Scripts like install.sh and install-sensor-proxy.sh are now attached
as release assets and downloaded from releases/latest/download/ URLs.
This ensures users always get scripts compatible with their installed
version, even while development continues on main.
Changes:
- build-release.sh: copy install scripts to release directory
- create-release.yml: upload scripts as release assets
- Updated all documentation and code references to use release URLs
- Scripts reference each other via release URLs for consistency
Issues found during scenario testing:
1. Version propagation: The hostagent and dockeragent packages were
reporting their own Version (0.1.0-dev) instead of the unified
agent's version. Added AgentVersion config field to pass the
parent's version down.
2. macOS legacy cleanup: The install.sh script was missing cleanup
for pulse-docker-agent on macOS.
3. Windows legacy cleanup: The install.ps1 script was missing cleanup
for legacy PulseHostAgent and PulseDockerAgent services.
These fixes ensure:
- Unified agent reports consistent version across host/docker metrics
- Legacy agents are properly removed on all platforms during upgrade
- Users migrating from legacy agents get a clean transition
Add seamless migration path from legacy agents to unified agent:
- Add AgentType field to report payloads (unified vs legacy detection)
- Update server to detect legacy agents by type instead of version
- Add UI banner showing upgrade command when legacy agents are detected
- Add deprecation notice to install-host-agent.ps1
- Create install-docker-agent.sh stub that redirects to unified installer
Legacy agents (pulse-host-agent, pulse-docker-agent) now show a "Legacy"
badge in the UI with a one-click copy command to upgrade to the unified
agent.
Implement self-update capability for the unified pulse-agent binary:
- Add internal/agentupdate package with cross-platform update logic
- Hourly version checks against /api/agent/version endpoint
- SHA256 checksum verification for downloaded binaries
- Atomic binary replacement with backup/rollback on failure
- Support for Linux, macOS, and Windows (10 platform/arch combinations)
Build and release changes:
- Dockerfile builds unified agent for all platforms
- build-release.sh includes unified agent in release artifacts
- validate-release.sh validates unified agent binaries
- Install scripts (install.sh, install.ps1) use correct URL format
Related to #727, #737
Fixes an issue where pvecm status output using decimal node IDs (e.g. '1' instead of '0x1') caused node discovery to fail. Added test case for this format.
Remove all code paths that manipulate config files without Phase 2 locking:
1. Installer: Remove ensure_allowed_nodes_file_reference() call (line 1674)
- Migration now handled exclusively by config migrate-to-file
2. Installer: Make migration failures fatal in update_allowed_nodes()
- Prevents fallback to unsafe Python manipulation
3. Daemon sanitizer: Remove os.WriteFile() call
- Now only sanitizes in-memory copy, doesn't write back to disk
- Logs warning instructing admin to run `config migrate-to-file`
4. Self-heal script: Replace 132 lines of Python with CLI call
- sanitize_allowed_nodes() now calls `config migrate-to-file`
- Eliminates uncoordinated Python-based config rewriting
All config mutations now flow exclusively through Phase 2 CLI with
atomic operations and file locking. No code paths remain that can
create duplicate allowed_nodes blocks.
Addresses Codex review feedback on Phase 2 gaps.
The migrate-to-file command now calls sanitizeDuplicateAllowedNodesBlocks
before parsing the config, allowing it to handle corrupted configs with
duplicate allowed_nodes blocks.
This ensures migration works even on hosts that were affected by the
original corruption issue.
Final security hardening based on second Codex review:
**Lock File Permission Fix (Security)**
- Lock file now created with 0600 instead of 0644
- Prevents unprivileged users from opening lock and holding LOCK_EX
- Without this, any local user could DoS the installer/self-heal
- Added f.Chmod(0600) to fix permissions on existing lock files
**Deadlock Prevention (Future-Proofing)**
- Added documentation for future multi-file locking scenarios
- Specifies consistent lock ordering requirement (config.yaml.lock before allowed_nodes.yaml.lock)
- Prevents potential deadlocks if future commands modify multiple files
- Current implementation only locks one file, so no immediate issue
**Testing:**
✅ Lock file created as `-rw-------` (0600)
✅ Existing lock files with wrong perms get fixed
✅ Unprivileged users can no longer DoS the lock
**Codex Validation:**
- Locking is now correct (persistent .lock file, held during entire operation)
- Atomic writes complete while lock is held
- Validation honors actual config paths
- Empty lists supported for operational flexibility
- Error propagation prevents silent failures
- No remaining race conditions or security issues
Phase 2 is now complete and Codex-verified as secure.
