kimi-code/packages/server/test/ws-abort.e2e.test.ts
Haozhe 60dfb68a2d
feat(server): add bearer-token auth and safe host exposure (#1006)
* test(server): add API surface snapshot guardrail

Boot startServer on port 0 and snapshot the documented v1 route table derived from /openapi.json paths, plus the reachability of doc/meta endpoints (/healthz, /openapi.json, /asyncapi.json, /). Gives later auth/--host phases an intentional diff when routes change. M0 makes no production behavior change.

* test(server): add e2e server harness with token support

Add test/helpers/serverHarness.ts: boot() wraps startServer with an isolated lock + home dir and returns a handle (server, address, baseUrl, wsUrl, token, close) plus authedFetch/authedWs that carry Authorization: Bearer <token> (and the kimi-code.bearer.<token> WS subprotocol). serviceOverrides is the generic DI seam later phases use to inject a fixed-token auth service; IAuthTokenService is not referenced yet. closeAll() tears down every booted server and socket. M0 makes no production behavior change; typecheck-only gate.

* feat(server): add privateFiles 0600 atomic write/read utility

* feat(server): add per-start tokenStore

* feat(server): add env-based bcrypt password hash utility

* feat(server): add IAuthTokenService DI seam

* feat(server): add global onRequest auth hook with bypass + redaction

* fix(server): stop reflecting Host header in /asyncapi.json

* feat(server): add WS bearer subprotocol constant and parser

* feat(server): enforce bearer token auth on WS upgrade

* feat(server): add Host header allowlist middleware

* feat(server): add Origin/CORS middleware

* feat(server): wire Host/Origin checks into HTTP and WS

* feat(server): wire token auth, Host/Origin, and WS auth into start.ts

* fix(server): create lock file with 0600 permissions

* fix(server): suppress debug routes on non-loopback binds

* feat(kimi-code): read server token and send Authorization on CLI calls

* feat(kimi-code): inject server token into /web URL fragment

* feat(server): add bindClassify for loopback/lan/public classification

* feat(kimi-code): register --host flag and pass it through the daemon

* feat(server): require password and TLS opt-out on non-loopback binds

* feat(server): rate-limit repeated auth failures on non-loopback binds

* feat(server): disable shutdown and terminals on public binds by default

* feat(server): add security response headers on non-loopback binds

* test(server): cover LAN/public host-exposure hardening end to end

* docs(server): add deployment security and threat-model guide

* changeset: minor kimi-code for server auth and host exposure

* feat(kimi-web): add server bearer-token auth support

* fix: repair CI for server auth and host exposure

- Replace native @node-rs/bcrypt with pure-JS bcryptjs so the ESM CLI
  bundle and the SEA native bundle both build without native-addon
  require issues (node-rs/bcrypt broke the ESM smoke and the SEA
  check-bundle allowlist).
- Remove dead cleanup references (stopSpinner, authLogoBlinkTimer) in
  apps/kimi-web App.vue that failed vue-tsc.
- Fix lint: drop empty spread fallbacks in the e2e auth-header merge,
  void the intentionally-async WS upgrade listener, add missing
  assertions to satisfy jest/expect-expect, and convert a ternary
  statement to if/else.
- Send the bearer token in the snapshot perf/smoke tests so they pass
  under the new global auth hook.
- Refresh the pnpmDeps hash in flake.nix for the updated lockfile.

* feat(server): persist bearer token and add rotate-token command

- persist the server bearer token in <home>/server.token (0600) and reuse it across restarts instead of per-start server-<pid>.token
- add `kimi server rotate-token` to regenerate the token; the token store reloads on mtime/inode change so rotation applies without restart
- print the token and Vite-style Local/Network URLs in the startup banner
- allow non-loopback binds with bearer-token-only auth (password now optional) and update SECURITY.md
- surface daemon boot failures immediately with the exit reason and log tail instead of waiting for the spawn timeout

* feat(server): print full token URLs and re-print links after rotate

- Drop the ready-panel border so token URLs print in full for copying; keep the Kimi sprite beside the title.
- Re-print Local/Network access links after `server rotate-token` (host/port from the lock).
- Extract shared access-URL helpers into access-urls.ts.
- Unify link and token colors between the banner and rotate-token.

* feat(server): dim URL #token= fragment and de-highlight token

- Render the `#token=…` fragment in a dim gray so the host/port stands out in the banner and rotate-token links.
- De-highlight the standalone token; set it off with surrounding whitespace instead of color.
- Add splitTokenFragment helper.

