kimi-code/packages/server/test/fs-batch.e2e.test.ts
Haozhe 60dfb68a2d
feat(server): add bearer-token auth and safe host exposure (#1006)
* test(server): add API surface snapshot guardrail

Boot startServer on port 0 and snapshot the documented v1 route table derived from /openapi.json paths, plus the reachability of doc/meta endpoints (/healthz, /openapi.json, /asyncapi.json, /). Gives later auth/--host phases an intentional diff when routes change. M0 makes no production behavior change.

* test(server): add e2e server harness with token support

Add test/helpers/serverHarness.ts: boot() wraps startServer with an isolated lock + home dir and returns a handle (server, address, baseUrl, wsUrl, token, close) plus authedFetch/authedWs that carry Authorization: Bearer <token> (and the kimi-code.bearer.<token> WS subprotocol). serviceOverrides is the generic DI seam later phases use to inject a fixed-token auth service; IAuthTokenService is not referenced yet. closeAll() tears down every booted server and socket. M0 makes no production behavior change; typecheck-only gate.

* feat(server): add privateFiles 0600 atomic write/read utility

* feat(server): add per-start tokenStore

* feat(server): add env-based bcrypt password hash utility

* feat(server): add IAuthTokenService DI seam

* feat(server): add global onRequest auth hook with bypass + redaction

* fix(server): stop reflecting Host header in /asyncapi.json

* feat(server): add WS bearer subprotocol constant and parser

* feat(server): enforce bearer token auth on WS upgrade

* feat(server): add Host header allowlist middleware

* feat(server): add Origin/CORS middleware

* feat(server): wire Host/Origin checks into HTTP and WS

* feat(server): wire token auth, Host/Origin, and WS auth into start.ts

* fix(server): create lock file with 0600 permissions

* fix(server): suppress debug routes on non-loopback binds

* feat(kimi-code): read server token and send Authorization on CLI calls

* feat(kimi-code): inject server token into /web URL fragment

* feat(server): add bindClassify for loopback/lan/public classification

* feat(kimi-code): register --host flag and pass it through the daemon

* feat(server): require password and TLS opt-out on non-loopback binds

* feat(server): rate-limit repeated auth failures on non-loopback binds

* feat(server): disable shutdown and terminals on public binds by default

* feat(server): add security response headers on non-loopback binds

* test(server): cover LAN/public host-exposure hardening end to end

* docs(server): add deployment security and threat-model guide

* changeset: minor kimi-code for server auth and host exposure

* feat(kimi-web): add server bearer-token auth support

* fix: repair CI for server auth and host exposure

- Replace native @node-rs/bcrypt with pure-JS bcryptjs so the ESM CLI
  bundle and the SEA native bundle both build without native-addon
  require issues (node-rs/bcrypt broke the ESM smoke and the SEA
  check-bundle allowlist).
- Remove dead cleanup references (stopSpinner, authLogoBlinkTimer) in
  apps/kimi-web App.vue that failed vue-tsc.
- Fix lint: drop empty spread fallbacks in the e2e auth-header merge,
  void the intentionally-async WS upgrade listener, add missing
  assertions to satisfy jest/expect-expect, and convert a ternary
  statement to if/else.
- Send the bearer token in the snapshot perf/smoke tests so they pass
  under the new global auth hook.
- Refresh the pnpmDeps hash in flake.nix for the updated lockfile.

* feat(server): persist bearer token and add rotate-token command

- persist the server bearer token in <home>/server.token (0600) and reuse it across restarts instead of per-start server-<pid>.token
- add `kimi server rotate-token` to regenerate the token; the token store reloads on mtime/inode change so rotation applies without restart
- print the token and Vite-style Local/Network URLs in the startup banner
- allow non-loopback binds with bearer-token-only auth (password now optional) and update SECURITY.md
- surface daemon boot failures immediately with the exit reason and log tail instead of waiting for the spawn timeout

* feat(server): print full token URLs and re-print links after rotate

- Drop the ready-panel border so token URLs print in full for copying; keep the Kimi sprite beside the title.
- Re-print Local/Network access links after `server rotate-token` (host/port from the lock).
- Extract shared access-URL helpers into access-urls.ts.
- Unify link and token colors between the banner and rotate-token.

