mirror of
https://github.com/rcourtman/Pulse.git
synced 2026-05-19 07:54:10 +00:00
- Remove overly restrictive password complexity requirements (now only 8+ chars) - Fix Change Password section not appearing in Settings > Security - Fix logout sometimes showing setup page instead of login page - Remove misleading desktop notifications option from first-run setup - Improve rate limiting on authentication endpoints - Fix sensitive data appearing in logs (passwords, tokens) - Enhance file permissions for sensitive files (0600) - Fix WebSocket origin validation defaults - Add password complexity validation for setup - Improve CSRF token handling after server restarts - Fix security status API using wrong fetch client - Add logout race condition prevention Security improvements: - No credential leakage in logs - Proper bcrypt password hashing - Session management enhancements - Rate limiting on all auth endpoints - Secure file permissions on sensitive data
321 lines
No EOL
9.5 KiB
Go
321 lines
No EOL
9.5 KiB
Go
package api
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import (
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cryptorand "crypto/rand"
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/hex"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"time"
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internalauth "github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/auth"
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"github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/config"
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"github.com/rs/zerolog/log"
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)
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// Simple session store - in production you'd use Redis or similar
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var (
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sessions = make(map[string]time.Time)
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sessionMu sync.RWMutex
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)
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// generateSessionToken creates a cryptographically secure session token
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func generateSessionToken() string {
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b := make([]byte, 32)
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if _, err := cryptorand.Read(b); err != nil {
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log.Error().Err(err).Msg("Failed to generate secure session token")
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// Fallback - should never happen
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return ""
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}
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return hex.EncodeToString(b)
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}
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// ValidateSession checks if a session token is valid
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func ValidateSession(token string) bool {
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sessionMu.RLock()
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defer sessionMu.RUnlock()
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expiry, exists := sessions[token]
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if !exists {
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return false
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}
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// Check if expired
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if time.Now().After(expiry) {
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// Clean up expired session
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sessionMu.RUnlock()
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sessionMu.Lock()
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delete(sessions, token)
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sessionMu.Unlock()
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sessionMu.RLock()
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return false
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}
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return true
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}
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// CheckAuth checks both basic auth and API token
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func CheckAuth(cfg *config.Config, w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) bool {
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// If no auth is configured at all, allow access
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if cfg.AuthUser == "" && cfg.AuthPass == "" && cfg.APIToken == "" {
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log.Debug().Msg("No auth configured, allowing access")
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return true
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}
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// API-only mode: when only API token is configured (no password auth)
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// Allow read-only endpoints for the UI to work
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if cfg.AuthUser == "" && cfg.AuthPass == "" && cfg.APIToken != "" {
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// Check if an API token was provided
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providedToken := r.Header.Get("X-API-Token")
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if providedToken == "" {
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providedToken = r.URL.Query().Get("token")
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}
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// If a token was provided, validate it
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if providedToken != "" {
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if providedToken == cfg.APIToken {
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return true
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}
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// Invalid token provided
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if w != nil {
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http.Error(w, "Invalid API token", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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}
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return false
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}
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// No token provided - allow read-only endpoints for UI
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if r.Method == "GET" || r.URL.Path == "/ws" {
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// Allow these endpoints without auth for UI to function
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allowedPaths := []string{
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"/api/state",
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"/api/config/nodes",
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"/api/config/system",
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"/api/settings",
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"/api/discover",
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"/api/security/status",
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"/api/version",
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"/api/health",
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"/api/updates/check",
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"/api/system/diagnostics",
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"/api/guests/metadata",
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"/ws", // WebSocket for real-time updates
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}
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for _, path := range allowedPaths {
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if r.URL.Path == path || strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, path+"/") {
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log.Debug().Str("path", r.URL.Path).Msg("Allowing read-only access in API-only mode")
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return true
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}
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}
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}
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// Require token for everything else
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if w != nil {
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w.Header().Set("WWW-Authenticate", `Bearer realm="API Token Required"`)
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http.Error(w, "API token required", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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}
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return false
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}
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log.Debug().
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Str("configured_user", cfg.AuthUser).
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Bool("has_pass", cfg.AuthPass != "").
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Bool("has_token", cfg.APIToken != "").
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Str("url", r.URL.Path).
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Msg("Checking authentication")
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// Check API token first (for backward compatibility)
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if cfg.APIToken != "" {
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// Check header
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if token := r.Header.Get("X-API-Token"); token != "" {
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// Check if stored token is hashed or plain text
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isHashed := internalauth.IsAPITokenHashed(cfg.APIToken)
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log.Debug().
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Bool("is_hashed", isHashed).
