kimi-code/packages/server/test/api-surface.snapshot.test.ts
Haozhe 60dfb68a2d
feat(server): add bearer-token auth and safe host exposure (#1006)
* test(server): add API surface snapshot guardrail

Boot startServer on port 0 and snapshot the documented v1 route table derived from /openapi.json paths, plus the reachability of doc/meta endpoints (/healthz, /openapi.json, /asyncapi.json, /). Gives later auth/--host phases an intentional diff when routes change. M0 makes no production behavior change.

* test(server): add e2e server harness with token support

Add test/helpers/serverHarness.ts: boot() wraps startServer with an isolated lock + home dir and returns a handle (server, address, baseUrl, wsUrl, token, close) plus authedFetch/authedWs that carry Authorization: Bearer <token> (and the kimi-code.bearer.<token> WS subprotocol). serviceOverrides is the generic DI seam later phases use to inject a fixed-token auth service; IAuthTokenService is not referenced yet. closeAll() tears down every booted server and socket. M0 makes no production behavior change; typecheck-only gate.

* feat(server): add privateFiles 0600 atomic write/read utility

* feat(server): add per-start tokenStore

* feat(server): add env-based bcrypt password hash utility

* feat(server): add IAuthTokenService DI seam

* feat(server): add global onRequest auth hook with bypass + redaction

* fix(server): stop reflecting Host header in /asyncapi.json

* feat(server): add WS bearer subprotocol constant and parser

* feat(server): enforce bearer token auth on WS upgrade

* feat(server): add Host header allowlist middleware

* feat(server): add Origin/CORS middleware

* feat(server): wire Host/Origin checks into HTTP and WS

* feat(server): wire token auth, Host/Origin, and WS auth into start.ts

* fix(server): create lock file with 0600 permissions

* fix(server): suppress debug routes on non-loopback binds

* feat(kimi-code): read server token and send Authorization on CLI calls

* feat(kimi-code): inject server token into /web URL fragment

* feat(server): add bindClassify for loopback/lan/public classification

* feat(kimi-code): register --host flag and pass it through the daemon

* feat(server): require password and TLS opt-out on non-loopback binds

* feat(server): rate-limit repeated auth failures on non-loopback binds

* feat(server): disable shutdown and terminals on public binds by default

* feat(server): add security response headers on non-loopback binds

* test(server): cover LAN/public host-exposure hardening end to end

* docs(server): add deployment security and threat-model guide

* changeset: minor kimi-code for server auth and host exposure

* feat(kimi-web): add server bearer-token auth support

* fix: repair CI for server auth and host exposure

- Replace native @node-rs/bcrypt with pure-JS bcryptjs so the ESM CLI
  bundle and the SEA native bundle both build without native-addon
  require issues (node-rs/bcrypt broke the ESM smoke and the SEA
  check-bundle allowlist).
- Remove dead cleanup references (stopSpinner, authLogoBlinkTimer) in
  apps/kimi-web App.vue that failed vue-tsc.
- Fix lint: drop empty spread fallbacks in the e2e auth-header merge,
  void the intentionally-async WS upgrade listener, add missing
  assertions to satisfy jest/expect-expect, and convert a ternary
  statement to if/else.
- Send the bearer token in the snapshot perf/smoke tests so they pass
  under the new global auth hook.
- Refresh the pnpmDeps hash in flake.nix for the updated lockfile.

* feat(server): persist bearer token and add rotate-token command

- persist the server bearer token in <home>/server.token (0600) and reuse it across restarts instead of per-start server-<pid>.token
- add `kimi server rotate-token` to regenerate the token; the token store reloads on mtime/inode change so rotation applies without restart
- print the token and Vite-style Local/Network URLs in the startup banner
- allow non-loopback binds with bearer-token-only auth (password now optional) and update SECURITY.md
- surface daemon boot failures immediately with the exit reason and log tail instead of waiting for the spawn timeout

* feat(server): print full token URLs and re-print links after rotate

- Drop the ready-panel border so token URLs print in full for copying; keep the Kimi sprite beside the title.
- Re-print Local/Network access links after `server rotate-token` (host/port from the lock).
- Extract shared access-URL helpers into access-urls.ts.
- Unify link and token colors between the banner and rotate-token.

* feat(server): dim URL #token= fragment and de-highlight token

- Render the `#token=…` fragment in a dim gray so the host/port stands out in the banner and rotate-token links.
- De-highlight the standalone token; set it off with surrounding whitespace instead of color.
- Add splitTokenFragment helper.

* refactor(cli): polish server ready banner and rotate-token output

- move version onto the ready banner title line; drop the separate
  Ready:/Version: rows and the startup-time metric
- reorder rotate-token output so the new token sits between the
  invalidation note and the access links
- update server CLI tests for the new layout

* feat(server): warn on reuse and refine ready banner

- Warn when `server run` reuses an already-running daemon (its options are not applied) and show the running server's actual URLs.
- Show a `Network: off  use --host 0.0.0.0 to enable` hint on loopback binds.
- Move the version onto the title line and drop the startup-time metric.