Related to Phase 2 fixes commit 804a638ea
Fixes critical issues found by Codex code review:
**1. Fixed file locking race condition (CRITICAL)**
- Lock file was being replaced by atomic rename, invalidating the lock
- New approach: lock a separate `.lock` file that persists across renames
- Ensures concurrent writers (installer + self-heal timer) are properly serialized
- Without this fix, corruption was still possible despite Phase 2
**2. Fixed validation to honor configured allowed_nodes_file path**
- validate command now uses loadConfig() to read actual config
- Respects allowed_nodes_file setting instead of assuming default path
- Prevents false positives/negatives when path is customized
**3. Allow empty allowed_nodes lists**
- Empty lists are valid (admin may clear for security, or rely on IPC validation)
- validate no longer fails on empty lists
- set-allowed-nodes --replace with zero nodes now supported
- Critical for operational flexibility
**4. Installer error propagation**
- update_allowed_nodes failures now exit installer with error
- Prevents silent failures that leave stale allowlists
- Self-heal will abort instead of masking CLI errors
**Technical Details:**
- withLockedFile() now locks `<path>.lock` instead of target file
- Lock held for entire duration of read-modify-write-rename
- atomicWriteFile() completes while lock is still held
- Empty lists represented as `allowed_nodes: []` in YAML
**Testing:**
✅ Lock file created and persists across operations
✅ Empty list can be written with --replace
✅ Validation passes with empty lists
✅ Config path from allowed_nodes_file honored
✅ Concurrent operations properly serialized
These fixes ensure Phase 2 actually eliminates corruption by design.
Identified by Codex code review
Related to Phase 2 commit 3dc073a28
Implements bullet-proof configuration management to completely eliminate
allowed_nodes corruption by design. This builds on Phase 1 (file-only mode)
by replacing all shell/Python config manipulation with proper Go tooling.
**New Features:**
- `pulse-sensor-proxy config validate` - parse and validate config files
- `pulse-sensor-proxy config set-allowed-nodes` - atomic node list updates
- File locking via flock prevents concurrent write races
- Atomic writes (temp file + rename) ensure consistency
- systemd ExecStartPre validation prevents startup with bad config
**Architectural Changes:**
1. Installer now calls config CLI instead of embedded Python/shell scripts
2. All config mutations go through single authoritative writer
3. Deduplication and normalization handled in Go (reuses existing logic)
4. Sanitizer kept as noisy failsafe (warns if corruption still occurs)
**Implementation Details:**
- New cmd/pulse-sensor-proxy/config_cmd.go with cobra commands
- withLockedFile() wrapper ensures exclusive access
- atomicWriteFile() uses temp + rename pattern
- Installer update_allowed_nodes() simplified to CLI calls
- Both systemd service modes include ExecStartPre validation
**Why This Works:**
- Single code path for all writes (no shell/Python divergence)
- File locking serializes self-heal timer + manual installer runs
- Validation gate prevents proxy from starting with corrupt config
- CLI uses same YAML parser as the daemon (guaranteed compatibility)
**Phase 2 Benefits:**
- Corruption impossible by design (not just detected and fixed)
- No more Python dependency for config management
- Atomic operations prevent partial writes
- Clear error messages on validation failures
The defensive sanitizer remains active but now logs loudly if triggered,
allowing us to confirm Phase 2 eliminates corruption in production before
removing the safety net entirely.
This completes the fix for the recurring temperature monitoring outages.
Related to Phase 1 commit 53dec6010
The getTemperatureLocal() function was running sensors without a timeout,
which could cause HTTP requests to hang if the sensors command stalled.
This adds context.Context parameter and uses exec.CommandContext to ensure
local temperature collection respects the same 15-second timeout as SSH-based
collection.
Fixes issue where HTTP mode worked for remote nodes but timed out for
self-monitoring on the same host.
Critical fix for intermittent HTTP endpoint hangs identified by Codex analysis.
## Root Cause
SSH collection via getTemperatureViaSSH() had no timeout, causing HTTP
handlers to block indefinitely when sensors command hung. This held node-level
mutexes and rate limit slots, creating cascading failures where subsequent
requests queued indefinitely.
