kimi-code/packages/server/test/auth.e2e.test.ts
Haozhe 60dfb68a2d
feat(server): add bearer-token auth and safe host exposure (#1006)
* test(server): add API surface snapshot guardrail

Boot startServer on port 0 and snapshot the documented v1 route table derived from /openapi.json paths, plus the reachability of doc/meta endpoints (/healthz, /openapi.json, /asyncapi.json, /). Gives later auth/--host phases an intentional diff when routes change. M0 makes no production behavior change.

* test(server): add e2e server harness with token support

Add test/helpers/serverHarness.ts: boot() wraps startServer with an isolated lock + home dir and returns a handle (server, address, baseUrl, wsUrl, token, close) plus authedFetch/authedWs that carry Authorization: Bearer <token> (and the kimi-code.bearer.<token> WS subprotocol). serviceOverrides is the generic DI seam later phases use to inject a fixed-token auth service; IAuthTokenService is not referenced yet. closeAll() tears down every booted server and socket. M0 makes no production behavior change; typecheck-only gate.

* feat(server): add privateFiles 0600 atomic write/read utility

* feat(server): add per-start tokenStore

* feat(server): add env-based bcrypt password hash utility

* feat(server): add IAuthTokenService DI seam

* feat(server): add global onRequest auth hook with bypass + redaction

* fix(server): stop reflecting Host header in /asyncapi.json

* feat(server): add WS bearer subprotocol constant and parser

* feat(server): enforce bearer token auth on WS upgrade

* feat(server): add Host header allowlist middleware

* feat(server): add Origin/CORS middleware

* feat(server): wire Host/Origin checks into HTTP and WS

* feat(server): wire token auth, Host/Origin, and WS auth into start.ts

* fix(server): create lock file with 0600 permissions

* fix(server): suppress debug routes on non-loopback binds

* feat(kimi-code): read server token and send Authorization on CLI calls

* feat(kimi-code): inject server token into /web URL fragment

* feat(server): add bindClassify for loopback/lan/public classification

* feat(kimi-code): register --host flag and pass it through the daemon

* feat(server): require password and TLS opt-out on non-loopback binds

* feat(server): rate-limit repeated auth failures on non-loopback binds

* feat(server): disable shutdown and terminals on public binds by default

* feat(server): add security response headers on non-loopback binds

* test(server): cover LAN/public host-exposure hardening end to end

* docs(server): add deployment security and threat-model guide

* changeset: minor kimi-code for server auth and host exposure

* feat(kimi-web): add server bearer-token auth support

* fix: repair CI for server auth and host exposure

- Replace native @node-rs/bcrypt with pure-JS bcryptjs so the ESM CLI
  bundle and the SEA native bundle both build without native-addon
  require issues (node-rs/bcrypt broke the ESM smoke and the SEA
  check-bundle allowlist).
- Remove dead cleanup references (stopSpinner, authLogoBlinkTimer) in
  apps/kimi-web App.vue that failed vue-tsc.
- Fix lint: drop empty spread fallbacks in the e2e auth-header merge,
  void the intentionally-async WS upgrade listener, add missing
  assertions to satisfy jest/expect-expect, and convert a ternary
  statement to if/else.
- Send the bearer token in the snapshot perf/smoke tests so they pass
  under the new global auth hook.
- Refresh the pnpmDeps hash in flake.nix for the updated lockfile.

* feat(server): persist bearer token and add rotate-token command

- persist the server bearer token in <home>/server.token (0600) and reuse it across restarts instead of per-start server-<pid>.token
- add `kimi server rotate-token` to regenerate the token; the token store reloads on mtime/inode change so rotation applies without restart
- print the token and Vite-style Local/Network URLs in the startup banner
- allow non-loopback binds with bearer-token-only auth (password now optional) and update SECURITY.md
- surface daemon boot failures immediately with the exit reason and log tail instead of waiting for the spawn timeout

* feat(server): print full token URLs and re-print links after rotate

- Drop the ready-panel border so token URLs print in full for copying; keep the Kimi sprite beside the title.
- Re-print Local/Network access links after `server rotate-token` (host/port from the lock).
- Extract shared access-URL helpers into access-urls.ts.
- Unify link and token colors between the banner and rotate-token.

