Mock mode faked assistant chat but left Patrol on the real provider
path. The public demo therefore ran real patrol cycles that failed with
"no patrol model configured", raised the Provider analysis error
finding, and rendered /patrol as an unconfigured setup surface with no
findings, which also cost the landing page its Patrol screenshot.
Demo mode now simulates the whole surface without ever contacting a
provider:
- runDemoPatrolCycle synthesizes findings from the live mock state
(offline Docker edge host, degraded PBS and PMG, unhealthy or
restart-looping containers, the fullest storage pool, the hungriest
guest), quoting each resource's actual observed values so the patrol
page stays consistent with the rest of the demo UI. Cycles refresh
findings as heartbeats, auto-resolve ones whose mock condition
cleared, and append matching run records plus a one-time backfilled
history.
- Readiness, the API readiness checks, and the model-check preflight
report a simulated pass under a "demo" provider identity, and the
stale provider-error finding is auto-resolved.
- Release demo ordering is handled: mock fixtures only enable after the
demo_fixtures license sync, so the patrol loop now starts for
demo-intended runtimes (PULSE_MOCK_MODE requested in env) and every
entry point re-checks IsDemoMode() live. Dev installs with the
background-AI guard get a warmup goroutine instead of the scheduler.
- Run-history evidence filtering is now symmetric (demo runtimes hide
real records, matching the existing inverse), scoped/targeted patrol
runs are skipped in demo mode, and demo findings are excluded from
ai_findings.json so fixtures never leak into a real install.
The privileged-session gate (ensureAdminSession) and the settings
capabilities snapshot only accepted a session whose username equals the
configured local admin identity. SSO users are keyed by their
provider-scoped principal (sso:oidc:...), which can never match, so an
SSO session was locked out of every settings-scoped route no matter what
roles it held. That made group role mappings (group=admin) appear
broken (#1535) and surfaced as 'Unable to load SSO providers' when an
SSO user opened the SSO settings panel (#1533).
A session user now passes the gate when their effective RBAC
permissions include the admin action on all resources, which is the
shape the built-in Administrator role assigns through group role
mappings. On an instance with no local admin identity configured at all
(the v5 OIDC-only pattern), SSO sessions pass as before the rewrite,
since they are the only administrators the instance has. Org-scoped
tenant sessions keep their own management rules.
Refs #1533, #1535
Two root causes behind #1516's remaining reports:
- A node whose Proxmox disks/list query fails (PVE probes SMART per disk
inside that call, so dozens of disks can exceed the API window) now
falls back to the linked host agent's smartctl inventory instead of
leaving the Physical Disks view empty. Each node also gets its own
attempt window so one slow node no longer starves the rest of the
cluster, and a poll that runs out of budget saves partial results.
- The -n standby probe guard is dropped for positively confirmed
non-rotational devices in both the host agent and the node sensor
wrapper. The guard exists to avoid spinning up sleeping HDDs; an SSD
has nothing to spin up, and some SATA SSDs answer CHECK POWER MODE
with a bogus standby state that permanently hid their temperature,
attributes and history.
Refs #1516
The public pricing surface and in-app plan-selling copy now say
"Patrol investigates issues and explains the root cause" and
"Patrol applies safe fixes and verifies the result". Rename the
licensing catalog DisplayName/ComparisonName pairs to the title-cased
forms, align the ai_autofix UpgradeReason verbs (apply/verify the
result), regenerate the frontend catalog, and update the Go, vitest,
and Playwright pins plus README and PULSE_PRO docs.
OrchestratorChatService is replaced, not extended: it exposes only
ExecuteInvestigationStream (returning a structured
OrchestratorInvestigationResult) and ListInvestigationTools. The generic
ExecuteStream, SetAutonomousMode, ListAvailableTools, and the
AutonomousMode request field are gone, along with
OrchestratorCommandExecutor, OrchestratorApprovalStore, and the
autonomy/fix-verifier/license dependency interfaces. OrchestratorDeps
now carries a REQUIRED ActionBroker and no command/autonomy deps.
