',
'--type',
]);
// `env`'s value-taking flags. `-u NAME` unsets a variable;
// `-S "string"` splits a single string into args. Without skipping
// the value, `env -u FOO git commit ...` would leave `FOO` as the
// next token and the parser would treat it as the program.
const ENV_FLAGS_WITH_VALUE = new Set(['-u', '--unset', '-S', '--split-string']);
/**
* Walk a `git ...` token sequence past git's global flags
* (`-c key=val`, `-C path`, `--no-pager`, `--git-dir`, `--work-tree`,
* `--namespace`, etc.) to find the actual subcommand. Without this,
* `git -c k=v commit -m x` and `git --no-pager commit -m x` would
* silently slip past a fixed-position check at index 1.
*
* `changesCwd` is true when any of the consumed flags would relocate
* the working directory (`-C`, `--git-dir`, `--work-tree`).
*/
// Two-token global flags whose second token is consumed as a value.
const GIT_GLOBAL_FLAGS_TAKES_VALUE = new Set([
'-c',
'-C',
'--git-dir',
'--work-tree',
'--namespace',
'--exec-path',
'--config-env',
'--super-prefix',
'--list-cmds',
]);
// Flags whose presence shifts cwd interpretation.
const GIT_GLOBAL_FLAGS_SHIFTS_CWD = new Set(['-C', '--git-dir', '--work-tree']);
function parseGitInvocation(tokens: string[]): {
subcommand: string | undefined;
changesCwd: boolean;
} {
let i = 1; // skip 'git'
let changesCwd = false;
while (i < tokens.length) {
const t = tokens[i]!;
if (GIT_GLOBAL_FLAGS_TAKES_VALUE.has(t)) {
if (GIT_GLOBAL_FLAGS_SHIFTS_CWD.has(t)) changesCwd = true;
i += 2;
continue;
}
// Attached-value form: `--git-dir=path`, `--work-tree=path`, etc.
if (t.startsWith('--git-dir=') || t.startsWith('--work-tree=')) {
changesCwd = true;
i++;
continue;
}
// Attached-value form for `-C`: `git -C/path commit ...`. Git
// accepts both `-C path` (handled above by TAKES_VALUE) and the
// concatenated form. shell-quote tokenises the latter as a single
// `-Cpath` token.
if (t.length > 2 && t.startsWith('-C')) {
changesCwd = true;
i++;
continue;
}
// Other long/short flag (no separate arg, e.g. --no-pager,
// --version, --bare, -p).
if (t.startsWith('-')) {
i++;
continue;
}
// First non-flag is the subcommand.
return { subcommand: t, changesCwd };
}
return { subcommand: undefined, changesCwd };
}
/**
* Classify whether a command chain (potentially compound) contains a
* `git commit` invocation, and whether that invocation lands in the
* tool's initial cwd.
*
* Two flags are returned because the answers feed different decisions:
* - `hasCommit` is the broader "did the user try to commit anywhere
* in this chain?" — used to refuse background mode and to gate
* prompt-counter snapshotting.
* - `attributableInCwd` is the stricter "is it safe to capture HEAD
* in our cwd and write a note to that repo?" — used by the actual
* trailer rewrite and git-notes write.
*
* Walks segments in order so a `cd` AFTER an in-cwd commit doesn't
* invalidate that commit's attribution; only a `cd` (or `git -C` /
* `--git-dir` / `--work-tree`) BEFORE the commit shifts safety.
*
* `cwdShifted` is intentionally a one-way latch — it isn't reset on
* a subsequent `cd .` or `cd ..`, so harmless cd cycles like
* `cd src && cd .. && git commit -m x` will conservatively skip
* attribution. The trade-off matches the wrong-repo guard's intent
* (better miss than corrupt unrelated repos).
*/
function gitCommitContext(command: string): {
hasCommit: boolean;
attributableInCwd: boolean;
} {
let hasCommit = false;
let attributable = false;
let cwdShifted = false;
for (const sub of splitCommands(command)) {
const tokens = tokeniseSegment(sub);
if (!tokens || tokens.length === 0) continue;
const program = tokens[0]!;
if (program === 'cd') {
// A cd before any commit might redirect a later `git commit` into
// a different repo. A cd AFTER the commit doesn't matter for the
// commit we already saw.
//
// A heuristic relaxation: relative cd targets that don't escape
// upward (no `..`, no absolute path, no env-var/$home expansion)
// almost always stay within the same repo. The very common
// `cd subdir && git commit -m "..."` flow is the motivating case
// — same repo, same toplevel, attribution is still safe. Only
// mark as shifted when the target *could* land us in a different
// repo. We can't be 100% certain without running `git rev-parse
// --show-toplevel` after the cd, which would require a synchronous
// fs/exec call that the rest of this walk avoids — the heuristic
// covers the common case and stays conservative on the rest.
if (!hasCommit && cdTargetMayChangeRepo(tokens)) cwdShifted = true;
continue;
}
if (program === 'git') {
const { subcommand, changesCwd } = parseGitInvocation(tokens);
if (subcommand === 'commit') {
hasCommit = true;
// The commit lands in our cwd only if no preceding cd shifted
// us and this very invocation didn't redirect via -C/--git-dir.
if (!cwdShifted && !changesCwd) attributable = true;
} else if (changesCwd && !hasCommit) {
// `git -C /path status` and friends signal cwd-elsewhere
// intent; subsequent in-cwd commits in this chain are unusual
// enough to be conservative about.
cwdShifted = true;
}
}
}
return { hasCommit, attributableInCwd: attributable };
}
/**
* Walk a `gh ...` token sequence past gh's global flags
* (`--repo owner/repo`, `--hostname host`, `--help`, `--version`) and
* return the resulting subcommand chain. Same purpose as
* `parseGitInvocation`: a fixed-position check at index 1 misses
* `gh --repo owner/repo pr create ...`, which is a common form.
*/
const GH_GLOBAL_FLAGS_TAKES_VALUE = new Set(['--repo', '-R', '--hostname']);
function parseGhInvocation(tokens: string[]): string[] {
let i = 1; // skip 'gh'
while (i < tokens.length) {
const t = tokens[i]!;
if (GH_GLOBAL_FLAGS_TAKES_VALUE.has(t)) {
i += 2;
continue;
}
if (
t.startsWith('--repo=') ||
t.startsWith('--hostname=') ||
t.startsWith('-R=')
) {
i++;
continue;
}
if (t.startsWith('-')) {
i++;
continue;
}
return tokens.slice(i);
}
return [];
}
/**
* Heuristic: does this `cd` invocation potentially redirect us into
* a different repository? Used by `gitCommitContext` to decide
* whether a subsequent `git commit` in the same chain is still
* attributable in our cwd.
*
* Returns true (conservative — assume shift) when the target is
* absolute, escapes upward (`..`), goes to `$HOME` / `~`, contains an
* env-var (we can't resolve it statically), or is missing entirely
* (`cd` alone goes to `$HOME`). Plain relative paths like `cd src`,
* `cd ./packages/foo`, or `cd subdir/nested` are treated as in-repo.
*/
function cdTargetMayChangeRepo(tokens: string[]): boolean {
// tokens[0] is 'cd'. The next non-flag token is the target.
let i = 1;
while (i < tokens.length && tokens[i]!.startsWith('-')) i++;
const target = tokens[i];
// `cd` with no argument goes to $HOME.
if (target === undefined) return true;
if (target.startsWith('/')) return true;
if (target.startsWith('~')) return true;
// Env-var reference (e.g. `$HOME`, `$REPO`) — can't resolve here.
if (target.includes('$')) return true;
// `..`, `../..`, `..\\foo` etc. could escape the repo root.
if (target === '..') return true;
if (target.startsWith('../') || target.startsWith('..\\')) return true;
// Embedded parent-dir traversal can also escape: `foo/../../escape`,
// `./..`, `nested/..`, etc. Catching `/..` and `\..` anywhere in
// the path covers both POSIX and Windows separators without
// false-positiving on legitimate names that happen to contain `..`
// (which only escape when followed by a separator).
if (target.includes('/..') || target.includes('\\..')) return true;
// `-` is bash's "previous directory" — could be anywhere.
if (target === '-') return true;
return false;
}
/**
* Detect whether the attributable `git commit` invocation in
* `command` carries the `--amend` flag. Used so attachCommitAttribution
* can switch the diff range from `HEAD~1..HEAD` (the amended commit
* vs its parent — too broad for amend) to `HEAD@{1}..HEAD` (the
* actual amend delta).
*
* Only the *first* commit segment that runs in the same cwd as the
* shell tool counts. `git -C ../other commit --amend && git commit -m x`
* must not flip the diff range for the second (fresh) commit, since
* `HEAD@{1}` belongs to the inner repo there, not ours.
*/
function isAmendCommit(command: string): boolean {
let cwdShifted = false;
for (const sub of splitCommands(command)) {
const tokens = tokeniseSegment(sub);
if (!tokens || tokens.length === 0) continue;
const program = tokens[0]!;
if (program === 'cd') {
if (!cwdShifted && cdTargetMayChangeRepo(tokens)) cwdShifted = true;
continue;
}
if (program !== 'git') continue;
const { subcommand, changesCwd } = parseGitInvocation(tokens);
if (subcommand === 'commit' && !cwdShifted && !changesCwd) {
return (
tokens.includes('--amend') ||
tokens.some((t) => t.startsWith('--amend='))
);
}
if (changesCwd && !cwdShifted) cwdShifted = true;
}
return false;
}
/**
* Locate the character range of the *first* attributable
* `git commit` invocation in the (potentially compound) command, or
* `null` if none is attributable in the current cwd. The range
* covers the segment as `splitCommands` tokenised it — i.e. just
* the `git commit ...` part, NOT later `&& git tag -m ...` or
* earlier `git status &&` segments.
*
* Used by `addCoAuthorToGitCommit` to scope the `-m` regex rewrite
* so a later `git tag -m "..."` (different sub-command in the same
* compound) can't be mistaken for the commit message.
*/
function findAttributableCommitSegment(
command: string,
): { start: number; end: number } | null {
let cursor = 0;
let cwdShifted = false;
for (const sub of splitCommands(command)) {
const start = command.indexOf(sub, cursor);
if (start < 0) {
// splitCommands strips line continuations (`\<newline>`) and
// some whitespace, so the trimmed segment text may not appear
// verbatim in the original command. Log so a multi-line
// command silently dropping its trailer is at least visible
// when QWEN_DEBUG_LOG_FILE is set.
debugLogger.warn(
`findAttributableCommitSegment: cannot map segment "${sub.slice(0, 60)}" ` +
`back to the original command (likely line-continuation / whitespace mismatch).`,
);
continue;
}
const end = start + sub.length;
cursor = end;
const tokens = tokeniseSegment(sub);
if (!tokens || tokens.length === 0) continue;
const program = tokens[0]!;
if (program === 'cd') {
// Mirror gitCommitContext's cd heuristic: relative paths that
// don't escape upward are treated as in-repo, so
// `cd subdir && git commit ...` still finds the segment.
if (!cwdShifted && cdTargetMayChangeRepo(tokens)) cwdShifted = true;
continue;
}
if (program === 'git') {
const { subcommand, changesCwd } = parseGitInvocation(tokens);
if (subcommand === 'commit' && !cwdShifted && !changesCwd) {
return { start, end };
}
if (changesCwd && !cwdShifted) cwdShifted = true;
}
}
return null;
}
/**
* Locate the character range of the `gh pr create` (or alias
* `gh pr new`) segment in a potentially compound command. Used by
* `addAttributionToPR` so the `--body`/`-b` rewrite is scoped to
* just that segment — without scoping, a command like
* `curl -b "session=abc" && gh pr create --body "summary"` would
* have the regex match `curl`'s `-b` cookie flag and inject
* attribution there.
