kimi-code/packages/server/test/approval.e2e.test.ts
Haozhe 60dfb68a2d
feat(server): add bearer-token auth and safe host exposure (#1006)
* test(server): add API surface snapshot guardrail

Boot startServer on port 0 and snapshot the documented v1 route table derived from /openapi.json paths, plus the reachability of doc/meta endpoints (/healthz, /openapi.json, /asyncapi.json, /). Gives later auth/--host phases an intentional diff when routes change. M0 makes no production behavior change.

* test(server): add e2e server harness with token support

Add test/helpers/serverHarness.ts: boot() wraps startServer with an isolated lock + home dir and returns a handle (server, address, baseUrl, wsUrl, token, close) plus authedFetch/authedWs that carry Authorization: Bearer <token> (and the kimi-code.bearer.<token> WS subprotocol). serviceOverrides is the generic DI seam later phases use to inject a fixed-token auth service; IAuthTokenService is not referenced yet. closeAll() tears down every booted server and socket. M0 makes no production behavior change; typecheck-only gate.

* feat(server): add privateFiles 0600 atomic write/read utility

* feat(server): add per-start tokenStore

* feat(server): add env-based bcrypt password hash utility

* feat(server): add IAuthTokenService DI seam

* feat(server): add global onRequest auth hook with bypass + redaction

* fix(server): stop reflecting Host header in /asyncapi.json

* feat(server): add WS bearer subprotocol constant and parser

* feat(server): enforce bearer token auth on WS upgrade

* feat(server): add Host header allowlist middleware

* feat(server): add Origin/CORS middleware

* feat(server): wire Host/Origin checks into HTTP and WS

* feat(server): wire token auth, Host/Origin, and WS auth into start.ts

* fix(server): create lock file with 0600 permissions

* fix(server): suppress debug routes on non-loopback binds

* feat(kimi-code): read server token and send Authorization on CLI calls

* feat(kimi-code): inject server token into /web URL fragment

* feat(server): add bindClassify for loopback/lan/public classification

* feat(kimi-code): register --host flag and pass it through the daemon

* feat(server): require password and TLS opt-out on non-loopback binds

* feat(server): rate-limit repeated auth failures on non-loopback binds

* feat(server): disable shutdown and terminals on public binds by default

* feat(server): add security response headers on non-loopback binds

* test(server): cover LAN/public host-exposure hardening end to end

* docs(server): add deployment security and threat-model guide

* changeset: minor kimi-code for server auth and host exposure

* feat(kimi-web): add server bearer-token auth support

* fix: repair CI for server auth and host exposure

- Replace native @node-rs/bcrypt with pure-JS bcryptjs so the ESM CLI
  bundle and the SEA native bundle both build without native-addon
  require issues (node-rs/bcrypt broke the ESM smoke and the SEA
  check-bundle allowlist).
- Remove dead cleanup references (stopSpinner, authLogoBlinkTimer) in
  apps/kimi-web App.vue that failed vue-tsc.
- Fix lint: drop empty spread fallbacks in the e2e auth-header merge,
  void the intentionally-async WS upgrade listener, add missing
  assertions to satisfy jest/expect-expect, and convert a ternary
  statement to if/else.
- Send the bearer token in the snapshot perf/smoke tests so they pass
  under the new global auth hook.
- Refresh the pnpmDeps hash in flake.nix for the updated lockfile.

* feat(server): persist bearer token and add rotate-token command

- persist the server bearer token in <home>/server.token (0600) and reuse it across restarts instead of per-start server-<pid>.token
- add `kimi server rotate-token` to regenerate the token; the token store reloads on mtime/inode change so rotation applies without restart
- print the token and Vite-style Local/Network URLs in the startup banner
- allow non-loopback binds with bearer-token-only auth (password now optional) and update SECURITY.md
- surface daemon boot failures immediately with the exit reason and log tail instead of waiting for the spawn timeout

* feat(server): print full token URLs and re-print links after rotate

- Drop the ready-panel border so token URLs print in full for copying; keep the Kimi sprite beside the title.
- Re-print Local/Network access links after `server rotate-token` (host/port from the lock).
- Extract shared access-URL helpers into access-urls.ts.
- Unify link and token colors between the banner and rotate-token.

* feat(server): dim URL #token= fragment and de-highlight token

- Render the `#token=…` fragment in a dim gray so the host/port stands out in the banner and rotate-token links.
- De-highlight the standalone token; set it off with surrounding whitespace instead of color.
- Add splitTokenFragment helper.