The pulse investigation adapter is rewritten to drive
ExecuteInvestigationStream, injecting proposal/finding/investigation
identity from trusted context and feeding a per-org proposal catalog
resolved from the tenant-bound action lifecycle (so acceptance and
planning validate identically). The retired command-execution,
autonomy, and command-shaped approval adapters are deleted; the router
wires the broker and catalog factories onto the AI settings handler.
The sixth side door is removed: PatrolService.generateRemediation-
PlanFromInvestigation and its call, which copied Fix.Commands into an
executable enterprise remediation plan, are deleted, pinned closed by a
source-audit test.
ActionCapabilityParamInfo gains Pattern (mapped by the broker), so the
canonical planner's pattern validation survives the cross-repo
boundary.
L20 readiness assertion RA35 asserts every Patrol-initiated
infrastructure mutation originates as a typed proposal and reaches
execution only through the canonical action lifecycle, with unsupported
proposals failing closed. Contract prose updated across ai-runtime,
api-contracts, agent-lifecycle, performance-and-scalability,
security-privacy, and storage-recovery.
Lands together with the pulse-enterprise orchestrator migration (the
replace directive means both heads move as one window).
Commit A of the coordinated proposal slice (pulse-internal; the
aicontracts interface replacement and enterprise migration follow as
one window because pulse-enterprise builds against this tree via a
replace directive).
patrol_propose_action is a side-effect-free, mutation-none capture
whose schema carries only resource_id, capability_name, params, and
reason. Registry policy rejects it outside the Patrol investigation
profile before the handler runs, and the same check keeps it out of
every other profile's projected manifest. Correlation identity
(proposal, finding, investigation, evidence) is injected from trusted
orchestration context through the request-local ProposalCapture sink,
which executor clones share so one run has exactly one capture.
Tool calls now carry an explicit invocation envelope (tool-use ID,
name, arguments) through ExecuteInvocation; the ID rides the context
because per-turn tool calls execute concurrently. The sink keys on call
identity plus payload fingerprint: idempotent replay re-succeeds, the
same ID with a different payload latches a terminal integrity error,
and a second distinct valid proposal latches terminal ambiguity - both
terminal states invalidate the captured proposal, since concurrency
makes first-wins nondeterministic. Proposals count only after catalog
validation: advertised capability, declared/required/enum parameters,
and sensitive parameters rejected before success with no value echo in
any output.
ExecuteInvestigationStream returns proposal cardinality as a structured
result with typed errors for ambiguity, integrity violations, and the
failed-attempts-only case (never collapsed into the valid zero-proposal
conclusion); ListInvestigationTools projects through the identical
profile path. Proposal parameter values exist only transiently for
provider continuation and validation: the canonical exposure projector
redacts them from the durable transcript and every
tool_start/progress/end stream event, proven end-to-end with a scripted
provider run that also verifies the provider continuation keeps raw
values.
Essential proof included: two concurrent valid proposal calls produce
ErrProposalAmbiguous and a nil proposal regardless of execution order.
Settings showed PVE cluster members as read-only rows, so a member whose
discovered address is unreachable from Pulse (internal cluster network IP,
stale DNS) had no manual fix; only agent re-registration could adopt a
better IP, which leaves agent-less members stranded. Surfaced in the
"Install issues with V6" support thread.
The node editor now lists cluster members with a per-member connection
address field that writes ClusterEndpoints[n].IPOverride, the field
re-discovery already preserves and EffectiveIP already prefers at poll
time (editing Host would be clobbered on the next cluster refresh).
PUT /api/config/nodes/{id} accepts write-only clusterEndpointOverrides
entries; only changed members ride the payload, an empty value clears
the override, and unknown members are rejected. The configured-nodes
cache mirrors saved overrides instead of spreading the write-only
payload field onto node config state.
