The sent-ledger is append-once and the OTLP span id derives from the same
deduplication key, so the pipeline assumes a served call is immutable: same
key, same value, forever. Copilot's serve-time reconciliation is the first
producer that breaks that (#988), three ways inside one session — a shutdown
residual shrinks as the store rows covering it land, a rollup is dropped once
rows cover its leg, and an unpaired row becomes supplementary when its journal
call appears. Sent at an intermediate state, the receiver keeps that state
forever AND receives what supersedes it. Local reports re-reconcile every pass
and were never affected; this is only about what leaves the machine.
Value-versioned keys were the other option, but usage spans have no upsert
contract — receivers sum them, so a superseding span adds rather than
replaces. (Attribution can do it because its spans are documented as upserts
by `ai.session_id`.) Giving usage spans one is a receiver protocol change.
So: hold, do not re-key. Every input to the reconciliation is written during
the session, so a session quiet for 24 hours cannot reconcile further and its
first send is also its last word. The whole session is held, not just its
residual — holding the residual alone still ships a row whose pairing can
flip. Nothing is dropped: `held` is reported by --dry-run and by the
nothing-to-push line, and the next push after the window sends it.
Scoped by provider because copilot is the only reconciling producer; every
other provider's calls go out unchanged and undelayed.
Review rounds 2-3 + self-review on --attribution:
Credential egress (round 2):
- normalizeRemoteUrl: scp userinfo expressed as an optional regex group
let backtracking re-parse a credential prefix as host:path
(x-access-token:ghp_...@host/repo -> token in git.repo). Userinfo is
now split off at the first @ BEFORE any host matching.
- Positive validation (allow-list) as the final gate on EVERY branch:
host must be hostname-shaped, every path segment repo-shaped, total
identity <= 200 chars. Kills transport-helper remotes (ext:: leaks
local SSH key paths, codecommit:: leaks AWS profile names), residual
@, spaces/colons, and unbounded strings.
- sanitizePrLinks: links are rebuilt from origin + pathname — userinfo,
query strings, and fragments are dropped instead of passed through;
collapsed duplicates dedupe.
Attribution correctness (round 3 + self-review):
- Double-count fix with precise retraction semantics: when a commit
migrates to a later-parsed tighter-window session, the loser re-emits
git.commit_count=0. Empty records are emitted ONLY on a true loss in
THIS computation (lostCandidacy) — a commit that merely aged out of
the --since range was lost to nobody, and retracting it would
permanently zero a still-correct server-side count. The sync layer
additionally requires a prior ledgered state for the session.
- Session dedup key includes project + both window timestamps, so
ongoing sessions re-emit with corrected span times.
- Span end times clamped like the usage builder (never 0, never
earlier than start + 1ms).
- CLI mirrors the usage path on attribution push failures instead of
claiming success.
- Identity normalization: case-insensitive .git strip, doubled path
slashes collapse.
AI-Origin: human
Review findings on the --attribution PR:
- Privacy: sessions whose project path no longer resolves inherited the
cwd-fallback repo identity, egressing whatever (possibly confidential)
repo the user pushes from and falsely attributing its commits.
buildRepoGroups now tracks per-session identity provenance; the
attribution path excludes fallback sessions from commit attribution
entirely (no repo, no commits, PR links only) — they also can no
longer steal a commit from a genuine session's window.
- Privacy: Windows drive-letter paths (C:/..., C:\..., drive-relative)
parsed as scp-like remotes, emitting local filesystem paths as repo
identities. normalizeRemoteUrl rejects drive letters and
single-character hosts (dotless intranet hosts still accepted).
- Hardening: PR links are shape-checked before sending (https,
/org/repo/pull/N path, <=256 chars, max 20 per session) — upstream
parsers only truthiness-check them.
- Safety valve: MAX_ATTRIBUTION_PER_PUSH (10k) caps a first
--since all --attribution push; dry-run reports the cap.
- Tests: adversarial normalize corpus, cwd-fallback egress repro,
commit-stealing prevention, PR-link sanitization, and CLI-level tests
(mock IdP + collector): dry-run sends nothing to the traces endpoint,
flag-off emits no attribution span names on the wire.
- Docs: reconciled the 'never sent' wording with reality (PR links ride
even when repo is null; device_id/methodology/timestamps disclosed).
CHANGELOG Unreleased entry added.
AI-Origin: human
Expose the yield session-to-commit correlation through codeburn sync so
backends can join AI usage to git activity without local git hooks.
- yield: export normalizeRemoteUrl (host/org/repo; credentials, ports,
and .git stripped) and computeAttributionRecords, which reuses the
exact repo-grouping + tightest-window attribution from computeYield
(extracted into a shared buildRepoGroups) and joins in the normalized
origin remote and session prLinks.
- otlp: two new span types sharing the session traceId —
codeburn.session.attribution (git.repo, git.pr_links, git.commit_count)
and codeburn.commit (git.sha, git.in_main, git.was_reverted). Resource
attribute codeburn.attribution_methodology=timestamp-window marks the
attribution as inferred.
- push: generic send core reused by usage and attribution batches. Dedup
keys encode mutable state (inMain/wasReverted), so a state transition
re-sends the updated fact while identical states dedupe via the
existing sent-ledger.
- cli: opt-in --attribution flag on sync push (dry-run aware); commits
in repos with no network remote are never sent.
AI-Origin: human