*/
function findGhPrCreateSegment(
command: string,
): { start: number; end: number } | null {
let cursor = 0;
for (const sub of splitCommands(command)) {
const start = command.indexOf(sub, cursor);
if (start < 0) {
debugLogger.warn(
`findGhPrCreateSegment: cannot map segment "${sub.slice(0, 60)}" ` +
`back to the original command (likely line-continuation / whitespace mismatch).`,
);
continue;
}
const end = start + sub.length;
cursor = end;
const tokens = tokeniseSegment(sub);
if (!tokens || tokens[0] !== 'gh') continue;
const rest = parseGhInvocation(tokens);
if (rest[0] === 'pr' && (rest[1] === 'create' || rest[1] === 'new')) {
return { start, end };
}
}
return null;
}
/** Approximate characters per text line for the diff-size estimate. */
const APPROX_CHARS_PER_LINE = 40;
/** Fallback char estimate when --numstat reports `-` (binary file). */
const BINARY_DIFF_SIZE_FALLBACK = 1024;
/**
* Parse `git diff --numstat` output into a `path → approximate change
* size` map for attribution accounting. The result feeds in as the
* denominator clamp for `aiChars`, so missing entries would silently
* drop a file from attribution — every changed file must land in the
* map.
*
* `--numstat` is preferred over `--stat` because the columns are exact
* integers (no graphical bars to parse). Each line is:
* `<additions>\t<deletions>\t<path>`
* For binary files, both counts are `-`; we fall back to a fixed
* estimate so binary-only changes still get a non-zero entry.
*
* The `(adds + dels) * 40` figure remains a heuristic — git diff has no
* cheap way to surface exact character counts. The clamp in
* `generateNotePayload` keeps the math consistent (aiChars never
* exceeds diffSize), so the heuristic drives the precision of the
* percentage but cannot make `aiChars + humanChars` diverge from
* `diffSize`.
*
* Rename notations (`{old => new}` and bare `old => new`) are
* normalized to the new path so lookups match `--name-only` output.
*
* Exported for unit testing — the function is otherwise an
* implementation detail of `attachCommitAttribution`.
*/
export function parseNumstat(numstatOutput: string): Map<string, number> {
const sizes = new Map<string, number>();
const lines = numstatOutput.split('\n').filter(Boolean);
const normalizeFilePath = (filePath: string): string => {
let p = filePath.trim();
// Brace rename: `{old => new}` or `dir/{old => new}/file`
p = p.replace(/\{[^}]*?=>\s*([^}]*)\}/g, '$1');
// Bare rename across directories: `old/path/file => new/path/file`
if (p.includes('=>')) {
const m = p.match(/^(.*?)\s=>\s(.*)$/);
if (m) p = m[2]!.trim();
}
return p;
};
for (const line of lines) {
// Format: "<additions>\t<deletions>\t<path>" — a literal "-" stands
// in for both counts on binary entries.
const m = line.match(/^([\d-]+)\t([\d-]+)\t(.+)$/);
if (!m) continue;
const filePath = normalizeFilePath(m[3]!);
if (m[1] === '-' && m[2] === '-') {
// Binary file: numstat omits exact counts. Fall back to a fixed
// estimate so the entry isn't missing entirely (which would zero
// out attribution for the file).
sizes.set(filePath, BINARY_DIFF_SIZE_FALLBACK);
continue;
}
const adds = parseInt(m[1]!, 10);
const dels = parseInt(m[2]!, 10);
if (Number.isNaN(adds) || Number.isNaN(dels)) continue;
sizes.set(filePath, (adds + dels) * APPROX_CHARS_PER_LINE);
}
return sizes;
}
export const OUTPUT_UPDATE_INTERVAL_MS = 1000;
const DEFAULT_FOREGROUND_TIMEOUT_MS = 120000;
// Long-run advisory threshold: half the EFFECTIVE foreground timeout
// (not the default), computed per-invocation by `longRunThresholdFor`.
// Couples to whichever timeout actually governs THIS command — so a
// user who sets `timeout: 600_000` (10 min) gets the advisory at 5 min,
// not at 60s. The 1/2 ratio is chosen so the hint surfaces well before
// the timeout would hard-kill, but late enough that normal foreground
// commands (under the 120s default) don't trigger it before ~60s.
//
// Floor of 1000ms guards the pathological tiny-positive-timeout edge.
// `timeout <= 0` is already rejected by `validateToolParamValues` so
// only positive values reach here, but `timeout: 1` (or any value < 2)
// would otherwise produce `Math.floor(timeout / 2) = 0` and make
// `elapsedMs >= 0` fire on every invocation showing "ran for 0s",
// surfacing the hint before the command had a chance to fail by
// timing out.
const MIN_LONG_RUN_THRESHOLD_MS = 1000;
function longRunThresholdFor(effectiveTimeoutMs: number): number {
return Math.max(
MIN_LONG_RUN_THRESHOLD_MS,
Math.floor(effectiveTimeoutMs / 2),
);
}
/**
* Format the long-run advisory appended to long foreground commands.
* Exported so tests and any future consumer (e.g. an alternative
* renderer) can render the same text without duplicating the threshold
* logic.
*
* Wording deliberately keeps the dialog mention conditional ("when
* running interactively") so the LLM doesn't relay misleading guidance
* to non-TTY users (`-p` headless / ACP / SDK consumers, where no
* dialog or footer pill exists). `/tasks` and the on-disk output file
* work in every mode.
*/
export function buildLongRunningForegroundHint(elapsedMs: number): string {
const seconds = Math.round(elapsedMs / 1000);
return (
`Note: this foreground command ran for ${seconds}s. ` +
`Next time you run a similar long-running process (build watchers, ` +
`dev servers, soak tests, polling loops), pass \`is_background: true\` ` +
`so the agent isn't blocked while the command runs. ` +
`(This is forward-looking guidance for FUTURE invocations — do NOT ` +
`re-run the command that just completed; for stateful operations ` +
`like deploys, migrations, or git push, that would cause double ` +
`side effects.) The output of background runs stays inspectable ` +
`via /tasks (text, any mode) or the on-disk output file; in ` +
`interactive mode the Background tasks dialog also has a per-entry ` +
`detail view + live updates.`
);
}
/**
* Detect standalone or leading `sleep N` patterns that should use Monitor
* instead. Catches `sleep 5`, `sleep 2.5`, `sleep 2s`,
* `sleep 5 && check`, `sleep 5; check`, `sleep 5 # wait` — but not sleep
* inside pipelines, subshells, backgrounded commands, or scripts (those are
* fine).
*/
export function detectBlockedSleepPattern(command: string): string | null {
// Strip trailing shell comments first; otherwise `sleep 5 # wait` would
// present `# wait` as the suffix, which `getSleepSequentialSeparator`
// rejects (only &&/||/;/\n are recognized), letting the foreground sleep
// bypass the guard. Shell ignores top-level trailing comments, so for the
// purposes of detection they are equivalent to end-of-command.
const trimmed = trimTrailingShellComment(command).trim();
if (!trimmed.startsWith('sleep')) return null;
const afterSleep = trimmed.slice('sleep'.length);
if (!afterSleep || !/\s/.test(afterSleep[0]!)) return null;
let index = 0;
while (index < afterSleep.length && /\s/.test(afterSleep[index]!)) {
index++;
}
const durationStart = index;
while (
index < afterSleep.length &&
!/\s/.test(afterSleep[index]!) &&
![';', '&', '|', '\n'].includes(afterSleep[index]!)
) {
index++;
}
const durationToken = afterSleep.slice(durationStart, index);
const secs = parseSleepDurationToSeconds(durationToken);
if (secs === null || secs < 2) return null;
const suffix = afterSleep.slice(index);
const separator = getSleepSequentialSeparator(suffix);
if (separator === null) return null;
const rest = separator.rest.trim();
return rest
? `sleep ${durationToken} followed by: ${rest}`
: `standalone sleep ${durationToken}`;
}
function parseSleepDurationToSeconds(token: string): number | null {
if (!token) return null;
let index = 0;
let seenDigit = false;
let seenDot = false;
while (index < token.length) {
const char = token[index]!;
if (char >= '0' && char <= '9') {
seenDigit = true;
index++;
continue;
}
if (char === '.' && !seenDot) {
seenDot = true;
index++;
continue;
}
break;
}
if (!seenDigit) return null;
const value = Number.parseFloat(token.slice(0, index));
if (!Number.isFinite(value)) return null;
const unit = token.slice(index).toLowerCase();
switch (unit || 's') {
case 'ms':
return value / 1000;
case 's':
return value;
case 'm':
return value * 60;
case 'h':
return value * 60 * 60;
case 'd':
return value * 60 * 60 * 24;
default:
return null;
}
}
function getSleepSequentialSeparator(suffix: string): { rest: string } | null {
let index = 0;
while (
index < suffix.length &&
suffix[index] !== '\n' &&
/\s/.test(suffix[index]!)
) {
index++;
}
const restWithSeparator = suffix.slice(index);
if (!restWithSeparator) return { rest: '' };
if (
restWithSeparator.startsWith('&&') ||
restWithSeparator.startsWith('||')
) {
return { rest: restWithSeparator.slice(2) };
}
if (restWithSeparator[0] === ';' || restWithSeparator[0] === '\n') {
return { rest: restWithSeparator.slice(1) };
}
return null;
}
function trimTrailingShellComment(command: string): string {
let inSingleQuote = false;
let inDoubleQuote = false;
let inBacktick = false;
let escapeNext = false;
let commandSubstitutionDepth = 0;
for (let i = 0; i < command.length; i++) {
const ch = command[i]!;
if (inSingleQuote) {
if (ch === "'") inSingleQuote = false;
continue;
}
if (inBacktick) {
if (escapeNext) {
escapeNext = false;
continue;
}
if (ch === '\\') {
escapeNext = true;
continue;
}
if (ch === '`') inBacktick = false;
continue;
}
if (inDoubleQuote) {
if (escapeNext) {
escapeNext = false;
continue;
}
if (ch === '\\') {
escapeNext = true;
continue;
}
if (ch === '"') {
inDoubleQuote = false;
continue;
}
if (ch === '$' && command[i + 1] === '(') {
commandSubstitutionDepth++;
i++;
continue;
}
if (ch === ')' && commandSubstitutionDepth > 0) {
commandSubstitutionDepth--;
}
continue;
}
if (escapeNext) {
escapeNext = false;
continue;
}
if (ch === '\\') {
escapeNext = true;
continue;
}
if (ch === "'") {
inSingleQuote = true;
continue;
}
if (ch === '"') {
inDoubleQuote = true;
continue;
}
if (ch === '`') {
inBacktick = true;
continue;
}
if (ch === '$' && command[i + 1] === '(') {
commandSubstitutionDepth++;
i++;
continue;
}
if (ch === ')' && commandSubstitutionDepth > 0) {
commandSubstitutionDepth--;
continue;
}
if (
ch === '#' &&
commandSubstitutionDepth === 0 &&
(i === 0 || /\s/.test(command[i - 1]!))
