deer-flow/backend/app/gateway/services.py
Janlay 72f033fbbe
feat(gateway): add redis stream bridge (#3191)
* feat: add redis stream bridge

* Potential fix for pull request finding

Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(gateway): address redis stream bridge review

Redis was imported eagerly through deerflow.runtime and declared as a hard dependency, which made memory-only installs load redis.asyncio at startup and left the lazy factory import ineffective. Move redis behind an optional extra, remove the public eager re-export, and keep make_stream_bridge as the only runtime import path with an actionable install hint when the extra is missing.

Because Docker deployments now default the stream bridge to Redis via DEER_FLOW_STREAM_BRIDGE_REDIS_URL, install the redis extra explicitly in Docker/dev container flows and teach the local uv-extra detector to infer redis from both stream_bridge.type and the Redis URL env var. This keeps Docker working while preserving slim non-Docker installs.

Harden the Redis bridge by batching XREAD replay, replacing brittle ResponseError string matching with a single fallback to 0-0 for malformed Last-Event-ID values, documenting connection/retention/fail-hard behavior, and adding fake plus opt-in real Redis coverage for XADD/XREAD, replay, invalid IDs, and MAXLEN trimming.

* fix(config): bump config version for stream bridge

* fix redis stream bridge terminal handling

* fix: repair uv.lock, format redis.py, and align Dockerfile extras test

The uv.lock file was missing a closing bracket for the redis extras
section, redis.py had a formatting issue caught by ruff, and the
Dockerfile extras test did not account for the hardcoded --extra redis
flag.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 09:21:19 +08:00

