kimi-code/packages/server/test/rate-limit.test.ts
Haozhe 60dfb68a2d
feat(server): add bearer-token auth and safe host exposure (#1006)
* test(server): add API surface snapshot guardrail

Boot startServer on port 0 and snapshot the documented v1 route table derived from /openapi.json paths, plus the reachability of doc/meta endpoints (/healthz, /openapi.json, /asyncapi.json, /). Gives later auth/--host phases an intentional diff when routes change. M0 makes no production behavior change.

* test(server): add e2e server harness with token support

Add test/helpers/serverHarness.ts: boot() wraps startServer with an isolated lock + home dir and returns a handle (server, address, baseUrl, wsUrl, token, close) plus authedFetch/authedWs that carry Authorization: Bearer <token> (and the kimi-code.bearer.<token> WS subprotocol). serviceOverrides is the generic DI seam later phases use to inject a fixed-token auth service; IAuthTokenService is not referenced yet. closeAll() tears down every booted server and socket. M0 makes no production behavior change; typecheck-only gate.

* feat(server): add privateFiles 0600 atomic write/read utility

* feat(server): add per-start tokenStore

* feat(server): add env-based bcrypt password hash utility

* feat(server): add IAuthTokenService DI seam

* feat(server): add global onRequest auth hook with bypass + redaction

* fix(server): stop reflecting Host header in /asyncapi.json

* feat(server): add WS bearer subprotocol constant and parser

* feat(server): enforce bearer token auth on WS upgrade

* feat(server): add Host header allowlist middleware

* feat(server): add Origin/CORS middleware

* feat(server): wire Host/Origin checks into HTTP and WS

* feat(server): wire token auth, Host/Origin, and WS auth into start.ts

* fix(server): create lock file with 0600 permissions

* fix(server): suppress debug routes on non-loopback binds

* feat(kimi-code): read server token and send Authorization on CLI calls

* feat(kimi-code): inject server token into /web URL fragment

* feat(server): add bindClassify for loopback/lan/public classification

* feat(kimi-code): register --host flag and pass it through the daemon

* feat(server): require password and TLS opt-out on non-loopback binds

* feat(server): rate-limit repeated auth failures on non-loopback binds

* feat(server): disable shutdown and terminals on public binds by default

* feat(server): add security response headers on non-loopback binds

* test(server): cover LAN/public host-exposure hardening end to end

* docs(server): add deployment security and threat-model guide

* changeset: minor kimi-code for server auth and host exposure

* feat(kimi-web): add server bearer-token auth support

* fix: repair CI for server auth and host exposure

- Replace native @node-rs/bcrypt with pure-JS bcryptjs so the ESM CLI
  bundle and the SEA native bundle both build without native-addon
  require issues (node-rs/bcrypt broke the ESM smoke and the SEA
  check-bundle allowlist).
- Remove dead cleanup references (stopSpinner, authLogoBlinkTimer) in
  apps/kimi-web App.vue that failed vue-tsc.
- Fix lint: drop empty spread fallbacks in the e2e auth-header merge,
  void the intentionally-async WS upgrade listener, add missing
  assertions to satisfy jest/expect-expect, and convert a ternary
  statement to if/else.
- Send the bearer token in the snapshot perf/smoke tests so they pass
  under the new global auth hook.
- Refresh the pnpmDeps hash in flake.nix for the updated lockfile.

* feat(server): persist bearer token and add rotate-token command

- persist the server bearer token in <home>/server.token (0600) and reuse it across restarts instead of per-start server-<pid>.token
- add `kimi server rotate-token` to regenerate the token; the token store reloads on mtime/inode change so rotation applies without restart
- print the token and Vite-style Local/Network URLs in the startup banner
- allow non-loopback binds with bearer-token-only auth (password now optional) and update SECURITY.md
- surface daemon boot failures immediately with the exit reason and log tail instead of waiting for the spawn timeout

* feat(server): print full token URLs and re-print links after rotate

- Drop the ready-panel border so token URLs print in full for copying; keep the Kimi sprite beside the title.
- Re-print Local/Network access links after `server rotate-token` (host/port from the lock).
- Extract shared access-URL helpers into access-urls.ts.
- Unify link and token colors between the banner and rotate-token.