) {
return command.slice(0, i);
}
}
return command;
}
function hasTopLevelTrailingBackgroundOperator(command: string): boolean {
const commentTrimmed = trimTrailingShellComment(command);
const trimmed = commentTrimmed.trimEnd();
if (!trimmed.endsWith('&')) return false;
const trailingAmpIndex = trimmed.length - 1;
const previousNonWhitespaceIndex = (() => {
for (let i = trailingAmpIndex - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
if (!/\s/.test(trimmed[i]!)) return i;
}
return -1;
})();
if (previousNonWhitespaceIndex >= 0) {
const previous = trimmed[previousNonWhitespaceIndex]!;
if (previous === '&' || previous === '|' || previous === '\\') {
return false;
}
}
let backslashCount = 0;
for (let i = trailingAmpIndex - 1; i >= 0 && trimmed[i] === '\\'; i--) {
backslashCount++;
}
if (backslashCount % 2 === 1) return false;
let inSingleQuote = false;
let inDoubleQuote = false;
let inBacktick = false;
let escapeNext = false;
let commandSubstitutionDepth = 0;
for (let i = 0; i <= trailingAmpIndex; i++) {
const ch = trimmed[i]!;
if (inSingleQuote) {
if (ch === "'") inSingleQuote = false;
continue;
}
if (inBacktick) {
if (escapeNext) {
escapeNext = false;
continue;
}
if (ch === '\\') {
escapeNext = true;
continue;
}
if (ch === '`') inBacktick = false;
continue;
}
if (inDoubleQuote) {
if (escapeNext) {
escapeNext = false;
continue;
}
if (ch === '\\') {
escapeNext = true;
continue;
}
if (ch === '"') {
inDoubleQuote = false;
continue;
}
if (ch === '$' && trimmed[i + 1] === '(') {
commandSubstitutionDepth++;
i++;
continue;
}
if (ch === ')' && commandSubstitutionDepth > 0) {
commandSubstitutionDepth--;
}
continue;
}
if (escapeNext) {
escapeNext = false;
continue;
}
if (ch === '\\') {
escapeNext = true;
continue;
}
if (ch === "'") {
inSingleQuote = true;
continue;
}
if (ch === '"') {
inDoubleQuote = true;
continue;
}
if (ch === '`') {
inBacktick = true;
continue;
}
if (ch === '$' && trimmed[i + 1] === '(') {
commandSubstitutionDepth++;
i++;
continue;
}
if (ch === ')' && commandSubstitutionDepth > 0) {
commandSubstitutionDepth--;
continue;
}
if (i === trailingAmpIndex) {
return commandSubstitutionDepth === 0;
}
}
return false;
}
export interface ShellToolParams {
command: string;
is_background: boolean;
timeout?: number;
description?: string;
directory?: string;
}
export class ShellToolInvocation extends BaseToolInvocation<
ShellToolParams,
ToolResult
> {
constructor(
private readonly config: Config,
params: ShellToolParams,
) {
super(params);
}
getDescription(): string {
let description = `${this.params.command}`;
// append optional [in directory]
// note description is needed even if validation fails due to absolute path
if (this.params.directory) {
description += ` [in ${this.params.directory}]`;
}
// append background indicator
if (this.params.is_background) {
description += ` [background]`;
} else if (this.params.timeout) {
// append timeout for foreground commands
description += ` [timeout: ${this.params.timeout}ms]`;
}
// append optional (description), replacing any line breaks with spaces
if (this.params.description) {
description += ` (${this.params.description.replace(/\n/g, ' ')})`;
}
return description;
}
/**
* AST-based permission check for the shell command.
* - Read-only commands (via AST analysis) → 'allow'
* - All other commands → 'ask'
*/
override async getDefaultPermission(): Promise<PermissionDecision> {
const command = stripShellWrapper(this.params.command);
// AST-based read-only detection
try {
const isReadOnly = await isShellCommandReadOnlyAST(command);
if (isReadOnly) {
return 'allow';
}
} catch (e) {
debugLogger.warn('AST read-only check failed, falling back to ask:', e);
}
return 'ask';
}
/**
* Constructs confirmation dialog details for a shell command that needs
* user approval. For compound commands (e.g. `cd foo && npm run build`),
* sub-commands that are already allowed (read-only) are excluded from both
* the displayed root-command list and the suggested permission rules.
*/
override async getConfirmationDetails(
_abortSignal: AbortSignal,
): Promise<ToolCallConfirmationDetails> {
const command = stripShellWrapper(this.params.command);
const pm = this.config.getPermissionManager?.();
const cwd = this.params.directory || this.config.getTargetDir();
// Split compound command and filter out already-allowed (read-only) sub-commands
const subCommands = splitCommands(command);
const confirmableSubCommands: string[] = [];
for (const sub of subCommands) {
let isReadOnly = false;
try {
isReadOnly = await isShellCommandReadOnlyAST(sub);
} catch {
// conservative: treat unknown commands as requiring confirmation
}
if (isReadOnly) {
continue;
}
if (pm) {
try {
if ((await pm.isCommandAllowed(sub, cwd)) === 'allow') {
continue;
}
} catch (e) {
debugLogger.warn('PermissionManager command check failed:', e);
}
}
confirmableSubCommands.push(sub);
}
// Fallback to all sub-commands if everything was filtered out (shouldn't
// normally happen since getDefaultPermission already returned 'ask').
const effectiveSubCommands =
confirmableSubCommands.length > 0 ? confirmableSubCommands : subCommands;
const rootCommands = [
...new Set(
effectiveSubCommands
.map((c) => getCommandRoot(c))
.filter((c): c is string => !!c),
),
];
// Extract minimum-scope permission rules only for sub-commands that
// actually need confirmation.
let permissionRules: string[] = [];
try {
const allRules: string[] = [];
for (const sub of effectiveSubCommands) {
const rules = await extractCommandRules(sub);
allRules.push(...rules);
}
permissionRules = [...new Set(allRules)].map((rule) => `Bash(${rule})`);
} catch (e) {
debugLogger.warn('Failed to extract command rules:', e);
}
const confirmationDetails: ToolExecuteConfirmationDetails = {
type: 'exec',
title: 'Confirm Shell Command',
command: this.params.command,
rootCommand: rootCommands.join(', '),
permissionRules,
onConfirm: async (
_outcome: ToolConfirmationOutcome,
_payload?: ToolConfirmationPayload,
) => {
// No-op: persistence is handled by coreToolScheduler via PM rules
},
};
return confirmationDetails;
}
async execute(
signal: AbortSignal,
updateOutput?: (output: ToolResultDisplay) => void,
shellExecutionConfig?: ShellExecutionConfig,
setPidCallback?: (pid: number) => void,
): Promise<ToolResult> {
const strippedCommand = stripShellWrapper(this.params.command);
if (signal.aborted) {
return {
llmContent: 'Command was cancelled by user before it could start.',
returnDisplay: 'Command cancelled by user.',
};
}
if (this.params.is_background) {
return this.executeBackground(signal, shellExecutionConfig);
}
const effectiveTimeout =
this.params.timeout ?? DEFAULT_FOREGROUND_TIMEOUT_MS;
// Create combined signal with timeout for foreground execution
let combinedSignal = signal;
if (effectiveTimeout) {
const timeoutSignal = AbortSignal.timeout(effectiveTimeout);
combinedSignal = AbortSignal.any([signal, timeoutSignal]);
}
// Add co-author to git commit commands and Qwen Code attribution to
// `gh pr create` bodies. Both wrappers are no-ops on commands they
// don't recognise. Apply to the *trimmed original* (not strippedCommand)
// so leading env assignments and shell wrappers (`FOO=bar bash -c '...'`)
// are preserved through to execution; the rewriters operate at the
// top-level shell layer and become no-ops when the commit hides
// inside a wrapper.
const processedCommand = this.addAttributionToPR(
this.addCoAuthorToGitCommit(this.params.command.trim()),
);
const commandToExecute = processedCommand;
const cwd = this.params.directory || this.config.getTargetDir();
// Snapshot HEAD before running so attachCommitAttribution can detect
// commit creation by HEAD movement instead of trusting the shell
// exit code (which is unreliable for compound commands).
//
// Synchronous capture via `execFileSync`: a fire-and-forget async
// rev-parse can resolve AFTER a fast-cached `git commit` moves
// HEAD (real race seen on slow filesystems / heavy contention),
// leaving preHead === postHead and silently skipping the
// attribution note. ~1050ms event-loop block per commit-shaped
// command, only when `commitCtx.hasCommit` is true.
//
// We act on `gitCommitContext` rather than a raw regex so quoted
// text like `echo "git commit"` doesn't trigger snapshot/notes,
// and so attribution still runs after a `git commit && cd ..`
// chain (which would have failed an "any cd anywhere" gate).
const commitCtx = gitCommitContext(strippedCommand);
// Capture preHead whenever ANY git commit was attempted in the
// chain — even non-attributable ones — so the post-command branch
// can detect HEAD movement and clear stale singleton state.
// Without this, `cd subdir && git commit` (a real same-repo
// commit) would skip attribution AND fail to clear pending
// attributions, leaking them into the next foreground commit.
const preHead: string | null = commitCtx.hasCommit
? this.getGitHeadSync(cwd)
: null;
let cumulativeOutput: string | AnsiOutput = '';
let lastUpdateTime = Date.now();
let isBinaryStream = false;
let totalLines = 0;
let totalBytes = 0;
const { result: resultPromise, pid } = await ShellExecutionService.execute(
commandToExecute,
cwd,
(event: ShellOutputEvent) => {
let shouldUpdate = false;
switch (event.type) {
case 'data':
if (isBinaryStream) break;
cumulativeOutput = event.chunk;
// Stats are only consumed by the ANSI-output branch below,
// so skip the per-chunk accounting for plain string chunks.
if (Array.isArray(event.chunk)) {
totalLines = event.chunk.length;
totalBytes = event.chunk.reduce(
(sum, line) =>
sum +
line.reduce(
(ls, token) => ls + Buffer.byteLength(token.text, 'utf-8'),
0,
),
0,
);
}
shouldUpdate = true;
break;
case 'binary_detected':
isBinaryStream = true;
cumulativeOutput = '[Binary output detected. Halting stream...]';
shouldUpdate = true;
break;
case 'binary_progress':
isBinaryStream = true;
cumulativeOutput = `[Receiving binary output... ${formatMemoryUsage(
event.bytesReceived,
)} received]`;
if (Date.now() - lastUpdateTime > OUTPUT_UPDATE_INTERVAL_MS) {
shouldUpdate = true;
}
break;
default: {
throw new Error('An unhandled ShellOutputEvent was found.');
}
}
if (shouldUpdate && updateOutput) {
if (typeof cumulativeOutput === 'string') {
updateOutput(cumulativeOutput);
} else {
updateOutput({
ansiOutput: cumulativeOutput,
totalLines,
totalBytes,
// Only include timeout when user explicitly set it
...(this.params.timeout != null && {
timeoutMs: this.params.timeout,
}),
});
}
lastUpdateTime = Date.now();
}
},
combinedSignal,
this.config.getShouldUseNodePtyShell(),
shellExecutionConfig ?? {},
);
if (pid && setPidCallback) {
setPidCallback(pid);
}
// Bracket the spawn → settle wall-clock so the result builder below
// can decide whether to append the long-run advisory. Captured AFTER
// `await ShellExecutionService.execute(...)` returns its handle so
// pre-spawn setup (PTY dynamic import via `getPty()`, ~50200ms on
// first call) is excluded — the elapsed should reflect the
// command's actual runtime, not the tool call's total wall time.
// The `pid` set above confirms the process has been spawned by this
// point, so subtraction below is true post-spawn-to-settle.
//
// `performance.now()` (monotonic high-res, ms-precision) instead of
// `Date.now()` so NTP corrections / VM clock drift between capture
// and read can't make `elapsedMs` go negative (which would silently
// skip the hint with no observable failure). Returned origin is
// arbitrary but consistent across the two reads — only the
// difference matters here.
const executionStartTime = performance.now();
const result = await resultPromise;
let llmContent = '';
if (result.aborted) {
// Check if it was a timeout or user cancellation
const wasTimeout =
effectiveTimeout && combinedSignal.aborted && !signal.aborted;
if (wasTimeout) {
llmContent = `Command timed out after ${effectiveTimeout}ms before it could complete.`;
if (result.output.trim()) {
llmContent += ` Below is the output before it timed out:\n${result.output}`;
} else {
llmContent += ' There was no output before it timed out.';
}
} else {
llmContent = 'Command was cancelled by user before it could complete.';
if (result.output.trim()) {
llmContent += ` Below is the output before it was cancelled:\n${result.output}`;
} else {
llmContent += ' There was no output before it was cancelled.';
}
}
} else {
// Create a formatted error string for display, replacing the wrapper command
// with the user-facing command.
const finalError = result.error
? result.error.message.replace(commandToExecute, this.params.command)
: '(none)';
llmContent = [
`Command: ${this.params.command}`,
`Directory: ${this.params.directory || '(root)'}`,
`Output: ${result.output || '(empty)'}`,
`Error: ${finalError}`, // Use the cleaned error string.
