kimi-code/packages/server/test/meta.e2e.test.ts
Haozhe 60dfb68a2d
feat(server): add bearer-token auth and safe host exposure (#1006)
* test(server): add API surface snapshot guardrail

Boot startServer on port 0 and snapshot the documented v1 route table derived from /openapi.json paths, plus the reachability of doc/meta endpoints (/healthz, /openapi.json, /asyncapi.json, /). Gives later auth/--host phases an intentional diff when routes change. M0 makes no production behavior change.

* test(server): add e2e server harness with token support

Add test/helpers/serverHarness.ts: boot() wraps startServer with an isolated lock + home dir and returns a handle (server, address, baseUrl, wsUrl, token, close) plus authedFetch/authedWs that carry Authorization: Bearer <token> (and the kimi-code.bearer.<token> WS subprotocol). serviceOverrides is the generic DI seam later phases use to inject a fixed-token auth service; IAuthTokenService is not referenced yet. closeAll() tears down every booted server and socket. M0 makes no production behavior change; typecheck-only gate.

* feat(server): add privateFiles 0600 atomic write/read utility

* feat(server): add per-start tokenStore

* feat(server): add env-based bcrypt password hash utility

* feat(server): add IAuthTokenService DI seam

* feat(server): add global onRequest auth hook with bypass + redaction

* fix(server): stop reflecting Host header in /asyncapi.json

* feat(server): add WS bearer subprotocol constant and parser

* feat(server): enforce bearer token auth on WS upgrade

* feat(server): add Host header allowlist middleware

* feat(server): add Origin/CORS middleware

* feat(server): wire Host/Origin checks into HTTP and WS

* feat(server): wire token auth, Host/Origin, and WS auth into start.ts

* fix(server): create lock file with 0600 permissions

* fix(server): suppress debug routes on non-loopback binds

* feat(kimi-code): read server token and send Authorization on CLI calls

* feat(kimi-code): inject server token into /web URL fragment

* feat(server): add bindClassify for loopback/lan/public classification

* feat(kimi-code): register --host flag and pass it through the daemon

* feat(server): require password and TLS opt-out on non-loopback binds

* feat(server): rate-limit repeated auth failures on non-loopback binds

* feat(server): disable shutdown and terminals on public binds by default

* feat(server): add security response headers on non-loopback binds

* test(server): cover LAN/public host-exposure hardening end to end

* docs(server): add deployment security and threat-model guide

* changeset: minor kimi-code for server auth and host exposure

* feat(kimi-web): add server bearer-token auth support

* fix: repair CI for server auth and host exposure

- Replace native @node-rs/bcrypt with pure-JS bcryptjs so the ESM CLI
  bundle and the SEA native bundle both build without native-addon
  require issues (node-rs/bcrypt broke the ESM smoke and the SEA
  check-bundle allowlist).
- Remove dead cleanup references (stopSpinner, authLogoBlinkTimer) in
  apps/kimi-web App.vue that failed vue-tsc.
- Fix lint: drop empty spread fallbacks in the e2e auth-header merge,
  void the intentionally-async WS upgrade listener, add missing
  assertions to satisfy jest/expect-expect, and convert a ternary
  statement to if/else.
- Send the bearer token in the snapshot perf/smoke tests so they pass
  under the new global auth hook.
- Refresh the pnpmDeps hash in flake.nix for the updated lockfile.

* feat(server): persist bearer token and add rotate-token command

- persist the server bearer token in <home>/server.token (0600) and reuse it across restarts instead of per-start server-<pid>.token
- add `kimi server rotate-token` to regenerate the token; the token store reloads on mtime/inode change so rotation applies without restart
- print the token and Vite-style Local/Network URLs in the startup banner
- allow non-loopback binds with bearer-token-only auth (password now optional) and update SECURITY.md
- surface daemon boot failures immediately with the exit reason and log tail instead of waiting for the spawn timeout

* feat(server): print full token URLs and re-print links after rotate

- Drop the ready-panel border so token URLs print in full for copying; keep the Kimi sprite beside the title.
- Re-print Local/Network access links after `server rotate-token` (host/port from the lock).
- Extract shared access-URL helpers into access-urls.ts.
- Unify link and token colors between the banner and rotate-token.

* feat(server): dim URL #token= fragment and de-highlight token

- Render the `#token=…` fragment in a dim gray so the host/port stands out in the banner and rotate-token links.
- De-highlight the standalone token; set it off with surrounding whitespace instead of color.
- Add splitTokenFragment helper.

* refactor(cli): polish server ready banner and rotate-token output

- move version onto the ready banner title line; drop the separate
  Ready:/Version: rows and the startup-time metric
- reorder rotate-token output so the new token sits between the
  invalidation note and the access links
- update server CLI tests for the new layout

* feat(server): warn on reuse and refine ready banner

- Warn when `server run` reuses an already-running daemon (its options are not applied) and show the running server's actual URLs.
- Show a `Network: off  use --host 0.0.0.0 to enable` hint on loopback binds.
- Move the version onto the title line and drop the startup-time metric.

