mirror of
https://github.com/MoonshotAI/kimi-code.git
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* test(server): add API surface snapshot guardrail
Boot startServer on port 0 and snapshot the documented v1 route table derived from /openapi.json paths, plus the reachability of doc/meta endpoints (/healthz, /openapi.json, /asyncapi.json, /). Gives later auth/--host phases an intentional diff when routes change. M0 makes no production behavior change.
* test(server): add e2e server harness with token support
Add test/helpers/serverHarness.ts: boot() wraps startServer with an isolated lock + home dir and returns a handle (server, address, baseUrl, wsUrl, token, close) plus authedFetch/authedWs that carry Authorization: Bearer <token> (and the kimi-code.bearer.<token> WS subprotocol). serviceOverrides is the generic DI seam later phases use to inject a fixed-token auth service; IAuthTokenService is not referenced yet. closeAll() tears down every booted server and socket. M0 makes no production behavior change; typecheck-only gate.
* feat(server): add privateFiles 0600 atomic write/read utility
* feat(server): add per-start tokenStore
* feat(server): add env-based bcrypt password hash utility
* feat(server): add IAuthTokenService DI seam
* feat(server): add global onRequest auth hook with bypass + redaction
* fix(server): stop reflecting Host header in /asyncapi.json
* feat(server): add WS bearer subprotocol constant and parser
* feat(server): enforce bearer token auth on WS upgrade
* feat(server): add Host header allowlist middleware
* feat(server): add Origin/CORS middleware
* feat(server): wire Host/Origin checks into HTTP and WS
* feat(server): wire token auth, Host/Origin, and WS auth into start.ts
* fix(server): create lock file with 0600 permissions
* fix(server): suppress debug routes on non-loopback binds
* feat(kimi-code): read server token and send Authorization on CLI calls
* feat(kimi-code): inject server token into /web URL fragment
* feat(server): add bindClassify for loopback/lan/public classification
* feat(kimi-code): register --host flag and pass it through the daemon
* feat(server): require password and TLS opt-out on non-loopback binds
* feat(server): rate-limit repeated auth failures on non-loopback binds
* feat(server): disable shutdown and terminals on public binds by default
* feat(server): add security response headers on non-loopback binds
* test(server): cover LAN/public host-exposure hardening end to end
* docs(server): add deployment security and threat-model guide
* changeset: minor kimi-code for server auth and host exposure
* feat(kimi-web): add server bearer-token auth support
* fix: repair CI for server auth and host exposure
- Replace native @node-rs/bcrypt with pure-JS bcryptjs so the ESM CLI
bundle and the SEA native bundle both build without native-addon
require issues (node-rs/bcrypt broke the ESM smoke and the SEA
check-bundle allowlist).
- Remove dead cleanup references (stopSpinner, authLogoBlinkTimer) in
apps/kimi-web App.vue that failed vue-tsc.
- Fix lint: drop empty spread fallbacks in the e2e auth-header merge,
void the intentionally-async WS upgrade listener, add missing
assertions to satisfy jest/expect-expect, and convert a ternary
statement to if/else.
- Send the bearer token in the snapshot perf/smoke tests so they pass
under the new global auth hook.
- Refresh the pnpmDeps hash in flake.nix for the updated lockfile.
* feat(server): persist bearer token and add rotate-token command
- persist the server bearer token in <home>/server.token (0600) and reuse it across restarts instead of per-start server-<pid>.token
- add `kimi server rotate-token` to regenerate the token; the token store reloads on mtime/inode change so rotation applies without restart
- print the token and Vite-style Local/Network URLs in the startup banner
- allow non-loopback binds with bearer-token-only auth (password now optional) and update SECURITY.md
- surface daemon boot failures immediately with the exit reason and log tail instead of waiting for the spawn timeout
* feat(server): print full token URLs and re-print links after rotate
- Drop the ready-panel border so token URLs print in full for copying; keep the Kimi sprite beside the title.
- Re-print Local/Network access links after `server rotate-token` (host/port from the lock).
- Extract shared access-URL helpers into access-urls.ts.