`Exit Code: ${result.exitCode ?? '(none)'}`,
`Signal: ${result.signal ?? '(none)'}`,
`Process Group PGID: ${result.pid ?? '(none)'}`,
].join('\n');
// (Long-run advisory append happens AFTER `truncateToolOutput`
// below — see the explanation there for why post-truncation.)
}
// Run attribution outside the aborted/non-aborted branch: a
// `git commit -m "x" && sleep 999` chain can move HEAD and then
// time out, leaving the new commit without its attribution note
// while the stale per-file attribution stays around for a later
// unrelated commit. attachCommitAttribution already gates on HEAD
// movement, so it's a no-op when no commit was actually created.
let attributionWarning: string | null = null;
if (commitCtx.attributableInCwd) {
// `git commit --amend` rewrites HEAD in place, so the diff
// `HEAD~1..HEAD` would span the entire amended commit (parent →
// amended), not just what this amend changed. Detect the flag
// so getCommittedFileInfo can switch to `HEAD@{1}..HEAD` and
// attribute only the actual amend delta.
const isAmend = isAmendCommit(strippedCommand);
attributionWarning = await this.attachCommitAttribution(
cwd,
preHead,
isAmend,
);
}
// Intentionally NO `else if (commitCtx.hasCommit)` cleanup branch:
// commands that match `hasCommit` but not `attributableInCwd`
// (e.g. `cd /abs/path/to/this/repo && git commit`, `git -C . commit`)
// can land a commit in our cwd, but we don't know which files were
// staged — the user may have done a partial `git add A` and left
// unstaged AI edits to B and C pending. A wholesale
// `clearAttributions(true)` here would silently lose B and C even
// though they weren't committed. Leave the singleton alone; the
// next attributable commit's `attachCommitAttribution` will do a
// proper partial clear via `clearAttributedFiles`.
// Decide whether to emit the long-run advisory. Conditions:
// - Process completed under its own steam (no AbortSignal
// trigger, no external signal). Specifically:
// * Suppressed on aborted (`result.aborted: true`) — covers
// the `if (result.aborted)` arm above (timeout / user-
// cancel). Their own messaging is enough; a "should have
// been background" reminder when the agent already knows
// the command didn't complete is noise.
// * Suppressed on external signal kills (`result.signal !=
// null` with `aborted: false`, e.g. SIGTERM from container
// shutdown, k8s eviction, OOM killer, sibling reaping the
// process group). `shellExecutionService` only sets
// `aborted` when the AbortSignal we passed was triggered,
// so external signals fall through to the non-aborted
// branch — same rationale as timeout.
// - Wall-clock duration ≥ threshold. Measured spawn → resultPromise
// settle, intentionally BEFORE the post-processing block below
// (truncation I/O, output-file write). The hint reports how long
// the COMMAND blocked the agent, not how long the tool call
// spent including post-processing — that's the number the agent
// should be reasoning about when deciding whether to background
// next time. Truncation time is bounded by the temp-dir backend
// and isn't representative of the command's actual wait.
// Fires on both successful and naturally-failed completions since
// the advice ("next time, background it") is the same in both.
const elapsedMs = performance.now() - executionStartTime;
const longRunThreshold = longRunThresholdFor(effectiveTimeout);
const shouldAppendLongRunHint =
!result.aborted &&
result.signal === null &&
elapsedMs >= longRunThreshold;
// Observability: the hint decision is otherwise invisible. If a
// user reports "my 65s command didn't get the hint" or "5s command
// got the hint", the debug log shows which suppression branch fired
// (aborted / signal / under-threshold) plus the actual elapsed and
// computed threshold. No PII — just timing + result flags.
debugLogger.debug(
`long-run hint: elapsed=${Math.round(elapsedMs)}ms threshold=${longRunThreshold}ms ` +
`aborted=${result.aborted} signal=${result.signal}${shouldAppendLongRunHint ? 'fire' : 'suppress'}`,
);
// returnDisplayMessage build order — chronologically:
// 1. Initial value: in debug mode, snapshot of pre-truncation
// `llmContent`; in non-debug mode, terse output-or-status.
// 2. Truncation block (below) appends `Output too long and was
// saved to: <path>` if truncation fired (BOTH modes).
// 3. Long-run hint append (further below) appends the hint
// itself with append-style re-sync (BOTH modes), so the user
// sees the same advisory the agent does — otherwise the
// agent would suddenly suggest `is_background: true` with no
// visible trigger in the TUI.
// The pre-existing debug snapshot is captured here (pre-truncation,
// pre-hint); both subsequent steps APPEND to it rather than
// replacing, so all information accumulates rather than being lost
// when later steps fire.
let returnDisplayMessage = '';
if (this.config.getDebugMode()) {
returnDisplayMessage = llmContent;
} else {
if (result.output.trim()) {
returnDisplayMessage = result.output;
} else {
if (result.aborted) {
// Check if it was a timeout or user cancellation
const wasTimeout =
effectiveTimeout && combinedSignal.aborted && !signal.aborted;
returnDisplayMessage = wasTimeout
? `Command timed out after ${effectiveTimeout}ms.`
: 'Command cancelled by user.';
} else if (result.signal) {
returnDisplayMessage = `Command terminated by signal: ${result.signal}`;
} else if (result.error) {
returnDisplayMessage = `Command failed: ${getErrorMessage(
result.error,
)}`;
} else if (result.exitCode !== null && result.exitCode !== 0) {
returnDisplayMessage = `Command exited with code: ${result.exitCode}`;
}
// If output is empty and command succeeded (code 0, no error/signal/abort),
// returnDisplayMessage will remain empty, which is fine.
}
}
// Truncate large output and save full content to a temp file.
if (typeof llmContent === 'string') {
const truncatedResult = await truncateToolOutput(
this.config,
ShellTool.Name,
llmContent,
);
if (truncatedResult.outputFile) {
llmContent = truncatedResult.content;
returnDisplayMessage +=
(returnDisplayMessage ? '\n' : '') +
`Output too long and was saved to: ${truncatedResult.outputFile}`;
}
}
// Append the long-run advisory AFTER truncation so the hint isn't
// wrapped in `truncateToolOutput`'s "Truncated part of the output"
// header (which the LLM might misread as part of the command's own
// output). The hint is process metadata about the command, not
// command output, so it belongs outside the truncation envelope.
const longRunHint = shouldAppendLongRunHint
? buildLongRunningForegroundHint(elapsedMs)
: null;
if (longRunHint) {
if (typeof llmContent === 'string') {
llmContent += `\n\n${longRunHint}`;
// Surface the hint in the user-facing TUI too — the user is
// the one waiting for long commands and benefits from the
// same "consider backgrounding next time" cue the agent sees.
// Append (not replace) in BOTH modes so the truncation marker
// line ("Output too long and was saved to: ...") and any
// pre-existing returnDisplayMessage content (debug snapshot,
// status line, command output) are preserved.
returnDisplayMessage +=
(returnDisplayMessage ? '\n\n' : '') + longRunHint;
}
// else: llmContent is a structured `Part[]` / `Part` rather than
// a plain string. Today shell.ts only emits string llmContent,
// but the type union allows structured content. If a future
// refactor changes that, the hint silently disappears here. We
// accept that risk for now — the alternative (encoding the hint
// as a Part) would require deciding on a rendering convention,
// and structured llmContent isn't on the roadmap. Revisit if
// someone adds a non-string return path.
}
// Surface AI-attribution failures (note exec failure, payload too
// large, diff-analysis exception, shallow clone, etc.) on the tool
// result so the user knows their commit succeeded but the per-file
// git note didn't land. Without this, the only signal is a
// QWEN_DEBUG_LOG_FILE entry the user has likely never set up.
// Appended to BOTH llmContent (so the agent can react / report) and
// returnDisplayMessage (so the human sees it in the TUI). Skipped
// when null (intentional skips like a bare `git commit` with no
// tracked AI edits don't need user-visible feedback).
if (attributionWarning) {
if (typeof llmContent === 'string') {
llmContent += `\n\n${attributionWarning}`;
}
returnDisplayMessage +=
(returnDisplayMessage ? '\n\n' : '') + attributionWarning;
}
// When `result.error` is set, `coreToolScheduler` builds the
// model-facing functionResponse from `error.message`, NOT from
// `llmContent` (see `convertToFunctionResponse` and the error
// branch in scheduler's success/error split). So if a long
// command hits this path the hint we appended to llmContent above
// would be silently dropped before reaching the agent. Append the
// hint to error.message too so the advisory survives whichever
// branch the scheduler takes.
//
// Note on reach: `ShellExecutionResult.error` is reserved for
// SPAWN / setup failures (per the field's doc comment in
// shellExecutionService.ts); non-zero exits leave it null. Real
// spawn failures (ENOENT, permission denied) typically resolve in
// <1s, so the elapsed >= threshold + spawn-error combination is
// rare. The preservation is here for the slow-spawn edge cases
// (PTY init dragging, remote-fs exec syscalls, security scanners
// interposing) where the rare path could still trigger and the
// hint would otherwise vanish.
//
// Use a `---` divider line so downstream consumers of
// `error.message` (firePostToolUseFailureHook, telemetry grouping,
// SIEM alerting, hook-side error parsers) have an unambiguous
// boundary they can split on rather than getting ~400 chars of
// advisory text mixed inline with the original error body.
const executionError = result.error
? {
error: {
message:
result.error.message +
(longRunHint ? `\n\n---\n${longRunHint}` : ''),
type: ToolErrorType.SHELL_EXECUTE_ERROR,
},
}
: {};
return {
llmContent,
returnDisplay: returnDisplayMessage,
...executionError,
};
}
/**
* Background-execution path: spawn the command into a managed registry
* entry instead of detaching with `&`. Output streams to a per-shell file
* the agent can `Read`; cancellation flows through the entry's
* AbortController; the registry's terminal status is set when the process
* exits. Returns immediately so the agent's turn isn't blocked.
*/
private async executeBackground(
signal: AbortSignal,
shellExecutionConfig?: ShellExecutionConfig,
): Promise<ToolResult> {
const strippedCommand = stripShellWrapper(this.params.command);
// The background lifecycle (BackgroundShellRegistry) doesn't run
// the post-command attribution path — there's no clean place to
// hook pre/post-HEAD comparison and `git notes` writes between
// the early `Background shell started` return and the eventual
// process exit. Allowing `git commit` to slip through would leave
// the new commit without notes and let stale per-file attribution
// leak into the next foreground commit. Refuse the request and
// tell the user to run it foreground.
//
// Use the broader `hasCommit` flag rather than `attributableInCwd`:
// `cd /elsewhere && git commit` should still be refused even
// though we wouldn't attribute it.
if (gitCommitContext(strippedCommand).hasCommit) {
return {
llmContent:
'Refusing to run `git commit` in background mode: AI-attribution notes ' +
'are written by the foreground completion path. Re-run the commit ' +
'with is_background=false (or split it out of the compound command).',
returnDisplay:
'Refused: `git commit` is not supported in background shell mode.',
};
}
// Strip a single bare trailing `&` (the bash background operator) before
// spawn: bash treats it as background-detach, exits the wrapper
// immediately, and the real child outlives the wrapper — the registry
// would settle as `completed` while the shell is still running, and
// chunked output would land on a closed stream. The managed path is
// itself the backgrounding mechanism, so the trailing `&` is redundant.
//
// Deliberately precise: do not touch `&&` (logical AND), `\&` (escaped
// literal `&`), or commands without a trailing `&`. Earlier `\s*&+\s*$`
// was both too greedy (it ate `&&` and `\&`) and a ReDoS hazard on
// long all-`&` inputs. Plain string checks here are linear and clearer
// than a lookbehind regex.