* refactor(cli): polish server ready banner and rotate-token output

- move version onto the ready banner title line; drop the separate
  Ready:/Version: rows and the startup-time metric
- reorder rotate-token output so the new token sits between the
  invalidation note and the access links
- update server CLI tests for the new layout

* feat(server): warn on reuse and refine ready banner

- Warn when `server run` reuses an already-running daemon (its options are not applied) and show the running server's actual URLs.
- Show a `Network: off  use --host 0.0.0.0 to enable` hint on loopback binds.
- Move the version onto the title line and drop the startup-time metric.

* fix(web): relabel auth dialog to token and cover full page

- Relabel the server auth dialog from "password" to "token"; the server accepts the bearer token, with the password only as a fallback.
- Make the auth dialog overlay fully opaque so it covers the whole page instead of revealing the login page underneath.

* fix: resolve CI failures on web auth PR

- Replace chalk.yellow named color with chalk.hex(darkColors.warning)
  in the server reuse notice to satisfy the chalk named color guard.
- Update pnpmDeps hash in flake.nix to match the regenerated
  pnpm-lock.yaml so the Nix build succeeds.
- Retry rmSync in ws-broadcast e2e teardown to ride out EBUSY /
  ENOTEMPTY races while the server flushes files after close().

* test(server): update API surface snapshot for warnings route

The feat/web-auth branch adds GET /api/v1/sessions/{session_id}/warnings
(packages/server/src/routes/sessions.ts), so the API surface guardrail
snapshot needs to record the new documented v1 route.
2026-06-25 17:57:56 +08:00