* fix(web): relabel auth dialog to token and cover full page

- Relabel the server auth dialog from "password" to "token"; the server accepts the bearer token, with the password only as a fallback.
- Make the auth dialog overlay fully opaque so it covers the whole page instead of revealing the login page underneath.

* fix: resolve CI failures on web auth PR

- Replace chalk.yellow named color with chalk.hex(darkColors.warning)
  in the server reuse notice to satisfy the chalk named color guard.
- Update pnpmDeps hash in flake.nix to match the regenerated
  pnpm-lock.yaml so the Nix build succeeds.
- Retry rmSync in ws-broadcast e2e teardown to ride out EBUSY /
  ENOTEMPTY races while the server flushes files after close().

* test(server): update API surface snapshot for warnings route

The feat/web-auth branch adds GET /api/v1/sessions/{session_id}/warnings
(packages/server/src/routes/sessions.ts), so the API surface guardrail
snapshot needs to record the new documented v1 route.
2026-06-25 17:57:56 +08:00

234 lines
8.5 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* `/api/v1/meta` end-to-end smoke (W6.1 / Chain 1 / P1.1).
*
* Boots the real server (hermetic — port 0, tmp lock + bridge home), hits
* `GET /api/v1/meta` via Fastify's `inject` simulator on the constructed app, and
* asserts:
* 1. Envelope shape (`code: 0`, `msg: success`, `request_id`, `data`).
* 2. `data` matches `metaResponseSchema` — server_version + capabilities
* literals + server_id ULID + started_at ISO `Z`.
* 3. `server_id` is stable across multiple calls to the same server
* (it's process-scoped, not per-request).
* 4. `started_at` is the server's boot time — within a generous window of
* `Date.now()` at test start.
*
* Plus request_id propagation (already covered for `/api/v1/healthz` in
* `error-handler.test.ts` but re-asserted here because the prompt requires
* Chain 1's first business endpoint to demonstrate the W4.3 request_id pipe):
*
* - Valid ULID `X-Request-Id` → echoed verbatim.
* - No header → bare ULID minted (`ulidRegex`).
* - Malformed header → fresh bare ULID (NOT `req_garbage`).
*
* The server's bridge `homeDir` is sandboxed so the test doesn't touch the
* user's `~/.kimi`.
*/
import { mkdtempSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { metaResponseSchema, ulidRegex } from '@moonshot-ai/protocol';
import { pino } from 'pino';
import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { IRestGateway, startServer, type RunningServer } from '../src';
import { fixedTokenAuth } from './helpers/serverHarness';
let tmpDir: string;
let lockPath: string;
let bridgeHome: string;
let server: RunningServer | undefined;
const bootBaseline = Date.now();
beforeEach(() => {
tmpDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'kimi-server-meta-test-'));
lockPath = join(tmpDir, 'lock');
bridgeHome = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'kimi-server-meta-home-'));
});
afterEach(async () => {
try {
await server?.close();
} catch {
// ignore
}
server = undefined;
rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
rmSync(bridgeHome, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
async function bootDaemon(): Promise<RunningServer> {
server = await startServer({
serviceOverrides: [fixedTokenAuth()],
host: '127.0.0.1',
port: 0,
lockPath,
logger: pino({ level: 'silent' }),
coreProcessOptions: { homeDir: bridgeHome },
});
return server;
}
/**
* Pull the Fastify instance off the running server via the IRestGateway
* accessor — Fastify exposes `.inject()` so we don't need a port.
*/
function appOf(r: RunningServer): {
inject: (req: unknown) => Promise<{ statusCode: number; json: () => unknown }>;
} {
const app = r.services.invokeFunction((a) => {
const gw = a.get(IRestGateway);
return gw.app as unknown as {
inject: (req: unknown) => Promise<{ statusCode: number; json: () => unknown }>;
};
});
// Auto-attach the fixed bearer token so the M5.1 auth hook passes. A
// caller-supplied `authorization` header wins, so explicit token tests keep
// working; every other header (Range, content-type, …) is preserved.
return {
inject(req: unknown) {
const q = req as { headers?: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined> };
return app.inject({
...q,
headers: { authorization: 'Bearer test-token', ...q.headers },
});
},
};
}
describe('GET /api/v1/meta — envelope + metaResponseSchema', () => {
it('responds 200 with code 0 + schema-conforming data', async () => {
const r = await bootDaemon();
const res = await appOf(r).inject({ method: 'GET', url: '/api/v1/meta' });
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
