mirror of
https://github.com/MoonshotAI/kimi-code.git
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* test(server): add API surface snapshot guardrail
Boot startServer on port 0 and snapshot the documented v1 route table derived from /openapi.json paths, plus the reachability of doc/meta endpoints (/healthz, /openapi.json, /asyncapi.json, /). Gives later auth/--host phases an intentional diff when routes change. M0 makes no production behavior change.
* test(server): add e2e server harness with token support
Add test/helpers/serverHarness.ts: boot() wraps startServer with an isolated lock + home dir and returns a handle (server, address, baseUrl, wsUrl, token, close) plus authedFetch/authedWs that carry Authorization: Bearer <token> (and the kimi-code.bearer.<token> WS subprotocol). serviceOverrides is the generic DI seam later phases use to inject a fixed-token auth service; IAuthTokenService is not referenced yet. closeAll() tears down every booted server and socket. M0 makes no production behavior change; typecheck-only gate.
* feat(server): add privateFiles 0600 atomic write/read utility
* feat(server): add per-start tokenStore
* feat(server): add env-based bcrypt password hash utility
* feat(server): add IAuthTokenService DI seam
* feat(server): add global onRequest auth hook with bypass + redaction
* fix(server): stop reflecting Host header in /asyncapi.json
* feat(server): add WS bearer subprotocol constant and parser
* feat(server): enforce bearer token auth on WS upgrade
* feat(server): add Host header allowlist middleware
* feat(server): add Origin/CORS middleware
* feat(server): wire Host/Origin checks into HTTP and WS
* feat(server): wire token auth, Host/Origin, and WS auth into start.ts
* fix(server): create lock file with 0600 permissions
* fix(server): suppress debug routes on non-loopback binds
* feat(kimi-code): read server token and send Authorization on CLI calls
* feat(kimi-code): inject server token into /web URL fragment
* feat(server): add bindClassify for loopback/lan/public classification
* feat(kimi-code): register --host flag and pass it through the daemon
* feat(server): require password and TLS opt-out on non-loopback binds
* feat(server): rate-limit repeated auth failures on non-loopback binds
* feat(server): disable shutdown and terminals on public binds by default
* feat(server): add security response headers on non-loopback binds
* test(server): cover LAN/public host-exposure hardening end to end
* docs(server): add deployment security and threat-model guide
* changeset: minor kimi-code for server auth and host exposure
* feat(kimi-web): add server bearer-token auth support
* fix: repair CI for server auth and host exposure
- Replace native @node-rs/bcrypt with pure-JS bcryptjs so the ESM CLI
bundle and the SEA native bundle both build without native-addon
require issues (node-rs/bcrypt broke the ESM smoke and the SEA
check-bundle allowlist).
- Remove dead cleanup references (stopSpinner, authLogoBlinkTimer) in
apps/kimi-web App.vue that failed vue-tsc.
- Fix lint: drop empty spread fallbacks in the e2e auth-header merge,
void the intentionally-async WS upgrade listener, add missing
assertions to satisfy jest/expect-expect, and convert a ternary
statement to if/else.
- Send the bearer token in the snapshot perf/smoke tests so they pass
under the new global auth hook.
- Refresh the pnpmDeps hash in flake.nix for the updated lockfile.
* feat(server): persist bearer token and add rotate-token command
- persist the server bearer token in <home>/server.token (0600) and reuse it across restarts instead of per-start server-<pid>.token
- add `kimi server rotate-token` to regenerate the token; the token store reloads on mtime/inode change so rotation applies without restart
- print the token and Vite-style Local/Network URLs in the startup banner
- allow non-loopback binds with bearer-token-only auth (password now optional) and update SECURITY.md
- surface daemon boot failures immediately with the exit reason and log tail instead of waiting for the spawn timeout
* feat(server): print full token URLs and re-print links after rotate
- Drop the ready-panel border so token URLs print in full for copying; keep the Kimi sprite beside the title.
- Re-print Local/Network access links after `server rotate-token` (host/port from the lock).
- Extract shared access-URL helpers into access-urls.ts.
- Unify link and token colors between the banner and rotate-token.
* feat(server): dim URL #token= fragment and de-highlight token
- Render the `#token=…` fragment in a dim gray so the host/port stands out in the banner and rotate-token links.
- De-highlight the standalone token; set it off with surrounding whitespace instead of color.
- Add splitTokenFragment helper.
* refactor(cli): polish server ready banner and rotate-token output
- move version onto the ready banner title line; drop the separate
Ready:/Version: rows and the startup-time metric
- reorder rotate-token output so the new token sits between the
invalidation note and the access links
- update server CLI tests for the new layout
* feat(server): warn on reuse and refine ready banner
- Warn when `server run` reuses an already-running daemon (its options are not applied) and show the running server's actual URLs.
- Show a `Network: off use --host 0.0.0.0 to enable` hint on loopback binds.