538 lines
17 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Approval end-to-end tests (W8.1 / Chain 5 / P1.5).
*
* Covers the reverse-RPC path: agent-core → BridgeClientAPI.requestApproval
* → IApprovalService.request → WS `event.approval.requested` → REST
* `POST /api/v1/sessions/{sid}/approvals/{aid}` → Promise resolves with agent-core
* `ApprovalResponse`.
*
* **Bootstrap strategy** (mirrors prompt.e2e.test.ts): spawn the real server,
* skip the `bridge.rpc.prompt(...)` path (requires provider creds), and drive
* the broker DIRECTLY via the DI accessor. This exercises:
* - Adapter (in-process SDK shape → snake_case wire shape)
* - WS broadcast through `IEventService.publish` → subscriber receives frame
* with `payload.approval_id` + 12-arm `tool_input_display` preserved
* - REST `POST` resolves → broker Promise settles → response converts back
* to in-process SDK shape
* - Idempotency (40902) + not-found (40404)
*/
import { mkdtempSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { pino } from 'pino';
import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { WebSocket } from 'ws';
import {
IApprovalService,
IEventService,
type ApprovalRequest,
type ApprovalResponse,
type Event,
} from '@moonshot-ai/agent-core';
import { IRestGateway, startServer, type RunningServer } from '../src';
import { fixedTokenAuth } from './helpers/serverHarness';
import { rawDataToString } from '../src/ws/rawData';
import {
ApprovalService,
} from '#/services/approval/approvalService';
let tmpDir: string;
let lockPath: string;
let bridgeHome: string;
let server: RunningServer | undefined;
beforeEach(() => {
tmpDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'kimi-server-approvals-test-'));
lockPath = join(tmpDir, 'lock');
bridgeHome = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'kimi-server-approvals-home-'));
});
afterEach(async () => {
try {
await server?.close();
} catch {
// ignore
}
server = undefined;
rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
rmSync(bridgeHome, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
async function bootDaemon(): Promise<RunningServer> {
server = await startServer({
serviceOverrides: [fixedTokenAuth()],
host: '127.0.0.1',
port: 0,
lockPath,
logger: pino({ level: 'silent' }),
coreProcessOptions: { homeDir: bridgeHome },
wsGatewayOptions: { pingIntervalMs: 5_000, pongTimeoutMs: 5_000 },
});
return server;
}
function appOf(r: RunningServer): {
inject: (req: unknown) => Promise<{ statusCode: number; json: () => unknown }>;
} {
const app = r.services.invokeFunction((a) => {
const gw = a.get(IRestGateway);
return gw.app as unknown as {
inject: (req: unknown) => Promise<{ statusCode: number; json: () => unknown }>;
};
});
// Auto-attach the fixed bearer token so the M5.1 auth hook passes. A
// caller-supplied `authorization` header wins, so explicit token tests keep
// working; every other header (Range, content-type, …) is preserved.
return {
inject(req: unknown) {
const q = req as { headers?: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined> };
return app.inject({
...q,
headers: { authorization: 'Bearer test-token', ...q.headers },
});
},
};
}
function envelopeOf<T>(body: unknown): {
code: number;
msg: string;
data: T | null;
request_id: string;
details?: unknown;
} {
return body as {
code: number;
msg: string;
data: T | null;
request_id: string;
details?: unknown;
};
}
async function createSession(r: RunningServer): Promise<string> {
const res = await appOf(r).inject({
method: 'POST',
url: '/api/v1/sessions',
payload: { metadata: { cwd: join(tmpDir, 'workspace') } },
});
const env = envelopeOf<{ id: string }>(res.json());
if (env.code !== 0 || env.data === null) {
throw new Error(`create session failed: ${JSON.stringify(env)}`);
}
return env.data.id;
}
async function openSubscriber(
r: RunningServer,
sid: string,
): Promise<{
ws: WebSocket;
received: Record<string, unknown>[];
}> {
const wsUrl = r.address.replace('http://', 'ws://') + '/api/v1/ws';
const received: Record<string, unknown>[] = [];
const ws = await new Promise<WebSocket>((resolve, reject) => {
const sock = new WebSocket(wsUrl, ['kimi-code.bearer.test-token']);
sock.on('message', (data) => {
try {
received.push(JSON.parse(rawDataToString(data)) as Record<string, unknown>);
} catch {
// ignore
}
});
sock.once('open', () => resolve(sock));
sock.once('error', reject);
});
await waitFor(received, (f) => f['type'] === 'server_hello');
ws.send(
JSON.stringify({
type: 'client_hello',
id: 'h1',
payload: { client_id: 'test', subscriptions: [sid] },
}),
);
await waitFor(received, (f) => f['type'] === 'ack' && f['id'] === 'h1');
return { ws, received };
}
async function waitFor(
received: Record<string, unknown>[],
pred: (f: Record<string, unknown>) => boolean,
timeoutMs = 2000,
): Promise<Record<string, unknown>> {
const start = Date.now();
while (Date.now() - start < timeoutMs) {
const hit = received.find(pred);
if (hit !== undefined) return hit;
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 10));
}
throw new Error(
`waitFor timed out; received: ${received.map((f) => f['type']).join(', ')}`,
);
}
function firstPendingApprovalId(broker: ApprovalService): string | undefined {
return (broker as unknown as {
_pending: Map<string, { approvalId: string }>;
})._pending.values().next().value?.approvalId;
}