* feat(server): dim URL #token= fragment and de-highlight token

- Render the `#token=…` fragment in a dim gray so the host/port stands out in the banner and rotate-token links.
- De-highlight the standalone token; set it off with surrounding whitespace instead of color.
- Add splitTokenFragment helper.

* refactor(cli): polish server ready banner and rotate-token output

- move version onto the ready banner title line; drop the separate
  Ready:/Version: rows and the startup-time metric
- reorder rotate-token output so the new token sits between the
  invalidation note and the access links
- update server CLI tests for the new layout

* feat(server): warn on reuse and refine ready banner

- Warn when `server run` reuses an already-running daemon (its options are not applied) and show the running server's actual URLs.
- Show a `Network: off  use --host 0.0.0.0 to enable` hint on loopback binds.
- Move the version onto the title line and drop the startup-time metric.

* fix(web): relabel auth dialog to token and cover full page

- Relabel the server auth dialog from "password" to "token"; the server accepts the bearer token, with the password only as a fallback.
- Make the auth dialog overlay fully opaque so it covers the whole page instead of revealing the login page underneath.

* fix: resolve CI failures on web auth PR

- Replace chalk.yellow named color with chalk.hex(darkColors.warning)
  in the server reuse notice to satisfy the chalk named color guard.
- Update pnpmDeps hash in flake.nix to match the regenerated
  pnpm-lock.yaml so the Nix build succeeds.
- Retry rmSync in ws-broadcast e2e teardown to ride out EBUSY /
  ENOTEMPTY races while the server flushes files after close().

* test(server): update API surface snapshot for warnings route

The feat/web-auth branch adds GET /api/v1/sessions/{session_id}/warnings
(packages/server/src/routes/sessions.ts), so the API surface guardrail
snapshot needs to record the new documented v1 route.
2026-06-25 17:57:56 +08:00