* fix(web): relabel auth dialog to token and cover full page

- Relabel the server auth dialog from "password" to "token"; the server accepts the bearer token, with the password only as a fallback.
- Make the auth dialog overlay fully opaque so it covers the whole page instead of revealing the login page underneath.

* fix: resolve CI failures on web auth PR

- Replace chalk.yellow named color with chalk.hex(darkColors.warning)
  in the server reuse notice to satisfy the chalk named color guard.
- Update pnpmDeps hash in flake.nix to match the regenerated
  pnpm-lock.yaml so the Nix build succeeds.
- Retry rmSync in ws-broadcast e2e teardown to ride out EBUSY /
  ENOTEMPTY races while the server flushes files after close().

* test(server): update API surface snapshot for warnings route

The feat/web-auth branch adds GET /api/v1/sessions/{session_id}/warnings
(packages/server/src/routes/sessions.ts), so the API surface guardrail
snapshot needs to record the new documented v1 route.
2026-06-25 17:57:56 +08:00

113 lines
3.9 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* API surface snapshot guardrail (ROADMAP M0.1).
*
* Boots `startServer` on port 0 with a tmpdir lock + isolated home dir, then
* records a stable, sorted snapshot of the documented API surface:
*
* - `routes`: every `[METHOD, path]` pair derived from `/openapi.json`
* `paths` (the documented v1 REST surface). This is the guardrail's target:
* later phases that add / remove / hide routes show an intentional diff.
* - `meta`: the `(method, url, status)` of doc/meta endpoints that sit
* outside `paths` (`/healthz`, `/openapi.json`, `/asyncapi.json`, `/`).
* Status codes prove reachability.
*
* `startServer` does not expose the Fastify `app`, so the surface is read
* through the public `/openapi.json` endpoint rather than by inspecting the
* route table directly — keeping M0 a no-behavior-change phase.
*/
import { mkdtempSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { pino } from 'pino';
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { startServer, type RunningServer } from '../src';
import { authHeaders, fixedTokenAuth } from './helpers/serverHarness';
/** OpenAPI path-item keys that are HTTP methods (skip `parameters`, etc.). */
const HTTP_METHODS = new Set([
'get',
'put',
'post',
'delete',
'options',
'head',
'patch',
'trace',
]);
/** Meta endpoints outside the OpenAPI `paths` map to probe for reachability. */
const META_ENDPOINTS = ['/healthz', '/openapi.json', '/asyncapi.json', '/'];
describe('API surface snapshot', () => {
let tmpDir: string | undefined;
let bridgeHome: string | undefined;
let server: RunningServer | undefined;
afterEach(async () => {
if (server !== undefined) {
try {
await server.close();
} catch {
// ignore — best-effort teardown
}
server = undefined;
}
if (tmpDir !== undefined) {
rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
tmpDir = undefined;
}
if (bridgeHome !== undefined) {
rmSync(bridgeHome, { recursive: true, force: true });
bridgeHome = undefined;
}
});
it('matches the documented v1 route table and meta endpoints', async () => {
tmpDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'kimi-server-api-surface-'));
bridgeHome = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'kimi-server-api-surface-home-'));
const lockPath = join(tmpDir, 'lock');
server = await startServer({
serviceOverrides: [fixedTokenAuth()],
host: '127.0.0.1',
port: 0,
lockPath,
logger: pino({ level: 'silent' }),
coreProcessOptions: { homeDir: bridgeHome },
});
const address = server.address;
// 1) Documented v1 REST surface, derived from /openapi.json `paths`.
const openApiRes = await fetch(`${address}/openapi.json`, { headers: authHeaders() });
expect(openApiRes.status).toBe(200);
const openApi = (await openApiRes.json()) as {
paths?: Record<string, Record<string, unknown>>;
};
const paths = openApi.paths ?? {};
expect(Object.keys(paths).length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
const routes: Array<[string, string]> = [];
for (const [path, item] of Object.entries(paths)) {
for (const key of Object.keys(item)) {
if (HTTP_METHODS.has(key.toLowerCase())) {
routes.push([key.toUpperCase(), path]);
}
}
}
routes.sort((a, b) => a[0].localeCompare(b[0]) || a[1].localeCompare(b[1]));
// 2) Doc/meta endpoints that are not part of the OpenAPI `paths` map.
const meta: Array<[string, string, number]> = [];
for (const endpoint of META_ENDPOINTS) {
const res = await fetch(`${address}${endpoint}`, { headers: authHeaders() });
meta.push(['GET', endpoint, res.status]);
}
meta.sort((a, b) => a[0].localeCompare(b[0]) || a[1].localeCompare(b[1]) || a[2] - b[2]);
expect({ routes, meta }).toMatchSnapshot();
});
});