//
// Operate on the trimmed *original* command so leading env assignments
// / shell wrappers survive through to execution; ShellExecutionService
// re-runs the user-approved invocation verbatim.
const trimmedOriginal = this.params.command.trim();
const noTrailingAmp = stripTrailingBackgroundAmp(trimmedOriginal);
if (noTrailingAmp !== trimmedOriginal) {
debugLogger.warn(
'Stripped trailing & from background shell command — managed path handles backgrounding',
);
}
const processedCommand = this.addAttributionToPR(
this.addCoAuthorToGitCommit(noTrailingAmp),
);
const cwd = this.params.directory || this.config.getTargetDir();
// Output goes under the project temp dir (which `ReadFileTool`
// auto-allows by default), so the LLM can `Read` the captured output
// without bouncing off a permission prompt — important because
// background-agent contexts can't surface interactive prompts.
const outputDir = path.join(
this.config.storage.getProjectTempDir(),
'background-shells',
this.config.getSessionId(),
);
fs.mkdirSync(outputDir, { recursive: true });
const shellId = `bg_${crypto.randomBytes(4).toString('hex')}`;
const outputPath = path.join(outputDir, `shell-${shellId}.output`);
// Background shells are explicitly independent of the current turn:
// the user pressing Ctrl+C on a turn (which aborts `signal`) should
// NOT kill a long-running dev server / watcher they intentionally
// backgrounded. Cancellation flows only through the entry's own
// AbortController, driven by future `task_stop` integration (#3471).
// The `signal` parameter is still honored for the synchronous early
// return below (don't even spawn if the agent already aborted), but
// we deliberately do not forward it.
const entryAc = new AbortController();
const outputStream = fs.createWriteStream(outputPath, { flags: 'w' });
// Without an 'error' listener, a write failure (disk full, permission
// change, fs going away) would surface as an uncaught exception and
// kill the entire CLI session. Log + drop is the sane default — the
// process keeps running, the registry still settles via resultPromise.
outputStream.on('error', (err) => {
debugLogger.warn(
`background shell ${shellId} output write error: ${err.message}`,
);
});
const startTime = Date.now();
const entry: BackgroundShellEntry = {
shellId,
command: processedCommand,
cwd,
status: 'running',
startTime,
outputPath,
abortController: entryAc,
};
const { result: resultPromise, pid } = await ShellExecutionService.execute(
processedCommand,
cwd,
(event: ShellOutputEvent) => {
if (event.type === 'data' && typeof event.chunk === 'string') {
// Strip ANSI escape codes (color, cursor-move, clear-screen) before
// writing — agents read the file as plain text, and dev servers /
// build tools spam plenty of escape sequences that would render as
// garbage. Costs ~one regex per chunk; cheap relative to disk I/O.
outputStream.write(stripAnsi(event.chunk));
}
// ANSI array chunks and binary streams are not written to the output
// file: agents read the file as plain text and binary spam would be
// unhelpful.
},
entryAc.signal,
// Background shells are non-interactive by design — no terminal to
// attach a PTY to, no human to type at it. Force the child_process
// path so we don't pull in node-pty for fire-and-forget commands.
false,
shellExecutionConfig ?? {},
// Stream stdout/stderr through to the output file as chunks arrive.
// Default child_process mode buffers until exit, which would leave
// dev-server / watcher output files empty until the process dies.
{ streamStdout: true },
);
if (pid !== undefined) entry.pid = pid;
const registry = this.config.getBackgroundShellRegistry();
registry.register(entry);
// Settle in the background — do NOT await here, the agent should be
// unblocked immediately.
void resultPromise.then(
(result) => {
outputStream.end();
const endTime = Date.now();
if (entryAc.signal.aborted) {
if (registry.get(shellId)?.status === 'running') {
registry.cancel(shellId, endTime);
}
} else if (
result.error ||
(result.exitCode !== null && result.exitCode !== 0) ||
result.signal !== null
) {
// Non-zero exit / killed by signal / spawn error all count as failed.
// Treating them as `completed` would let `/tasks` (and any future
// model-facing notification) misreport a failed `npm test` or
// `false` command as a success.
const reason = result.error
? result.error.message
: result.signal !== null
? `terminated by signal ${result.signal}`
: `exited with code ${result.exitCode}`;
registry.fail(shellId, reason, endTime);
} else {
registry.complete(shellId, result.exitCode ?? 0, endTime);
}
},
(err) => {
outputStream.end();
registry.fail(shellId, getErrorMessage(err), Date.now());
},
);
const pidLine = pid !== undefined ? `pid: ${pid}\n` : '';
return {
llmContent:
`Background shell started.\n` +
`id: ${shellId}\n` +
pidLine +
`output file: ${outputPath}\n` +
`To inspect: /tasks (text) or the interactive Background tasks dialog (focus the footer Background tasks pill, then Enter — detail view + live updates). Read the output file directly to view the captured output.`,
returnDisplay: `Background shell ${shellId} started${pid !== undefined ? ` (pid ${pid})` : ''}.`,
};
}
/**
* Count the commits between `preHead` (exclusive) and `HEAD`
* (inclusive). Returns 0 if either side is unreadable. Goes through
* `child_process.execFile` with argv to stay independent of the
* mockable `ShellExecutionService`.
*/
private async countCommitsAfter(
cwd: string,
preHead: string,
): Promise<number> {
return this.runGitCount(cwd, ['rev-list', '--count', `${preHead}..HEAD`]);
}
/**
* Count commits reachable from HEAD when the repo had no prior
* HEAD before the user's command — i.e. the very first commit (or
* compound `init && commit && commit ...`). Without this fallback
* the multi-commit guard would be skipped on a brand-new repo and
* mis-attribute combined data to the final commit.
*/
private async countCommitsFromRoot(cwd: string): Promise<number> {
return this.runGitCount(cwd, ['rev-list', '--count', 'HEAD']);
}
/** Shared helper for the two `rev-list --count` invocations. */
private async runGitCount(cwd: string, args: string[]): Promise<number> {
return new Promise((resolve) => {
const child = childProcess.execFile(
'git',
args,
{ cwd, timeout: 2000 },
(error, stdout) => {
if (error) {
resolve(0);
return;
}
const n = parseInt(String(stdout).trim(), 10);
resolve(Number.isFinite(n) && n > 0 ? n : 0);
},
);
child.on('error', () => {});
});
}
/**
* Read the current HEAD SHA, or null if unavailable (no commits
* yet, not a git repo, or git failed). Used to detect whether a
* `git commit` actually created a new commit, independent of the
* shell's exit code. Goes through `child_process.execFile` rather
* than {@link ShellExecutionService} so the lookup is unaffected
* by test mocks of the shell service and stays well clear of any
* user-supplied shell wrapper.
*/
private async getGitHead(cwd: string): Promise<string | null> {
return new Promise((resolve) => {
const child = childProcess.execFile(
'git',
['rev-parse', 'HEAD'],
{ cwd, timeout: 2000 },
(error, stdout) => {
if (error) {
resolve(null);
return;
}
const sha = String(stdout).trim();
resolve(sha.length > 0 ? sha : null);
},
);
// Suppress unhandled-error events from the child stream (e.g. ENOENT
// when git is missing); the callback still receives the error.
child.on('error', () => {});
});
}
/**
* Synchronous companion to {@link getGitHead}. Captured BEFORE the
* user's shell command spawns so a fast `git commit` (hot-cached,
* no hooks) cannot move HEAD before our async rev-parse has a chance
* to read it — a real race seen on slow filesystems / heavy contention
* where preHead would otherwise resolve to the new SHA, postHead would
* match, and `attachCommitAttribution` would silently skip writing the
* attribution note even though the commit succeeded.
*
* Worst case is ~1050 ms of event-loop block per commit-shaped shell
* command; acceptable trade for correctness of the post-command HEAD
* comparison.
*/
private getGitHeadSync(cwd: string): string | null {
try {
const stdout = childProcess.execFileSync('git', ['rev-parse', 'HEAD'], {
cwd,
timeout: 2000,
// Discard stderr noise (e.g. "fatal: not a git repository") —
// the catch-or-empty-output path already covers failure.
stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'ignore'],
});
const sha = String(stdout).trim();
return sha.length > 0 ? sha : null;
} catch {
return null;
}
}
/**
* After a successful git commit, attach per-file AI attribution metadata
* as git notes. Analyzes staged files via `git diff` to calculate real
* AI vs human contribution percentages.
*
* Detects commit creation by HEAD movement, not by shell exit code:
* for compound commands like `git commit -m "x" && npm test`, the
* commit can succeed and a later step can fail. Gating on `exitCode
* !== 0` would skip attribution for the successful commit, so we
* compare pre- and post-command HEAD instead.
*
* Respects the gitCoAuthor.commit setting: if the user disables commit
* attribution, the per-file note is skipped too (same toggle governs
* the Co-authored-by trailer and the git-notes payload).
*/
private async attachCommitAttribution(
cwd: string,
preHead: string | null,
isAmend: boolean,
): Promise<string | null> {
// Returns a one-line warning suitable for appending to the tool's
// returnDisplay when a write that the user could plausibly fix
// (note exec failure, payload too large, exception during diff
// analysis) drops the AI-attribution note. Returns null when the
// skip is intentional / inherent to the situation (no commit
// landed, multi-commit chain, attribution toggle off, no tracked
// edits) — those don't need user-visible feedback.
// Caller (`execute`) gates this with `commitCtx.attributableInCwd`,
// so we don't re-parse the command here. Re-parsing would be dead
// work and a maintenance trap — if the two checks ever drifted,
// trailer injection and git-notes writes could diverge silently.
const postHead = await this.getGitHead(cwd);
const commitCreated = postHead !== null && postHead !== preHead;
const attributionService = CommitAttributionService.getInstance();
if (!commitCreated) {
// HEAD didn't move in this cwd. Possible causes:
// 1. Commit failed (hook rejected, nothing staged, etc.)
// 2. User did `git commit && git reset HEAD~1` — HEAD reverted
// 3. Submodule case (`cd submodule && git commit`) — the inner
// repo's HEAD moved, ours didn't
// We can't tell these apart reliably from here. Dropping the
// per-file attributions on (1)/(2) is fine in isolation, but on
// (3) we'd silently lose the user's outer-repo edits even though
// none of them were committed. Leave attributions intact instead:
// a later successful commit will overwrite the counters and the
// accumulated aiContribution still represents real AI work.
return null;
}
// Refuse to attribute when a single shell command produced more
// than one commit (e.g. `git commit -m a && git commit -m b`).
// Our singleton has no way to partition the per-file AI
// contribution across the individual commits, so attaching the
// combined note to HEAD would mis-attribute earlier commits'
// changes to the last one. Snapshot prompt counters and bail.
//
// For a brand-new repo (preHead === null), use `git rev-list
// --count HEAD` so the very first compound `init && commit a &&
// commit b` chain still gets caught.
const commitCount =
preHead !== null
? await this.countCommitsAfter(cwd, preHead)
: await this.countCommitsFromRoot(cwd);
// commitCreated has already established that HEAD moved, so we
// expect exactly 1 commit. Anything else is suspicious:
// - >1: actual multi-commit chain we can't partition
// - 0: rev-list errored / timed out — could not verify, so
// we'd otherwise silently attribute as a single commit even
// though the count is unknown
// Bail in either case.
if (commitCount !== 1) {
const reason =
commitCount === 0
? 'commit count unavailable (rev-list failed) ' +
'after HEAD moved — refusing to assume single commit'
: `multi-commit shell command (${commitCount} commits since ` +
`${preHead ? preHead.slice(0, 12) : 'repo root'})`;
debugLogger.warn(`Refusing AI attribution: ${reason}.`);
// Snapshot the prompt counter but do NOT clear per-file
// attributions: in a `commit a && commit b` chain, the user
// may have unstaged AI edits to files that appeared in NEITHER
// commit. Wholesale-clearing here would erase those even
// though the rest of the flow is built to preserve unstaged
// entries across partial commits.
attributionService.noteCommitWithoutClearing();
return null;
}
// A new commit landed. Even when no per-file attribution was
// tracked (rare but possible — e.g. user committed external
// changes), we still need to snapshot the prompt counters as
// "at last commit" so a later `gh pr create` doesn't report an
// inflated N-shotted count spanning multiple commits.
if (!attributionService.hasAttributions()) {
attributionService.noteCommitWithoutClearing();
return null;
}
const gitCoAuthorSettings = this.config.getGitCoAuthor();
if (!gitCoAuthorSettings.commit) {
// Commit succeeded but attribution is disabled. Snapshot the
// prompt counters as "at last commit" but leave per-file
// attributions alone — a wholesale clear here would lose the
// user's pending unstaged AI work just because they toggled
// attribution off, which is a much harsher contract than the
// toggle name suggests.
attributionService.noteCommitWithoutClearing();
return null;
}
let committedAbsolutePaths: Set<string> | null = null;
let warning: string | null = null;
try {
// Analyze the just-committed files by diffing HEAD against its parent.
