kimi-code/packages/server/test/debug-nonloopback.e2e.test.ts
Haozhe 60dfb68a2d
feat(server): add bearer-token auth and safe host exposure (#1006)
* test(server): add API surface snapshot guardrail

Boot startServer on port 0 and snapshot the documented v1 route table derived from /openapi.json paths, plus the reachability of doc/meta endpoints (/healthz, /openapi.json, /asyncapi.json, /). Gives later auth/--host phases an intentional diff when routes change. M0 makes no production behavior change.

* test(server): add e2e server harness with token support

Add test/helpers/serverHarness.ts: boot() wraps startServer with an isolated lock + home dir and returns a handle (server, address, baseUrl, wsUrl, token, close) plus authedFetch/authedWs that carry Authorization: Bearer <token> (and the kimi-code.bearer.<token> WS subprotocol). serviceOverrides is the generic DI seam later phases use to inject a fixed-token auth service; IAuthTokenService is not referenced yet. closeAll() tears down every booted server and socket. M0 makes no production behavior change; typecheck-only gate.

* feat(server): add privateFiles 0600 atomic write/read utility

* feat(server): add per-start tokenStore

* feat(server): add env-based bcrypt password hash utility

* feat(server): add IAuthTokenService DI seam

* feat(server): add global onRequest auth hook with bypass + redaction

* fix(server): stop reflecting Host header in /asyncapi.json

* feat(server): add WS bearer subprotocol constant and parser

* feat(server): enforce bearer token auth on WS upgrade

* feat(server): add Host header allowlist middleware

* feat(server): add Origin/CORS middleware

* feat(server): wire Host/Origin checks into HTTP and WS

* feat(server): wire token auth, Host/Origin, and WS auth into start.ts

* fix(server): create lock file with 0600 permissions

* fix(server): suppress debug routes on non-loopback binds

* feat(kimi-code): read server token and send Authorization on CLI calls

* feat(kimi-code): inject server token into /web URL fragment

* feat(server): add bindClassify for loopback/lan/public classification

* feat(kimi-code): register --host flag and pass it through the daemon

* feat(server): require password and TLS opt-out on non-loopback binds

* feat(server): rate-limit repeated auth failures on non-loopback binds

* feat(server): disable shutdown and terminals on public binds by default

* feat(server): add security response headers on non-loopback binds

* test(server): cover LAN/public host-exposure hardening end to end

* docs(server): add deployment security and threat-model guide

* changeset: minor kimi-code for server auth and host exposure

* feat(kimi-web): add server bearer-token auth support

* fix: repair CI for server auth and host exposure

- Replace native @node-rs/bcrypt with pure-JS bcryptjs so the ESM CLI
  bundle and the SEA native bundle both build without native-addon
  require issues (node-rs/bcrypt broke the ESM smoke and the SEA
  check-bundle allowlist).
- Remove dead cleanup references (stopSpinner, authLogoBlinkTimer) in
  apps/kimi-web App.vue that failed vue-tsc.
- Fix lint: drop empty spread fallbacks in the e2e auth-header merge,
  void the intentionally-async WS upgrade listener, add missing
  assertions to satisfy jest/expect-expect, and convert a ternary
  statement to if/else.
- Send the bearer token in the snapshot perf/smoke tests so they pass
  under the new global auth hook.
- Refresh the pnpmDeps hash in flake.nix for the updated lockfile.

* feat(server): persist bearer token and add rotate-token command

- persist the server bearer token in <home>/server.token (0600) and reuse it across restarts instead of per-start server-<pid>.token
- add `kimi server rotate-token` to regenerate the token; the token store reloads on mtime/inode change so rotation applies without restart
- print the token and Vite-style Local/Network URLs in the startup banner
- allow non-loopback binds with bearer-token-only auth (password now optional) and update SECURITY.md
- surface daemon boot failures immediately with the exit reason and log tail instead of waiting for the spawn timeout

* feat(server): print full token URLs and re-print links after rotate

- Drop the ready-panel border so token URLs print in full for copying; keep the Kimi sprite beside the title.
- Re-print Local/Network access links after `server rotate-token` (host/port from the lock).
- Extract shared access-URL helpers into access-urls.ts.
- Unify link and token colors between the banner and rotate-token.

* feat(server): dim URL #token= fragment and de-highlight token

- Render the `#token=…` fragment in a dim gray so the host/port stands out in the banner and rotate-token links.
- De-highlight the standalone token; set it off with surrounding whitespace instead of color.
- Add splitTokenFragment helper.