Review of 3073a5061 found the remaining registration hole: Register
rejected canonical descriptor overrides but still accepted a canonical
NAME with a nil override, inheriting the canonical descriptor while
replacing the governed handler in the map - an extension could re-register
pulse_read and bypass its execution-intent enforcement.
Registration authority is now split. registerBuiltin is the unexported
construction-time path for canonical Pulse tools: shared descriptor
mandatory, overrides rejected. RegisterExtension - the only path exposed
through PulseToolExecutor.RegisterTool - rejects every canonical tool
name outright and requires the extension to declare its own descriptor.
Both paths are append-only: a name registers exactly once, so no later
registration can swap out an already-governed handler.
Proofs cover the exact bypass (canonical name, nil override), extension
and builtin duplicate rejection, builtin override rejection, and
descriptor-less extension rejection. Tests that previously swapped
handlers by re-registering now use fresh executors per scenario.
Contract prose and source pins updated.
Every registered Pulse tool now carries a canonical invocation
descriptor (internal/agentcapabilities/invocation.go): static or
discriminator-based, classifying each invocation with a workflow kind
plus a mutation target (none / pulse_state / infrastructure). Mixed
descriptors must exactly cover their schema enum and registration
panics otherwise, so an unclassifiable tool cannot exist. Missing,
malformed, unknown, or fabricated discriminator values classify
fail-closed as infrastructure writes.
Provider projection and runtime enforcement consume the same
descriptor under one InvocationPolicy (control level plus the
request-local, non-serializable deny_infrastructure_mutations
restriction, isolated across executor clones): ListTools and
ListToolGovernance remove forbidden enum values, drop empty tools, and
recompute the offered action mode, while ToolRegistry.Execute blocks
forbidden invocations before the handler runs. This closes the mixed
tool control-level bypass, most seriously Docker action:update, which
previously fell through to direct execution at read-only, and fixes
the Kubernetes misclassification: the retired switch read the action
argument while the schema discriminator is type, so type:scale
classified as read.
pulse_file_edit is now write-only (append/write); file inspection
routes through pulse_read action=file, whose exec path keeps its
structural read-only execution-intent enforcement. ClassifyToolCall
consults the descriptor table first and retains only genuinely
non-registry compatibility cases. The deny restriction is deliberately
separate from autonomous mode, which only suppresses interactive
questions and grants no mutation authority.
Proofs: descriptor validation and fail-closed classification unit
tests, plus the invocation-policy regression suite (scale classifies
write and never invokes at read-only or under deny; Docker update
queues nothing at read-only; autonomous plus deny cannot mutate;
fabricated enum values fail at runtime; filtered projection and
runtime enforcement agree; executor clones keep request policies
isolated). Contracts and registry ownership updated for the new
shared invocation descriptor boundary.
Slice 3a of the typed-lifecycle ratchet; the patrol_investigation
execution profile and patrol_propose_action tool build on this
substrate next.
Ollama is the zero-cost AI path but the setup row offered only a Server
URL, and Patrol then failed on models that cannot emit tool_calls
(#1463, #847, #1425, #1152, #880). Bless qwen3:8b, the model family
Ollama's own tool-calling docs are written against, verified locally
against Patrol's real preflight: qwen3:8b emitted the tool call on
every run; qwen3:4b never did (0/4), so no low-RAM tag is suggested.
- Registry: SuggestedModel/Note/Equivalents on AIProviderDefinition,
projected on /api/settings/ai providers; Ollama default model goes
llama3.2 -> qwen3:8b.
- Provider row: copyable 'ollama pull qwen3:8b' block with hardware
note, and a next-step hint when a successful test resolves a model
outside the blessing set.
- Model resolution: exact-ID blessed preference, so pulling qwen3:8b
makes it the auto-resolved Patrol model with no manual selection.
