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* feat(agent-core-v2): add the unified MCP management plane Port the v1 MCP management plane (#2858) onto the v2 DI x Scope engine: - App-scope IMcpOAuthService shared by every workspace handler and session overlay: credential events, single-flight refresh, proactive refresh timers, OAuthTokenTransaction-serialized writes, offline tokenState, shutdown. Providers read tokens through the store so grants written or revoked by another process are honored immediately; http/sse transports ride the transaction fetch. - IMcpConfigStore: the single write point for the user-level mcp.json over the filesystem byte store, byte-identical to v1's format, with per-entry validation, name normalization, __proto__-safe parsing, a mutation tail, and an onDidWrite event. - IMcpRegistryService: the unified read view over the layered config files (with per-entry origins) and plugin manifests (full descriptors incl. disabled, with provenance); collisions stay visible and runtime resolution ranks an enabled plugin above the file layers. - IMcpManagementService: guarded CRUD, connection-test probes, the locator-addressed inspection/auth-status surface, and locator-addressed OAuth begin/complete/cancel/reset with ambiguity rejection. Engine services stay ungated; the mcp_management flag gates the edge exposure. - Workspace runtime aligns with v1 precedence (an enabled plugin entry wins over the file layers, shadows revive), and management writes reload immediately via onDidWrite instead of the watch debounce. - node-sdk v2 facade delegates to the engine service (deleting its in-process duplication); kap-server exposes /api/v2/mcp/* and klient gains global.mcp.*, both flag-gated. * fix(agent-core-v2): settle early and cancelled MCP OAuth callbacks * refactor(node-sdk): write session MCP persists through the engine config store * refactor(agent-core-v2): strip comments from the MCP management plane files * fix(agent-core-v2): harden MCP management readiness * test(node-sdk): cover offline MCP auth statuses * fix(agent-core-v2): isolate stdio MCP probes * fix(klient): normalize MCP OAuth errors * fix(mcp): honor workspace CRUD context and refresh timing * fix(mcp): drain OAuth refreshes during shutdown * fix(mcp): guard CRUD across registry collisions * fix(mcp): canonicalize trust and refresh scheduling * fix(mcp): close callback listener on setup failure * fix(mcp): preserve trust and oauth behavior * fix(oauth): retain refresh tokens after SDK saves * fix(oauth): stop proactive sweep during shutdown * fix: await MCP workspace reconciliation * fix: serialize MCP OAuth and trust cleanup * fix: reject persisted MCP plugin collisions * fix: reconcile MCP workspaces concurrently * fix(mcp): check project-layer trust at the queried cwd * fix(mcp): expire abandoned OAuth flows after an idle timeout * fix(mcp): keep mutable user entries writable past read-only collisions * fix(mcp): abort the auth::complete long poll on client disconnect * fix(mcp): map OAuth flow failures to wire code 40929 * docs(mcp): note probe credential effects and plane semantics * chore: add the SDK changeset for MCP management cwd params * feat(mcp): expose the management plane without the experimental flag * fix(mcp): preserve auth management semantics * fix(agent-core-v2): bound MCP OAuth auth-server requests and the shutdown drain * fix(node-sdk): restate engine MCP management errors as KimiError * fix(agent-core-v2): preserve shared OAuth flow lifetime * fix(agent-core-v2): close MCP OAuth cancellation and shutdown gaps - bound the authorization-code exchange with the request timeout and the flow/caller abort signals, and make shutdown abort hung begins and close their callback listeners immediately - keep token-transaction effect coalescing intact when durable tokens carry local stamps, and serialize the meta sidecar and tokens-saved event with the token write inside the lock - drain transport-driven grants, their trailing SDK save continuations, and interactive completions during shutdown, with a cancellable deadline * fix(agent-core-v2): harden MCP probe runtime resolution and path handling - resolve stdio probes against the containing workspace's runtimes and reject out-of-workspace probes for non-local runtime_id instead of silently falling back to a local-only transient registry - share one Windows-aware path canonicalization across the config loader, registry trust lookup, trust records, and workspace matching - keep a UTF-8 BOM fatal for the user-level mcp.json store, matching the workspace loader and v1 - validate completeServerAuth timeoutMs bounds at the engine boundary * fix(agent-core-v2): await workspace MCP reconciliation on plugin mutations Plugin install/enable/disable/remove now resolve only after reload listeners settle their waitUntil work, so a disabled plugin's MCP server cannot linger connected and an enabled one is visible to the next session, matching v1. The workspace MCP consumer joins the barrier while keeping its log-only failure tolerance; delivery is awaited outside the mutation queue to avoid self-deadlock through consumption reads. * fix(mcp): close the SDK, klient, and server edge gaps - register mcp.oauth_failed in the v1 error registry and restate unknown engine codes as internal instead of minting undeclared KimiError codes - route persisted session MCP adds through the same KimiError restating as the global management methods - give the klient IPC transport a per-call timeout so completeAuth's long poll outlives the 30s default, clamped to the Node timer ceiling, and align the contract timeoutMs upper bound with REST - await the MCP OAuth service shutdown directly in SDK and server close before scope disposal * fix(agent-core-v2): keep file-over-plugin MCP precedence and harden the plane - Revert the v1-style precedence flip: the workspace merge and resolveRuntimeTarget keep the file entry above plugins (v2's historical order; the divergence from v1 is deliberate and documented in AGENTS.md). - Guards follow each engine's winner: project-layer entries stay read-only, while plugin entries never block user-level writes, so a file entry may shadow a plugin and removing it revives the plugin. The parity suite pins the engine split for a persisted session add over a plugin-owned name. - inspectServers tolerates a wire-encoded null targets array: klient's ipc transport sends null for an omitted leading optional argument. - Fire the config store's onDidWrite after the mutation tail settles, so a write listener can re-enter the store without deadlocking the queue; concurrent-mutation and re-entrant-listener tests pin both contracts. * chore: condense the sdk MCP changeset to one sentence * test(node-sdk): pin verify:false auth-status parity and fix the sdk changeset
90 lines
3.2 KiB
TypeScript
90 lines
3.2 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Scenario: runtime validation at Klient wire-contract boundaries.