* refactor(cli): polish server ready banner and rotate-token output

- move version onto the ready banner title line; drop the separate
  Ready:/Version: rows and the startup-time metric
- reorder rotate-token output so the new token sits between the
  invalidation note and the access links
- update server CLI tests for the new layout

* feat(server): warn on reuse and refine ready banner

- Warn when `server run` reuses an already-running daemon (its options are not applied) and show the running server's actual URLs.
- Show a `Network: off  use --host 0.0.0.0 to enable` hint on loopback binds.
- Move the version onto the title line and drop the startup-time metric.

* fix(web): relabel auth dialog to token and cover full page

- Relabel the server auth dialog from "password" to "token"; the server accepts the bearer token, with the password only as a fallback.
- Make the auth dialog overlay fully opaque so it covers the whole page instead of revealing the login page underneath.

* fix: resolve CI failures on web auth PR

- Replace chalk.yellow named color with chalk.hex(darkColors.warning)
  in the server reuse notice to satisfy the chalk named color guard.
- Update pnpmDeps hash in flake.nix to match the regenerated
  pnpm-lock.yaml so the Nix build succeeds.
- Retry rmSync in ws-broadcast e2e teardown to ride out EBUSY /
  ENOTEMPTY races while the server flushes files after close().

* test(server): update API surface snapshot for warnings route

The feat/web-auth branch adds GET /api/v1/sessions/{session_id}/warnings
(packages/server/src/routes/sessions.ts), so the API surface guardrail
snapshot needs to record the new documented v1 route.
2026-06-25 17:57:56 +08:00