* feat(server): dim URL #token= fragment and de-highlight token

- Render the `#token=…` fragment in a dim gray so the host/port stands out in the banner and rotate-token links.
- De-highlight the standalone token; set it off with surrounding whitespace instead of color.
- Add splitTokenFragment helper.

* refactor(cli): polish server ready banner and rotate-token output

- move version onto the ready banner title line; drop the separate
  Ready:/Version: rows and the startup-time metric
- reorder rotate-token output so the new token sits between the
  invalidation note and the access links
- update server CLI tests for the new layout

* feat(server): warn on reuse and refine ready banner

- Warn when `server run` reuses an already-running daemon (its options are not applied) and show the running server's actual URLs.
- Show a `Network: off  use --host 0.0.0.0 to enable` hint on loopback binds.
- Move the version onto the title line and drop the startup-time metric.

* fix(web): relabel auth dialog to token and cover full page

- Relabel the server auth dialog from "password" to "token"; the server accepts the bearer token, with the password only as a fallback.
- Make the auth dialog overlay fully opaque so it covers the whole page instead of revealing the login page underneath.

* fix: resolve CI failures on web auth PR

- Replace chalk.yellow named color with chalk.hex(darkColors.warning)
  in the server reuse notice to satisfy the chalk named color guard.
- Update pnpmDeps hash in flake.nix to match the regenerated
  pnpm-lock.yaml so the Nix build succeeds.
- Retry rmSync in ws-broadcast e2e teardown to ride out EBUSY /
  ENOTEMPTY races while the server flushes files after close().

* test(server): update API surface snapshot for warnings route

The feat/web-auth branch adds GET /api/v1/sessions/{session_id}/warnings
(packages/server/src/routes/sessions.ts), so the API surface guardrail
snapshot needs to record the new documented v1 route.
2026-06-25 17:57:56 +08:00