692 lines
30 KiB
Python

"""Run lifecycle service layer.
Centralizes the business logic for creating runs, formatting SSE
frames, and consuming stream bridge events. Router modules
(``thread_runs``, ``runs``) are thin HTTP handlers that delegate here.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import json
import logging
import re
from collections.abc import Mapping
from types import SimpleNamespace
from typing import Any
from fastapi import HTTPException, Request
from langchain_core.messages import BaseMessage
from langchain_core.messages.utils import convert_to_messages
from langgraph.types import Command
from app.gateway.deps import get_checkpointer, get_run_context, get_run_manager, get_stream_bridge
from app.gateway.internal_auth import INTERNAL_SYSTEM_ROLE, get_trusted_internal_owner_user_id
from app.gateway.utils import sanitize_log_param
from deerflow.config.app_config import get_app_config
from deerflow.runtime import (
END_SENTINEL,
HEARTBEAT_SENTINEL,
ConflictError,
DisconnectMode,
RunManager,
RunRecord,
RunStatus,
StreamBridge,
UnsupportedStrategyError,
run_agent,
)
from deerflow.runtime.runs.naming import resolve_root_run_name
from deerflow.runtime.secret_context import redact_config_secrets
from deerflow.runtime.user_context import reset_current_user, set_current_user
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
_TERMINAL_RUN_STATUSES = {
RunStatus.success,
RunStatus.error,
RunStatus.timeout,
RunStatus.interrupted,
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# SSE formatting
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def format_sse(event: str, data: Any, *, event_id: str | None = None) -> str:
"""Format a single SSE frame.
Field order: ``event:`` -> ``data:`` -> ``id:`` (optional) -> blank line.
This matches the LangGraph Platform wire format consumed by the
``useStream`` React hook and the Python ``langgraph-sdk`` SSE decoder.
"""
payload = json.dumps(data, default=str, ensure_ascii=False)
parts = [f"event: {event}", f"data: {payload}"]
if event_id:
parts.append(f"id: {event_id}")
parts.append("")
parts.append("")
return "\n".join(parts)
def _run_is_terminal(record: RunRecord) -> bool:
return record.status in _TERMINAL_RUN_STATUSES
async def _terminal_record_stream_missing(bridge: StreamBridge, record: RunRecord) -> bool:
"""True when a terminal run has no retained stream on bridges that can tell."""
if not _run_is_terminal(record):
return False
stream_exists = getattr(bridge, "stream_exists", None)
if stream_exists is None:
return False
try:
return not bool(await stream_exists(record.run_id))
except Exception:
logger.debug(
"Failed to probe stream existence for terminal run %s",
sanitize_log_param(record.run_id),
exc_info=True,
)
return False
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Input / config helpers
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def normalize_stream_modes(raw: list[str] | str | None) -> list[str]:
"""Normalize the stream_mode parameter to a list.
Default matches what ``useStream`` expects: values + messages-tuple.
"""
if raw is None:
return ["values"]
if isinstance(raw, str):
return [raw]
return raw if raw else ["values"]
def normalize_input(raw_input: dict[str, Any] | None) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Convert LangGraph Platform input format to LangChain state dict.
Delegates dict→message coercion to ``langchain_core.messages.utils.convert_to_messages``
so that ``additional_kwargs`` (e.g. uploaded-file metadata — gh #3132), ``id``,
``name``, and non-human roles (ai/system/tool) survive unchanged. An earlier
hand-rolled version only forwarded ``content`` and collapsed every role to
``HumanMessage``, which silently stripped frontend-supplied attachments.
Malformed message dicts (missing ``role``/``type``/``content``, unsupported
role, etc.) raise ``HTTPException(400)`` with the offending index, instead
of bubbling up as a 500. The gateway is a system boundary, so per-entry
validation errors are the right shape for clients to retry against.
"""
if raw_input is None:
return {}
messages = raw_input.get("messages")
if messages and isinstance(messages, list):
converted: list[Any] = []
for index, msg in enumerate(messages):
if isinstance(msg, BaseMessage):
converted.append(msg)
elif isinstance(msg, dict):
try:
converted.extend(convert_to_messages([msg]))
except (ValueError, TypeError, NotImplementedError) as exc:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=f"Invalid message at input.messages[{index}]: {exc}",
) from exc
else:
converted.append(msg)
return {**raw_input, "messages": converted}
return raw_input
_DEFAULT_ASSISTANT_ID = "lead_agent"
# Whitelist of run-context keys that the langgraph-compat layer forwards from
# ``body.context`` into the run config. ``config["context"]`` exists in
# LangGraph >=0.6, but these values must be written to both ``configurable``
# (for legacy ``_get_runtime_config`` consumers) and ``context`` because
# LangGraph >=1.1.9 no longer makes ``ToolRuntime.context`` fall back to
# ``configurable`` for consumers like ``setup_agent``.
_CONTEXT_CONFIGURABLE_KEYS: frozenset[str] = frozenset(
{
"model_name",
"mode",
"thinking_enabled",