- Move the version onto the title line and drop the startup-time metric.
* fix(web): relabel auth dialog to token and cover full page
- Relabel the server auth dialog from "password" to "token"; the server accepts the bearer token, with the password only as a fallback.
- Make the auth dialog overlay fully opaque so it covers the whole page instead of revealing the login page underneath.
* fix: resolve CI failures on web auth PR
- Replace chalk.yellow named color with chalk.hex(darkColors.warning)
in the server reuse notice to satisfy the chalk named color guard.
- Update pnpmDeps hash in flake.nix to match the regenerated
pnpm-lock.yaml so the Nix build succeeds.
- Retry rmSync in ws-broadcast e2e teardown to ride out EBUSY /
ENOTEMPTY races while the server flushes files after close().
* test(server): update API surface snapshot for warnings route
The feat/web-auth branch adds GET /api/v1/sessions/{session_id}/warnings
(packages/server/src/routes/sessions.ts), so the API surface guardrail
snapshot needs to record the new documented v1 route.
254 lines
8.6 KiB
TypeScript
254 lines
8.6 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Messages history end-to-end tests (W7.1 / Chain 3 / P1.3).
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*
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* **Bootstrap strategy**: spawn the real server (port 0, tmp lock + bridge
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* home) and exercise the 2 endpoints via `app.inject(...)`. KimiCore is fully
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* constructed via the W3 bridge pattern — fresh tmpdir per test, no `~/.kimi`
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* interference.
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*
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* Coverage matrix per REST.md §3.4:
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* - GET /api/v1/sessions/{sid}/messages → Page<Message> + has_more
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* - Empty session → empty page, has_more=false
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* - page_size honored (sub-cap)
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* - GET /api/v1/sessions/{sid}/messages/{mid} → Message (40403 unknown id)
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*
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* Plus the validation matrix:
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* - page_size=0 → 40001
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* - before_id + after_id together → 40001
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* - page_size=101 (over SCHEMAS §1.3 cap of 100) → 40001
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* - unknown role → 40001
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*
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* Plus the error mapping matrix:
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* - Unknown session_id → 40401
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* - Known session, missing message_id → 40403
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*
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* **Note on `getContext` against a freshly-created session**: agent-core's
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* `getContext` requires the session to be loaded into the active session map.
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* Brand-new sessions (via `createSession`) emit no history yet; the bridge's
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* `getContext({sessionId, agentId:'main'})` returns
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* `{history: [], tokenCount: 0}`. The list endpoint surfaces this as
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* `{items:[], has_more:false}` — the test exercises that path. Populated
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* history is unit-tested at the services layer with a mocked bridge (see
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* `packages/services/test/message-service.test.ts`).
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*/
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import { mkdtempSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
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import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
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import { join } from 'node:path';
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import { pino } from 'pino';
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import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
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import { IRestGateway, startServer, type RunningServer } from '../src';
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import { fixedTokenAuth } from './helpers/serverHarness';
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let tmpDir: string;
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let lockPath: string;
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let bridgeHome: string;
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let server: RunningServer | undefined;
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beforeEach(() => {
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tmpDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'kimi-server-messages-test-'));
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lockPath = join(tmpDir, 'lock');
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bridgeHome = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'kimi-server-messages-home-'));
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});
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afterEach(async () => {
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try {
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await server?.close();
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} catch {
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// ignore
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}
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server = undefined;
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rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
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rmSync(bridgeHome, { recursive: true, force: true });
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});
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async function bootDaemon(): Promise<RunningServer> {
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server = await startServer({
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serviceOverrides: [fixedTokenAuth()],
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host: '127.0.0.1',
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port: 0,
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lockPath,
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logger: pino({ level: 'silent' }),
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coreProcessOptions: { homeDir: bridgeHome },
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});
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return server;
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}
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function appOf(r: RunningServer): {
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inject: (req: unknown) => Promise<{ statusCode: number; json: () => unknown }>;
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} {
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const app = r.services.invokeFunction((a) => {
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const gw = a.get(IRestGateway);
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return gw.app as unknown as {
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inject: (req: unknown) => Promise<{ statusCode: number; json: () => unknown }>;
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};
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});
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// Auto-attach the fixed bearer token so the M5.1 auth hook passes. A
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// caller-supplied `authorization` header wins, so explicit token tests keep
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// working; every other header (Range, content-type, …) is preserved.