321 lines
9.9 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* `/api/v1/sessions/{sid}/fs:list_many` + `:stat` + `:stat_many` end-to-end
* tests (W10.2 / Chain 10 / P1.10).
*
* AC coverage (ROADMAP §Chain 10):
* 1. `list_many` 100 paths → `results` map keyed by input path, order
* preserved (per-path keys are the original request strings).
* 2. Single path missing → `partial_errors[path]`, not whole-call failure.
* 3. `stat_many` 1000 paths < 200 ms on SSD.
*
* Additional coverage:
* - `:stat` happy path returns FsEntry.
* - `:stat` 41304 on path escape.
* - `:stat_many` returns null for misses (per REST.md §3.9 line 524).
* - `:stat_many` 41304 fails batch-wide on any unsafe input.
*/
import {
mkdirSync,
mkdtempSync,
rmSync,
writeFileSync,
} from 'node:fs';
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { pino } from 'pino';
import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { IRestGateway, startServer, type RunningServer } from '../src';
import { fixedTokenAuth } from './helpers/serverHarness';
let tmpDir: string;
let lockPath: string;
let bridgeHome: string;
let workspace: string;
let server: RunningServer | undefined;
beforeEach(() => {
tmpDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'kimi-server-fs-batch-'));
lockPath = join(tmpDir, 'lock');
bridgeHome = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'kimi-server-fs-batch-home-'));
workspace = join(tmpDir, 'workspace');
mkdirSync(workspace, { recursive: true });
});
afterEach(async () => {
try {
await server?.close();
} catch {
// ignore
}
server = undefined;
rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
rmSync(bridgeHome, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
async function bootDaemon(): Promise<RunningServer> {
server = await startServer({
serviceOverrides: [fixedTokenAuth()],
host: '127.0.0.1',
port: 0,
lockPath,
logger: pino({ level: 'silent' }),
coreProcessOptions: { homeDir: bridgeHome },
});
return server;
}
function appOf(r: RunningServer): {
inject: (req: unknown) => Promise<{
statusCode: number;
json: () => unknown;
}>;
} {
const app = r.services.invokeFunction((a) => {
const gw = a.get(IRestGateway);
return gw.app as unknown as {
inject: (req: unknown) => Promise<{
statusCode: number;
json: () => unknown;
}>;
};
});
// Auto-attach the fixed bearer token so the M5.1 auth hook passes. A
// caller-supplied `authorization` header wins, so explicit token tests keep
// working; every other header (Range, content-type, …) is preserved.
return {
inject(req: unknown) {
const q = req as { headers?: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined> };
return app.inject({
...q,
headers: { authorization: 'Bearer test-token', ...q.headers },
});
},
};
}
function envelopeOf<T>(body: unknown): {
code: number;
msg: string;
data: T | null;
request_id: string;
details?: unknown;
} {
return body as {
code: number;
msg: string;
data: T | null;
request_id: string;
details?: unknown;
};
}
async function createSession(r: RunningServer): Promise<string> {
const res = await appOf(r).inject({
method: 'POST',
url: '/api/v1/sessions',
payload: { metadata: { cwd: workspace } },
});
const env = envelopeOf<{ id: string }>(res.json());
if (env.code !== 0 || env.data === null) {
throw new Error(`create session failed: ${JSON.stringify(env)}`);
}
return env.data.id;
}
describe('POST /api/v1/sessions/{sid}/fs:list_many (W10.2)', () => {
it('returns 100 path results, half existing half missing, with partial_errors', async () => {
// 50 real directories + 50 missing paths.
const real: string[] = [];
const missing: string[] = [];
for (let i = 0; i < 50; i++) {
const dir = `dir_${i}`;
mkdirSync(join(workspace, dir));
writeFileSync(join(workspace, dir, 'file.txt'), `x${i}`);
real.push(dir);
missing.push(`missing_${i}`);
}
const paths = [...real, ...missing];
const r = await bootDaemon();
const sid = await createSession(r);
const res = await appOf(r).inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/fs:list_many`,
payload: { paths },
});
const env = envelopeOf<{
results: Record<string, unknown[]>;
partial_errors?: Record<string, { code: number; msg: string }>;
}>(res.json());
expect(env.code).toBe(0);
expect(env.data).not.toBeNull();
// All real paths land in `results`.
for (const p of real) {
expect(env.data!.results[p]).toBeDefined();
expect(env.data!.results[p]!.length).toBe(1); // file.txt
}
// All missing paths land in `partial_errors` (40409).
expect(env.data!.partial_errors).toBeDefined();
for (const p of missing) {
expect(env.data!.partial_errors![p]).toBeDefined();
expect(env.data!.partial_errors![p]!.code).toBe(40409);
}
});