"reasoning_effort",
"is_plan_mode",
"subagent_enabled",
"max_concurrent_subagents",
"agent_name",
"is_bootstrap",
}
)
def merge_run_context_overrides(config: dict[str, Any], context: Mapping[str, Any] | None) -> None:
"""Merge whitelisted keys from ``body.context`` into both ``config['configurable']``
and ``config['context']`` so they are visible to legacy configurable readers and
to LangGraph ``ToolRuntime.context`` consumers (e.g. the ``setup_agent`` tool —
see issue #2677).
``user_id`` is intentionally propagated into ``config['context']`` in addition to
the whitelisted keys, so non-web callers (e.g. IM channels) that supply identity in
``body.context`` keep it on ``ToolRuntime.context``. It is merged with
``setdefault`` so a server-authenticated id stamped by
:func:`inject_authenticated_user_context` always wins over the client-supplied one.
"""
if not context:
return
configurable = config.setdefault("configurable", {})
runtime_context = config.setdefault("context", {})
for key in _CONTEXT_CONFIGURABLE_KEYS:
if key in context:
if isinstance(configurable, dict):
configurable.setdefault(key, context[key])
if isinstance(runtime_context, dict):
runtime_context.setdefault(key, context[key])
if "user_id" in context and isinstance(runtime_context, dict):
runtime_context.setdefault("user_id", context["user_id"])
def inject_authenticated_user_context(config: dict[str, Any], request: Request) -> None:
"""Stamp the authenticated user into the run context for background tools.
Tool execution may happen after the request handler has returned, so tools
that persist user-scoped files should not rely only on ambient ContextVars.
The value comes from server-side auth state, never from client context.
"""
user = getattr(request.state, "user", None)
user_id = getattr(user, "id", None)
if user_id is None:
return
if getattr(user, "system_role", None) == INTERNAL_SYSTEM_ROLE:
return
runtime_context = config.setdefault("context", {})
if isinstance(runtime_context, dict):
runtime_context["user_id"] = str(user_id)
runtime_context["user_role"] = getattr(user, "system_role", None)
runtime_context["oauth_provider"] = getattr(user, "oauth_provider", None)
runtime_context["oauth_id"] = getattr(user, "oauth_id", None)
def resolve_agent_factory(assistant_id: str | None):
"""Resolve the agent factory callable from config.
Custom agents are implemented as ``lead_agent`` + an ``agent_name``
injected into ``configurable`` or ``context`` — see
:func:`build_run_config`. All ``assistant_id`` values therefore map to the
same factory; the routing happens inside ``make_lead_agent`` when it reads
``cfg["agent_name"]``.
"""
from deerflow.agents.lead_agent.agent import make_lead_agent
return make_lead_agent
# Lead-agent recursion budget bounds. The Gateway must NOT trust a
# client-supplied ``recursion_limit`` verbatim: an arbitrarily large value lets
# a single run execute unbounded LangGraph super-steps (each at least one LLM
# call), enabling runaway API cost / DoS. ``_DEFAULT_RECURSION_LIMIT`` is the
# server default when the client sends nothing; the hard ceiling any client
# value is clamped to is configurable via ``AppConfig.max_recursion_limit``.
_DEFAULT_RECURSION_LIMIT = 100
_DEFAULT_MAX_RECURSION_LIMIT = 1000
def _resolve_max_recursion_limit() -> int:
"""Resolve the clamp ceiling from ``AppConfig.max_recursion_limit``.
Falls back to ``_DEFAULT_MAX_RECURSION_LIMIT`` when the app config cannot be
loaded (e.g. no ``config.yaml`` in a bare unit-test environment) so that the
clamp still applies rather than crashing the run-config assembly.
"""
try:
return get_app_config().max_recursion_limit
except Exception:
return _DEFAULT_MAX_RECURSION_LIMIT
def _clamp_recursion_limit(value: Any, max_limit: int) -> int:
"""Clamp a client-supplied ``recursion_limit`` into a safe server range.
Non-integer values (including ``bool``, an ``int`` subclass) and non-positive
values fall back to ``_DEFAULT_RECURSION_LIMIT``; valid positive integers are
capped at ``max_limit`` (from ``AppConfig.max_recursion_limit``).
"""
if isinstance(value, bool) or not isinstance(value, int) or value <= 0:
return _DEFAULT_RECURSION_LIMIT
return min(value, max_limit)
def build_run_config(
thread_id: str,
request_config: dict[str, Any] | None,
metadata: dict[str, Any] | None,
*,
assistant_id: str | None = None,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Build a RunnableConfig dict for the agent.
When *assistant_id* refers to a custom agent (anything other than
``"lead_agent"`` / ``None``), the name is forwarded as ``agent_name`` in
both ``configurable`` and ``context`` so it is visible to legacy
configurable readers and to LangGraph ``ToolRuntime.context`` consumers
(e.g. the ``setup_agent`` tool, which since LangGraph >=1.1.9 no longer
falls back from ``context`` to ``configurable``). An explicit
``agent_name`` in either container takes precedence over the value
derived from ``assistant_id``. ``make_lead_agent`` reads this key to
load the matching ``agents/<name>/SOUL.md`` and per-agent config —
without it the agent silently runs as the default lead agent.
This mirrors the channel manager's ``_resolve_run_params`` logic so that
