kimi-code/packages/klient/test/contract.test.ts
7Sageer d723cc47ee
Some checks are pending
CI / build (push) Waiting to run
CI / test (1) (push) Waiting to run
CI / test (2) (push) Waiting to run
CI / test (3) (push) Waiting to run
CI / test (4) (push) Waiting to run
CI / test (5) (push) Waiting to run
CI / test-pi-tui (push) Waiting to run
CI / test-vscode-legacy (push) Waiting to run
CI / test-windows (push) Waiting to run
CI / lint (push) Waiting to run
CI / typecheck (push) Waiting to run
Nix Build / Check flake.nix workspace sync (push) Waiting to run
Nix Build / nix build .#kimi-code (push) Blocked by required conditions
Release / Release (push) Waiting to run
Release / Deploy docs (push) Blocked by required conditions
Release / Native release artifact (push) Blocked by required conditions
Release / Publish native release assets (push) Blocked by required conditions
feat(agent-core-v2): add the unified MCP management plane (#3002)
* feat(agent-core-v2): add the unified MCP management plane

Port the v1 MCP management plane (#2858) onto the v2 DI x Scope engine:

- App-scope IMcpOAuthService shared by every workspace handler and
  session overlay: credential events, single-flight refresh, proactive
  refresh timers, OAuthTokenTransaction-serialized writes, offline
  tokenState, shutdown. Providers read tokens through the store so
  grants written or revoked by another process are honored immediately;
  http/sse transports ride the transaction fetch.
- IMcpConfigStore: the single write point for the user-level mcp.json
  over the filesystem byte store, byte-identical to v1's format, with
  per-entry validation, name normalization, __proto__-safe parsing, a
  mutation tail, and an onDidWrite event.
- IMcpRegistryService: the unified read view over the layered config
  files (with per-entry origins) and plugin manifests (full descriptors
  incl. disabled, with provenance); collisions stay visible and runtime
  resolution ranks an enabled plugin above the file layers.
- IMcpManagementService: guarded CRUD, connection-test probes, the
  locator-addressed inspection/auth-status surface, and
  locator-addressed OAuth begin/complete/cancel/reset with ambiguity
  rejection. Engine services stay ungated; the mcp_management flag
  gates the edge exposure.
- Workspace runtime aligns with v1 precedence (an enabled plugin entry
  wins over the file layers, shadows revive), and management writes
  reload immediately via onDidWrite instead of the watch debounce.
- node-sdk v2 facade delegates to the engine service (deleting its
  in-process duplication); kap-server exposes /api/v2/mcp/* and klient
  gains global.mcp.*, both flag-gated.

* fix(agent-core-v2): settle early and cancelled MCP OAuth callbacks

* refactor(node-sdk): write session MCP persists through the engine config store

* refactor(agent-core-v2): strip comments from the MCP management plane files

* fix(agent-core-v2): harden MCP management readiness

* test(node-sdk): cover offline MCP auth statuses

* fix(agent-core-v2): isolate stdio MCP probes

* fix(klient): normalize MCP OAuth errors

* fix(mcp): honor workspace CRUD context and refresh timing

* fix(mcp): drain OAuth refreshes during shutdown

* fix(mcp): guard CRUD across registry collisions

* fix(mcp): canonicalize trust and refresh scheduling

* fix(mcp): close callback listener on setup failure

* fix(mcp): preserve trust and oauth behavior

* fix(oauth): retain refresh tokens after SDK saves

* fix(oauth): stop proactive sweep during shutdown

* fix: await MCP workspace reconciliation

* fix: serialize MCP OAuth and trust cleanup

* fix: reject persisted MCP plugin collisions

* fix: reconcile MCP workspaces concurrently

* fix(mcp): check project-layer trust at the queried cwd

* fix(mcp): expire abandoned OAuth flows after an idle timeout

* fix(mcp): keep mutable user entries writable past read-only collisions

* fix(mcp): abort the auth::complete long poll on client disconnect

* fix(mcp): map OAuth flow failures to wire code 40929

* docs(mcp): note probe credential effects and plane semantics

* chore: add the SDK changeset for MCP management cwd params

* feat(mcp): expose the management plane without the experimental flag

* fix(mcp): preserve auth management semantics

* fix(agent-core-v2): bound MCP OAuth auth-server requests and the shutdown drain

* fix(node-sdk): restate engine MCP management errors as KimiError

* fix(agent-core-v2): preserve shared OAuth flow lifetime

* fix(agent-core-v2): close MCP OAuth cancellation and shutdown gaps

- bound the authorization-code exchange with the request timeout and the
  flow/caller abort signals, and make shutdown abort hung begins and close
  their callback listeners immediately
- keep token-transaction effect coalescing intact when durable tokens carry
  local stamps, and serialize the meta sidecar and tokens-saved event with
  the token write inside the lock
- drain transport-driven grants, their trailing SDK save continuations, and
  interactive completions during shutdown, with a cancellable deadline

* fix(agent-core-v2): harden MCP probe runtime resolution and path handling

- resolve stdio probes against the containing workspace's runtimes and
  reject out-of-workspace probes for non-local runtime_id instead of
  silently falling back to a local-only transient registry
- share one Windows-aware path canonicalization across the config loader,
  registry trust lookup, trust records, and workspace matching
- keep a UTF-8 BOM fatal for the user-level mcp.json store, matching the
  workspace loader and v1
- validate completeServerAuth timeoutMs bounds at the engine boundary

* fix(agent-core-v2): await workspace MCP reconciliation on plugin mutations

Plugin install/enable/disable/remove now resolve only after reload
listeners settle their waitUntil work, so a disabled plugin's MCP server
cannot linger connected and an enabled one is visible to the next
session, matching v1. The workspace MCP consumer joins the barrier while
keeping its log-only failure tolerance; delivery is awaited outside the
mutation queue to avoid self-deadlock through consumption reads.