## Solution
- Thread request context through to SSH execution
- Add exec.CommandContext with 15s timeout (vs 30s HTTP client timeout)
- Create execCommandWithLimitsContext() to wrap SSH commands
- Ensures handlers always release locks and respond within deadline
## Impact
- HTTP temps endpoint now responds in ~70ms consistently
- Temperature data successfully collected and displayed in Pulse
- Eliminates 'context deadline exceeded' errors
- Prevents node gate deadlocks from slow/stuck SSH sessions
Related to Codex session 019a7e99-00fc-7903-afa3-01100baf47c6
## HTTP Server Fixes
- Add source IP middleware to enforce allowed_source_subnets
- Fix missing source subnet validation for external HTTP requests
- HTTP health endpoint now respects subnet restrictions
## Installer Improvements
- Auto-configure allowed_source_subnets with Pulse server IP
- Add cluster node hostnames to allowed_nodes (not just IPs)
- Fix node validation to accept both hostnames and IPs
- Add Pulse server reachability check before installation
- Add port availability check for HTTP mode
- Add automatic rollback on service startup failure
- Add HTTP endpoint health check after installation
- Fix config backup and deduplication (prevent duplicate keys)
- Fix IPv4 validation with loopback rejection
- Improve registration retry logic with detailed errors
- Add automatic LXC bind mount cleanup on uninstall
## Temperature Collection Fixes
- Add local temperature collection for self-monitoring nodes
- Fix node identifier matching (use hostname not SSH host)
- Fix JSON double-encoding in HTTP client response
Related to #XXX (temperature monitoring fixes)
This implements HTTP/HTTPS support for pulse-sensor-proxy to enable
temperature monitoring across multiple separate Proxmox instances.
Architecture changes:
- Dual-mode operation: Unix socket (local) + HTTPS (remote)
- Unix socket remains default for security/performance (no breaking change)
- HTTP mode enables temps from external PVE hosts
Backend implementation:
- Add HTTPS server with TLS + Bearer token authentication to sensor-proxy
- Add TemperatureProxyURL and TemperatureProxyToken fields to PVEInstance
- Add HTTP client (internal/tempproxy/http_client.go) for remote proxy calls
- Update temperature collector to prefer HTTP proxy when configured
- Fallback logic: HTTP proxy → Unix socket → direct SSH (if not containerized)
Configuration:
- pulse-sensor-proxy config: http_enabled, http_listen_addr, http_tls_cert/key, http_auth_token
- PVEInstance config: temperature_proxy_url, temperature_proxy_token
- Environment variables: PULSE_SENSOR_PROXY_HTTP_* for all HTTP settings
Security:
- TLS 1.2+ with modern cipher suites
- Constant-time token comparison (timing attack prevention)
- Rate limiting applied to HTTP requests (shared with socket mode)
- Audit logging for all HTTP requests
Next steps:
- Update installer script to support HTTP mode + auto-registration
- Add Pulse API endpoint for proxy registration
- Generate TLS certificates during installation
- Test multi-instance temperature collection
Related to #571 (multi-instance architecture)
Increased default rate limits to handle Pulse startup polling:
- Per-peer burst: 5 → 10 requests (handles multi-node clusters with retries)
- Per-peer interval: 1s → 500ms (1 QPS → 2 QPS, 60/min → 120/min)
This prevents the proxy from being disabled during Pulse startup when it
polls all nodes simultaneously. The previous limits were too restrictive
for clusters with 3+ nodes.
Codex independent review identified a critical security issue: when cluster
validation fails, the previous fix fell back to permissive mode (allowing
ALL nodes), making the proxy a potential SSRF/network scanner for any
container that could reach the socket.
NEW BEHAVIOR:
When cluster validation is unavailable (IPC blocked), fall back to
localhost-only validation instead of permissive mode. This maintains
security while still allowing self-monitoring.
Implementation:
- Added validateAsLocalhost() method to nodeValidator
- Calls discoverLocalHostAddresses() to get local IPs/hostnames
- Only allows requests matching the local host
- Blocks requests to other cluster members or arbitrary hosts
Test results on delly (clustered node with IPC blocked):
- Request to 192.168.0.5 (self): ALLOWED, temps fetched
- Request to 192.168.0.134 (cluster peer): BLOCKED with node_not_localhost
- No more "allowing all nodes" security regression
Related to #571 - addresses Codex security audit feedback
This prevents the proxy from being abused as a network scanner while
still solving the original temperature monitoring issue.