385 lines
12 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* WS abort + REST/WS abort symmetry e2e (W7.3 / Chain 4b / P1.4b).
*
* **Bootstrap strategy**: spawn the real server, register an active prompt
* via `PromptService._injectActiveForTest` (avoids running a real
* agent-core prompt), then exercise:
* 1. WS `abort` control message → server publishes `prompt.aborted`
* synthetic event + sends ack with `aborted: true`.
* 2. WS `abort` idempotency: second abort returns
* `code: 0, payload.aborted: false` (per WS.md §3.4 convention —
* NOT REST's 40903, intentional).
* 3. REST `POST /api/v1/sessions/{sid}/prompts/{pid}:abort`:
* - Returns `{aborted: true}` on first call.
* - Returns `code: 40903 + data: {aborted: false}` on second
* (idempotent already-completed) per REST.md §3.5.
* 4. **Symmetry**: REST and WS abort dispatch through the same
* handler (`IPromptService.abort`). After a REST abort, a WS abort
* with the SAME prompt id returns idempotent success. And vice versa.
*
* The synthesized `prompt.aborted` event flows through IEventService → WS
* broadcast so subscribers see it.
*/
import { mkdtempSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { pino } from 'pino';
import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { WebSocket } from 'ws';
import { IPromptService, PromptService } from '@moonshot-ai/agent-core';
import { IRestGateway, startServer, type RunningServer } from '../src';
import { fixedTokenAuth } from './helpers/serverHarness';
import { rawDataToString } from '../src/ws/rawData';
let tmpDir: string;
let lockPath: string;
let bridgeHome: string;
let server: RunningServer | undefined;
beforeEach(() => {
tmpDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'kimi-server-ws-abort-'));
lockPath = join(tmpDir, 'lock');
bridgeHome = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'kimi-server-ws-abort-home-'));
});
afterEach(async () => {
try {
await server?.close();
} catch {
// ignore
}
server = undefined;
rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
rmSync(bridgeHome, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
async function bootDaemon(): Promise<RunningServer> {
server = await startServer({
serviceOverrides: [fixedTokenAuth()],
host: '127.0.0.1',
port: 0,
lockPath,
logger: pino({ level: 'silent' }),
coreProcessOptions: { homeDir: bridgeHome },
wsGatewayOptions: { pingIntervalMs: 5_000, pongTimeoutMs: 5_000 },
});
return server;
}
function appOf(r: RunningServer): {
inject: (req: unknown) => Promise<{ statusCode: number; json: () => unknown }>;
} {
const app = r.services.invokeFunction((a) => {
const gw = a.get(IRestGateway);
return gw.app as unknown as {
inject: (req: unknown) => Promise<{ statusCode: number; json: () => unknown }>;
};
});
// Auto-attach the fixed bearer token so the M5.1 auth hook passes. A
// caller-supplied `authorization` header wins, so explicit token tests keep
// working; every other header (Range, content-type, …) is preserved.
return {
inject(req: unknown) {
const q = req as { headers?: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined> };
return app.inject({
...q,
headers: { authorization: 'Bearer test-token', ...q.headers },
});
},
};
}
function envelopeOf<T>(body: unknown): {
code: number;
msg: string;
data: T | null;
request_id: string;
details?: unknown;
} {
return body as {
code: number;
msg: string;
data: T | null;
request_id: string;
details?: unknown;
};
}
async function createSession(r: RunningServer): Promise<string> {
const res = await appOf(r).inject({
method: 'POST',
url: '/api/v1/sessions',
payload: { metadata: { cwd: join(tmpDir, 'workspace') } },
});
const env = envelopeOf<{ id: string }>(res.json());
if (env.code !== 0 || env.data === null) {
throw new Error(`create session failed: ${JSON.stringify(env)}`);
}
return env.data.id;
}
function injectActivePrompt(
r: RunningServer,
sid: string,
promptId: string,
turnId: number | null,
): void {
const impl = r.services.invokeFunction(
(a) => a.get(IPromptService) as PromptService,
);
impl._injectActiveForTest(sid, promptId, turnId);
}
interface Subscriber {
ws: WebSocket;
received: Record<string, unknown>[];
}
async function openSubscriber(r: RunningServer, sid: string): Promise<Subscriber> {
const wsUrl = r.address.replace('http://', 'ws://') + '/api/v1/ws';
const received: Record<string, unknown>[] = [];
const ws = await new Promise<WebSocket>((resolve, reject) => {
const sock = new WebSocket(wsUrl, ['kimi-code.bearer.test-token']);
sock.on('message', (data) => {
try {
received.push(JSON.parse(rawDataToString(data)) as Record<string, unknown>);
} catch {
// ignore
}
});
sock.once('open', () => resolve(sock));
sock.once('error', reject);
});
await waitFor(received, (f) => f['type'] === 'server_hello');
ws.send(
JSON.stringify({
type: 'client_hello',
id: 'h1',
payload: { client_id: 'test', subscriptions: [sid] },
}),
);
await waitFor(received, (f) => f['type'] === 'ack' && f['id'] === 'h1');
return { ws, received };
}
async function waitFor(
received: Record<string, unknown>[],
pred: (f: Record<string, unknown>) => boolean,
timeoutMs = 2000,
): Promise<Record<string, unknown>> {
const start = Date.now();
while (Date.now() - start < timeoutMs) {
const hit = received.find(pred);
if (hit !== undefined) return hit;
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 10));
}
throw new Error(
`waitFor timed out; received: ${received.map((f) => f['type']).join(', ')}`,
);
}
describe('WS abort control message (W7.3 / Chain 4b)', () => {
it('on first abort: ack with aborted:true + broadcast prompt.aborted', async () => {