the LangGraph Platform-compatible HTTP API and the IM channel path behave
identically.
"""
# Lead-agent recursion budget (LangGraph super-steps for the lead graph
# only). Independent of subagent depth: a `task()` dispatch runs the whole
# subagent inside ONE lead tools-node step, and subagents enforce their own
# limit via `subagents.max_turns`. Do not conflate this 100 with the
# general-purpose subagent's max_turns.
config: dict[str, Any] = {"recursion_limit": _DEFAULT_RECURSION_LIMIT}
if request_config:
# LangGraph >= 0.6.0 introduced ``context`` as the preferred way to
# pass thread-level data and rejects requests that include both
# ``configurable`` and ``context``. If the caller already sends
# ``context``, honour it and skip our own ``configurable`` dict.
if "context" in request_config:
if "configurable" in request_config:
logger.warning(
"build_run_config: client sent both 'context' and 'configurable'; preferring 'context' (LangGraph >= 0.6.0). thread_id=%s, caller_configurable keys=%s",
thread_id,
list(request_config.get("configurable", {}).keys()),
)
context_value = request_config["context"]
if context_value is None:
context = {}
elif isinstance(context_value, Mapping):
context = dict(context_value)
else:
raise ValueError("request config 'context' must be a mapping or null.")
context["thread_id"] = thread_id
config["context"] = context
# The checkpointer always scopes state by configurable["thread_id"],
# regardless of whether the caller drives the run via context (e.g.
# request-scoped secrets, #3861). thread_id comes from the URL path,
# not caller config, so mirror it here while keeping secret-bearing
# context keys out of configurable.
config["configurable"] = {"thread_id": thread_id}
else:
configurable = {"thread_id": thread_id}
configurable.update(request_config.get("configurable", {}))
config["configurable"] = configurable
for k, v in request_config.items():
if k not in ("configurable", "context"):
config[k] = v
# Never trust a client-supplied recursion_limit verbatim: clamp it to a
# safe server range so a single run cannot execute unbounded LangGraph
# super-steps (runaway LLM cost / DoS). Applied after the passthrough so
# it overrides whatever the client sent.
if "recursion_limit" in request_config:
max_limit = _resolve_max_recursion_limit()
clamped = _clamp_recursion_limit(request_config["recursion_limit"], max_limit)
if clamped != request_config["recursion_limit"]:
logger.warning(
"build_run_config: clamped client recursion_limit %r -> %d (max %d). thread_id=%s",
request_config["recursion_limit"],
clamped,
max_limit,
thread_id,
)
config["recursion_limit"] = clamped
else:
config["configurable"] = {"thread_id": thread_id}
# Inject custom agent name when the caller specified a non-default assistant.
# Honour an explicit agent_name in either runtime options container.
if assistant_id and assistant_id != _DEFAULT_ASSISTANT_ID:
normalized = assistant_id.strip().lower().replace("_", "-")
if not normalized or not re.fullmatch(r"[a-z0-9-]+", normalized):
raise ValueError(f"Invalid assistant_id {assistant_id!r}: must contain only letters, digits, and hyphens after normalization.")
configurable = config.setdefault("configurable", {})
runtime_context = config.setdefault("context", {})
explicit_agent_name: str | None = None
if isinstance(configurable, dict) and isinstance(configurable.get("agent_name"), str):
explicit_agent_name = configurable["agent_name"]
elif isinstance(runtime_context, dict) and isinstance(runtime_context.get("agent_name"), str):
explicit_agent_name = runtime_context["agent_name"]
effective_agent_name = explicit_agent_name or normalized
if isinstance(configurable, dict):
configurable["agent_name"] = effective_agent_name
if isinstance(runtime_context, dict):
runtime_context["agent_name"] = effective_agent_name
config.setdefault("run_name", resolve_root_run_name(config, normalized))
if metadata:
config.setdefault("metadata", {}).update(metadata)
return config
async def apply_checkpoint_to_run_config(
config: dict[str, Any],
*,
body: Any,
thread_id: str,
request: Request,
) -> None:
"""Validate an optional run checkpoint and attach it to RunnableConfig."""
checkpoint = getattr(body, "checkpoint", None)
checkpoint_id = getattr(body, "checkpoint_id", None)
checkpoint_ns = ""
checkpoint_map = None
if checkpoint:
if not isinstance(checkpoint, Mapping):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="checkpoint must be an object")
checkpoint_thread_id = checkpoint.get("thread_id")
if checkpoint_thread_id is not None and str(checkpoint_thread_id) != thread_id:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="checkpoint thread_id does not match request thread_id")
raw_checkpoint_id = checkpoint.get("checkpoint_id")
if raw_checkpoint_id:
checkpoint_id = str(raw_checkpoint_id)
raw_checkpoint_ns = checkpoint.get("checkpoint_ns")
if raw_checkpoint_ns is not None:
checkpoint_ns = str(raw_checkpoint_ns)
checkpoint_map = checkpoint.get("checkpoint_map")
if not checkpoint_id:
return
read_config: dict[str, Any] = {
"configurable": {
"thread_id": thread_id,
"checkpoint_ns": checkpoint_ns,
"checkpoint_id": str(checkpoint_id),
}
}
if checkpoint_map is not None:
read_config["configurable"]["checkpoint_map"] = checkpoint_map