Changes based on independent Codex review:
1. Elevated log level from Debug to Warn for permissive mode fallback
- Operators now see "SECURITY: Cluster validation unavailable" in
journalctl at default log level
- Added similar warning on startup when running in permissive mode
- Makes it obvious when node validation is bypassed
2. Added runtime fallback for AF_NETLINK restrictions
- New discoverLocalHostAddressesFallback() shells out to 'ip addr'
- Triggered when net.Interfaces() fails with netlinkrib error
- Ensures existing installations work even without systemd unit update
- Logs recommendation to update systemd unit for better performance
3. Improved security awareness
- Changed message to explicitly state "allowing all nodes"
- Recommends configuring allowed_nodes for security
- Makes permissive fallback behavior transparent to operators
Related to #571 - temperature monitoring on standalone nodes
These changes ensure the fix works for existing installations that
haven't updated their systemd units, while clearly communicating when
the proxy is running in an insecure permissive mode.
Root cause: pulse-sensor-proxy runs with strict systemd hardening that prevents
access to Proxmox corosync IPC (abstract UNIX sockets). When pvecm fails with
IPC errors, the code incorrectly treated it as "standalone mode" and only
discovered localhost addresses, rejecting legitimate cluster members and external
nodes.
Changes:
1. **Distinguish IPC failures from true standalone mode**
- Detect ipcc_send_rec and access control list errors specifically
- These indicate a cluster exists but isn't accessible (LXC, systemd restrictions)
- Return error to disable cluster validation instead of misusing standalone logic
2. **Graceful degradation when cluster validation fails**
- When cluster IPC is unavailable, fall through to permissive mode
- Log debug message suggesting allowed_nodes configuration
- Allows requests to proceed rather than blocking all temperature monitoring
3. **Improve local address discovery for true standalone nodes**
- Use Go's native net.Interfaces() instead of shelling out to 'ip addr'
- More reliable and works with AF_NETLINK restrictions
- Add helpful logging when only hostnames are discovered
4. **Systemd hardening adjustments**
- Add AF_NETLINK to RestrictAddressFamilies (for net.Interfaces())
- Remove RemoveIPC=true (attempted fix for corosync, insufficient)
- Add ReadWritePaths=-/run/corosync (optional path, corosync uses abstract sockets anyway)
Result: Temperature monitoring now works in:
- Clustered Proxmox hosts (falls back to permissive when IPC blocked)
- LXC containers (correctly detects IPC failure, allows requests)
- Standalone nodes (proper local address discovery with IPs)
Workaround for maximum security: Configure allowed_nodes in /etc/pulse-sensor-proxy/config.yaml
when cluster validation cannot be used.
Root cause: The systemd service hardening blocked AF_NETLINK sockets,
preventing IP address discovery on standalone nodes. The proxy could
only discover hostnames, causing node_not_cluster_member rejections
when users configured Pulse with IP addresses.
Changes:
1. Add AF_NETLINK to RestrictAddressFamilies in all systemd services
- pulse-sensor-proxy.service
- install-sensor-proxy.sh (both modes)
- pulse-sensor-cleanup.service
2. Replace shell-based 'ip addr' with Go native net.Interfaces() API
- More reliable and doesn't require external commands
- Works even with strict systemd restrictions
- Properly filters loopback, link-local, and down interfaces
3. Improve error logging and user guidance
- Warn when no IP addresses can be discovered
- Provide clear instructions about allowed_nodes workaround
- Include address counts in logs for debugging
This fix ensures standalone Proxmox nodes can properly validate
temperature requests by IP address without requiring manual
allowed_nodes configuration.
After implementing the health gate, added comprehensive safety measures
to prevent the health checks themselves from becoming a new failure point.
**Problem**: Previous commit added strict health checks but could fail in
edge cases:
- `pct exec` could hang if container stopped/frozen → installer deadlocks
- systemctl/journalctl might not be available → diagnostics fail
- Container access check could fail for transient reasons
- pvecm error detection was fragile (string matching specific messages)
**Solutions Implemented**:
1. **Timeouts on All External Commands** (install.sh:1596,1618)
- `timeout 5` on systemctl checks
- `timeout 10` on pct exec checks
- Prevents installer from hanging indefinitely
2. **Graceful Degradation** (install.sh:1602-1630)
- Check for systemctl/pct availability before using
- Warn if tools missing instead of failing
- Container check is warning-only (may be transient)
- Only fail on critical checks: service running, socket exists
3. **Bypass Flag Support** (install.sh:1589-1594)
- Set `PULSE_SKIP_HEALTH_CHECKS=1` to bypass all checks
- Documented in error messages for troubleshooting
- Allows installation in unsupported environments
4. **Flexible Diagnostics** (install.sh:1640-1647)
- Use journalctl if available, fallback to syslog
- Conditional tool-specific advice
5. **Broader Error Detection** (ssh.go:582-628)
- List of 14 standalone indicators (vs 5 hardcoded checks)
- Case-insensitive matching for localization tolerance
- Permissive strategy: treat any known pattern as standalone
- Handles variations: "no cluster", "IPC", "connection refused", etc.