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return {
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inject(req: unknown) {
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const q = req as { headers?: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined> };
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return app.inject({
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...q,
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headers: { authorization: 'Bearer test-token', ...q.headers },
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});
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},
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};
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}
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function envelopeOf<T>(body: unknown): {
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code: number;
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msg: string;
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data: T | null;
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request_id: string;
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details?: unknown;
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} {
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return body as {
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code: number;
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msg: string;
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data: T | null;
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request_id: string;
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details?: unknown;
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};
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}
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async function createSession(r: RunningServer): Promise<string> {
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const res = await appOf(r).inject({
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method: 'POST',
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url: '/api/v1/sessions',
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payload: { metadata: { cwd: join(tmpDir, 'workspace') } },
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});
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const env = envelopeOf<{ id: string }>(res.json());
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if (env.code !== 0 || env.data === null) {
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throw new Error(`failed to create session: ${JSON.stringify(env)}`);
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}
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return env.data.id;
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}
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describe('GET /api/v1/sessions/{session_id}/messages — list (W7.1 / Chain 3)', () => {
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it('returns an empty page for a freshly-created session', async () => {
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const r = await bootDaemon();
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const sid = await createSession(r);
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const res = await appOf(r).inject({
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method: 'GET',
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url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/messages`,
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});
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expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
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const env = envelopeOf<{ items: unknown[]; has_more: boolean }>(res.json());
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expect(env.code).toBe(0);
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expect(env.data).not.toBeNull();
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expect(env.data!.items).toEqual([]);
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expect(env.data!.has_more).toBe(false);
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});
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it('returns 40401 for an unknown session id', async () => {
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const r = await bootDaemon();
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const res = await appOf(r).inject({
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method: 'GET',
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url: '/api/v1/sessions/sess_missing/messages',
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});
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const env = envelopeOf<unknown>(res.json());
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expect(env.code).toBe(40401);
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expect(env.data).toBeNull();
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});
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it('rejects page_size=0 with code 40001 + details', async () => {
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const r = await bootDaemon();
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const sid = await createSession(r);
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const res = await appOf(r).inject({
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method: 'GET',
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url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/messages?page_size=0`,
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});
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const env = envelopeOf<unknown>(res.json());
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expect(env.code).toBe(40001);
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expect(Array.isArray(env.details)).toBe(true);
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});
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it('rejects page_size=101 with code 40001 (SCHEMAS §1.3 cap)', async () => {
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const r = await bootDaemon();
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const sid = await createSession(r);
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const res = await appOf(r).inject({
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method: 'GET',
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url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/messages?page_size=101`,
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});
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const env = envelopeOf<unknown>(res.json());
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expect(env.code).toBe(40001);
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});
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it('rejects before_id + after_id together with code 40001', async () => {
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const r = await bootDaemon();
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const sid = await createSession(r);
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const res = await appOf(r).inject({
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method: 'GET',
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url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/messages?before_id=a&after_id=b`,
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});
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const env = envelopeOf<unknown>(res.json());
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expect(env.code).toBe(40001);
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});
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it('rejects unknown role values with code 40001', async () => {
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const r = await bootDaemon();
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const sid = await createSession(r);
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const res = await appOf(r).inject({
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method: 'GET',
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url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/messages?role=cat`,
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});
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const env = envelopeOf<unknown>(res.json());
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expect(env.code).toBe(40001);
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});
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it('accepts page_size + role together (positive)', async () => {
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const r = await bootDaemon();
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const sid = await createSession(r);
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const res = await appOf(r).inject({
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method: 'GET',
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url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/messages?page_size=10&role=assistant`,
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});
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const env = envelopeOf<{ items: unknown[]; has_more: boolean }>(res.json());
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expect(env.code).toBe(0);
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expect(env.data!.items).toEqual([]);
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expect(env.data!.has_more).toBe(false);
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});
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});
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describe('GET /api/v1/sessions/{session_id}/messages/{message_id} — get (W7.1 / Chain 3)', () => {
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it('returns 40403 (message.not_found) when the id has no matching history entry', async () => {
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const r = await bootDaemon();
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const sid = await createSession(r);
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// The id syntax is opaque; any well-formed id that points at an index
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// outside the empty history surfaces as message.not_found.
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const fakeId = `msg_${sid}_000000`;
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const res = await appOf(r).inject({
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method: 'GET',
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url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/messages/${fakeId}`,
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});
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const env = envelopeOf<unknown>(res.json());
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expect(env.code).toBe(40403);
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expect(env.data).toBeNull();
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expect(env.msg).toMatch(/does not exist/);
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});
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it('returns 40403 for a malformed message id (parse failure)', async () => {
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const r = await bootDaemon();
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const sid = await createSession(r);
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const res = await appOf(r).inject({
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method: 'GET',
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url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/messages/garbage`,
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});
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const env = envelopeOf<unknown>(res.json());
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expect(env.code).toBe(40403);
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});
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it('returns 40401 when the session is unknown (regardless of message id shape)', async () => {
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const r = await bootDaemon();
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const res = await appOf(r).inject({
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method: 'GET',
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url: '/api/v1/sessions/sess_missing/messages/msg_anything',
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});
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const env = envelopeOf<unknown>(res.json());
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expect(env.code).toBe(40401);
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});
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});
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