Windows Host Agent Enhancements:
- Implement native Windows service support using golang.org/x/sys/windows/svc
- Add Windows Event Log integration for troubleshooting
- Create professional PowerShell installation/uninstallation scripts
- Add process termination and retry logic to handle Windows file locking
- Register uninstall endpoint at /uninstall-host-agent.ps1
Host Agent UI Improvements:
- Add expandable drawer to Hosts page (click row to view details)
- Display system info, network interfaces, disks, and temperatures in cards
- Replace status badges with subtle colored indicators
- Remove redundant master-detail sidebar layout
- Add search filtering for hosts
Technical Details:
- service_windows.go: Windows service lifecycle management with graceful shutdown
- service_stub.go: Cross-platform compatibility for non-Windows builds
- install-host-agent.ps1: Full Windows installation with validation
- uninstall-host-agent.ps1: Clean removal with process termination and retries
- HostsOverview.tsx: Expandable row pattern matching Docker/Proxmox pages
Files Added:
- cmd/pulse-host-agent/service_windows.go
- cmd/pulse-host-agent/service_stub.go
- scripts/install-host-agent.ps1
- scripts/uninstall-host-agent.ps1
- frontend-modern/src/components/Hosts/HostsOverview.tsx
- frontend-modern/src/components/Hosts/HostsFilter.tsx
The Windows service now starts reliably with automatic restart on failure,
and the uninstall script handles file locking gracefully without requiring reboots.
Introduces granular permission scopes for API tokens (docker:report, docker:manage, host-agent:report, monitoring:read/write, settings:read/write) allowing tokens to be restricted to minimum required access. Legacy tokens default to full access until scopes are explicitly configured.
Adds standalone host agent for monitoring Linux, macOS, and Windows servers outside Proxmox/Docker estates. New Servers workspace in UI displays uptime, OS metadata, and capacity metrics from enrolled agents.
Includes comprehensive token management UI overhaul with scope presets, inline editing, and visual scope indicators.
Update config.example.yaml with:
- Recommendations for very large deployments (30+ nodes)
- Formula for calculating optimal rate limits based on node count
- Example calculation: 30 nodes with 10s polling = 300ms interval
- Security note about minimum safe intervals
This helps admins properly configure the proxy for enterprise
deployments with dozens of nodes.
Add support for configuring rate limits via config.yaml to allow
administrators to tune the proxy for different deployment sizes.
Changes:
- Add RateLimitConfig struct to config.go with per_peer_interval_ms and per_peer_burst
- Update newRateLimiter() to accept optional RateLimitConfig parameter
- Load rate limit config from YAML and apply overrides to defaults
- Update tests to pass nil for default behavior
- Add comprehensive config.example.yaml with documentation
Configuration examples:
- Small (1-3 nodes): 1000ms interval, burst 5 (default)
- Medium (4-10 nodes): 500ms interval, burst 10
- Large (10+ nodes): 250ms interval, burst 20
Defaults remain conservative (1 req/sec, burst 5) to support most
deployments while allowing customization for larger environments.
Related: #46b8b8d08 (rate limit fix for multi-node support)
- Increase rate limit from 1 req/5sec to 1 req/sec (60/min)
- Increase burst from 2 to 5 requests
- Fixes temperature collection failures when monitoring 3+ nodes
- All requests from containerized Pulse use same UID, causing rate limiting
- New limits support 5-10 node deployments comfortably
Resolves issue where adding standalone nodes broke temperature monitoring
for all nodes due to aggressive rate limiting.
Resolves two remaining TODOs from codebase audit.
## 1. PBS/PMG Test Harness Stubs
**Location:** internal/monitoring/harness_integration.go:149-151
**Changes:**
- Added PBS client stub registration: `monitor.pbsClients[inst.Name] = &pbs.Client{}`
- Added PMG client stub registration: `monitor.pmgClients[inst.Name] = &pmg.Client{}`
- Added imports for pkg/pbs and pkg/pmg
**Purpose:**
Enables integration test scenarios to include PBS and PMG instance types
alongside existing PVE support. Stubs allow scheduler to register and
execute tasks for these instance types during integration testing.
**Testing:**
✅ TestAdaptiveSchedulerIntegration passes (55.5s)
✅ Integration test harness now supports all three instance types
## 2. HTTP Config URL Fetch
**Location:** cmd/pulse/config.go:226-261
**Problem:**
`PULSE_INIT_CONFIG_URL` was recognized but not implemented, returning
"URL import not yet implemented" error.