* refactor(cli): polish server ready banner and rotate-token output

- move version onto the ready banner title line; drop the separate
  Ready:/Version: rows and the startup-time metric
- reorder rotate-token output so the new token sits between the
  invalidation note and the access links
- update server CLI tests for the new layout

* feat(server): warn on reuse and refine ready banner

- Warn when `server run` reuses an already-running daemon (its options are not applied) and show the running server's actual URLs.
- Show a `Network: off  use --host 0.0.0.0 to enable` hint on loopback binds.
- Move the version onto the title line and drop the startup-time metric.

* fix(web): relabel auth dialog to token and cover full page

- Relabel the server auth dialog from "password" to "token"; the server accepts the bearer token, with the password only as a fallback.
- Make the auth dialog overlay fully opaque so it covers the whole page instead of revealing the login page underneath.

* fix: resolve CI failures on web auth PR

- Replace chalk.yellow named color with chalk.hex(darkColors.warning)
  in the server reuse notice to satisfy the chalk named color guard.
- Update pnpmDeps hash in flake.nix to match the regenerated
  pnpm-lock.yaml so the Nix build succeeds.
- Retry rmSync in ws-broadcast e2e teardown to ride out EBUSY /
  ENOTEMPTY races while the server flushes files after close().

* test(server): update API surface snapshot for warnings route

The feat/web-auth branch adds GET /api/v1/sessions/{session_id}/warnings
(packages/server/src/routes/sessions.ts), so the API surface guardrail
snapshot needs to record the new documented v1 route.
2026-06-25 17:57:56 +08:00

93 lines
3.2 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Debug-route loopback gating (ROADMAP M5.3).
*
* `/api/v1/debug/*` routes are test-only introspection/mutation endpoints.
* They must only be mounted when the server is bound to a loopback interface;
* on a non-loopback bind (e.g. `0.0.0.0`) they are suppressed even when the
* caller passes `debugEndpoints: true`.
*/
import { mkdtempSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { pino } from 'pino';
import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { startServer, type RunningServer } from '../src';
import { authHeaders, fixedTokenAuth } from './helpers/serverHarness';
let tmpDir: string;
let lockPath: string;
let bridgeHome: string;
let prevPassword: string | undefined;
const running: RunningServer[] = [];
beforeEach(() => {
tmpDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'kimi-server-debug-loopback-'));
lockPath = join(tmpDir, 'lock');
bridgeHome = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'kimi-server-debug-loopback-home-'));
// M6.3: a non-loopback bind (0.0.0.0) now refuses to start without a
// password + TLS opt-out. Set a password so the 0.0.0.0 case can boot; the
// fixed-token override still governs auth (password ≠ token).
prevPassword = process.env['KIMI_CODE_PASSWORD'];
process.env['KIMI_CODE_PASSWORD'] = 'test-pw';
});
afterEach(async () => {
for (const r of running.splice(0)) {
try {
await r.close();
} catch {
// ignore
}
}
if (prevPassword === undefined) {
delete process.env['KIMI_CODE_PASSWORD'];
} else {
process.env['KIMI_CODE_PASSWORD'] = prevPassword;
}
rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
rmSync(bridgeHome, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
async function boot(host: string): Promise<RunningServer> {
const r = await startServer({
serviceOverrides: [fixedTokenAuth()],
host,
port: 0,
lockPath: host === '0.0.0.0' ? join(tmpDir, `lock-${host}`) : lockPath,
logger: pino({ level: 'silent' }),
coreProcessOptions: { homeDir: bridgeHome },
debugEndpoints: true,
// M6.3: acknowledge the lack of a TLS proxy so the 0.0.0.0 bind is allowed
// (loopback ignores this — the gate only fires for non-loopback).
insecureNoTls: true,
});
running.push(r);
return r;
}
/** Probe a debug route on `127.0.0.1:<port>` regardless of the bound host. */
async function probeDebug(r: RunningServer): Promise<number> {
const port = new URL(r.address).port;
const res = await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/api/v1/debug/prompts/some-session/state`, {
headers: authHeaders(),
});
return res.status;
}
describe('debug endpoints are loopback-only (M5.3)', () => {
it('does NOT mount /api/v1/debug/* on a non-loopback bind (0.0.0.0)', async () => {
const r = await boot('0.0.0.0');
// Route suppressed → Fastify 404 (the auth hook would 401 if the route
// existed without a token, but with a token a missing route is 404).
expect(await probeDebug(r)).toBe(404);
});
it('mounts /api/v1/debug/* on a loopback bind (127.0.0.1)', async () => {
const r = await boot('127.0.0.1');
// Route mounted + valid token → 200 (data is null for an unknown session).
expect(await probeDebug(r)).toBe(200);
});
});