Pulse/cmd/pulse-temp-proxy/auth.go
rcourtman 6d4694f019 security: Add SO_PEERCRED authentication to temperature proxy
Addresses security concern raised in code review:
- Socket permissions changed from 0666 to 0660
- Added SO_PEERCRED verification to authenticate connecting processes
- Only allows root (UID 0) or proxy's own user
- Prevents unauthorized processes from triggering SSH key rollout
- Documented passwordless root SSH requirement for clusters

This prevents any process on the host or in other containers from
accessing the proxy RPC endpoints.
2025-10-12 21:42:22 +00:00

52 lines
1.2 KiB
Go

package main
import (
"fmt"
"net"
"syscall"
"github.com/rs/zerolog/log"
)
// verifyPeerCredentials checks if the connecting process is authorized
// Returns nil if authorized, error otherwise
func verifyPeerCredentials(conn net.Conn) error {
// Get the underlying file descriptor
unixConn, ok := conn.(*net.UnixConn)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("not a unix connection")
}
file, err := unixConn.File()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get file descriptor: %w", err)
}
defer file.Close()
fd := int(file.Fd())
// Get peer credentials using SO_PEERCRED
cred, err := syscall.GetsockoptUcred(fd, syscall.SOL_SOCKET, syscall.SO_PEERCRED)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get peer credentials: %w", err)
}
log.Debug().
Int32("pid", cred.Pid).
Uint32("uid", cred.Uid).
Uint32("gid", cred.Gid).
Msg("Peer credentials")
// Allow root (UID 0) - this covers most service scenarios
if cred.Uid == 0 {
return nil
}
// Allow the proxy's own user (for testing/debugging)
if cred.Uid == uint32(syscall.Getuid()) {
return nil
}
// Reject all other users
return fmt.Errorf("unauthorized: uid=%d gid=%d", cred.Uid, cred.Gid)
}