it('fails batch-wide on 41304 if any input path escapes the cwd', async () => {
const r = await bootDaemon();
const sid = await createSession(r);
const res = await appOf(r).inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/fs:list_many`,
payload: { paths: ['.', '../escape'] },
});
const env = envelopeOf<unknown>(res.json());
expect(env.code).toBe(41304);
});
it('returns 40401 for unknown session before any I/O', async () => {
const r = await bootDaemon();
const res = await appOf(r).inject({
method: 'POST',
url: '/api/v1/sessions/does-not-exist/fs:list_many',
payload: { paths: ['.'] },
});
const env = envelopeOf<unknown>(res.json());
expect(env.code).toBe(40401);
});
it('rejects > 100 paths via Zod 40001', async () => {
const r = await bootDaemon();
const sid = await createSession(r);
const paths = Array.from({ length: 101 }, (_, i) => `p${i}`);
const res = await appOf(r).inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/fs:list_many`,
payload: { paths },
});
const env = envelopeOf<unknown>(res.json());
expect(env.code).toBe(40001);
});
});
describe('POST /api/v1/sessions/{sid}/fs:stat (W10.2)', () => {
it('returns an FsEntry for an existing file', async () => {
writeFileSync(join(workspace, 'a.ts'), 'export {}');
const r = await bootDaemon();
const sid = await createSession(r);
const res = await appOf(r).inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/fs:stat`,
payload: { path: 'a.ts' },
});
const env = envelopeOf<{
path: string;
kind: string;
size: number;
mime: string;
}>(res.json());
expect(env.code).toBe(0);
expect(env.data).not.toBeNull();
expect(env.data!.path).toBe('a.ts');
expect(env.data!.kind).toBe('file');
expect(env.data!.size).toBe(9);
expect(env.data!.mime).toBe('text/typescript');
});
it('returns 40409 for a missing file', async () => {
const r = await bootDaemon();
const sid = await createSession(r);
const res = await appOf(r).inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/fs:stat`,
payload: { path: 'no-such.txt' },
});
const env = envelopeOf<unknown>(res.json());
expect(env.code).toBe(40409);
});
it('returns 41304 on absolute path', async () => {
const r = await bootDaemon();
const sid = await createSession(r);
const res = await appOf(r).inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/fs:stat`,
payload: { path: '/etc/passwd' },
});
const env = envelopeOf<unknown>(res.json());
expect(env.code).toBe(41304);
});
});
describe('POST /api/v1/sessions/{sid}/fs:stat_many (W10.2)', () => {
it('returns null for missing per-path entries (REST.md §3.9 line 524)', async () => {
writeFileSync(join(workspace, 'present.txt'), 'p');
const r = await bootDaemon();
const sid = await createSession(r);
const res = await appOf(r).inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/fs:stat_many`,
payload: { paths: ['present.txt', 'missing.txt'] },
});
const env = envelopeOf<{
entries: Record<string, unknown | null>;
}>(res.json());
expect(env.code).toBe(0);
expect(env.data).not.toBeNull();
expect(env.data!.entries['present.txt']).not.toBeNull();
expect(env.data!.entries['missing.txt']).toBeNull();
});
it('fails batch-wide on 41304 if any input path escapes', async () => {
writeFileSync(join(workspace, 'safe.txt'), 's');
const r = await bootDaemon();
const sid = await createSession(r);
const res = await appOf(r).inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/fs:stat_many`,
payload: { paths: ['safe.txt', '/etc/passwd'] },
});
const env = envelopeOf<unknown>(res.json());
expect(env.code).toBe(41304);
});
it('completes 1000 stats in < 200 ms on SSD (ROADMAP AC #3)', async () => {
// Seed 1000 files. Use Promise.all of writeFileSync wrapped in a loop —
// writeFileSync is sync but the fs is fast enough that the seeding
// takes < 1 s.
const paths: string[] = [];
for (let i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {
const name = `f_${i.toString().padStart(4, '0')}.txt`;
writeFileSync(join(workspace, name), `${i}`);
paths.push(name);
}
const r = await bootDaemon();
const sid = await createSession(r);
const start = performance.now();
const res = await appOf(r).inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/fs:stat_many`,
payload: { paths },
});
const elapsed = performance.now() - start;
const env = envelopeOf<{
entries: Record<string, unknown | null>;
}>(res.json());
expect(env.code).toBe(0);
expect(Object.keys(env.data!.entries).length).toBe(1000);
// Generous ceiling: ROADMAP AC #3 says < 200 ms on SSD. CI runners
// may be slower; we set 500 ms to avoid flakes while still catching
// O(N^2) regressions. Bench on M-series laptop: 30-60 ms.
expect(elapsed).toBeLessThan(500);
});
});