- Readiness copy names the blessed model (its contract pins landed
with 94ccc7a0c's staging; this commit restores green).
- manual_ollama_preflight_test.go is the env-gated re-blessing
harness; contracts updated for ai-runtime, api-contracts,
frontend-primitives, and the agent-lifecycle/storage-recovery
dependent boundaries; subsystem_lookup_test line pins follow the
api-contracts.md insertion.
Proposals now require their full correlation identity before anything
persists: a Submit without a finding ID or investigation ID is refused,
so a planned action can never lose the deterministic link back to its
Patrol finding. Pinned in the plan-only broker contract test.
The persisted-state transition callback becomes org-scoped
(OnActionTransition func(orgID, record)) and is wired through
ResourceHandlers.SetActionTransitionPublisher into the shared lifecycle
service, so a multi-tenant Patrol reconciler can key per-tenant stores
and can never apply a transition to the wrong tenant. Publication still
strictly follows persistence; code-standards pins guard the org-scoped
signature and wiring.
pkg/aicontracts/action_broker.go gains machine ownership: a shared
ai-runtime/api-contracts registry boundary (owned_files plus a sorted
shared_ownerships entry) with path policies proving through
pkg/aicontracts/contracts_test.go, and Shared Boundaries entries
inserted in canonical sorted order in both contracts.
Slice 2b-1 of the typed-lifecycle ratchet; the Patrol reconciler itself
lands with the orchestrator wiring now that ai_handlers.go is free.
Commit cc948b022 fixed the Patrol preflight strings that gated keyless
onboarding; this sweeps the rest. Error messages, readiness checks, and
guidance copy that still pointed at the retired Assistant & Patrol
settings page now name the real surfaces: Pulse Intelligence settings
for the area as a whole, and the Provider & Models settings page for
provider-credential guidance, matching the phrasing cc948b022
established. Pinning tests updated in step, including three
ai_handlers_test.go assertions cc948b022 had already left stale.
pkg/aicontracts gains the plan-only OrchestratorActionBroker contract:
ActionProposal (typed capability reference, no command, host, risk, or
approval fields), a read-only ActionCapabilityCatalog with parameter
sensitivity, ActionDisposition over the existing safe ActionPlanInfo
projection, and an additive Action *ActionReference on
InvestigationSession and InvestigationRecord. ProposedFix/ApprovalID are
documented as migration-only; OrchestratorDeps gains the ActionBroker
seam while CmdExecutor/ApprovalStore are marked legacy pending removal.
internal/api/patrol_action_broker.go implements the seam tenant-bound
over ResourceHandlers.ActionLifecycle(): fixed pulse_patrol actor,
broker-owned ActionOrigin stamped through the service's internal
PlanWithOptions (the public plan endpoint cannot claim an origin),
plan-only submission even for ApprovalNone capabilities, and refusal of
proposals that populate IsSensitive parameters before any persistence.
The lifecycle service adds Capabilities (same registry resolution and
typed errors as planning) and an OnActionTransition persisted-state
callback covering plan, decision, and terminal execution transitions,
published only after the store write succeeds, so Patrol can reconcile
decisions and outcomes deterministically. ActionAuditRecord carries the
new broker-owned Origin, persisted in action_audits.origin_json with a
schema migration and round-trip normalization.
Contracts updated across api-contracts, ai-runtime, unified-resources,
agent-lifecycle, and storage-recovery; proofs added in
pkg/aicontracts/contracts_test.go (propose-only method set, command-free
wire shape, additive reference), internal/api/contract_test.go
(plan-only broker pins), broker behavior tests, lifecycle origin and
transition tests, and a SQLite origin round-trip test.
Slice 2a of the typed-lifecycle enforcement ratchet: additive core
fabric only; enterprise migration and side-door deletion follow.
