Use strict org principals for runtime access

docs/release-control/v6/internal/IDENTITY_INVARIANTS.md

@@ -97,9 +97,14 @@ principal once a stable user ID exists.
    Stripe contact email through current server-side org membership first;
    matching contact metadata with a blank owner/member principal is not enough
    to send a sign-in link.
-5. Legacy email-keyed records may be accepted only at migration boundaries and
+5. Live organization authorization paths must use strict user-ID membership
+   checks against `OwnerUserID` and member `UserID`. Email-aware organization
+   helpers are migration/delivery compatibility only; they must not authorize
+   a request just because a session user string matches `OwnerEmail` or member
+   `Email` after a stable principal exists.
+6. Legacy email-keyed records may be accepted only at migration boundaries and
    should be canonicalized to stable user IDs when the stable ID is known.
-6. Self-hosted OIDC and SAML sessions bind to an opaque principal derived from
+7. Self-hosted OIDC and SAML sessions bind to an opaque principal derived from
    provider type, provider ID, and the provider subject (`sub` or `NameID`).
    RBAC may copy a legacy username/email assignment to that principal during
    compatibility migration, but the browser session and tracked active-session

docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/agent-lifecycle.md

@@ -205,6 +205,11 @@ profile and assignment columns, but embedded table framing must route through
    after server-owned org linkage, but they must not treat Stripe contact email
    as fleet authority unless the API-owned organization resolver maps it to a
    stored owner/member principal first.
+   Runtime org authorization consumed by lifecycle-adjacent setup and fleet
+   routes must use strict `OwnerUserID`/member `UserID` membership checks; the
+   API-owned email-aware organization helpers are migration/delivery helpers
+   only and must not let contact email become setup, install, or fleet
+   authority after a stable principal exists.
    API-token owner metadata follows the same rule: lifecycle-adjacent setup or
    mobile-pairing token flows may consume the shared token helper, but they
    must not pass extension metadata that authors or overwrites `owner_user_id`.

docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/api-contracts.md

@@ -411,6 +411,11 @@ the canonical monitored-system blocked payload.
     delivery after server-owned org linkage is validated, and it must not send
     when the linked org row has matching contact metadata but no stored
     owner/member principal.
+    Live org authorization is stricter than those delivery and migration
+    helpers: `internal/api/authorization.go`, `internal/api/org_handlers.go`,
+    `internal/api/cloud_org_admin_auth.go`, and settings-scope checks must use
+    strict `OwnerUserID`/member `UserID` membership helpers for request access,
+    not the email-aware compatibility accessors.
     Public hosted signup must therefore keep the generated owner user ID
     server-side for org metadata and RBAC assignment while using returned
     contact email only for `GenerateToken`/`SendMagicLink`; the accepted signup

docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/organization-settings.md

@@ -170,6 +170,13 @@ control-plane user IDs exist, while `OwnerEmail` and member `Email` carry
 delivery/display email. Email-shaped owner/member IDs remain only as legacy
 fallback and migration input, and hosted handoff may canonicalize those records
 to stable user IDs without changing the stored role.
+Live organization authorization must use strict user-ID checks from
+`internal/models/organization.go`: `internal/api/authorization.go`,
+`internal/api/org_handlers.go`, `internal/api/cloud_org_admin_auth.go`, and
+settings-scope admin checks may authorize only against `OwnerUserID` or member
+`UserID`. The legacy email-aware organization helpers remain migration and
+delivery compatibility only, so a stable-principal org cannot be entered by a
+session whose user string merely matches `OwnerEmail` or member `Email`.
 Email-delivery flows that need to mint sessions, including hosted magic links,
 must resolve contact email back through this organization model before
 authorizing. `internal/models/organization.go` owns the email-to-principal

docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/security-privacy.md

@@ -118,6 +118,10 @@ controls as normal product settings.
    sessions must bind to the durable principal rather than a delivery address.
    For SSO, the durable principal is the provider-scoped subject, and mutable
    username/email/display claims may not be written as the session owner.
+   Live organization authorization follows the same trust boundary: contact
+   email can support display, delivery, or migration, but request access must
+   match the authenticated principal against stored `OwnerUserID` or member
+   `UserID`.
 5. Change security/privacy settings presentation through the shared `frontend-modern/src/components/Settings/APIAccessPanel.tsx`, `frontend-modern/src/components/Settings/GeneralSettingsPanel.tsx`, `frontend-modern/src/components/Settings/SecurityAuthPanel.tsx`, `frontend-modern/src/components/Settings/SecurityOverviewPanel.tsx`, `frontend-modern/src/components/Settings/QuickSecuritySetup.tsx`, `frontend-modern/src/components/Settings/SecurityPostureSummary.tsx`, `frontend-modern/src/components/Settings/SSOProviderTypeIcon.tsx`, `frontend-modern/src/constants/apiScopes.ts`, `frontend-modern/src/utils/apiTokenPresentation.ts`, `frontend-modern/src/utils/securityAuthPresentation.ts`, `frontend-modern/src/utils/securityScorePresentation.ts`, `frontend-modern/src/utils/auditLogPresentation.ts`, and `frontend-modern/src/utils/auditWebhookPresentation.ts` boundary.
 6. Change operator-facing telemetry/adoption reporting through `scripts/telemetry_adoption_report.py` together with the privacy disclosure whenever release-identity interpretation changes.
 7. Change data-at-rest encryption-key or control-plane magic-link HMAC key and storage-root hardening semantics through `internal/crypto/crypto.go`, `internal/cloudcp/auth/magiclink.go`, `internal/cloudcp/auth/magiclink_store.go`, and `internal/securityutil/secure_storage_dir.go` together so writable-but-not-owned runtime storage mounts stay supported without weakening file-level secrecy.

docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/storage-recovery.md

@@ -87,6 +87,10 @@ boundary: storage/recovery may observe billing activation for a server-linked
 org, but Stripe contact email must not become recovery or storage authority
 unless the shared API organization resolver maps it to a stored owner/member
 principal first.
+Runtime org authorization on that shared API boundary must also stay strict:
+storage/recovery-adjacent routes may consume accepted org access only after
+`OwnerUserID` or member `UserID` matches the authenticated principal, not after
+the session user string matches `OwnerEmail` or member `Email`.
 The canonical actor vocabulary for those shared sessions is
 `docs/release-control/v6/internal/IDENTITY_INVARIANTS.md`; recovery and storage
 work may consume accepted org access, but must not mint or widen access from a

internal/api/authorization.go

@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ func (c *DefaultAuthorizationChecker) UserCanAccessOrg(userID, orgID string) boo
 		return false
 	}
 
-	canAccess := org.CanUserAccess(userID)
+	canAccess := org.CanUserIDAccess(userID)
 	if !canAccess {
 		log.Debug().
 			Str("user_id", userID).

internal/api/cloud_org_admin_auth.go

@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ func RequireOrgOwnerOrPlatformAdmin(cfg *config.Config, orgs OrgPersistenceProvi
 			return
 		}
 
-		if !strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(org.OwnerUserID), strings.TrimSpace(userID)) {
+		if !org.IsOwnerUserID(userID) {
 			writeErrorResponse(w, http.StatusForbidden, "access_denied", "Organization owner or platform admin required", nil)
 			return
 		}

internal/api/contract_test.go

@@ -153,6 +153,76 @@ func TestContract_CheckoutMagicLinkDeliveryRequiresStoredPrincipalProof(t *testi
 	}
 }
 
+func TestContract_OrganizationRuntimeAccessUsesStrictUserIDProof(t *testing.T) {
+	modelSource, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Clean("../models/organization.go"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read organization model: %v", err)
+	}
+	modelText := string(modelSource)
+	for _, required := range []string{
+		"HasMemberUserID",
+		"GetMemberRoleByUserID",
+		"IsOwnerUserID",
+		"CanUserIDAccess",
+		"CanUserIDManage",
+	} {
+		if !strings.Contains(modelText, required) {
+			t.Fatalf("organization model must contain strict user ID helper %q", required)
+		}
+	}
+
+	requiredByFile := map[string][]string{
+		"authorization.go": {
+			"org.CanUserIDAccess(userID)",
+		},
+		"org_handlers.go": {
+			"org.CanUserIDAccess(username)",
+			"org.CanUserIDManage(username)",
+			"org.IsOwnerUserID(username)",
+			"org.GetMemberRoleByUserID(username)",
+		},
+		"security_setup_fix.go": {
+			"org.CanUserIDManage(sessionUser)",
+		},
+		"cloud_org_admin_auth.go": {
+			"org.IsOwnerUserID(userID)",
+		},
+	}
+	for file, required := range requiredByFile {
+		source, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Clean(file))
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("read %s: %v", file, err)
+		}
+		text := string(source)
+		for _, needle := range required {
+			if !strings.Contains(text, needle) {
+				t.Fatalf("%s must contain strict runtime authorization proof %q", file, needle)
+			}
+		}
+		for _, forbidden := range []string{
+			".CanUserAccess(username)",
+			".CanUserAccess(userID)",
+			".CanUserManage(username)",
+			".CanUserManage(sessionUser)",
+			".IsOwner(username)",
+			".GetMemberRole(username)",
+		} {
+			if strings.Contains(text, forbidden) {
+				t.Fatalf("%s must not use legacy email-aware runtime accessor %q", file, forbidden)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	identityDoc, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Clean("../../docs/release-control/v6/internal/IDENTITY_INVARIANTS.md"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read identity invariant contract: %v", err)
+	}
+	identityText := string(identityDoc)
+	if !strings.Contains(identityText, "strict user-ID") || !strings.Contains(identityText, "OwnerUserID") {
+		t.Fatal("identity invariant contract must require strict user-ID membership checks for live authorization")
+	}
+}
+
 func TestContract_HostedHandoffRequiresStableSubjectProof(t *testing.T) {
 	directSource, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Clean("cloud_handoff.go"))
 	if err != nil {