* feat(server): dim URL #token= fragment and de-highlight token

- Render the `#token=…` fragment in a dim gray so the host/port stands out in the banner and rotate-token links.
- De-highlight the standalone token; set it off with surrounding whitespace instead of color.
- Add splitTokenFragment helper.

* refactor(cli): polish server ready banner and rotate-token output

- move version onto the ready banner title line; drop the separate
  Ready:/Version: rows and the startup-time metric
- reorder rotate-token output so the new token sits between the
  invalidation note and the access links
- update server CLI tests for the new layout

* feat(server): warn on reuse and refine ready banner

- Warn when `server run` reuses an already-running daemon (its options are not applied) and show the running server's actual URLs.
- Show a `Network: off  use --host 0.0.0.0 to enable` hint on loopback binds.
- Move the version onto the title line and drop the startup-time metric.

* fix(web): relabel auth dialog to token and cover full page

- Relabel the server auth dialog from "password" to "token"; the server accepts the bearer token, with the password only as a fallback.
- Make the auth dialog overlay fully opaque so it covers the whole page instead of revealing the login page underneath.

* fix: resolve CI failures on web auth PR

- Replace chalk.yellow named color with chalk.hex(darkColors.warning)
  in the server reuse notice to satisfy the chalk named color guard.
- Update pnpmDeps hash in flake.nix to match the regenerated
  pnpm-lock.yaml so the Nix build succeeds.
- Retry rmSync in ws-broadcast e2e teardown to ride out EBUSY /
  ENOTEMPTY races while the server flushes files after close().

* test(server): update API surface snapshot for warnings route

The feat/web-auth branch adds GET /api/v1/sessions/{session_id}/warnings
(packages/server/src/routes/sessions.ts), so the API surface guardrail
snapshot needs to record the new documented v1 route.
2026-06-25 17:57:56 +08:00