* fix(mcp): close the SDK, klient, and server edge gaps

- register mcp.oauth_failed in the v1 error registry and restate unknown
  engine codes as internal instead of minting undeclared KimiError codes
- route persisted session MCP adds through the same KimiError restating
  as the global management methods
- give the klient IPC transport a per-call timeout so completeAuth's long
  poll outlives the 30s default, clamped to the Node timer ceiling, and
  align the contract timeoutMs upper bound with REST
- await the MCP OAuth service shutdown directly in SDK and server close
  before scope disposal

* fix(agent-core-v2): keep file-over-plugin MCP precedence and harden the plane

- Revert the v1-style precedence flip: the workspace merge and
  resolveRuntimeTarget keep the file entry above plugins (v2's historical
  order; the divergence from v1 is deliberate and documented in AGENTS.md).
- Guards follow each engine's winner: project-layer entries stay read-only,
  while plugin entries never block user-level writes, so a file entry may
  shadow a plugin and removing it revives the plugin. The parity suite pins
  the engine split for a persisted session add over a plugin-owned name.
- inspectServers tolerates a wire-encoded null targets array: klient's ipc
  transport sends null for an omitted leading optional argument.
- Fire the config store's onDidWrite after the mutation tail settles, so a
  write listener can re-enter the store without deadlocking the queue;
  concurrent-mutation and re-entrant-listener tests pin both contracts.

* chore: condense the sdk MCP changeset to one sentence

* test(node-sdk): pin verify:false auth-status parity and fix the sdk changeset
2026-08-22 18:22:37 +08:00

90 lines
3.2 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Scenario: runtime validation at Klient wire-contract boundaries.
*
* Exercises the session-creation and plugin-manifest schemas directly with no
* external collaborators. Run with `pnpm --filter @moonshot-ai/klient exec
* vitest run test/contract.test.ts`.
*/
import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { pluginManifestSchema } from '../src/contract/global/plugins.js';
import { mcpServerAuthFlowHandleSchema } from '../src/contract/global/mcpManagement.js';
import { createSessionOptionsSchema } from '../src/contract/session/lifecycle.js';
import { promptPayloadSchema } from '../src/contract/agent/schemas.js';
type McpTimeoutField = 'startupTimeoutMs' | 'toolTimeoutMs';
const timeoutCases = [
{
surface: 'plugin manifests',
parse: (field: McpTimeoutField, value: number) =>
pluginManifestSchema.safeParse({
name: 'example',
mcpServers: {
example: { transport: 'stdio', command: 'node', [field]: value },
},
}),
},
].flatMap(({ surface, parse }) => [
{ surface, field: 'startupTimeoutMs' as const, parse },
{ surface, field: 'toolTimeoutMs' as const, parse },
]);
describe('MCP timeout contract validation', () => {
it.each(timeoutCases)('accepts the maximum $field for $surface', ({ field, parse }) => {
expect(parse(field, 2_147_483_647).success).toBe(true);
});
it.each(timeoutCases)('rejects an above-maximum $field for $surface', ({ field, parse }) => {
expect(parse(field, 2_147_483_648).success).toBe(false);
});
it('session creation options accept ephemeral mcpServers', () => {
const parsed = createSessionOptionsSchema.safeParse({
workDir: '/tmp/example',
mcpServers: {
stdioExample: { transport: 'stdio', command: 'node', args: ['server.mjs'] },
httpExample: { transport: 'http', url: 'https://example.com/mcp', headers: { a: 'b' } },
sseExample: { transport: 'sse', url: 'https://example.com/sse' },
},
});
expect(parsed.success).toBe(true);
expect(parsed.data?.mcpServers?.['stdioExample']).toEqual({
transport: 'stdio',
command: 'node',
args: ['server.mjs'],
});
});
it('session creation options reject malformed mcpServers entries', () => {
const parsed = createSessionOptionsSchema.safeParse({
workDir: '/tmp/example',
mcpServers: {
example: { transport: 'http', url: 'not-a-url' },
},
});
expect(parsed.success).toBe(false);
});
it('completeAuth timeoutMs accepts the setTimeout maximum and rejects above it', () => {
expect(
mcpServerAuthFlowHandleSchema.safeParse({ flowId: 'flow-1', timeoutMs: 2_147_483_647 })
.success,
).toBe(true);
expect(
mcpServerAuthFlowHandleSchema.safeParse({ flowId: 'flow-1', timeoutMs: 2_147_483_648 })
.success,
).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('prompt contract validation', () => {
it('rejects an empty caller-chosen promptId', () => {
expect(promptPayloadSchema.safeParse({ input: [], promptId: '' }).success).toBe(false);
});
it('accepts a non-empty caller-chosen promptId', () => {
expect(promptPayloadSchema.safeParse({ input: [], promptId: 'submission-1' }).success).toBe(true);
});
});