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Msg("Comparing API tokens")
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if isHashed {
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// Compare against hash
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if internalauth.CompareAPIToken(token, cfg.APIToken) {
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return true
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}
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} else {
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// Legacy plain text comparison (should migrate)
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if token == cfg.APIToken {
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log.Warn().Msg("Using plain text API token - please regenerate for security")
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return true
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}
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}
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}
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// Check query parameter (for export/import)
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if token := r.URL.Query().Get("token"); token != "" {
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if internalauth.IsAPITokenHashed(cfg.APIToken) {
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if internalauth.CompareAPIToken(token, cfg.APIToken) {
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return true
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}
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} else {
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if token == cfg.APIToken {
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log.Warn().Msg("Using plain text API token - please regenerate for security")
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return true
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}
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}
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}
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}
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// Check session cookie (for WebSocket and UI)
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if cookie, err := r.Cookie("pulse_session"); err == nil && cookie.Value != "" {
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if ValidateSession(cookie.Value) {
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return true
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}
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}
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// Check basic auth
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if cfg.AuthUser != "" && cfg.AuthPass != "" {
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auth := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
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log.Debug().Str("auth_header", auth).Str("url", r.URL.Path).Msg("Checking auth")
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if auth != "" {
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const prefix = "Basic "
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if strings.HasPrefix(auth, prefix) {
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decoded, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(auth[len(prefix):])
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if err == nil {
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parts := strings.SplitN(string(decoded), ":", 2)
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if len(parts) == 2 {
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clientIP := GetClientIP(r)
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// Only apply rate limiting for actual login attempts, not regular auth checks
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// Login attempts come to /api/login endpoint
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if r.URL.Path == "/api/login" {
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// Check rate limiting for auth attempts
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if !authLimiter.Allow(clientIP) {
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log.Warn().Str("ip", clientIP).Msg("Rate limit exceeded for auth")
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LogAuditEvent("login", parts[0], clientIP, r.URL.Path, false, "Rate limited")
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if w != nil {
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http.Error(w, "Too many authentication attempts", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
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}
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return false
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}
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}
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// Check if account is locked out
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if IsLockedOut(parts[0]) || IsLockedOut(clientIP) {
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log.Warn().Str("user", parts[0]).Str("ip", clientIP).Msg("Account locked out")
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LogAuditEvent("login", parts[0], clientIP, r.URL.Path, false, "Account locked")
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if w != nil {
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http.Error(w, "Account temporarily locked due to failed attempts", http.StatusForbidden)
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}
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return false
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}
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// Check username
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userMatch := parts[0] == cfg.AuthUser
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// Check password - support both hashed and plain text for migration
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var passMatch bool
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if strings.HasPrefix(cfg.AuthPass, "$2") && len(cfg.AuthPass) == 60 {
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// Config has hashed password, check against hash
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passMatch = internalauth.CheckPasswordHash(parts[1], cfg.AuthPass)
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} else {
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// Config has plain text password (legacy), do direct comparison
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passMatch = parts[1] == cfg.AuthPass
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if passMatch {
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log.Warn().Msg("Using plain text password comparison - please update to hashed password")
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}
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}
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log.Debug().
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Str("provided_user", parts[0]).
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Str("expected_user", cfg.AuthUser).
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Bool("user_match", userMatch).
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Bool("pass_match", passMatch).
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Bool("password_is_hashed", strings.HasPrefix(cfg.AuthPass, "$2") && len(cfg.AuthPass) == 60).
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Msg("Auth check")
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if userMatch && passMatch {
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// Clear failed login attempts
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ClearFailedLogins(parts[0])
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ClearFailedLogins(GetClientIP(r))
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// Valid credentials - create session
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if w != nil {
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token := generateSessionToken()
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if token == "" {
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return false
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}
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// Store session
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sessionMu.Lock()
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sessions[token] = time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour)
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sessionMu.Unlock()
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// Track session for user
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TrackUserSession(parts[0], token)
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// Generate CSRF token
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csrfToken := generateCSRFToken(token)
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// Set session cookie
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http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
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Name: "pulse_session",
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Value: token,
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Path: "/",
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HttpOnly: true,
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Secure: r.TLS != nil,
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SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
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MaxAge: 86400, // 24 hours
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})
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// Set CSRF cookie (not HttpOnly so JS can read it)
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http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
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Name: "pulse_csrf",
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Value: csrfToken,
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Path: "/",
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Secure: r.TLS != nil,
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SameSite: http.SameSiteStrictMode,
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MaxAge: 86400, // 24 hours
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})
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// Audit log successful login
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LogAuditEvent("login", parts[0], GetClientIP(r), r.URL.Path, true, "Basic auth login")
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}
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return true
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} else {
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// Failed login
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RecordFailedLogin(parts[0])
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RecordFailedLogin(GetClientIP(r))
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LogAuditEvent("login", parts[0], GetClientIP(r), r.URL.Path, false, "Invalid credentials")
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}
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}
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}
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}
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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// RequireAuth middleware checks for authentication
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func RequireAuth(cfg *config.Config, handler http.HandlerFunc) http.HandlerFunc {
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if CheckAuth(cfg, w, r) {
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handler(w, r)
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return
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}
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// Log the failed attempt
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log.Warn().
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Str("ip", r.RemoteAddr).
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Str("path", r.URL.Path).
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Str("method", r.Method).
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Msg("Unauthorized access attempt")
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// Never send WWW-Authenticate header - we want to use our custom login page
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// The frontend will detect 401 responses and show the login component
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// Return JSON error for API requests, plain text for others
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if strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/") || strings.Contains(r.Header.Get("Accept"), "application/json") {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
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w.Write([]byte(`{"error":"Authentication required"}`))
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} else {
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http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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}
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}
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} |