mirror of
https://github.com/MoonshotAI/kimi-code.git
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* test(server): add API surface snapshot guardrail
Boot startServer on port 0 and snapshot the documented v1 route table derived from /openapi.json paths, plus the reachability of doc/meta endpoints (/healthz, /openapi.json, /asyncapi.json, /). Gives later auth/--host phases an intentional diff when routes change. M0 makes no production behavior change.
* test(server): add e2e server harness with token support
Add test/helpers/serverHarness.ts: boot() wraps startServer with an isolated lock + home dir and returns a handle (server, address, baseUrl, wsUrl, token, close) plus authedFetch/authedWs that carry Authorization: Bearer <token> (and the kimi-code.bearer.<token> WS subprotocol). serviceOverrides is the generic DI seam later phases use to inject a fixed-token auth service; IAuthTokenService is not referenced yet. closeAll() tears down every booted server and socket. M0 makes no production behavior change; typecheck-only gate.
* feat(server): add privateFiles 0600 atomic write/read utility
* feat(server): add per-start tokenStore
* feat(server): add env-based bcrypt password hash utility
* feat(server): add IAuthTokenService DI seam
* feat(server): add global onRequest auth hook with bypass + redaction
* fix(server): stop reflecting Host header in /asyncapi.json
* feat(server): add WS bearer subprotocol constant and parser
* feat(server): enforce bearer token auth on WS upgrade
* feat(server): add Host header allowlist middleware
* feat(server): add Origin/CORS middleware
* feat(server): wire Host/Origin checks into HTTP and WS
* feat(server): wire token auth, Host/Origin, and WS auth into start.ts
* fix(server): create lock file with 0600 permissions
* fix(server): suppress debug routes on non-loopback binds
* feat(kimi-code): read server token and send Authorization on CLI calls
* feat(kimi-code): inject server token into /web URL fragment
* feat(server): add bindClassify for loopback/lan/public classification
* feat(kimi-code): register --host flag and pass it through the daemon
* feat(server): require password and TLS opt-out on non-loopback binds
* feat(server): rate-limit repeated auth failures on non-loopback binds
* feat(server): disable shutdown and terminals on public binds by default
* feat(server): add security response headers on non-loopback binds
* test(server): cover LAN/public host-exposure hardening end to end
* docs(server): add deployment security and threat-model guide
* changeset: minor kimi-code for server auth and host exposure
* feat(kimi-web): add server bearer-token auth support
* fix: repair CI for server auth and host exposure
- Replace native @node-rs/bcrypt with pure-JS bcryptjs so the ESM CLI
bundle and the SEA native bundle both build without native-addon
require issues (node-rs/bcrypt broke the ESM smoke and the SEA
check-bundle allowlist).
- Remove dead cleanup references (stopSpinner, authLogoBlinkTimer) in
apps/kimi-web App.vue that failed vue-tsc.
- Fix lint: drop empty spread fallbacks in the e2e auth-header merge,
void the intentionally-async WS upgrade listener, add missing
assertions to satisfy jest/expect-expect, and convert a ternary
statement to if/else.
- Send the bearer token in the snapshot perf/smoke tests so they pass
under the new global auth hook.
- Refresh the pnpmDeps hash in flake.nix for the updated lockfile.
* feat(server): persist bearer token and add rotate-token command
- persist the server bearer token in <home>/server.token (0600) and reuse it across restarts instead of per-start server-<pid>.token
- add `kimi server rotate-token` to regenerate the token; the token store reloads on mtime/inode change so rotation applies without restart
- print the token and Vite-style Local/Network URLs in the startup banner
- allow non-loopback binds with bearer-token-only auth (password now optional) and update SECURITY.md
- surface daemon boot failures immediately with the exit reason and log tail instead of waiting for the spawn timeout
* feat(server): print full token URLs and re-print links after rotate
- Drop the ready-panel border so token URLs print in full for copying; keep the Kimi sprite beside the title.
- Re-print Local/Network access links after `server rotate-token` (host/port from the lock).
- Extract shared access-URL helpers into access-urls.ts.
- Unify link and token colors between the banner and rotate-token.
* feat(server): dim URL #token= fragment and de-highlight token
- Render the `#token=…` fragment in a dim gray so the host/port stands out in the banner and rotate-token links.
- De-highlight the standalone token; set it off with surrounding whitespace instead of color.
- Add splitTokenFragment helper.