- Unify link and token colors between the banner and rotate-token.
* feat(server): dim URL #token= fragment and de-highlight token
- Render the `#token=…` fragment in a dim gray so the host/port stands out in the banner and rotate-token links.
- De-highlight the standalone token; set it off with surrounding whitespace instead of color.
- Add splitTokenFragment helper.
* refactor(cli): polish server ready banner and rotate-token output
- move version onto the ready banner title line; drop the separate
Ready:/Version: rows and the startup-time metric
- reorder rotate-token output so the new token sits between the
invalidation note and the access links
- update server CLI tests for the new layout
* feat(server): warn on reuse and refine ready banner
- Warn when `server run` reuses an already-running daemon (its options are not applied) and show the running server's actual URLs.
- Show a `Network: off use --host 0.0.0.0 to enable` hint on loopback binds.
- Move the version onto the title line and drop the startup-time metric.
* fix(web): relabel auth dialog to token and cover full page
- Relabel the server auth dialog from "password" to "token"; the server accepts the bearer token, with the password only as a fallback.
- Make the auth dialog overlay fully opaque so it covers the whole page instead of revealing the login page underneath.
* fix: resolve CI failures on web auth PR
- Replace chalk.yellow named color with chalk.hex(darkColors.warning)
in the server reuse notice to satisfy the chalk named color guard.
- Update pnpmDeps hash in flake.nix to match the regenerated
pnpm-lock.yaml so the Nix build succeeds.
- Retry rmSync in ws-broadcast e2e teardown to ride out EBUSY /
ENOTEMPTY races while the server flushes files after close().
* test(server): update API surface snapshot for warnings route
The feat/web-auth branch adds GET /api/v1/sessions/{session_id}/warnings
(packages/server/src/routes/sessions.ts), so the API surface guardrail
snapshot needs to record the new documented v1 route.
165 lines
5.5 KiB
TypeScript
165 lines
5.5 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Auth-failure rate limiting (ROADMAP M6.4).
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*
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* Two layers:
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* 1. `createAuthFailureLimiter` unit behavior — failure counting, ban on
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* threshold, ban expiry (fake timers), and window reset.
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* 2. `createAuthHook` integration — a banned source gets `429` (even with a
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* valid token), a different source still gets `401`, and a hook without a
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* limiter (the loopback wiring) never returns `429`.
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*
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* Distinct source IPs are expressed via `X-Forwarded-For` with Fastify
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* `trustProxy: true`, which is what `req.ip` reads behind a reverse proxy.
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*/
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import Fastify, { type FastifyInstance } from 'fastify';
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import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
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import { createAuthHook } from '#/middleware/auth';
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import {
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createAuthFailureLimiter,
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type AuthFailureLimiter,
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} from '#/middleware/rateLimit';
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import type { IAuthTokenService } from '#/services/auth/authTokenService';
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const TOKEN = 'test-token';
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const IP_A = '203.0.113.10';
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const IP_B = '203.0.113.11';
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function fixedImpl(): IAuthTokenService {
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return {
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_serviceBrand: undefined,
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getToken: () => TOKEN,
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isValid: async (candidate) => candidate === TOKEN,
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};
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}
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function buildApp(limiter?: AuthFailureLimiter): FastifyInstance {
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const app = Fastify({ trustProxy: true });
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app.addHook('onRequest', createAuthHook(fixedImpl(), { limiter }));
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app.get('/api/v1/sessions', async () => ({ ok: true }));
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return app;
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}
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function badToken(ip: string): { method: 'GET'; url: string; headers: Record<string, string> } {
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return {
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method: 'GET',
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url: '/api/v1/sessions',
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headers: { 'x-forwarded-for': ip, authorization: 'Bearer wrong-token' },
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};
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}
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describe('createAuthHook rate limiting (M6.4)', () => {
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let app: FastifyInstance;
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let limiter: AuthFailureLimiter;
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beforeEach(async () => {
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limiter = createAuthFailureLimiter({ maxFailures: 3, windowMs: 60_000, banMs: 60_000 });
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app = buildApp(limiter);
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await app.ready();
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});
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afterEach(async () => {
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await app.close();
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limiter.dispose();
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});
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it('returns 401 for the first N failures, then 429 on the (N+1)th from the same IP', async () => {
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expect((await app.inject(badToken(IP_A))).statusCode).toBe(401);
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expect((await app.inject(badToken(IP_A))).statusCode).toBe(401);
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expect((await app.inject(badToken(IP_A))).statusCode).toBe(401);
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const fourth = await app.inject(badToken(IP_A));
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expect(fourth.statusCode).toBe(429);
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const body = fourth.json() as Record<string, unknown>;
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expect(body['code']).toBe(42901);
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expect(body['msg']).toBe('Too many failed auth attempts');
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});
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it('does not ban a different IP that has not hit the threshold', async () => {
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// Push IP_A over the threshold.