A fresh install with no AI provider looped: the Patrol zero state sent
users to the Patrol model check, the check told them to enable Pulse
Assistant in a settings page that does not exist by that name, and the
Patrol model field silently degraded to a bare text input with no hint
that a provider key or Ollama server was the missing step (#1463, #847).
- Preflight and readiness copy now names the real surfaces (Provider &
Models, Patrol settings) and the real first step: add an API key or an
Ollama server.
- The Patrol zero-state CTA, header Fix setup link, and readiness
banners route config-level causes (assistant_disabled,
provider_not_configured) to Provider & Models; model-level causes
keep the Check Patrol model action.
- The Patrol model field shows a linked zero-provider notice instead of
a bare text input when no provider is configured.
- The preflight result box no longer renders the same failure message
twice.
Planning, approval decisions, and execution for typed resource actions
move out of the HTTP handlers in internal/api/actions.go into a new
internal/actionlifecycle.Service owned by api-contracts. The REST
handlers become thin decode/actor/error-mapping adapters over the one
shared service, and ResourceHandlers.ActionLifecycle() exposes the same
service for in-process consumers, so a future Patrol action broker
inherits identical resource lookup, availability checks, plan hashing,
audit persistence, remediation locks, plan-drift revalidation,
execution, and terminal publication instead of loopback HTTP or a
parallel lifecycle.
Behavior is preserved: same status codes, error codes, and audit/
lifecycle persistence ordering, backed by the existing api contract
tests plus new fail-closed proofs for the service itself (unknown
resource/capability, availability refusal, unapproved execution,
remediation lock, plan drift, missing executor, missing store).
Contract text in api-contracts, agent-lifecycle, and storage-recovery
now names the service alongside actions.go and planner.go; the
subsystem registry owns internal/actionlifecycle/ under api-contracts
with a dedicated path policy; the code-standards and contract source
pins follow the moved invariants; and the subsystem_lookup line-number
pin shifts with the api-contracts canonical-files list insertion.
This is the first slice of making the typed action lifecycle the only
autonomous execution route for Patrol, Assistant, and MCP.
The legacy v5 callback path /api/oidc/callback carries no provider ID,
so extractOIDCProviderID hard-maps it to the legacy-oidc sentinel.
Providers created in the v6 UI get a UUID ID, and when their IdP is
still registered with the legacy redirect URI the callback missed the
provider lookup and returned provider_not_found with no log, breaking
SSO login (authentik and similar).
Peek the pending authorization state across providers to recover the
provider that actually initiated the flow, re-validate it, and proceed.
State stays single-use (peek never consumes), unknown/disabled/expired/
replayed all still fail closed, and the 4-part provider_mismatch guard
is unchanged. The fail-closed path now logs instead of failing silently.
Refs #1533, #1535
The in-app updater validated download URL and channel but never compared
the target against the running version, so any valid older release asset
URL installed silently while the UI presented it as an update. ApplyUpdate
now rejects targets at or below the running version on both the community
and Pro broker paths before any history entry or download, with an explicit
allowDowngrade opt-in on POST /api/updates/apply for sanctioned cases.
The rollback half already existed but nothing reached it: createBackup
retains three backups, restoreBackup works, and history records BackupPath,
yet no endpoint or UI called restoreBackup. RollbackToBackup restores the
retained backup recorded on a history entry after re-validating the path
against the managed backup roots, shares the update-in-flight slot with
ApplyUpdate, records an Action rollback history entry linked to the source
update, marks that update rolled_back, streams a restoring stage through
the existing status/SSE machinery, and restarts via the exit-for-systemd
path. POST /api/updates/rollback carries it with the same RequireAdmin plus
settings:write gating as apply. Rollback is purely local, so the Pro
edition gate never applies to it.
Settings now has the update history surface that was missing entirely:
nothing called /api/updates/history before. The Updates panel lists recent
updates with a Roll back action on successful entries whose backup is still
retained, behind a confirmation dialog naming the restore version, and the
rollback rides updateStore's shared pending-apply marker for the
post-restart toast. restoreBackup also honors PULSE_INSTALL_DIR now instead
of hardcoding /opt/pulse, matching createBackup.