// The commit already happened, so we diff HEAD~1..HEAD instead of --cached.
const stagedInfo = await this.getCommittedFileInfo(cwd, isAmend);
// null = analysis failed (shallow clone, --amend without reflog,
// partial diff failure, etc.). Leave `committedAbsolutePaths`
// null so the finally block falls back to a full clear and we
// don't leak stale per-file attributions into the next commit.
// Skip the note write entirely — emitting a structurally valid
// but factually wrong all-zero note is worse than no note.
if (stagedInfo === null) {
warning =
'AI attribution note skipped: could not analyze the commit ' +
'diff (shallow clone, missing reflog for --amend, or partial ' +
'`git diff` failure). Co-authored-by trailer is unaffected.';
return warning; // finally still runs for cleanup
}
// Pass the actual model name (e.g. `qwen3-coder-plus`) rather than the
// co-author display label so the note's `generator` field reflects
// which model produced the changes — and so generateNotePayload's
// sanitizeModelName() actually has the codename it's meant to scrub.
// The base directory must be the git repo root: getCommittedFileInfo
// returns paths relative to `git rev-parse --show-toplevel`, and any
// mismatch here would cause path.relative to produce `../...` keys
// that never match in the AI-attribution lookup.
const baseDir = stagedInfo.repoRoot ?? this.config.getTargetDir();
// Capture the absolute paths actually included in this commit so
// the finally block can do a partial clear: files the AI edited
// but the user didn't `git add` should still be tracked for a
// later commit.
//
// Match against the canonical keys already stored in
// `fileAttributions` (recordEdit canonicalises every component
// via realpathSync) rather than re-resolving each diff path on
// the fly. Re-resolving fails for deleted files (realpathSync
// throws on a missing leaf) and for files behind intermediate
// symlinked directories (path.resolve only canonicalises the
// base) — both cases produced cleanup keys that didn't match
// the stored canonical keys, leaking stale per-file attribution
// into subsequent commits.
let canonicalBase: string;
try {
canonicalBase = fs.realpathSync(baseDir);
} catch {
canonicalBase = baseDir;
}
committedAbsolutePaths = attributionService.matchCommittedFiles(
stagedInfo.files,
canonicalBase,
);
// No file in this commit was AI-touched in the current session.
// Writing a note anyway would emit an all-zero "0% AI" payload
// attached to a commit that legitimately had no AI involvement
// — actively misleading. Skip the note; the partial clear in
// the finally block is a no-op (empty set) so unrelated pending
// attributions stay tracked for a later commit.
if (committedAbsolutePaths.size === 0) {
return null;
}
const note = attributionService.generateNotePayload(
stagedInfo,
baseDir,
this.config.getModel(),
);
const notesCommand = buildGitNotesCommand(note);
if (!notesCommand) {
debugLogger.warn(
'AI attribution note too large, skipping git notes attachment',
);
warning =
'AI attribution note skipped: payload exceeded the 30 KB ' +
'size cap (large generated-file exclusion list?). ' +
'Co-authored-by trailer is unaffected.';
return warning;
}
// Use execFile with argv (rather than ShellExecutionService) so the
// JSON note isn't subjected to shell quoting at all — important on
// Windows where the bash-style escape used previously is invalid
// for cmd.exe / PowerShell. 5s timeout keeps a wedged repo from
// stalling the user-visible turn.
const { exitCode, output } = await new Promise<{
exitCode: number | null;
output: string;
}>((resolve) => {
const child = childProcess.execFile(
notesCommand.command,
notesCommand.args,
{ cwd, timeout: 5000 },
(error, stdout, stderr) => {
const merged = (stdout || '') + (stderr || '');
if (error) {
const code =
typeof (error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === 'number'
? ((error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code as unknown as number)
: null;
resolve({ exitCode: code ?? 1, output: merged });
} else {
resolve({ exitCode: 0, output: merged });
}
},
);
child.on('error', () => {});
});
if (exitCode !== 0) {
debugLogger.warn(`git notes exited with code ${exitCode}: ${output}`);
warning =
`AI attribution note skipped: \`git notes add\` exited ${exitCode}` +
(output ? ` (${output.trim().slice(0, 120)})` : '') +
'. Co-authored-by trailer is unaffected.';
} else {
debugLogger.debug(
`Attached AI attribution note: ${note.summary.aiPercent}% AI, ${note.summary.totalFilesTouched} file(s)`,
);
}
} catch (err) {
debugLogger.warn(
`Failed to attach AI attribution note: ${getErrorMessage(err)}`,
);
warning =
`AI attribution note skipped: ${getErrorMessage(err)}. ` +
'Co-authored-by trailer is unaffected.';
} finally {
// Partial clear: only drop tracking for the files that actually
// landed in this commit. Files the AI edited but the user
// omitted from `git add` stay pending for a later commit.
// If we never determined the committed set (analysis failure:
// shallow clone, --amend without reflog, partial diff failure,
// exception), DO NOT wholesale-clear: that would erase pending
// AI edits for files the user never staged in this commit. The
// small risk is stale per-file state for the just-committed
// file (re-attributed if it appears in a future commit) — much
// less harmful than losing unrelated unstaged work.
if (committedAbsolutePaths) {
attributionService.clearAttributedFiles(committedAbsolutePaths);
} else {
attributionService.noteCommitWithoutClearing();
}
}
return warning;
}
/**
* Get information about files in the most recent commit by diffing
* HEAD against its parent (HEAD~1).
*
* Returns:
* - A populated `StagedFileInfo` when analysis succeeded.
* - An empty `StagedFileInfo` when the commit truly has no files
* (e.g. `--allow-empty`). The caller does a no-op partial clear so
* pending AI attributions stay tracked for the next real commit.
* - `null` when analysis itself failed (shallow clone with no parent
* object, --amend with no reflog, partial diff failure, exception).
* The caller treats this as "could not determine the committed
* set" and falls back to a full clear so stale per-file state
* doesn't leak into a subsequent commit.
*/
private async getCommittedFileInfo(
cwd: string,
isAmend: boolean,
): Promise<StagedFileInfo | null> {
const empty: StagedFileInfo = {
files: [],
diffSizes: new Map(),
deletedFiles: new Set(),
};
// Distinguish a successful git command with no output (e.g.
// `--allow-empty` -> empty `--name-only` listing) from a failed
// git command (silenced by ShellExecutionService) so the caller
// can choose between the empty-commit sentinel and the analysis-
// failure sentinel. Returning the same `''` for both used to
// alias `--allow-empty` to a `--name-only` failure, which left
// pending attributions tracked across the just-committed file
// and re-attributed it on the next commit.
const runGit = async (args: string): Promise<string | null> => {
const handle = await ShellExecutionService.execute(
`git ${args}`,
cwd,
() => {},
AbortSignal.timeout(5000),
false,
{},
);
const r = await handle.result;
return r.exitCode === 0 ? r.output : null;
};
try {
// The three calls are independent — fan out so we don't pay the
// spawn latency serially. Same for the three diff calls below
// once we know which form to use.
// - `rev-parse --verify HEAD~1`: probe whether the parent OBJECT
// is locally available (fails in shallow clones where the
// parent was pruned).
// - `log -1 --pretty=%P HEAD`: read the parent SHA from HEAD's
// commit metadata. Works regardless of shallow status because
// the parent SHA is recorded on the commit itself, not derived
// by walking. Empty output = HEAD is a true root commit.
// Non-empty output = HEAD has a parent (whether or not its
// object is locally available).
// - `rev-parse --show-toplevel`: capture the repo root.
//
// `rev-list --count HEAD` looks tempting as a "is this a root
// commit?" probe but it returns 1 in a depth-1 shallow clone
// (only the local object is reachable), aliasing the shallow
// and root cases. The parent-SHA approach disambiguates them
// correctly.
const [hasParentOutput, parentShaOutput, repoRootOutput] =
await Promise.all([
runGit('rev-parse --verify HEAD~1'),
runGit('log -1 --pretty=%P HEAD'),
runGit('rev-parse --show-toplevel'),
]);
// `rev-parse --verify HEAD~1` is allowed to fail (shallow
// clone, true root commit) — treat null and '' uniformly.
const hasParent = hasParentOutput !== null && hasParentOutput.length > 0;
// `log -1 --pretty=%P HEAD` MUST succeed; if git can't read the
// current HEAD's metadata we have no way to tell shallow apart
// from a real root commit. Bail.
if (parentShaOutput === null) {
debugLogger.warn(
'getCommittedFileInfo: log -1 --pretty=%P HEAD failed; ' +
'cannot distinguish shallow clone from true root commit.',
);
return null;
}
const isTrueRootCommit = parentShaOutput.trim().length === 0;
// Shallow clone: HEAD has a parent recorded but the object
// isn't local. Bail rather than over-attribute via --root.
if (!hasParent && !isTrueRootCommit) {
debugLogger.warn(
'getCommittedFileInfo: HEAD~1 unreadable but commit is not the ' +
'true root (shallow clone?); skipping attribution to avoid ' +
'attributing the entire commit contents.',
);
return null;
}
// Capture the repo root so the attribution service can
// reconcile paths from `git diff` (relative to the toplevel)
// against absolute paths recorded by the edit/write tools.
// Using the configured target directory as base would zero out
// attribution for any file outside it. Tolerate failure (null
// -> empty string -> caller falls back to targetDir).
const repoRoot = (repoRootOutput ?? '').trim();
// Choose the diff range:
// - amend: `HEAD@{1}..HEAD` — the actual amend delta. The
// pre-amend HEAD is in the reflog and points at the original
// commit; diffing against the *amended* HEAD captures only
// what changed in this amend operation, not the entire commit
// contents (which `HEAD~1..HEAD` would falsely include).
// - has parent: `HEAD~1..HEAD` — standard parent diff.