// --- Tests -----------------------------------------------------------------
describe('Approval reverse-RPC: WS broadcast → REST resolve → Promise settle (W8.1)', () => {
it('full happy path: broker request → WS event.approval.requested → REST POST → Promise resolves', async () => {
const r = await bootDaemon();
const sid = await createSession(r);
const { ws, received } = await openSubscriber(r, sid);
const broker = r.services.invokeFunction(
(a) => a.get(IApprovalService) as ApprovalService,
);
const inProcReq: ApprovalRequest = {
turnId: 11,
toolCallId: 'tc_approval_happy',
toolName: 'shell.run',
action: 'Run `ls`',
display: { kind: 'command', command: 'ls', summary: 'ls' } as never,
};
const pending = broker.request({
...inProcReq,
sessionId: sid,
agentId: 'main',
});
// Wait for the WS event.
const requested = await waitFor(
received,
(f) => f['type'] === 'event.approval.requested',
2000,
);
const payload = requested['payload'] as {
approval_id: string;
session_id: string;
tool_call_id: string;
tool_name: string;
action: string;
tool_input_display: { kind: string; command: string; summary: string };
created_at: string;
expires_at: string;
};
expect(payload.approval_id).toMatch(/^[0-9A-HJKMNP-TV-Z]{26}$/);
expect(payload.session_id).toBe(sid);
expect(payload.tool_call_id).toBe('tc_approval_happy');
expect(payload.tool_name).toBe('shell.run');
expect(payload.action).toBe('Run `ls`');
// 12-arm passthrough: snake_case `tool_input_display` preserves the
// entire SDK shape unchanged.
expect(payload.tool_input_display).toEqual({
kind: 'command',
command: 'ls',
summary: 'ls',
});
expect(payload.created_at).toMatch(/^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T/);
expect(payload.expires_at).toMatch(/^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T/);
// REST resolve.
const res = await appOf(r).inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/approvals/${payload.approval_id}`,
payload: {
decision: 'approved',
scope: 'session',
feedback: 'looks good',
selected_label: 'Run',
},
});
const env = envelopeOf<{ resolved: boolean; resolved_at: string }>(res.json());
expect(env.code).toBe(0);
expect(env.data?.resolved).toBe(true);
expect(env.data?.resolved_at).toMatch(/^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T/);
// Promise settles with snake→camel adapted shape.
const inProcResp: ApprovalResponse = await pending;
expect(inProcResp.decision).toBe('approved');
expect(inProcResp.scope).toBe('session');
expect(inProcResp.feedback).toBe('looks good');
expect(inProcResp.selectedLabel).toBe('Run');
// Resolved broadcast also reaches the subscriber.
const resolvedFrame = await waitFor(
received,
(f) => f['type'] === 'event.approval.resolved',
2000,
);
const resolvedPayload = resolvedFrame['payload'] as {
approval_id: string;
decision: string;
selected_label?: string;
};
expect(resolvedPayload.approval_id).toBe(payload.approval_id);
expect(resolvedPayload.decision).toBe('approved');
expect(resolvedPayload.selected_label).toBe('Run');
ws.close();
});
it('aborts the pending approval when the turn ends for a cancellation reason', async () => {
const r = await bootDaemon();
const sid = await createSession(r);
const { ws, received } = await openSubscriber(r, sid);
const broker = r.services.invokeFunction(
(a) => a.get(IApprovalService) as ApprovalService,
);
const eventService = r.services.invokeFunction((a) => a.get(IEventService));
const pending = broker.request({
sessionId: sid,
agentId: 'main',
turnId: 21,
toolCallId: 'tc_approval_abort',
toolName: 'shell.run',
action: 'Run `ls`',
display: { kind: 'command', command: 'ls', summary: 'ls' } as never,
});
const requested = await waitFor(
received,
(f) => f['type'] === 'event.approval.requested',
2000,
);
const payload = requested['payload'] as { approval_id: string };
expect(broker.isPending(payload.approval_id)).toBe(true);
// Simulate the agent's turn being aborted before the user resolves the
// approval. The broker subscribes to the in-process bus because the turn
// abort signal never reaches it through the RPC boundary.
eventService.publish({
type: 'turn.ended',
sessionId: sid,
agentId: 'main',
turnId: 21,
reason: 'cancelled',
} as unknown as Event);
const resolvedFrame = await waitFor(
received,
(f) => f['type'] === 'event.approval.resolved',
2000,
);
const resolvedPayload = resolvedFrame['payload'] as {
approval_id: string;
decision: string;
};
expect(resolvedPayload.approval_id).toBe(payload.approval_id);
expect(resolvedPayload.decision).toBe('cancelled');
// Broker entry is cleaned up so listPending()/session status don't stick
// in awaiting_approval for a dead turn.
expect(broker.isPending(payload.approval_id)).toBe(false);
const inProcResp: ApprovalResponse = await pending;
expect(inProcResp.decision).toBe('cancelled');
ws.close();
});
it('GET pending approvals lists recoverable requests and omits resolved ones', async () => {
const r = await bootDaemon();
const sid = await createSession(r);
const broker = r.services.invokeFunction(
(a) => a.get(IApprovalService) as ApprovalService,
);
const pending = broker.request({
sessionId: sid,
agentId: 'main',
turnId: 12,
toolCallId: 'tc_approval_recovery',
toolName: 'shell.run',
action: 'Run `pwd`',
display: { kind: 'command', command: 'pwd', summary: 'pwd' } as never,
});
let approvalId: string | undefined;