const body = res.json() as Record<string, unknown>;
expect(body['code']).toBe(0);
expect(body['msg']).toBe('success');
expect(typeof body['request_id']).toBe('string');
expect(body['data']).not.toBeNull();
const data = body['data'];
const parsed = metaResponseSchema.parse(data);
expect(parsed.server_version.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
expect(parsed.capabilities).toEqual({
websocket: true,
file_upload: true,
fs_query: true,
mcp: true,
background_tasks: true,
terminal: true,
});
expect(ulidRegex.test(parsed.server_id)).toBe(true);
// started_at is ISO 8601 UTC `Z` per isoDateTimeSchema's normalization.
expect(parsed.started_at).toMatch(/Z$/);
const startedMs = Date.parse(parsed.started_at);
expect(Number.isFinite(startedMs)).toBe(true);
// Should fall within [bootBaseline-1s, now+1s] — generous slack.
expect(startedMs).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(bootBaseline - 1_000);
expect(startedMs).toBeLessThanOrEqual(Date.now() + 1_000);
});
it('server_id is stable across multiple calls (process-scoped)', async () => {
const r = await bootDaemon();
const app = appOf(r);
const a = await app.inject({ method: 'GET', url: '/api/v1/meta' });
const b = await app.inject({ method: 'GET', url: '/api/v1/meta' });
const aData = (a.json() as { data: { server_id: string } }).data;
const bData = (b.json() as { data: { server_id: string } }).data;
expect(aData.server_id).toBe(bData.server_id);
});
it('two independent daemons get distinct daemon_ids', async () => {
// Use distinct lock paths so both can coexist for the duration of the test.
const lockA = join(tmpDir, 'lock-a');
const lockB = join(tmpDir, 'lock-b');
const homeA = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'kimi-server-meta-home-a-'));
const homeB = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'kimi-server-meta-home-b-'));
const r1 = await startServer({
serviceOverrides: [fixedTokenAuth()],
host: '127.0.0.1',
port: 0,
lockPath: lockA,
logger: pino({ level: 'silent' }),
coreProcessOptions: { homeDir: homeA },
});
const r2 = await startServer({
serviceOverrides: [fixedTokenAuth()],
host: '127.0.0.1',
port: 0,
lockPath: lockB,
logger: pino({ level: 'silent' }),
coreProcessOptions: { homeDir: homeB },
});
try {
const a = await appOf(r1).inject({ method: 'GET', url: '/api/v1/meta' });
const b = await appOf(r2).inject({ method: 'GET', url: '/api/v1/meta' });
const aData = (a.json() as { data: { server_id: string } }).data;
const bData = (b.json() as { data: { server_id: string } }).data;
expect(aData.server_id).not.toBe(bData.server_id);
} finally {
await r1.close();
await r2.close();
rmSync(homeA, { recursive: true, force: true });
rmSync(homeB, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
});
describe('GET /api/v1/meta — server_version precedence', () => {
it('reports the host kimi-code identity version when provided', async () => {
server = await startServer({
serviceOverrides: [fixedTokenAuth()],
host: '127.0.0.1',
port: 0,
lockPath,
logger: pino({ level: 'silent' }),
coreProcessOptions: {
homeDir: bridgeHome,
identity: { userAgentProduct: 'kimi-code-cli', version: '9.9.9-test' },
},
});
const res = await appOf(server).inject({ method: 'GET', url: '/api/v1/meta' });
const data = (res.json() as { data: { server_version: string } }).data;
expect(data.server_version).toBe('9.9.9-test');
});
});
describe('GET /api/v1/meta — request_id propagation (W4.3 contract)', () => {
it('echoes a client-supplied valid ULID verbatim', async () => {
const r = await bootDaemon();
const goodUlid = '01HQXY4Z2M3GZP6F8K9R5W7VBA';
const res = await appOf(r).inject({
method: 'GET',
url: '/api/v1/meta',
headers: { 'x-request-id': goodUlid },
});
const body = res.json() as Record<string, unknown>;
expect(body['request_id']).toBe(goodUlid);
});
it('mints a bare ULID when no header is supplied (no req_ prefix)', async () => {
const r = await bootDaemon();
const res = await appOf(r).inject({ method: 'GET', url: '/api/v1/meta' });
const body = res.json() as Record<string, unknown>;
const id = body['request_id'] as string;
expect(id).not.toMatch(/^req_/);
expect(ulidRegex.test(id)).toBe(true);
});
it('discards malformed X-Request-Id and mints a fresh ULID', async () => {
const r = await bootDaemon();
const res = await appOf(r).inject({
method: 'GET',
url: '/api/v1/meta',
headers: { 'x-request-id': 'req_garbage' },
});
const body = res.json() as Record<string, unknown>;
const id = body['request_id'] as string;
expect(id).not.toBe('req_garbage');
expect(id).not.toMatch(/^req_/);
expect(ulidRegex.test(id)).toBe(true);
});
});