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*
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* Exercises the session-creation and plugin-manifest schemas directly with no
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* external collaborators. Run with `pnpm --filter @moonshot-ai/klient exec
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* vitest run test/contract.test.ts`.
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*/
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import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
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import { pluginManifestSchema } from '../src/contract/global/plugins.js';
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import { mcpServerAuthFlowHandleSchema } from '../src/contract/global/mcpManagement.js';
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import { createSessionOptionsSchema } from '../src/contract/session/lifecycle.js';
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import { promptPayloadSchema } from '../src/contract/agent/schemas.js';
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type McpTimeoutField = 'startupTimeoutMs' | 'toolTimeoutMs';
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const timeoutCases = [
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{
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surface: 'plugin manifests',
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parse: (field: McpTimeoutField, value: number) =>
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pluginManifestSchema.safeParse({
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name: 'example',
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mcpServers: {
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example: { transport: 'stdio', command: 'node', [field]: value },
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},
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}),
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},
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].flatMap(({ surface, parse }) => [
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{ surface, field: 'startupTimeoutMs' as const, parse },
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{ surface, field: 'toolTimeoutMs' as const, parse },
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]);
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describe('MCP timeout contract validation', () => {
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it.each(timeoutCases)('accepts the maximum $field for $surface', ({ field, parse }) => {
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expect(parse(field, 2_147_483_647).success).toBe(true);
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});
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it.each(timeoutCases)('rejects an above-maximum $field for $surface', ({ field, parse }) => {
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expect(parse(field, 2_147_483_648).success).toBe(false);
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});
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it('session creation options accept ephemeral mcpServers', () => {
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const parsed = createSessionOptionsSchema.safeParse({
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workDir: '/tmp/example',
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mcpServers: {
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stdioExample: { transport: 'stdio', command: 'node', args: ['server.mjs'] },
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httpExample: { transport: 'http', url: 'https://example.com/mcp', headers: { a: 'b' } },
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sseExample: { transport: 'sse', url: 'https://example.com/sse' },
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},
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});
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expect(parsed.success).toBe(true);
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expect(parsed.data?.mcpServers?.['stdioExample']).toEqual({
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transport: 'stdio',
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command: 'node',
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args: ['server.mjs'],
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});
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});
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it('session creation options reject malformed mcpServers entries', () => {
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const parsed = createSessionOptionsSchema.safeParse({
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workDir: '/tmp/example',
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mcpServers: {
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example: { transport: 'http', url: 'not-a-url' },
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},
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});
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expect(parsed.success).toBe(false);
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});
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it('completeAuth timeoutMs accepts the setTimeout maximum and rejects above it', () => {
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expect(
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mcpServerAuthFlowHandleSchema.safeParse({ flowId: 'flow-1', timeoutMs: 2_147_483_647 })
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.success,
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).toBe(true);
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expect(
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mcpServerAuthFlowHandleSchema.safeParse({ flowId: 'flow-1', timeoutMs: 2_147_483_648 })
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.success,
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).toBe(false);
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});
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});
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describe('prompt contract validation', () => {
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it('rejects an empty caller-chosen promptId', () => {
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expect(promptPayloadSchema.safeParse({ input: [], promptId: '' }).success).toBe(false);
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});
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it('accepts a non-empty caller-chosen promptId', () => {
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expect(promptPayloadSchema.safeParse({ input: [], promptId: 'submission-1' }).success).toBe(true);
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});
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});
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