393 lines
12 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* `GET /api/v1/auth` + prompt-submit readiness-gate e2e tests (P2.1).
*
* Four fixture states cover acceptance:
* 1. **Empty config** → ready=false, providers_count=0; prompt
* submit blocked with `40110`.
* 2. **Manual provider, no key** → ready=false (key gate not met);
* prompt submit blocked with `40111`.
* 3. **Provider, no default** → ready=false (no default_model);
* prompt submit blocked with `40113`.
* 4. **Provider + key + model** → ready=true; prompt submit gets past the
* gate (and may fail downstream — that's
* out of scope here).
*
* **Bootstrap**: each test seeds `<bridgeHome>/config.toml` BEFORE calling
* `startServer` so KimiCore loads it on construction. The `homeDir` we pass
* via `coreProcessOptions.homeDir` is also what `AuthSummaryServiceImpl` uses to
* locate the credential dir — keeping the file paths in lockstep with prod.
*
* **Anti-corruption**: tests only use the public REST surface + `RunningServer`
* accessor. No reaching into `IPromptService._injectActiveForTest` like the
* lifecycle test — we want the real ensureReady → bridge.rpc.prompt path.
*/
import { mkdtempSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { pino } from 'pino';
import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { authSummarySchema, type AuthSummary } from '@moonshot-ai/protocol';
import { IRestGateway, startServer, type RunningServer } from '../src';
import { fixedTokenAuth } from './helpers/serverHarness';
let tmpDir: string;
let lockPath: string;
let bridgeHome: string;
let server: RunningServer | undefined;
beforeEach(() => {
tmpDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'kimi-server-auth-test-'));
lockPath = join(tmpDir, 'lock');
bridgeHome = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'kimi-server-auth-home-'));
});
afterEach(async () => {
try {
await server?.close();
} catch {
// ignore
}
server = undefined;
rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
rmSync(bridgeHome, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
async function bootDaemon(): Promise<RunningServer> {
server = await startServer({
serviceOverrides: [fixedTokenAuth()],
host: '127.0.0.1',
port: 0,
lockPath,
logger: pino({ level: 'silent' }),
coreProcessOptions: { homeDir: bridgeHome },
});
return server;
}
function appOf(r: RunningServer): {
inject: (req: unknown) => Promise<{ statusCode: number; json: () => unknown }>;
} {
const app = r.services.invokeFunction((a) => {
const gw = a.get(IRestGateway);
return gw.app as unknown as {
inject: (req: unknown) => Promise<{ statusCode: number; json: () => unknown }>;
};
});
// Auto-attach the fixed bearer token so the M5.1 auth hook passes. A
// caller-supplied `authorization` header wins, so explicit token tests keep
// working; every other header (Range, content-type, …) is preserved.
return {
inject(req: unknown) {
const q = req as { headers?: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined> };
return app.inject({
...q,
headers: { authorization: 'Bearer test-token', ...q.headers },
});
},
};
}
function envelopeOf<T>(body: unknown): {
code: number;
msg: string;
data: T | null;
request_id: string;
details?: unknown;
} {
return body as {
code: number;
msg: string;
data: T | null;
request_id: string;
details?: unknown;
};
}
/**
* Seed `<bridgeHome>/config.toml` BEFORE server boot. Path layout matches
* `resolveConfigPath({homeDir})` exactly so KimiCore + AuthSummaryService
* load the same file.
*/
function seedConfig(toml: string): void {
writeFileSync(join(bridgeHome, 'config.toml'), toml, 'utf-8');
}
async function createSession(r: RunningServer): Promise<string> {
const res = await appOf(r).inject({
method: 'POST',
url: '/api/v1/sessions',
payload: { metadata: { cwd: join(tmpDir, 'workspace') } },
});
const env = envelopeOf<{ id: string }>(res.json());
if (env.code !== 0 || env.data === null) {
throw new Error(`create session failed: ${JSON.stringify(env)}`);
}
return env.data.id;
}
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* GET /v1/auth — readiness snapshot */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
describe('GET /api/v1/auth — readiness probe (P2.1 D2)', () => {
it('returns ready=false + zero providers on empty config', async () => {
const r = await bootDaemon();
const res = await appOf(r).inject({ method: 'GET', url: '/api/v1/auth' });
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
const env = envelopeOf<AuthSummary>(res.json());
expect(env.code).toBe(0);
const summary = authSummarySchema.parse(env.data);
expect(summary).toEqual({
ready: false,
providers_count: 0,
default_model: null,
managed_provider: null,
});
});
it('returns ready=false when provider exists but default_model missing', async () => {
seedConfig(
[
'[providers.x]',
'type = "kimi"',
'api_key = "sk-test"',
'',
'[models.x]',
'provider = "x"',
'model = "x"',
'max_context_size = 1000',
'',
].join('\n'),
);
const r = await bootDaemon();
const res = await appOf(r).inject({ method: 'GET', url: '/api/v1/auth' });
const env = envelopeOf<AuthSummary>(res.json());
const summary = authSummarySchema.parse(env.data);
expect(summary.ready).toBe(false);
expect(summary.providers_count).toBe(1);
expect(summary.default_model).toBeNull();
});