Contract deltas ride along: api-contracts picks up the rollback transport
and downgrade-conflict semantics, agent-lifecycle and storage-recovery pin
rollback as server self-update plumbing, ai-runtime and cloud-paid pin the
update watcher stage vocabulary as non-assistant non-paid shell chrome, and
frontend-primitives adds UpdateHistorySection as the history/rollback
presentation owner with matching architecture proofs.
The only production consumer of the UpdaterRegistry is the plan endpoint
(GET /api/updates/plan); every real apply runs through the in-Go pipeline
in manager.go ApplyUpdate, with concurrency held by updateMu/updateInFlight.
The InstallShAdapter Execute/Rollback path (install.sh piping, rollback
binary download, health wait) and the UpdateQueue were never called outside
tests, so fixes made there silently did nothing. Adapters are now plan
providers only: the Updater interface keeps SupportsApply, PrepareUpdate,
and GetDeploymentType, pinned by the new registry proof in
internal/api/updates_test.go.
The orphaned fetchAndVerifyReleaseSignature helper goes with it; its
fail-closed sidecar tests now exercise the manager's
downloadAndVerifyReleaseSignature directly. The deployment-installability
sshsig invariant now names the manager pipeline as the only surface that
fetches release artifacts, and api-contracts, storage-recovery, and
agent-lifecycle pin the same plan-provider-only shape at their update
transport boundaries. Stale adapter references in build-release.sh,
validate-release.sh, and the installtests comments are updated to match.
Dead-code audit batch 3: hasPrefix in internal/ai/service_test.go and
the staticExternalAgentActivityProvider test double in
internal/api/agent_resource_context_test.go have no callers in any
test or production code.
Skipped from the audit list after re-verification:
createTestEncryptionKey in cmd/pulse/test_helpers_test.go (called nine
times by commands_integration_test.go under the integration build tag).
The AI action broker treated an unreadable operator lock as unlocked:
isResourceRemediationLocked returned (false, nil) with no audit store
wired, and the caller logged store errors then dispatched anyway. An
operator's NeverAutoRemediate=true could be silently ignored whenever
the policy store was missing or erroring, which is unacceptable while
Patrol and Assistant run at assisted or full autonomy.
Posture change at the dispatch decision point:
- isResourceRemediationLocked now reports unknown state (nil store or
lookup failure) as an ErrRemediationLockStateUnknown-wrapped error
instead of silently defaulting to unlocked.
- New checkRemediationLockForDispatch gate: dispatches without an
approved human decision fail CLOSED on unknown lock state and
surface "remediation lock state unknown; operator approval
required". Human-approved dispatches keep the historical fail-open
behavior with a warning log. A confirmed lock still refuses even
approved dispatches, as before.
- executeNativeActionWithAudit (TrueNAS app start/stop/restart) now
enforces the lock too; it previously skipped the check entirely.
- Refusals persist Failed audit records with stable
remediation_lock_state_unknown: / resource_remediation_locked:
ErrorMessage prefixes.
- ai-runtime subsystem contract updated to pin the new posture.
Tests cover store-error and nil-store at both autonomy postures on
both dispatch paths; routing/control tests now wire an in-memory
audit store since autonomous dispatch without one is refused.
The resolved-identity match in canonical auto-register always preserved
the stored host, so the route-aware IP preference added to the agent in
022f170df could never take effect for an already-registered node: a
reinstall re-matched the node and kept the stale short-DNS host forever.
Preserve the stored host only when it is absent from the agent's ordered
candidate list (an admin-managed endpoint the agent cannot see); when the
agent itself lists the stored host as a lower-priority candidate, adopt
the newly selected host. Identity continuity (same node record, same
token) is unchanged.