**Implementation:**
- URL validation (http/https schemes only)
- HTTP client with 15 second timeout
- Status code validation (2xx required)
- Empty response detection
- Base64 decoding with fallback to raw data
- Matches existing env-var behavior for `PULSE_INIT_CONFIG_DATA`
**Security:**
- Both HTTP and HTTPS supported (HTTPS recommended for production)
- URL scheme validation prevents file:// or other protocols
- Timeout prevents hanging on unresponsive servers
**Usage:**
```bash
export PULSE_INIT_CONFIG_URL="https://config-server/encrypted-config"
export PULSE_INIT_CONFIG_PASSPHRASE="secret"
pulse config auto-import
```
**Testing:**
✅ Code compiles cleanly
✅ Follows same pattern as existing PULSE_INIT_CONFIG_DATA handling
## Impact
- Completes integration test infrastructure for all instance types
- Enables automated config distribution via HTTP(S) for container deployments
- Removes last TODOs from codebase (no TODO/FIXME remaining in Go files)
Implements structured logging package with LOG_LEVEL/LOG_FORMAT env support, debug level guards for hot paths, enriched error messages with actionable context, and stack trace capture for production debugging. Improves observability and reduces log overhead in high-frequency polling loops.
Implements all remaining Codex recommendations before launch:
1. Privileged Methods Tests:
- TestPrivilegedMethodsCompleteness ensures all host-side RPCs are protected
- Will fail if new privileged RPC is added without authorization
- Verifies read-only methods are NOT in privilegedMethods
2. ID-Mapped Root Detection Tests:
- TestIDMappedRootDetection covers all boundary conditions
- Tests UID/GID range detection (both must be in range)
- Tests multiple ID ranges, edge cases, disabled mode
- 100% coverage of container identification logic
3. Authorization Tests:
- TestPrivilegedMethodsBlocked verifies containers can't call privileged RPCs
- TestIDMappedRootDisabled ensures feature can be disabled
- Tests both container and host credentials
4. Comprehensive Security Documentation (23 KB):
- Architecture overview with diagrams
- Complete authentication & authorization flow
- Rate limiting details (already implemented: 20/min per peer)
- SSH security model and forced commands
- Container isolation mechanisms
- Monitoring & alerting recommendations
- Development mode documentation (PULSE_DEV_ALLOW_CONTAINER_SSH)
- Troubleshooting guide with common issues
- Incident response procedures
Rate Limiting Status:
- Already implemented in throttle.go (20 req/min, burst 10, max 10 concurrent)
- Per-peer rate limiting at line 328 in main.go
- Per-node concurrency control at line 825 in main.go
- Exceeds Codex's requirements
All tests pass. Documentation covers all security aspects.
Addresses final Codex recommendations for production readiness.
RELEASE BLOCKER FIX - Prevents containers from triggering host-level operations.
Added host-only method restrictions:
- RPCEnsureClusterKeys (SSH key distribution)
- RPCRegisterNodes (node registration)
- RPCRequestCleanup (cleanup operations)
Implementation:
- New privilegedMethods map defines host-only methods
- Request handler checks if method is privileged
- If privileged AND caller is from ID-mapped UID range (container), reject
- Host processes (real root, configured UIDs) can still call privileged methods
- Containers can still call get_temperature and get_status
Security impact:
- Prevents compromised containers from:
• Triggering unwanted SSH key distribution to cluster nodes
• Learning about cluster topology via forced registration
• DOS attacks by repeatedly calling key distribution
• Other host-level privileged operations
Without this fix, any container with root could call these methods after
authentication, undermining the security isolation between container and host.
Addresses high-severity finding #2 from security audit.
CRITICAL security fixes for pulse-sensor-proxy:
1. Strengthened hostname validation regex:
- Now requires hostnames to start with alphanumeric character
- Prevents SSH option injection via hostnames starting with '-'
- Pattern: ^[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9._-]{0,63}$ (1-64 chars total)
- Added IPv4 and IPv6 validation regexes for future use
2. Added validation to vulnerable V1 RPC handlers:
- handleGetTemperature: Now validates node parameter before SSH
- handleRegisterNodes: Now validates discovered cluster nodes
- Previously these handlers passed unsanitized input directly to SSH
3. Defense in depth:
- V2 handlers already had validation (now using improved regex)
- Multiple layers of protection against malicious node identifiers
- Validation prevents container from passing SSH options as hostnames
Without these fixes, a compromised container could potentially inject SSH
options by providing malicious node names, though the 'root@' prefix
provided some mitigation.