try {
const res = await appOf(r).inject({
method: 'GET',
url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/approvals?status=pending`,
});
const env = envelopeOf<{
items: Array<{
approval_id: string;
session_id: string;
turn_id?: number;
tool_call_id: string;
tool_name: string;
action: string;
tool_input_display: unknown;
created_at: string;
expires_at: string;
}>;
}>(res.json());
expect(env.code).toBe(0);
expect(env.data?.items).toHaveLength(1);
const item = env.data?.items[0];
expect(item).toBeDefined();
approvalId = item?.approval_id;
expect(item?.session_id).toBe(sid);
expect(item?.turn_id).toBe(12);
expect(item?.tool_call_id).toBe('tc_approval_recovery');
expect(item?.tool_name).toBe('shell.run');
expect(item?.action).toBe('Run `pwd`');
expect(item?.tool_input_display).toEqual({
kind: 'command',
command: 'pwd',
summary: 'pwd',
});
expect(item?.created_at).toMatch(/^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T/);
expect(item?.expires_at).toMatch(/^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T/);
const ok = await appOf(r).inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/approvals/${approvalId}`,
payload: { decision: 'approved' },
});
expect(envelopeOf<{ resolved: boolean }>(ok.json()).code).toBe(0);
await pending;
const after = await appOf(r).inject({
method: 'GET',
url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/approvals?status=pending`,
});
const afterEnv = envelopeOf<{ items: unknown[] }>(after.json());
expect(afterEnv.code).toBe(0);
expect(afterEnv.data?.items).toEqual([]);
} finally {
const cleanupId = approvalId ?? firstPendingApprovalId(broker);
if (cleanupId !== undefined && broker.isPending(cleanupId)) {
broker.resolve(cleanupId, { decision: 'cancelled' });
}
await pending.catch(() => undefined);
}
});
it('GET pending approvals rejects unsupported status', async () => {
const r = await bootDaemon();
const sid = await createSession(r);
const res = await appOf(r).inject({
method: 'GET',
url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/approvals?status=resolved`,
});
const env = envelopeOf<unknown>(res.json());
expect(env.code).toBe(40001);
});
it('REST resolve on unknown approval_id returns 40404', async () => {
const r = await bootDaemon();
const sid = await createSession(r);
const res = await appOf(r).inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/approvals/01JAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA`,
payload: { decision: 'approved' },
});
const env = envelopeOf<unknown>(res.json());
expect(env.code).toBe(40404);
});
it('REST re-resolve on already-resolved approval returns 40902 with data:{resolved:false}', async () => {
const r = await bootDaemon();
const sid = await createSession(r);
const broker = r.services.invokeFunction(
(a) => a.get(IApprovalService) as ApprovalService,
);
const pending = broker.request({
sessionId: sid,
agentId: 'main',
toolCallId: 'tc_idem',
toolName: 'shell.run',
action: 'Run',
display: { kind: 'generic', summary: 'test' } as never,
});
// Capture the server-minted approval_id by inspecting the broker's
// pending map (single entry).
let approvalId: string | undefined;
for (let i = 0; i < 20 && !approvalId; i++) {
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 10));
const peek = (broker as unknown as {
_pending: Map<string, { approvalId: string }>;
})._pending;
approvalId = peek.values().next().value?.approvalId;
}
expect(approvalId).toBeDefined();
// First resolve succeeds.
const ok = await appOf(r).inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/approvals/${approvalId}`,
payload: { decision: 'approved' },
});
const env1 = envelopeOf<{ resolved: boolean }>(ok.json());
expect(env1.code).toBe(0);
await pending;
// Second resolve hits the idempotency window.
const dup = await appOf(r).inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/approvals/${approvalId}`,
payload: { decision: 'approved' },
});
const env2 = envelopeOf<{ resolved: boolean }>(dup.json());
expect(env2.code).toBe(40902);
expect(env2.data).toEqual({ resolved: false });
});
it('REST resolve with bad body returns 40001 (validation failure)', async () => {
const r = await bootDaemon();
const sid = await createSession(r);
const broker = r.services.invokeFunction(
(a) => a.get(IApprovalService) as ApprovalService,
);
const _pending = broker.request({
sessionId: sid,
agentId: 'main',
toolCallId: 'tc_bad_body',
toolName: 'shell.run',
action: 'Run',
display: { kind: 'generic', summary: 'test' } as never,
});
void _pending;
// Reach into the pending map to grab the id.
let approvalId: string | undefined;
for (let i = 0; i < 20 && !approvalId; i++) {
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 10));
const peek = (broker as unknown as {
_pending: Map<string, { approvalId: string }>;
})._pending;
approvalId = peek.values().next().value?.approvalId;
}
expect(approvalId).toBeDefined();
const res = await appOf(r).inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/approvals/${approvalId}`,
payload: { decision: 'maybe' },
});
const env = envelopeOf<unknown>(res.json());
expect(env.code).toBe(40001);
expect(Array.isArray(env.details)).toBe(true);
// Cleanup: the broker still has the pending entry; settle it so the
// afterEach close doesn't fight a hanging Promise.
broker.resolve(approvalId!, { decision: 'cancelled' });
});
});