165 lines
5.5 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Auth-failure rate limiting (ROADMAP M6.4).
*
* Two layers:
* 1. `createAuthFailureLimiter` unit behavior — failure counting, ban on
* threshold, ban expiry (fake timers), and window reset.
* 2. `createAuthHook` integration — a banned source gets `429` (even with a
* valid token), a different source still gets `401`, and a hook without a
* limiter (the loopback wiring) never returns `429`.
*
* Distinct source IPs are expressed via `X-Forwarded-For` with Fastify
* `trustProxy: true`, which is what `req.ip` reads behind a reverse proxy.
*/
import Fastify, { type FastifyInstance } from 'fastify';
import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import { createAuthHook } from '#/middleware/auth';
import {
createAuthFailureLimiter,
type AuthFailureLimiter,
} from '#/middleware/rateLimit';
import type { IAuthTokenService } from '#/services/auth/authTokenService';
const TOKEN = 'test-token';
const IP_A = '203.0.113.10';
const IP_B = '203.0.113.11';
function fixedImpl(): IAuthTokenService {
return {
_serviceBrand: undefined,
getToken: () => TOKEN,
isValid: async (candidate) => candidate === TOKEN,
};
}
function buildApp(limiter?: AuthFailureLimiter): FastifyInstance {
const app = Fastify({ trustProxy: true });
app.addHook('onRequest', createAuthHook(fixedImpl(), { limiter }));
app.get('/api/v1/sessions', async () => ({ ok: true }));
return app;
}
function badToken(ip: string): { method: 'GET'; url: string; headers: Record<string, string> } {
return {
method: 'GET',
url: '/api/v1/sessions',
headers: { 'x-forwarded-for': ip, authorization: 'Bearer wrong-token' },
};
}
describe('createAuthHook rate limiting (M6.4)', () => {
let app: FastifyInstance;
let limiter: AuthFailureLimiter;
beforeEach(async () => {
limiter = createAuthFailureLimiter({ maxFailures: 3, windowMs: 60_000, banMs: 60_000 });
app = buildApp(limiter);
await app.ready();
});
afterEach(async () => {
await app.close();
limiter.dispose();
});
it('returns 401 for the first N failures, then 429 on the (N+1)th from the same IP', async () => {
expect((await app.inject(badToken(IP_A))).statusCode).toBe(401);
expect((await app.inject(badToken(IP_A))).statusCode).toBe(401);
expect((await app.inject(badToken(IP_A))).statusCode).toBe(401);
const fourth = await app.inject(badToken(IP_A));
expect(fourth.statusCode).toBe(429);
const body = fourth.json() as Record<string, unknown>;
expect(body['code']).toBe(42901);
expect(body['msg']).toBe('Too many failed auth attempts');
});
it('does not ban a different IP that has not hit the threshold', async () => {
// Push IP_A over the threshold.
await app.inject(badToken(IP_A));
await app.inject(badToken(IP_A));
await app.inject(badToken(IP_A));
expect((await app.inject(badToken(IP_A))).statusCode).toBe(429);
// IP_B is a fresh source — still 401, not 429.
expect((await app.inject(badToken(IP_B))).statusCode).toBe(401);
});
it('returns 429 to a banned IP even when it presents a valid token', async () => {
await app.inject(badToken(IP_A));
await app.inject(badToken(IP_A));
await app.inject(badToken(IP_A));
expect((await app.inject(badToken(IP_A))).statusCode).toBe(429);
const valid = await app.inject({
method: 'GET',
url: '/api/v1/sessions',
headers: { 'x-forwarded-for': IP_A, authorization: `Bearer ${TOKEN}` },
});
expect(valid.statusCode).toBe(429);
});
it('never returns 429 when no limiter is wired (loopback behavior)', async () => {
const noLimiterApp = buildApp(undefined);
await noLimiterApp.ready();
try {
for (let i = 0; i < 10; i += 1) {
expect((await noLimiterApp.inject(badToken(IP_A))).statusCode).toBe(401);
}
} finally {
await noLimiterApp.close();
}
});
});
describe('createAuthFailureLimiter (unit)', () => {
afterEach(() => {
vi.useRealTimers();
});
it('bans a source at the threshold and clears the ban after banMs', () => {
vi.useFakeTimers();
const limiter = createAuthFailureLimiter({ maxFailures: 2, windowMs: 1_000, banMs: 500 });
try {
expect(limiter.isBanned('1.2.3.4')).toBe(false);
limiter.recordFailure('1.2.3.4');
expect(limiter.isBanned('1.2.3.4')).toBe(false);
limiter.recordFailure('1.2.3.4');
expect(limiter.isBanned('1.2.3.4')).toBe(true);
vi.advanceTimersByTime(499);
expect(limiter.isBanned('1.2.3.4')).toBe(true);
vi.advanceTimersByTime(1);
expect(limiter.isBanned('1.2.3.4')).toBe(false);
} finally {
limiter.dispose();
}
});
it('resets the failure count once the window elapses', () => {
vi.useFakeTimers();
const limiter = createAuthFailureLimiter({ maxFailures: 2, windowMs: 1_000, banMs: 500 });
try {
limiter.recordFailure('5.5.5.5');
vi.advanceTimersByTime(1_001); // window expired → next failure starts fresh
limiter.recordFailure('5.5.5.5');
// Only one failure in the new window → not banned.
expect(limiter.isBanned('5.5.5.5')).toBe(false);
} finally {
limiter.dispose();
}
});
it('tracks sources independently', () => {
vi.useFakeTimers();
const limiter = createAuthFailureLimiter({ maxFailures: 1, windowMs: 1_000, banMs: 500 });
try {
limiter.recordFailure('9.9.9.9');
expect(limiter.isBanned('9.9.9.9')).toBe(true);
expect(limiter.isBanned('8.8.8.8')).toBe(false);
} finally {
limiter.dispose();
}
});
});