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e447cbe0dd
A `@qwen-code /triage` comment on a PR now starts the sandboxed verify lane too, in parallel. The two answer different questions — triage reads, verify builds and runs — and neither waits on the other; they were already sibling jobs on `needs: [authorize]`, so this is a trigger change, not a new pipeline. The trigger cannot be a second copy of the command patterns. authorize publishes `verify_lane`, and the verify job's `if` and concurrency group both read it, because re-matching the strings in the job predicate is exactly what would let the trigger and the trust classification drift: the classifier keyed on `/verify` while the predicate answered to `/triage` as well, and a `/triage`-started run would then have executed an external author's code with `verify_trust` empty — skipping the head-OID pin, the risk screen and both workspace wipes, the four controls that exist for untrusted code on a reused pool. Routing the new trigger through the same classifier is what keeps them on. The lane fails closed differently from an explicit `/verify`. An unreadable author permission or a failed head-OID snapshot still denies `/verify` outright, since the commenter asked for exactly that; on `/triage` it closes the lane only, so a flaky permission API cannot cost a reviewer their triage. Automatic per-PR triage (`pull_request_target`) deliberately does not pull the lane: the constraint is the agent budget, not runner capacity — a verify run is up to 110 minutes of model time, and every `synchronize` would spend one. Commenting is what says the PR is worth it. On a plain issue the lane stays off and no author lookup is spent. The verify lane's trigger turned out to be unpinned: deleting the gate from the job predicate left the suite green. The new test pins both predicates, and it took two tries — asserting over the whole job text could not tell `if:` from `concurrency:`, so the first version survived its own mutation, and so did the positive control written to vouch for it. Both are now sliced per predicate. Mutation results: dropping the gate from `if`, from `concurrency`, from authorize's `/triage` branch, and making the piggybacked lane deny triage are all caught; the unmutated control and the ECS kill-switch control behave as expected. Verified by executing the real authorize step with a per-user permission stub across twelve branches: /verify and /triage on a PR classify identically (trusted for a write author, external plus a pinned OID otherwise), /verify still denies on a lookup failure where /triage keeps should_run with the lane off, /tmux and plain comments are unchanged, and a commenter without write is denied throughout. actionlint, yamllint, eslint clean; the prettier warning on this file is pre-existing (fails identically with the change stashed). Co-authored-by: verify <verify@local> |
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| actionlint.yaml | ||
| CODEOWNERS | ||
| dependabot.yml | ||
| pull_request_template.md | ||
| release.yml | ||
| spam-blocklist.txt | ||