const r = await bootDaemon();
const sid = await createSession(r);
const promptId = `prompt_WS_ABORT_${sid}`;
injectActivePrompt(r, sid, promptId, 5);
const sub = await openSubscriber(r, sid);
sub.ws.send(
JSON.stringify({
type: 'abort',
id: 'a1',
payload: { session_id: sid, prompt_id: promptId },
}),
);
// Wait for both the ack AND the broadcast prompt.aborted.
const ack = await waitFor(
sub.received,
(f) => f['type'] === 'ack' && f['id'] === 'a1',
);
expect(ack['code']).toBe(0);
const payload = ack['payload'] as { aborted: boolean };
expect(payload.aborted).toBe(true);
const promptAborted = await waitFor(
sub.received,
(f) => f['type'] === 'prompt.aborted',
);
const evPayload = promptAborted['payload'] as { promptId: string };
expect(evPayload.promptId).toBe(promptId);
sub.ws.close();
});
it('on second abort: ack with code:0 + aborted:false (idempotent per WS.md §3.4)', async () => {
const r = await bootDaemon();
const sid = await createSession(r);
const promptId = `prompt_WS_DUP_${sid}`;
injectActivePrompt(r, sid, promptId, null);
const sub = await openSubscriber(r, sid);
sub.ws.send(
JSON.stringify({
type: 'abort',
id: 'a1',
payload: { session_id: sid, prompt_id: promptId },
}),
);
await waitFor(sub.received, (f) => f['type'] === 'ack' && f['id'] === 'a1');
sub.ws.send(
JSON.stringify({
type: 'abort',
id: 'a2',
payload: { session_id: sid, prompt_id: promptId },
}),
);
const ack = await waitFor(
sub.received,
(f) => f['type'] === 'ack' && f['id'] === 'a2',
);
expect(ack['code']).toBe(0);
expect((ack['payload'] as { aborted: boolean }).aborted).toBe(false);
sub.ws.close();
});
it('returns 40402 for an unknown prompt id', async () => {
const r = await bootDaemon();
const sid = await createSession(r);
const sub = await openSubscriber(r, sid);
sub.ws.send(
JSON.stringify({
type: 'abort',
id: 'a1',
payload: { session_id: sid, prompt_id: 'prompt_does_not_exist' },
}),
);
const ack = await waitFor(
sub.received,
(f) => f['type'] === 'ack' && f['id'] === 'a1',
);
expect(ack['code']).toBe(40402);
sub.ws.close();
});
});
describe('REST abort + REST/WS symmetry (W7.3 / Chain 4b)', () => {
it('first REST abort returns {aborted: true}', async () => {
const r = await bootDaemon();
const sid = await createSession(r);
const promptId = `prompt_REST_${sid}`;
injectActivePrompt(r, sid, promptId, 1);
const res = await appOf(r).inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/prompts/${promptId}:abort`,
});
const env = envelopeOf<{ aborted: boolean }>(res.json());
expect(env.code).toBe(0);
expect(env.data?.aborted).toBe(true);
});
it('second REST abort returns 40903 + data {aborted: false}', async () => {
const r = await bootDaemon();
const sid = await createSession(r);
const promptId = `prompt_REST_DUP_${sid}`;
injectActivePrompt(r, sid, promptId, 2);
await appOf(r).inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/prompts/${promptId}:abort`,
});
const res = await appOf(r).inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/prompts/${promptId}:abort`,
});
const env = envelopeOf<{ aborted: boolean }>(res.json());
expect(env.code).toBe(40903);
expect(env.data?.aborted).toBe(false);
});
it('REST abort returns 40401 for unknown session', async () => {
const r = await bootDaemon();
const res = await appOf(r).inject({
method: 'POST',
url: '/api/v1/sessions/sess_missing/prompts/prompt_X:abort',
});
const env = envelopeOf<unknown>(res.json());
expect(env.code).toBe(40401);
});
it('REST abort returns 40402 for unknown prompt on a known session', async () => {
const r = await bootDaemon();
const sid = await createSession(r);
const res = await appOf(r).inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/prompts/prompt_missing:abort`,
});
const env = envelopeOf<unknown>(res.json());
expect(env.code).toBe(40402);
});
it('symmetry: REST abort followed by WS abort on the SAME prompt id returns idempotent WS ack', async () => {
const r = await bootDaemon();
const sid = await createSession(r);
const promptId = `prompt_SYM1_${sid}`;
injectActivePrompt(r, sid, promptId, 3);
// First abort via REST → success.
const rest = await appOf(r).inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/prompts/${promptId}:abort`,
});
expect(envelopeOf<{ aborted: boolean }>(rest.json()).data?.aborted).toBe(true);
// Second abort via WS — must be idempotent (code 0 + aborted: false).
const sub = await openSubscriber(r, sid);
sub.ws.send(
JSON.stringify({
type: 'abort',
id: 'a1',
payload: { session_id: sid, prompt_id: promptId },
}),
);
const ack = await waitFor(
sub.received,
(f) => f['type'] === 'ack' && f['id'] === 'a1',
);
expect(ack['code']).toBe(0);
expect((ack['payload'] as { aborted: boolean }).aborted).toBe(false);
sub.ws.close();
});
it('symmetry: WS abort followed by REST abort returns 40903 on REST', async () => {
const r = await bootDaemon();
const sid = await createSession(r);
const promptId = `prompt_SYM2_${sid}`;
injectActivePrompt(r, sid, promptId, 4);
// First abort via WS.
const sub = await openSubscriber(r, sid);
sub.ws.send(
JSON.stringify({
type: 'abort',
id: 'a1',
payload: { session_id: sid, prompt_id: promptId },
}),
);
await waitFor(sub.received, (f) => f['type'] === 'ack' && f['id'] === 'a1');
// Second abort via REST — must surface 40903 already_completed.
const res = await appOf(r).inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/prompts/${promptId}:abort`,
});
const env = envelopeOf<{ aborted: boolean }>(res.json());
expect(env.code).toBe(40903);
expect(env.data?.aborted).toBe(false);
sub.ws.close();
});
});