6. **Enhanced Test Coverage** (ssh_test.go:+35 lines)
- Added 3 new test cases (variation patterns)
- Tests now cover 8 standalone scenarios + 3 negative cases
- All tests pass (11/11)
**Impact**:
- Health gate won't block installation in edge cases
- Better user experience on non-standard setups
- Standalone detection handles more error message variations
- Clear escape hatch for troubleshooting (bypass flag)
**Confidence Level**: High
- All tests pass (bash syntax + Go unit tests)
- Graceful fallbacks for every external command
- Only critical checks are hard failures
- Warnings guide users through validation issues
Related to #571
Tests validate the error pattern matching logic added in previous commit,
ensuring we correctly identify:
1. **Standalone Node Patterns** (should trigger fallback):
- Classic: 'Corosync config does not exist'
- LXC ipcc errors: 'ipcc_send_rec[1] failed: Unknown error -1'
- Access control errors: 'Unable to load access control list'
- All patterns from GitHub issue #571
2. **Genuine Errors** (should NOT trigger fallback):
- Network timeouts
- Permission denied
- Command not found
Tests use real error messages from production GitHub issues to prevent
regressions. All 9 test cases pass.
Coverage:
- 6 standalone/LXC error patterns
- 3 genuine error cases (negative testing)
- References issue #571 for traceability
Related to #571
Users were abandoning Pulse due to catastrophic temperature monitoring setup failures. This commit addresses the root causes:
**Problem 1: Silent Failures**
- Installations reported "SUCCESS" even when proxy never started
- UI showed green checkmarks with no temperature data
- Zero feedback when things went wrong
**Problem 2: Missing Diagnostics**
- Service failures logged only in journald
- Users saw "Something going on with the proxy" with no actionable guidance
- No way to troubleshoot from error messages
**Problem 3: Standalone Node Issues**
- Proxy daemon logged continuous pvecm errors as warnings
- "ipcc_send_rec" and "Unknown error -1" messages confused users
- These are expected for non-clustered/LXC setups
**Solutions Implemented:**
1. **Health Gate in install.sh (lines 1588-1629)**
- Verify service is running after installation
- Check socket exists on host
- Confirm socket visible inside container via bind mount
- Fail loudly with specific diagnostics if any check fails
2. **Actionable Error Messages in install-sensor-proxy.sh (lines 822-877)**
- When service fails to start: dump full systemctl status + 40 lines of logs
- When socket missing: show permissions, service status, and remediation command
- Include common issues checklist (missing user, permission errors, lm-sensors, etc.)
- Direct link to troubleshooting docs
3. **Better Standalone Node Detection in ssh.go (lines 585-595)**
- Recognize "Unknown error -1" and "Unable to load access control list" as LXC indicators
- Log at INFO level (not WARN) since this is expected behavior
- Clarify message: "using localhost for temperature collection"
**Impact:**
- Eliminates "green checkmark but no temps" scenario
- Users get immediate actionable feedback on failures
- Standalone/LXC installations work silently without error spam
- Reduces support burden from #571 (15+ comments of user frustration)
Related to #571
The standalone node detection in discoverClusterNodes was only checking
stderr for "not part of a cluster" messages, but some Proxmox versions
write these messages to stdout instead. This caused the fallback to
discoverLocalHostAddresses to never trigger, leaving temperature
monitoring broken on standalone nodes.
Changes:
- Check both stdout and stderr for standalone node indicators
- Document exit code 255 in addition to code 2
- Improve error logging to show both stdout and stderr
This ensures standalone nodes correctly fall back to local address
discovery regardless of where pvecm writes its error messages.
When pulse-sensor-proxy runs inside an LXC container on a Proxmox host,
pvecm status fails with "ipcc_send_rec[1] failed: Unknown error -1"
because the container can't access the host's corosync IPC socket.
This caused repeated warnings every few seconds even though the proxy
can function correctly by discovering local host addresses.
Extended the standalone node detection to recognize "ipcc_send_rec"
errors as indicating an LXC container deployment and gracefully fall
back to local address discovery instead of logging warnings.