checkpointer = get_checkpointer(request)
try:
checkpoint_tuple = await checkpointer.aget_tuple(read_config)
except Exception as exc:
logger.exception("Failed to validate checkpoint %s for thread %s", checkpoint_id, sanitize_log_param(thread_id))
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to validate checkpoint") from exc
if checkpoint_tuple is None:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Checkpoint {checkpoint_id} not found")
configurable = config.setdefault("configurable", {})
if not isinstance(configurable, dict):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="request config configurable must be an object")
configurable["thread_id"] = thread_id
configurable["checkpoint_ns"] = checkpoint_ns
configurable["checkpoint_id"] = str(checkpoint_id)
if checkpoint_map is not None:
configurable["checkpoint_map"] = checkpoint_map
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Run lifecycle
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
async def start_run(
body: Any,
thread_id: str,
request: Request,
) -> RunRecord:
"""Create a RunRecord and launch the background agent task.
Parameters
----------
body : RunCreateRequest
The validated request body (typed as Any to avoid circular import
with the router module that defines the Pydantic model).
thread_id : str
Target thread.
request : Request
FastAPI request — used to retrieve singletons from ``app.state``.
"""
bridge = get_stream_bridge(request)
run_mgr = get_run_manager(request)
run_ctx = get_run_context(request)
disconnect = DisconnectMode.cancel if body.on_disconnect == "cancel" else DisconnectMode.continue_
body_context = getattr(body, "context", None) or {}
model_name = body_context.get("model_name")
# Coerce non-string model_name values to str before truncation.
if model_name is not None and not isinstance(model_name, str):
model_name = str(model_name)
# Validate model against the allowlist when a model_name is provided.
if model_name:
app_config = get_app_config()
resolved = app_config.get_model_config(model_name)
if resolved is None:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=f"Model {model_name!r} is not in the configured model allowlist",
)
owner_user_id = get_trusted_internal_owner_user_id(request)
# Stateless run endpoints carry thread_id in the request *body*, so the
# @require_permission(owner_check=True) decorator -- which resolves ownership
# from the path param -- cannot protect them. Enforce thread ownership here,
# before any run is created, so one user cannot start runs on (or read /wait
# checkpoint state from) another user's thread. Missing rows (auto-created
# temp threads) and NULL-owner rows (shared / pre-auth data) stay accessible
# via check_access; only a thread already owned by another user is rejected
# with 404, matching thread_runs.py's anti-enumeration behaviour. Internal
# channel runs act on behalf of the connection owner carried in
# X-DeerFlow-Owner-User-Id, so they are scoped to that owner instead of
# bypassing the check -- a leaked internal token must not grant cross-user
# thread access.
user = getattr(request.state, "user", None)
if user is not None:
allowed = await run_ctx.thread_store.check_access(thread_id, str(user.id))
if not allowed and owner_user_id and getattr(user, "system_role", None) == INTERNAL_SYSTEM_ROLE:
# Channel workers may also act for the connection owner named in
# the trusted header (e.g. claiming a legacy default-owned channel
# thread for its real owner).
allowed = await run_ctx.thread_store.check_access(thread_id, owner_user_id)
if not allowed:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Thread {thread_id} not found")
owner_context_token = set_current_user(SimpleNamespace(id=owner_user_id)) if owner_user_id else None
try:
try:
record = await run_mgr.create_or_reject(
thread_id,
body.assistant_id,
on_disconnect=disconnect,
metadata=body.metadata or {},
# Persist a secret-redacted copy of the config: the run record is
# written to runs.kwargs_json and echoed by the run API, so a
# request-scoped secret (#3861) must not ride along. The live
# config built below keeps the secrets for the actual run.
kwargs={"input": body.input, "config": redact_config_secrets(body.config)},
multitask_strategy=body.multitask_strategy,
model_name=model_name,
user_id=owner_user_id,
)
except ConflictError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=409, detail=str(exc)) from exc
except UnsupportedStrategyError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=501, detail=str(exc)) from exc
# Upsert thread metadata so the thread appears in /threads/search,
# even for threads that were never explicitly created via POST /threads
# (e.g. stateless runs).
try:
existing = await run_ctx.thread_store.get(thread_id)
if existing is None and owner_user_id:
unscoped_existing = await run_ctx.thread_store.get(thread_id, user_id=None)
if unscoped_existing is not None:
if unscoped_existing.get("user_id") != owner_user_id:
await run_ctx.thread_store.update_owner(thread_id, owner_user_id, user_id=None)
existing = await run_ctx.thread_store.get(thread_id)
if existing is None:
await run_ctx.thread_store.create(
thread_id,