internal/api/org_handlers.go

@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ func (h *OrgHandlers) HandleUpdateOrg(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		writeErrorResponse(w, http.StatusForbidden, "session_required", "Session-based user authentication is required", nil)
 		return
 	}
-	if !org.CanUserManage(username) {
+	if !org.CanUserIDManage(username) {
 		writeErrorResponse(w, http.StatusForbidden, "access_denied", "Admin role required for this organization", nil)
 		return
 	}
@@ -349,7 +349,7 @@ func (h *OrgHandlers) HandleDeleteOrg(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		writeErrorResponse(w, http.StatusForbidden, "session_required", "Session-based user authentication is required", nil)
 		return
 	}
-	if !org.CanUserManage(username) {
+	if !org.CanUserIDManage(username) {
 		writeErrorResponse(w, http.StatusForbidden, "access_denied", "Admin role required for this organization", nil)
 		return
 	}
@@ -438,7 +438,7 @@ func (h *OrgHandlers) HandleInviteMember(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request)
 		writeErrorResponse(w, http.StatusForbidden, "session_required", "Session-based user authentication is required", nil)
 		return
 	}
-	if !org.CanUserManage(username) {
+	if !org.CanUserIDManage(username) {
 		writeErrorResponse(w, http.StatusForbidden, "access_denied", "Admin role required for this organization", nil)
 		return
 	}
@@ -586,7 +586,7 @@ func (h *OrgHandlers) HandleRemoveMember(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request)
 		writeErrorResponse(w, http.StatusForbidden, "session_required", "Session-based user authentication is required", nil)
 		return
 	}
-	if !org.CanUserManage(username) {
+	if !org.CanUserIDManage(username) {
 		writeErrorResponse(w, http.StatusForbidden, "access_denied", "Admin role required for this organization", nil)
 		return
 	}
@@ -640,7 +640,7 @@ func (h *OrgHandlers) HandleListInvitations(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Reque
 		writeErrorResponse(w, http.StatusForbidden, "session_required", "Session-based user authentication is required", nil)
 		return
 	}
-	if !org.CanUserManage(username) {
+	if !org.CanUserIDManage(username) {
 		writeErrorResponse(w, http.StatusForbidden, "access_denied", "Admin role required for this organization", nil)
 		return
 	}
@@ -676,7 +676,7 @@ func (h *OrgHandlers) HandleRevokeInvitation(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Requ
 		writeErrorResponse(w, http.StatusForbidden, "session_required", "Session-based user authentication is required", nil)
 		return
 	}
-	if !org.CanUserManage(username) {
+	if !org.CanUserIDManage(username) {
 		writeErrorResponse(w, http.StatusForbidden, "access_denied", "Admin role required for this organization", nil)
 		return
 	}
@@ -916,7 +916,7 @@ func (h *OrgHandlers) HandleListIncomingShares(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
 		return
 	}
 	targetRole := organizationRoleForUser(targetOrg, username)
-	canManageTargetOrg := targetOrg.CanUserManage(username)
+	canManageTargetOrg := targetOrg.CanUserIDManage(username)
 