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await app.inject(badToken(IP_A));
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await app.inject(badToken(IP_A));
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await app.inject(badToken(IP_A));
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expect((await app.inject(badToken(IP_A))).statusCode).toBe(429);
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// IP_B is a fresh source — still 401, not 429.
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expect((await app.inject(badToken(IP_B))).statusCode).toBe(401);
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});
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it('returns 429 to a banned IP even when it presents a valid token', async () => {
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await app.inject(badToken(IP_A));
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await app.inject(badToken(IP_A));
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await app.inject(badToken(IP_A));
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expect((await app.inject(badToken(IP_A))).statusCode).toBe(429);
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const valid = await app.inject({
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method: 'GET',
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url: '/api/v1/sessions',
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headers: { 'x-forwarded-for': IP_A, authorization: `Bearer ${TOKEN}` },
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});
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expect(valid.statusCode).toBe(429);
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});
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it('never returns 429 when no limiter is wired (loopback behavior)', async () => {
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const noLimiterApp = buildApp(undefined);
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await noLimiterApp.ready();
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try {
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for (let i = 0; i < 10; i += 1) {
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expect((await noLimiterApp.inject(badToken(IP_A))).statusCode).toBe(401);
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}
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} finally {
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await noLimiterApp.close();
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}
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});
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});
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describe('createAuthFailureLimiter (unit)', () => {
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afterEach(() => {
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vi.useRealTimers();
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});
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it('bans a source at the threshold and clears the ban after banMs', () => {
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vi.useFakeTimers();
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const limiter = createAuthFailureLimiter({ maxFailures: 2, windowMs: 1_000, banMs: 500 });
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try {
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expect(limiter.isBanned('1.2.3.4')).toBe(false);
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limiter.recordFailure('1.2.3.4');
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expect(limiter.isBanned('1.2.3.4')).toBe(false);
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limiter.recordFailure('1.2.3.4');
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expect(limiter.isBanned('1.2.3.4')).toBe(true);
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vi.advanceTimersByTime(499);
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expect(limiter.isBanned('1.2.3.4')).toBe(true);
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vi.advanceTimersByTime(1);
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expect(limiter.isBanned('1.2.3.4')).toBe(false);
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} finally {
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limiter.dispose();
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}
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});
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it('resets the failure count once the window elapses', () => {
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vi.useFakeTimers();
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const limiter = createAuthFailureLimiter({ maxFailures: 2, windowMs: 1_000, banMs: 500 });
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try {
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limiter.recordFailure('5.5.5.5');
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vi.advanceTimersByTime(1_001); // window expired → next failure starts fresh
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limiter.recordFailure('5.5.5.5');
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// Only one failure in the new window → not banned.
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expect(limiter.isBanned('5.5.5.5')).toBe(false);
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} finally {
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limiter.dispose();
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}
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});
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it('tracks sources independently', () => {
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vi.useFakeTimers();
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const limiter = createAuthFailureLimiter({ maxFailures: 1, windowMs: 1_000, banMs: 500 });
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try {
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limiter.recordFailure('9.9.9.9');
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expect(limiter.isBanned('9.9.9.9')).toBe(true);
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expect(limiter.isBanned('8.8.8.8')).toBe(false);
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} finally {
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limiter.dispose();
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}
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});
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});
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