* refactor(cli): polish server ready banner and rotate-token output
- move version onto the ready banner title line; drop the separate
Ready:/Version: rows and the startup-time metric
- reorder rotate-token output so the new token sits between the
invalidation note and the access links
- update server CLI tests for the new layout
* feat(server): warn on reuse and refine ready banner
- Warn when `server run` reuses an already-running daemon (its options are not applied) and show the running server's actual URLs.
- Show a `Network: off use --host 0.0.0.0 to enable` hint on loopback binds.
- Move the version onto the title line and drop the startup-time metric.
* fix(web): relabel auth dialog to token and cover full page
- Relabel the server auth dialog from "password" to "token"; the server accepts the bearer token, with the password only as a fallback.
- Make the auth dialog overlay fully opaque so it covers the whole page instead of revealing the login page underneath.
* fix: resolve CI failures on web auth PR
- Replace chalk.yellow named color with chalk.hex(darkColors.warning)
in the server reuse notice to satisfy the chalk named color guard.
- Update pnpmDeps hash in flake.nix to match the regenerated
pnpm-lock.yaml so the Nix build succeeds.
- Retry rmSync in ws-broadcast e2e teardown to ride out EBUSY /
ENOTEMPTY races while the server flushes files after close().
* test(server): update API surface snapshot for warnings route
The feat/web-auth branch adds GET /api/v1/sessions/{session_id}/warnings
(packages/server/src/routes/sessions.ts), so the API surface guardrail
snapshot needs to record the new documented v1 route.
95 lines
3.1 KiB
TypeScript
95 lines
3.1 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Security response headers (ROADMAP M6.6).
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*
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* Verifies the `onSend` hook is registered only on a non-loopback bind and
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* that HSTS is omitted while TLS is terminated elsewhere (`tls: false`).
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*/
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import { mkdtempSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
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import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
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import { join } from 'node:path';
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import { pino } from 'pino';
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import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
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import { startServer, type RunningServer } from '../src';
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import { authHeaders, fixedTokenAuth } from './helpers/serverHarness';
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const createdDirs: string[] = [];
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const running: RunningServer[] = [];
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let prevPassword: string | undefined;
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function tmpPaths(): { lockPath: string; homeDir: string } {
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const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'kimi-sec-headers-'));
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const home = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'kimi-sec-headers-home-'));
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createdDirs.push(dir, home);
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return { lockPath: join(dir, 'lock'), homeDir: home };
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}
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beforeEach(() => {
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prevPassword = process.env['KIMI_CODE_PASSWORD'];
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});
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afterEach(async () => {
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for (const r of running.splice(0)) {
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try {
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await r.close();
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} catch {
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// ignore — best-effort teardown
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}
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}
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for (const dir of createdDirs.splice(0)) {
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rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
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}
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if (prevPassword === undefined) {
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delete process.env['KIMI_CODE_PASSWORD'];
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} else {
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process.env['KIMI_CODE_PASSWORD'] = prevPassword;
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}
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});
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async function boot(host: string): Promise<RunningServer> {
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const { lockPath, homeDir } = tmpPaths();
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if (host !== '127.0.0.1') {
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// Non-loopback binds require a password + TLS opt-out (M6.3).
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process.env['KIMI_CODE_PASSWORD'] = 'test-pw';
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}
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const server = await startServer({
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serviceOverrides: [fixedTokenAuth()],
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host,
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port: 0,
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lockPath,
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insecureNoTls: host !== '127.0.0.1',
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logger: pino({ level: 'silent' }),
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coreProcessOptions: { homeDir },
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});
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running.push(server);
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return server;
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}
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describe('security response headers (M6.6)', () => {
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it('sets nosniff / Referrer-Policy / CSP on a non-loopback bind, without HSTS', async () => {
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const server = await boot('0.0.0.0');
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const res = await fetch(`${server.address}/api/v1/sessions`, {
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headers: authHeaders(),
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});
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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expect(res.headers.get('x-content-type-options')).toBe('nosniff');
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expect(res.headers.get('referrer-policy')).toBe('no-referrer');
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expect(res.headers.get('content-security-policy')).toBe("default-src 'self'");
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// TLS is terminated by the reverse proxy in this phase → no HSTS here.
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expect(res.headers.get('strict-transport-security')).toBeNull();
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});
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it('does NOT set the security headers on a loopback bind', async () => {
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const server = await boot('127.0.0.1');
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const res = await fetch(`${server.address}/api/v1/sessions`, {
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headers: authHeaders(),
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});
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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expect(res.headers.get('x-content-type-options')).toBeNull();
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expect(res.headers.get('referrer-policy')).toBeNull();
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expect(res.headers.get('content-security-policy')).toBeNull();
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expect(res.headers.get('strict-transport-security')).toBeNull();
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});
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});
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