// - root commit: `diff-tree --root` against the empty tree.
let diffArgs: { name: string; status: string; numstat: string };
if (isAmend) {
// Verify HEAD@{1} actually exists; reflogs can be GC'd.
const reflogProbe = await runGit('rev-parse --verify HEAD@{1}');
const hasReflog = reflogProbe !== null && reflogProbe.length > 0;
if (!hasReflog) {
// Without a pre-amend snapshot we can't compute the amend
// delta; emitting `HEAD~1..HEAD` would over-attribute.
debugLogger.warn(
'getCommittedFileInfo: --amend with empty reflog; skipping ' +
'attribution note (cannot determine amend delta).',
);
return null;
}
diffArgs = {
name: 'diff --name-only HEAD@{1} HEAD',
status: 'diff --name-status HEAD@{1} HEAD',
numstat: 'diff --numstat HEAD@{1} HEAD',
};
} else if (hasParent) {
diffArgs = {
name: 'diff --name-only HEAD~1 HEAD',
status: 'diff --name-status HEAD~1 HEAD',
numstat: 'diff --numstat HEAD~1 HEAD',
};
} else {
diffArgs = {
name: 'diff-tree --root --no-commit-id -r --name-only HEAD',
status: 'diff-tree --root --no-commit-id -r --name-status HEAD',
numstat: 'diff-tree --root --no-commit-id -r --numstat HEAD',
};
}
const [nameOutput, statusOutput, numstatOutput] = await Promise.all([
runGit(diffArgs.name),
runGit(diffArgs.status),
runGit(diffArgs.numstat),
]);
// ANY of the three diffs failing (null) is an analysis failure,
// NOT an empty commit. Without this check, a `--name-only` that
// failed silently used to alias to `--allow-empty`, leaving the
// just-committed file's tracked AI edit in the singleton and
// re-attributing it to the next commit.
if (
nameOutput === null ||
statusOutput === null ||
numstatOutput === null
) {
debugLogger.warn(
'getCommittedFileInfo: one or more diff calls failed; ' +
'cannot distinguish empty commit from analysis failure.',
);
return null;
}
const files = nameOutput
.split('\n')
.map((f) => f.trim())
.filter(Boolean);
if (files.length === 0) return empty;
// Get deleted files
const deletedFiles = new Set<string>();
for (const line of statusOutput.split('\n')) {
if (line.startsWith('D\t')) {
deletedFiles.add(line.slice(2).trim());
}
}
// Get diff sizes from numstat output. Bail if `--numstat`
// returned nothing while `--name-only` succeeded — that's the
// partial-failure signal for `Promise.all`, and writing a note
// anyway would force every file's diffSize to 0, then
// generateNotePayload would clamp aiChars to 0 and emit a
// structurally valid but factually wrong all-zero attribution.
const diffSizes = parseNumstat(numstatOutput);
if (diffSizes.size === 0) {
debugLogger.warn(
'getCommittedFileInfo: --numstat returned empty while ' +
'--name-only listed files; skipping attribution note to ' +
'avoid emitting all-zero AI percentages.',
);
return null;
}
return {
files,
diffSizes,
deletedFiles,
repoRoot: repoRoot.length > 0 ? repoRoot : undefined,
};
} catch {
return null;
}
}
/**
* Append a configured `Co-authored-by:` trailer to `git commit`
* commands when the commit co-author feature is enabled. No-op for
* commands that don't carry an inline `-m`/`-am` message (those open
* an editor, which we don't try to rewrite).
*/
private addCoAuthorToGitCommit(command: string): string {
// Check if commit co-author feature is enabled
const gitCoAuthorSettings = this.config.getGitCoAuthor();
if (!gitCoAuthorSettings.commit) {
return command;
}
// Same shell-type guard as addAttributionToPR — bash escaping is
// wrong for cmd/PowerShell. Gating on the active shell rather than
// the OS platform keeps Windows + Git Bash users (where
// getShellConfiguration() reports shell:'bash') working.
if (getShellConfiguration().shell !== 'bash') {
return command;
}
// Shell-aware detection — a raw regex would falsely match quoted
// text such as `echo "git commit"` and hand a corrupted command
// (with the trailer mid-string) back to the executor. The stricter
// `attributableInCwd` is what we want here: only inject the
// trailer when we're confident the commit lands in our cwd.
const segmentRange = findAttributableCommitSegment(command);
if (!segmentRange) {
return command;
}
// Handle different git commit patterns:
// Match -m "message" or -m 'message', including combined flags like -am
// Use separate patterns to avoid ReDoS (catastrophic backtracking).
// The regex tolerates `-m"msg"` shorthand (no space) — bash accepts
// both `-m foo` and `-mfoo`, and we shouldn't silently skip the
// shorthand form.
//
// The regex is scoped to the actual `git commit` segment (not the
// whole compound command) so a later `git tag -a v1 -m "..."` in
// the same chain can't be mistaken for the commit message.
//
// Pattern breakdown:
// -[a-zA-Z]*m matches -m, -am, -nm, etc. (combined short flags)
// \s* matches optional whitespace after the flag
// [^"\\] matches any char except double-quote and backslash
// \\. matches escape sequences like \" or \\
// (?:...|...)* matches normal chars or escapes, repeated
// Match both the short form (`-m`, `-am`, combined short flags)
// and git's long alias `--message` (with optional `=` separator:
// `--message="..."`). Inner alternation is non-capturing so the
// existing `[full, prefix, body]` destructure still applies.
const FLAG_PREFIX = `(?:-[a-zA-Z]*m|--message)\\s*=?\\s*`;
const doubleQuotePattern = new RegExp(
`(${FLAG_PREFIX})"((?:[^"\\\\]|\\\\.)*)"`,
'g',
);
// Bash single quotes can't be escaped, so apostrophes inside a
// single-quoted message use the close-escape-reopen form `'\''`
// (e.g. `git commit -m 'don'\''t'`). The inner alternation matches
// either a non-apostrophe character or that escape sequence as a
// whole, so the trailer lands at the true end of the body — at the
// FINAL closing `'` after the user's content — rather than after
// the first interior apostrophe. Mirrors `bodySinglePattern` in
// `addAttributionToPR`.
const singleQuotePattern = new RegExp(
`(${FLAG_PREFIX})'((?:[^']|'\\\\'')*)'`,
'g',
);
const segment = command.slice(segmentRange.start, segmentRange.end);
// Git concatenates multiple `-m` values with a blank line, so the
// co-author trailer has to land in the *last* `-m` value to be
// recognised by `git interpret-trailers`. matchAll → take the
// last match (`lastMatchOf` is the shared helper).
const doubleMatch = lastMatchOf(segment.matchAll(doubleQuotePattern));
const singleMatch = lastMatchOf(segment.matchAll(singleQuotePattern));
// Pick whichever match appears LAST in the segment, regardless of
// quote style — but reject any candidate that's nested inside the
// other's range. For `git commit -m "docs mention -m 'flag'"` the
// single-quoted `-m 'flag'` lives INSIDE the double-quoted real
// message; without a nesting check the later (inner) `-m` would
// win and the trailer would be spliced into the body text.
const matchRange = (m: RegExpMatchArray | null) =>
m ? { start: m.index ?? 0, end: (m.index ?? 0) + m[0].length } : null;
const isInside = (
inner: RegExpMatchArray | null,
outer: RegExpMatchArray | null,
): boolean => {
const i = matchRange(inner);
const o = matchRange(outer);
return !!(i && o && i.start >= o.start && i.end <= o.end);
};
let match: RegExpMatchArray | null;
if (doubleMatch && singleMatch) {
if (isInside(singleMatch, doubleMatch)) {
match = doubleMatch;
} else if (isInside(doubleMatch, singleMatch)) {
match = singleMatch;
} else {
match =
(doubleMatch.index ?? 0) > (singleMatch.index ?? 0)
? doubleMatch
: singleMatch;
}
} else {
match = doubleMatch ?? singleMatch;
}
const quote = match === doubleMatch ? '"' : "'";
// Escape the configured name/email for the surrounding quote
// style — has to follow the actually-selected match.
const escape =
match === doubleMatch
? escapeForBashDoubleQuote
: escapeForBashSingleQuote;
const escapedName = escape(gitCoAuthorSettings.name ?? '');
const escapedEmail = escape(gitCoAuthorSettings.email ?? '');
const coAuthor = `\n\nCo-authored-by: ${escapedName} <${escapedEmail}>`;
if (match) {
const [fullMatch, prefix, existingMessage] = match;
// Bail on `$(...)` command substitution inside the captured
// body: our regex's `(?:[^"\\]|\\.)*` body group stops at the
// first interior `"`, so a heredoc-style
// `git commit -m "$(cat <<'HEREDOC' ... HEREDOC)"` (which the
// tool description recommends for multi-line messages) would
// be matched only up to the first inner `"`, then the trailer
// would be spliced into the middle of the command
// substitution and break the shell command. Recognising
// `$(` is enough — if it's there we can't safely rewrite
// without a real shell parser.
if (existingMessage.includes('$(')) {
return command;
}
const newMessage = existingMessage + coAuthor;
const replacement = prefix + quote + newMessage + quote;
// Splice the modified segment back into the original command,
// preserving everything outside the commit segment exactly as
// the caller had it.
const matchStart = (match.index ?? 0) + segmentRange.start;
if (matchStart >= segmentRange.start) {
return (
command.slice(0, matchStart) +
replacement +
command.slice(matchStart + fullMatch.length)
);
}
}
// If no -m flag found, the command might open an editor
// In this case, we can't easily modify it, so return as-is
return command;
}
/**
* Detect `gh pr create` commands and append AI attribution text to the
* PR body. Format: "🤖 Generated with Qwen Code (N-shotted by Qwen-Coder)"
* when at least one user prompt has been recorded since the last commit;
* otherwise just "🤖 Generated with Qwen Code".
*
* Skipped on Windows: the appended text relies on bash quote-escape
* conventions (`\$`, `'\''`) that cmd.exe and PowerShell don't honor,
* so on those shells our injection could either break the user-approved
* `gh pr create` command or be evaluated as command substitution.
* Losing PR attribution on Windows is an acceptable trade for safety.
*/
private addAttributionToPR(command: string): string {
// Shell-aware detection — a raw regex would falsely match quoted
// text such as `echo "gh pr create --body \"x\""` and rewrite a
// command that wasn't actually creating a PR.
const ghSegment = findGhPrCreateSegment(command);
if (!ghSegment) {
return command;
}
// Gate on shell type rather than OS platform: bash escaping is
// invalid under cmd/PowerShell but works fine under Windows +
// Git Bash, which `getShellConfiguration()` reports as `'bash'`.
if (getShellConfiguration().shell !== 'bash') {
return command;
}
const gitCoAuthorSettings = this.config.getGitCoAuthor();
if (!gitCoAuthorSettings.pr) {
return command;
}
const attributionService = CommitAttributionService.getInstance();
const shots = attributionService.getPromptsSinceLastCommit();
const generator = gitCoAuthorSettings.name ?? 'Qwen-Coder';
const attribution =
shots > 0
? `\n\n🤖 Generated with Qwen Code (${shots}-shotted by ${generator})`
: `\n\n🤖 Generated with Qwen Code`;
// Match both the long form `--body` and the short alias `-b`
// (documented in `gh pr create --help`), with either space or
// `=` separator: `--body "..."`, `--body="..."`, `-b "..."`,
// `-b="..."`. Inner alternation is non-capturing so the existing
// `[full, prefix, body]` destructure stays intact.
//
// Run the regex against just the gh segment, NOT the full
// command. Otherwise a compound like
// `curl -b "session=abc" && gh pr create --body "summary"` would
// have the body regex match `curl`'s `-b` cookie flag and inject
// attribution into the cookie value, corrupting the curl call.
const BODY_FLAG = `(?:--body|-b)[\\s=]+`;
const bodyDoublePattern = new RegExp(
`(${BODY_FLAG})"((?:[^"\\\\]|\\\\.)*)"`,
'g',
);
// Bash apostrophes inside a single-quoted body use the
// close-escape-reopen form `'\''`. The inner alternation matches
// either a non-apostrophe character or that escape sequence as a
// whole, so the trailer lands at the true end of the body rather
// than after only the first quoted segment.
const bodySinglePattern = new RegExp(
`(${BODY_FLAG})'((?:[^']|'\\\\'')*)'`,
'g',
);
const segment = command.slice(ghSegment.start, ghSegment.end);
// gh ignores all but the last `--body`/`-b` flag, so the trailer
// has to land in the final occurrence to actually appear in the PR.