it('returns ready=true when provider + api_key + default_model are all set', async () => {
seedConfig(
[
'default_model = "x"',
'',
'[providers.x]',
'type = "kimi"',
'api_key = "sk-test"',
'',
'[models.x]',
'provider = "x"',
'model = "x"',
'max_context_size = 1000',
'',
].join('\n'),
);
const r = await bootDaemon();
const res = await appOf(r).inject({ method: 'GET', url: '/api/v1/auth' });
const env = envelopeOf<AuthSummary>(res.json());
const summary = authSummarySchema.parse(env.data);
expect(summary).toEqual({
ready: true,
providers_count: 1,
default_model: 'x',
managed_provider: null,
});
});
it('surfaces managed_provider.unauthenticated when config has managed:kimi-code but no cached token', async () => {
seedConfig(
[
'[providers."managed:kimi-code"]',
'type = "kimi"',
'base_url = "https://example/v1"',
'',
'[providers."managed:kimi-code".oauth]',
'storage = "file"',
'key = "oauth/kimi-code"',
'',
].join('\n'),
);
const r = await bootDaemon();
const res = await appOf(r).inject({ method: 'GET', url: '/api/v1/auth' });
const env = envelopeOf<AuthSummary>(res.json());
const summary = authSummarySchema.parse(env.data);
expect(summary.managed_provider).toEqual({
name: 'managed:kimi-code',
status: 'unauthenticated',
});
// ready is still false — no default_model, even though provider exists
expect(summary.ready).toBe(false);
});
});
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* POST /sessions/{sid}/prompts — readiness gate */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
describe('POST /api/v1/sessions/{sid}/prompts — readiness gate (P2.1 D1)', () => {
it('returns 40110 with details=null on empty config', async () => {
const r = await bootDaemon();
const sid = await createSession(r);
const res = await appOf(r).inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/prompts`,
payload: {
content: [{ type: 'text', text: 'hello' }],
model: 'x',
thinking: 'off',
permission_mode: 'manual',
plan_mode: false,
},
});
const env = envelopeOf<unknown>(res.json());
expect(env.code).toBe(40110);
expect(env.data).toBeNull();
expect(env.details).toBeNull();
});
it('returns 40111 with details.provider_id when manual provider has no api_key', async () => {
seedConfig(
[
'default_model = "x"',
'',
'[providers.x]',
'type = "kimi"',
'# no api_key',
'',
'[models.x]',
'provider = "x"',
'model = "x"',
'max_context_size = 1000',
'',
].join('\n'),
);
const r = await bootDaemon();
const sid = await createSession(r);
const res = await appOf(r).inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/prompts`,
payload: {
content: [{ type: 'text', text: 'hello' }],
model: 'x',
thinking: 'off',
permission_mode: 'manual',
plan_mode: false,
},
});
const env = envelopeOf<unknown>(res.json());
expect(env.code).toBe(40111);
expect(env.data).toBeNull();
expect(env.details).toEqual({ provider_id: 'x' });
});
it('returns 40113 with details.model_id when default_model alias does not resolve', async () => {
seedConfig(
[
'default_model = "missing-alias"',
'',
'[providers.x]',
'type = "kimi"',
'api_key = "sk-test"',
'',
'[models.x]',
'provider = "x"',
'model = "x"',
'max_context_size = 1000',
'',
].join('\n'),
);
const r = await bootDaemon();
const sid = await createSession(r);
const res = await appOf(r).inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/prompts`,
payload: {
content: [{ type: 'text', text: 'hello' }],
model: 'x',
thinking: 'off',
permission_mode: 'manual',
plan_mode: false,
},
});
const env = envelopeOf<unknown>(res.json());
expect(env.code).toBe(40113);
expect(env.data).toBeNull();
expect(env.details).toEqual({ model_id: 'missing-alias' });
});
it('returns 40113 when default_model is unset (no model_id detail)', async () => {
seedConfig(
[
'[providers.x]',
'type = "kimi"',
'api_key = "sk-test"',
'',
'[models.x]',
'provider = "x"',
'model = "x"',
'max_context_size = 1000',
'',
].join('\n'),
);
const r = await bootDaemon();
const sid = await createSession(r);
const res = await appOf(r).inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/prompts`,
payload: {
content: [{ type: 'text', text: 'hello' }],
model: 'x',
thinking: 'off',
permission_mode: 'manual',
plan_mode: false,
},
});
const env = envelopeOf<unknown>(res.json());
expect(env.code).toBe(40113);
// No model_id in details when default is simply unset — clients should
// route to "select a model" UX rather than "this alias is broken".
expect(env.details).toBeNull();
});
it('passes the readiness gate when provider + key + default_model are all set', async () => {
seedConfig(
[
'default_model = "x"',
'',
'[providers.x]',
'type = "kimi"',
'api_key = "sk-test"',
'',
'[models.x]',
'provider = "x"',
'model = "x"',
'max_context_size = 1000',
'',
].join('\n'),
);
const r = await bootDaemon();
const sid = await createSession(r);
const res = await appOf(r).inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/prompts`,
payload: {
content: [{ type: 'text', text: 'hello' }],
model: 'x',
thinking: 'off',
permission_mode: 'manual',
plan_mode: false,
},
});
const env = envelopeOf<unknown>(res.json());
// The gate passes; bridge.rpc.prompt then runs against the test fixture
// which has no real model wired up. We assert the readiness codes are
// NOT what we see — anything beyond P2.1's scope is "out of band".
expect([40110, 40111, 40112, 40113]).not.toContain(env.code);
});
});