Addresses high-severity finding from security audit.
Implements automated cleanup workflow when nodes are deleted from Pulse, removing all monitoring footprint from the host. Changes include a new RPC handler in the sensor proxy for cleanup requests, enhanced node deletion modal with detailed cleanup explanations, and improved SSH key management with proper tagging for atomic updates.
Improvements to pulse-sensor-proxy:
- Fix cluster discovery to use pvecm status for IP addresses instead of node names
- Add standalone node support for non-clustered Proxmox hosts
- Enhanced SSH key push with detailed logging, success/failure tracking, and error reporting
- Add --pulse-server flag to installer for custom Pulse URLs
- Configure www-data group membership for Proxmox IPC access
UI and API cleanup:
- Remove unused "Ensure cluster keys" button from Settings
- Remove /api/diagnostics/temperature-proxy/ensure-cluster-keys endpoint
- Remove EnsureClusterKeys method from tempproxy client
The setup script already handles SSH key distribution during initial configuration,
making the manual refresh button redundant.
The name "temp-proxy" implied a temporary or incomplete implementation. The new name better reflects its purpose as a secure sensor data bridge for containerized Pulse deployments.
Changes:
- Renamed cmd/pulse-temp-proxy/ to cmd/pulse-sensor-proxy/
- Updated all path constants and binary references
- Renamed environment variables: PULSE_TEMP_PROXY_* to PULSE_SENSOR_PROXY_*
- Updated systemd service and service account name
- Updated installation, rotation, and build scripts
- Renamed hardening documentation
- Maintained backward compatibility for key removal during upgrades
Fixes LXC bind mount issue where socket-level mounts break when the
socket is recreated by systemd. Following Codex's recommendation to
bind mount the directory instead of the file.
Changes:
- Socket path: /run/pulse-temp-proxy/pulse-temp-proxy.sock
- Systemd: RuntimeDirectory=pulse-temp-proxy (auto-creates /run/pulse-temp-proxy)
- Systemd: RuntimeDirectoryMode=0770 for group access
- LXC mount: Bind entire /run/pulse-temp-proxy directory
- Install script: Upgrades old socket-level mounts to directory-level
- Install script: Detects and handles bind mount changes
This survives socket recreations and container restarts. The directory
mount persists even when systemd unlinks/recreates the socket file.
Related to #528
Addresses security concern raised in code review:
- Socket permissions changed from 0666 to 0660
- Added SO_PEERCRED verification to authenticate connecting processes
- Only allows root (UID 0) or proxy's own user
- Prevents unauthorized processes from triggering SSH key rollout
- Documented passwordless root SSH requirement for clusters
This prevents any process on the host or in other containers from
accessing the proxy RPC endpoints.
Addresses #528
Introduces pulse-temp-proxy architecture to eliminate SSH key exposure in containers:
**Architecture:**
- pulse-temp-proxy runs on Proxmox host (outside LXC/Docker)
- SSH keys stored on host filesystem (/var/lib/pulse-temp-proxy/ssh/)
- Pulse communicates via unix socket (bind-mounted into container)
- Proxy handles cluster discovery, key rollout, and temperature fetching
**Components:**
- cmd/pulse-temp-proxy: Standalone Go binary with unix socket RPC server
- internal/tempproxy: Client library for Pulse backend
- scripts/install-temp-proxy.sh: Idempotent installer for existing deployments
- scripts/pulse-temp-proxy.service: Systemd service for proxy
**Integration:**
- Pulse automatically detects and uses proxy when socket exists
- Falls back to direct SSH for native installations
- Installer automatically configures proxy for new LXC deployments
- Existing LXC users can upgrade by running install-temp-proxy.sh
**Security improvements:**
- Container compromise no longer exposes SSH keys
- SSH keys never enter container filesystem
- Maintains forced command restrictions
- Transparent to users - no workflow changes
**Documentation:**
- Updated TEMPERATURE_MONITORING.md with new architecture
- Added verification steps and upgrade instructions
- Preserved legacy documentation for native installs