// matchAll → take the last match for each quote style, then pick
// whichever sits later in the segment (mirrors addCoAuthorToGitCommit;
// shares the `lastMatchOf` helper).
const bodyDoubleMatch = lastMatchOf(segment.matchAll(bodyDoublePattern));
const bodySingleMatch = lastMatchOf(segment.matchAll(bodySinglePattern));
// Pick whichever match appears LAST in the segment, regardless of
// quote style — but reject any candidate that's nested inside the
// other's range. For `gh pr create --body "docs mention -b 'flag'"`
// the inner `-b 'flag'` is INSIDE the outer `--body "..."`; without
// a nesting check the inner (later) `-b` would win and the trailer
// would be spliced into the body text rather than appended after it.
const bodyMatchRange = (m: RegExpMatchArray | null) =>
m ? { start: m.index ?? 0, end: (m.index ?? 0) + m[0].length } : null;
const bodyIsInside = (
inner: RegExpMatchArray | null,
outer: RegExpMatchArray | null,
): boolean => {
const i = bodyMatchRange(inner);
const o = bodyMatchRange(outer);
return !!(i && o && i.start >= o.start && i.end <= o.end);
};
let bodyMatch: RegExpMatchArray | null;
if (bodyDoubleMatch && bodySingleMatch) {
if (bodyIsInside(bodySingleMatch, bodyDoubleMatch)) {
bodyMatch = bodyDoubleMatch;
} else if (bodyIsInside(bodyDoubleMatch, bodySingleMatch)) {
bodyMatch = bodySingleMatch;
} else {
bodyMatch =
(bodyDoubleMatch.index ?? 0) > (bodySingleMatch.index ?? 0)
? bodyDoubleMatch
: bodySingleMatch;
}
} else {
bodyMatch = bodyDoubleMatch ?? bodySingleMatch;
}
const bodyQuote = bodyMatch === bodyDoubleMatch ? '"' : "'";
if (bodyMatch) {
const [fullMatch, prefix, existingBody] = bodyMatch;
// Same `$(...)` bailout as addCoAuthorToGitCommit: a heredoc-
// style body (`gh pr create --body "$(cat <<'EOF' ... EOF)"`)
// contains nested `"` that our regex's `(?:[^"\\]|\\.)*` body
// group can't span — the match would terminate at the first
// interior quote and the splice would land mid-substitution,
// corrupting the user-approved command.
if (existingBody.includes('$(')) {
return command;
}
// Escape the appended text for the surrounding quote style.
// Without this, a configured generator name containing `"`, `$`, a
// backtick, or `'` would either break the user-approved `gh pr
// create` command or, worse, be interpreted as command substitution.
const escapedAttribution =
bodyMatch === bodyDoubleMatch
? escapeForBashDoubleQuote(attribution)
: escapeForBashSingleQuote(attribution);
const newBody = existingBody + escapedAttribution;
// Splice the modified segment back into the original command,
// offsetting the in-segment match index by the segment start.
const idx = (bodyMatch.index ?? 0) + ghSegment.start;
if (idx >= ghSegment.start) {
const replacement = prefix + bodyQuote + newBody + bodyQuote;
return (
command.slice(0, idx) +
replacement +
command.slice(idx + fullMatch.length)
);
}
}
return command;
}
}
function getShellToolDescription(): string {
const isWindows = os.platform() === 'win32';
const executionWrapper = isWindows
? 'cmd.exe /c <command>'
: 'bash -c <command>';
const processGroupNote = isWindows
? ''
: '\n - Command is executed as a subprocess that leads its own process group. Command process group can be terminated as `kill -- -PGID` or signaled as `kill -s SIGNAL -- -PGID`.';
return `Executes a given shell command (as \`${executionWrapper}\`) in a persistent shell session with optional timeout, ensuring proper handling and security measures.
IMPORTANT: This tool is for terminal operations like git, npm, docker, etc. DO NOT use it for file operations (reading, writing, editing, searching, finding files) - use the specialized tools for this instead.
**Usage notes**:
- The command argument is required.
- You can specify an optional timeout in milliseconds (up to 600000ms / 10 minutes). If not specified, commands will timeout after 120000ms (2 minutes).
- It is very helpful if you write a clear, concise description of what this command does in 5-10 words.
- Avoid using run_shell_command with the \`find\`, \`grep\`, \`cat\`, \`head\`, \`tail\`, \`sed\`, \`awk\`, or \`echo\` commands, unless explicitly instructed or when these commands are truly necessary for the task. Instead, always prefer using the dedicated tools for these commands:
- File search: Use ${ToolNames.GLOB} (NOT find or ls)
- Content search: Use ${ToolNames.GREP} (NOT grep or rg)
- Read files: Use ${ToolNames.READ_FILE} (NOT cat/head/tail)
- Edit files: Use ${ToolNames.EDIT} (NOT sed/awk)
- Write files: Use ${ToolNames.WRITE_FILE} (NOT echo >/cat <<EOF)
- Communication: Output text directly (NOT echo/printf)
- **Shell argument quoting and special characters**: When passing arguments that contain special characters (parentheses \`()\`, backticks \`\`\`\`, dollar signs \`$\`, backslashes \`\\\`, semicolons \`;\`, pipes \`|\`, angle brackets \`<>\`, ampersands \`&\`, exclamation marks \`!\`, etc.), you MUST ensure they are properly quoted to prevent the shell from misinterpreting them as shell syntax:
- **Single quotes** \`'...'\` pass everything literally, but cannot contain a literal single quote.
- **ANSI-C quoting** \`$'...'\` supports escape sequences (e.g. \`\\n\` for newline, \`\\'\` for single quote) and is the safest approach for multi-line strings or strings with single quotes.
- **Heredoc** is the most robust approach for large, multi-line text with mixed quotes:
\`\`\`bash
gh pr create --title "My Title" --body "$(cat <<'HEREDOC'
Multi-line body with (parentheses), \`backticks\`, and 'single-quotes'.
HEREDOC
)"
\`\`\`
- NEVER use unescaped single quotes inside single-quoted strings (e.g. \`'it\\'s'\` is wrong; use \`$'it\\'s'\` or \`"it's"\` instead).
- If unsure, prefer double-quoting arguments and escape inner double-quotes as \`\\"\`.
- When issuing multiple commands:
- If the commands are independent and can run in parallel, make multiple run_shell_command tool calls in a single message. For example, if you need to run "git status" and "git diff", send a single message with two run_shell_command tool calls in parallel.
- If the commands depend on each other and must run sequentially, use a single run_shell_command call with '&&' to chain them together (e.g., \`git add . && git commit -m "message" && git push\`). For instance, if one operation must complete before another starts (like mkdir before cp, Write before run_shell_command for git operations, or git add before git commit), run these operations sequentially instead.
- Use ';' only when you need to run commands sequentially but don't care if earlier commands fail
- DO NOT use newlines to separate commands (newlines are ok in quoted strings)
- Try to maintain your current working directory throughout the session by using absolute paths and avoiding usage of \`cd\`. You may use \`cd\` if the User explicitly requests it.
<good-example>
pytest /foo/bar/tests
</good-example>
<bad-example>
cd /foo/bar && pytest tests
</bad-example>
**Background vs Foreground Execution:**
- You should decide whether commands should run in background or foreground based on their nature:
- Use background execution (is_background: true) for:
- Long-running development servers: \`npm run start\`, \`npm run dev\`, \`yarn dev\`, \`bun run start\`
- Build watchers: \`npm run watch\`, \`webpack --watch\`
- Database servers: \`mongod\`, \`mysql\`, \`redis-server\`
- Web servers: \`python -m http.server\`, \`php -S localhost:8000\`
- Any command expected to run indefinitely until manually stopped
${processGroupNote}
- Use foreground execution (is_background: false) for:
- One-time commands: \`ls\`, \`cat\`, \`grep\`
- Build commands: \`npm run build\`, \`make\`
- Installation commands: \`npm install\`, \`pip install\`
- Git operations: \`git commit\`, \`git push\`
- Test runs: \`npm test\`, \`pytest\`
`;
}
function getCommandDescription(): string {
if (os.platform() === 'win32') {
return 'Exact command to execute as `cmd.exe /c <command>`';
} else {
return 'Exact bash command to execute as `bash -c <command>`';
}
}
export class ShellTool extends BaseDeclarativeTool<
ShellToolParams,
ToolResult
> {
static Name: string = ToolNames.SHELL;
constructor(private readonly config: Config) {
super(
ShellTool.Name,
ToolDisplayNames.SHELL,
getShellToolDescription(),
Kind.Execute,
{
type: 'object',
properties: {
command: {
type: 'string',
description: getCommandDescription(),
},
is_background: {
type: 'boolean',
description:
'Optional: Whether to run the command in background. If not specified, defaults to false (foreground execution). Explicitly set to true for long-running processes like development servers, watchers, or daemons that should continue running without blocking further commands.',
},
timeout: {
type: 'number',
description: 'Optional timeout in milliseconds (max 600000)',
},
description: {
type: 'string',
description:
'Brief description of the command for the user. Be specific and concise. Ideally a single sentence. Can be up to 3 sentences for clarity. No line breaks.',
},
directory: {
type: 'string',
description:
'(OPTIONAL) The absolute path of the directory to run the command in. If not provided, the project root directory is used. Must be a directory within the workspace and must already exist.',
},
},
required: ['command'],
},
false, // output is not markdown
true, // output can be updated
);
}
protected override validateToolParamValues(
params: ShellToolParams,
): string | null {
// NOTE: Permission checks (read-only detection, PM rules) are handled at
// L3 (getDefaultPermission) and L4 (PM override) in coreToolScheduler.
// This method only performs pure parameter validation.
if (!params.command.trim()) {
return 'Command cannot be empty.';
}
const strippedCommand = stripShellWrapper(params.command);
if (
params.is_background &&
hasTopLevelTrailingBackgroundOperator(strippedCommand)
) {
return 'Background shell commands must not end with a bare "&". Remove the trailing "&" and rely on is_background: true instead.';
}
if (getCommandRoots(params.command).length === 0) {
return 'Could not identify command root to obtain permission from user.';
}
if (params.timeout !== undefined) {
if (
typeof params.timeout !== 'number' ||
!Number.isInteger(params.timeout)
) {
return 'Timeout must be an integer number of milliseconds.';
}
if (params.timeout <= 0) {
return 'Timeout must be a positive number.';
}
if (params.timeout > 600000) {
return 'Timeout cannot exceed 600000ms (10 minutes).';
}
}
if (params.directory) {
if (!path.isAbsolute(params.directory)) {
return 'Directory must be an absolute path.';
}
const userSkillsDirs = this.config.storage.getUserSkillsDirs();
const resolvedDirectoryPath = path.resolve(params.directory);
const isWithinUserSkills = isSubpaths(
userSkillsDirs,
resolvedDirectoryPath,
);
if (isWithinUserSkills) {
return `Explicitly running shell commands from within the user skills directory is not allowed. Please use absolute paths for command parameter instead.`;
}
const workspaceDirs = this.config.getWorkspaceContext().getDirectories();
const isWithinWorkspace = workspaceDirs.some((wsDir) =>
params.directory!.startsWith(wsDir),
);
if (!isWithinWorkspace) {
return `Directory '${params.directory}' is not within any of the registered workspace directories.`;
}
}
// Sleep interception: block sleep >= 2s in foreground, suggest Monitor.
// Strip shell wrappers first so `bash -c 'sleep 5'` / `sh -c '...'` etc.
// cannot route around the check by hiding the foreground sleep inside a
// `-c` script. This matches every other sensitive check in this file
// (directory, read-only, command-root extraction, etc.).
if (!params.is_background) {
const sleepPattern = detectBlockedSleepPattern(
stripShellWrapper(params.command),
);
if (sleepPattern !== null) {
return (
`Blocked: ${sleepPattern}. ` +
'Run blocking commands in the background with is_background: true. ' +
'For streaming events (watching logs, polling APIs), use the Monitor tool. ' +
'If you genuinely need a delay (rate limiting, deliberate pacing), keep it under 2 seconds.'
);
}
}
return null;
}
protected createInvocation(
params: ShellToolParams,
): ToolInvocation<ShellToolParams, ToolResult> {
return new ShellToolInvocation(this.config, params);
}
}