assistant_id=body.assistant_id,
metadata=body.metadata,
)
else:
await run_ctx.thread_store.update_status(thread_id, "running")
except Exception:
logger.warning("Failed to upsert thread_meta for %s (non-fatal)", sanitize_log_param(thread_id))
agent_factory = resolve_agent_factory(body.assistant_id)
command = getattr(body, "command", None)
if command and command.get("resume") is not None:
graph_input = Command(resume=command["resume"])
else:
graph_input = normalize_input(body.input)
config = build_run_config(thread_id, body.config, body.metadata, assistant_id=body.assistant_id)
await apply_checkpoint_to_run_config(config, body=body, thread_id=thread_id, request=request)
# Merge DeerFlow-specific context overrides into both ``configurable`` and ``context``.
# The ``context`` field is a custom extension for the langgraph-compat layer
# that carries agent configuration (model_name, thinking_enabled, etc.).
# Only agent-relevant keys are forwarded; unknown keys (e.g. thread_id) are ignored.
merge_run_context_overrides(config, getattr(body, "context", None))
inject_authenticated_user_context(config, request)
stream_modes = normalize_stream_modes(body.stream_mode)
task = asyncio.create_task(
run_agent(
bridge,
run_mgr,
record,
ctx=run_ctx,
agent_factory=agent_factory,
graph_input=graph_input,
config=config,
stream_modes=stream_modes,
stream_subgraphs=body.stream_subgraphs,
interrupt_before=body.interrupt_before,
interrupt_after=body.interrupt_after,
)
)
record.task = task
# Title sync is handled by worker.py's finally block which reads the
# title from the checkpoint and calls thread_store.update_display_name
# after the run completes.
return record
finally:
if owner_context_token is not None:
reset_current_user(owner_context_token)
async def sse_consumer(
bridge: StreamBridge,
record: RunRecord,
request: Request,
run_mgr: RunManager,
):
"""Async generator that yields SSE frames from the bridge.
The ``finally`` block implements ``on_disconnect`` semantics:
- ``cancel``: abort the background task on client disconnect.
- ``continue``: let the task run; events are discarded.
"""
last_event_id = request.headers.get("Last-Event-ID")
if await _terminal_record_stream_missing(bridge, record):
yield format_sse("end", None)
return
try:
async for entry in bridge.subscribe(record.run_id, last_event_id=last_event_id):
if await request.is_disconnected():
break
if entry is HEARTBEAT_SENTINEL:
if await _terminal_record_stream_missing(bridge, record):
yield format_sse("end", None)
return
yield ": heartbeat\n\n"
continue
if entry is END_SENTINEL:
yield format_sse("end", None, event_id=entry.id or None)
return
yield format_sse(entry.event, entry.data, event_id=entry.id or None)
finally:
# store_only records are cross-worker runs hydrated from the RunStore; this
# worker holds no in-memory task/abort state for them, so run_mgr.cancel()
# cannot stop the task (it would 409). Skip on_disconnect cancellation for
# those and only act on runs this worker actually owns.
if not record.store_only and record.status in (RunStatus.pending, RunStatus.running):
if record.on_disconnect == DisconnectMode.cancel:
await run_mgr.cancel(record.run_id)
async def wait_for_run_completion(
bridge: StreamBridge,
record: RunRecord,
request: Request,
run_mgr: RunManager,
) -> bool:
"""Block until the run publishes ``END_SENTINEL``, honouring on_disconnect.
The non-streaming ``/wait`` endpoints used to ``await record.task``
directly with no disconnect handling. When the client (or an
intermediate HTTP proxy) timed out during a long tool call such as
``pip install``, the handler would swallow ``CancelledError`` and
serialize whatever checkpoint happened to exist — masking a half-finished
run as a normal completion (issue #3265).
This helper consumes the same bridge that ``sse_consumer`` does so the
wait path shares its disconnect semantics: each wake-up polls
``request.is_disconnected()``; on a real disconnect it cancels the
background run when ``record.on_disconnect`` is ``cancel``. The bridge's
heartbeat sentinels guarantee at least one wake-up per
``heartbeat_interval`` even when the agent emits no events for a while.
Returns:
``True`` when ``END_SENTINEL`` was observed (run reached a terminal
state), ``False`` when the loop exited because the client
disconnected. Callers must skip checkpoint serialization on
``False`` so a partial checkpoint is not returned as a normal
response.
"""
completed = False
if await _terminal_record_stream_missing(bridge, record):
return True
try:
async for entry in bridge.subscribe(record.run_id):
# END_SENTINEL means the run reached a terminal state; honour it
# even if the client just disconnected so the caller still serializes
# the real final checkpoint.
if entry is END_SENTINEL:
completed = True
return True
if entry is HEARTBEAT_SENTINEL and await _terminal_record_stream_missing(bridge, record):
completed = True
return True
if await request.is_disconnected():
break
# Heartbeats and regular events: keep waiting for END_SENTINEL.
return completed
finally:
if not completed and record.status in (RunStatus.pending, RunStatus.running):
if record.on_disconnect == DisconnectMode.cancel:
await run_mgr.cancel(record.run_id)