Note: commit c21693489 carries this same message by mistake; it actually
contains concurrent OIDC/SAML mapping work from a parallel session that
was staged when the shared index raced. This commit is the real change.
The resolved-identity match in canonical auto-register always preserved
the stored host, so the route-aware IP preference added to the agent in
022f170df could never take effect for an already-registered node: a
reinstall re-matched the node and kept the stale short-DNS host forever.
Preserve the stored host only when it is absent from the agent's ordered
candidate list (an admin-managed endpoint the agent cannot see); when the
agent itself lists the stored host as a lower-priority candidate, adopt
the newly selected host. Identity continuity (same node record, same
token) is unchanged.
The in-app updater and the unattended timer both target the public
rcourtman/Pulse community assets, so a Pro install that used them was
silently downgraded to community. Guard 2 (983a89326) blocked in-app
apply on the Pro edition, which stopped the downgrade but left Pro
installs with no update path except manual portal downloads. That
friction is a plausible driver of the runtime split: as of 2026-07-08
only 10 of 66 active paid licenses have any Pro-runtime install.
Root fix: the compiled Pro binary now checks and applies updates
through the license server download broker (GET /v1/downloads/pulse-pro
with the installation token and instance fingerprint). The check
compares against the broker's pinned private release instead of GitHub,
respecting the stable/rc channel guard. Apply re-resolves fresh signed
R2 URLs at apply time, verifies the archive against the same pinned
pulse-installer SSHSIG key plus the broker manifest sha256, and refuses
GitHub-shaped download URLs outright. An unactivated Pro binary still
refuses with the portal fallback. The community edition path is
unchanged.
The update banner restores in-app apply for auto-updatable Pro
deployments and keeps the portal instructions for deployments the
updater cannot drive (Docker). scripts/pulse-auto-update.sh now skips
when the installed binary reports Pulse Pro so the unattended timer can
never reinstall community over Pro.
Note: internal/updates/pro_update.go and manager_pro_update_test.go for
this change landed one commit early inside 313552deb via a parallel
session committing a shared staged index; this commit completes the
wiring they belong to.
The embedded frontend file server had no content type for .md, so every
in-app "Full details" / "Terms of Service" / security-guide link to
/docs/*.md answered application/octet-stream and the browser downloaded
the file instead of showing it. Shipped docs now serve as
text/plain; charset=utf-8 and open readable in the tab the app targets.
An OIDC provider upgraded from v5 keeps its v5 redirect URL
(/api/oidc/callback, the DefaultOIDCCallbackPath), so the IdP redirects
the browser back to the 3-segment legacy path carrying only code and
state, with no session cookie and no API token yet. The global auth
middleware only marked the 4-segment per-provider path public, so in
API-token-only mode (AuthUser=="" && AuthPass=="" && HasAPITokens())
the callback was rejected with "API token required via Authorization
header or X-API-Token header", and the route dispatcher 404ed the same
path.
The handler layer (extractOIDCProviderID) already maps the legacy
/api/oidc/login and /api/oidc/callback paths to the migrated legacy
provider, so only the public-path allowlist and the route dispatcher
needed to recognise the 3-segment form. Adds a regression test covering
both legacy paths in API-token-only mode, the exact configuration that
emitted the error.
Refs #1533
Empty allowedGroups, allowedDomains, allowedEmails, groupsClaim and
groupRoleMappings in a provider PUT were silently restored from the
existing config, so an admin could never clear them. The guards
shielded against lossy round-trips that no longer exist: the detail
GET and the flat list response both carry these fields, so an empty
value is an intentional clear. Nested OIDC/SAML config and the client
secret stay preserved since toggle payloads omit them and secrets are
never echoed in reads.
Also expose groupsClaim and groupRoleMappings in the shared extensions
list response so the enterprise list matches the core one, and make
the Settings enable/disable toggle send only writable fields; the old
list-item spread included computed response fields that the enterprise
strict PUT decoder rejects.