 	orgs, err := h.persistence.ListOrganizations()
 	if err != nil {
@@ -979,7 +979,7 @@ func (h *OrgHandlers) HandleAcceptIncomingShare(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.R
 		writeErrorResponse(w, http.StatusForbidden, "session_required", "Session-based user authentication is required", nil)
 		return
 	}
-	if !targetOrg.CanUserManage(username) {
+	if !targetOrg.CanUserIDManage(username) {
 		writeErrorResponse(w, http.StatusForbidden, "access_denied", "Admin role required for the target organization", nil)
 		return
 	}
@@ -1031,7 +1031,7 @@ func (h *OrgHandlers) HandleDeclineIncomingShare(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.
 		writeErrorResponse(w, http.StatusForbidden, "session_required", "Session-based user authentication is required", nil)
 		return
 	}
-	if !targetOrg.CanUserManage(username) {
+	if !targetOrg.CanUserIDManage(username) {
 		writeErrorResponse(w, http.StatusForbidden, "access_denied", "Admin role required for the target organization", nil)
 		return
 	}
@@ -1081,7 +1081,7 @@ func (h *OrgHandlers) HandleCreateShare(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request)
 		writeErrorResponse(w, http.StatusForbidden, "session_required", "Session-based user authentication is required", nil)
 		return
 	}
-	if !sourceOrg.CanUserManage(username) {
+	if !sourceOrg.CanUserIDManage(username) {
 		writeErrorResponse(w, http.StatusForbidden, "access_denied", "Admin role required for this organization", nil)
 		return
 	}
@@ -1209,7 +1209,7 @@ func (h *OrgHandlers) HandleDeleteShare(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request)
 		writeErrorResponse(w, http.StatusForbidden, "session_required", "Session-based user authentication is required", nil)
 		return
 	}
-	if !sourceOrg.CanUserManage(username) {
+	if !sourceOrg.CanUserIDManage(username) {
 		writeErrorResponse(w, http.StatusForbidden, "access_denied", "Admin role required for this organization", nil)
 		return
 	}
@@ -1305,17 +1305,17 @@ func (h *OrgHandlers) canAccessOrg(username string, token *config.APITokenRecord
 	if org.ID == "default" {
 		return true
 	}
-	return org.CanUserAccess(username)
+	return org.CanUserIDAccess(username)
 }
 
 func organizationRoleForUser(org *models.Organization, username string) models.OrganizationRole {
 	if org == nil || strings.TrimSpace(username) == "" {
 		return ""
 	}
-	if org.IsOwner(username) {
+	if org.IsOwnerUserID(username) {
 		return models.OrgRoleOwner
 	}
-	return org.GetMemberRole(username)
+	return org.GetMemberRoleByUserID(username)
 }
 
 func (h *OrgHandlers) writeLoadOrgError(w http.ResponseWriter, err error) {

internal/api/org_handlers_test.go

@@ -313,6 +313,58 @@ func TestOrgHandlersViewerCannotManageOrg(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestOrgHandlersRejectContactEmailWithoutStoredPrincipalMatch(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("PULSE_DEV", "true")
+	defer SetMultiTenantEnabled(false)
+	SetMultiTenantEnabled(true)
+
+	persistence := config.NewMultiTenantPersistence(t.TempDir())
+	h := NewOrgHandlers(persistence, nil)
+
+	if err := persistence.SaveOrganization(&models.Organization{
+		ID:          "acme",
+		DisplayName: "Acme",
+		OwnerUserID: "u_owner",
+		OwnerEmail:  "owner@example.com",
+		Members: []models.OrganizationMember{
+			{UserID: "u_owner", Email: "owner@example.com", Role: models.OrgRoleOwner, AddedAt: time.Now()},
+			{UserID: "u_admin", Email: "admin@example.com", Role: models.OrgRoleAdmin, AddedAt: time.Now()},
+		},
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("save organization: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	getReq := withUser(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/orgs/acme", nil), "owner@example.com")
+	getReq.SetPathValue("id", "acme")
+	getRec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.HandleGetOrg(getRec, getReq)
+	if getRec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 403 for owner contact-email read, got %d: %s", getRec.Code, getRec.Body.String())
+	}
+
+	updateReq := withUser(
+		httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPut, "/api/orgs/acme", bytes.NewBufferString(`{"displayName":"Nope"}`)),
+		"admin@example.com",
+	)
+	updateReq.SetPathValue("id", "acme")
+	updateRec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.HandleUpdateOrg(updateRec, updateReq)
+	if updateRec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 403 for admin contact-email update, got %d: %s", updateRec.Code, updateRec.Body.String())
+	}
+
+	principalReq := withUser(
+		httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPut, "/api/orgs/acme", bytes.NewBufferString(`{"displayName":"Renamed"}`)),
+		"u_admin",
+	)
+	principalReq.SetPathValue("id", "acme")
+	principalRec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.HandleUpdateOrg(principalRec, principalReq)
+	if principalRec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 200 for stored admin principal update, got %d: %s", principalRec.Code, principalRec.Body.String())
+	}
+}
+
 func TestOrgHandlersTokenListAllowedButWriteForbidden(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Setenv("PULSE_DEV", "true")
 	defer SetMultiTenantEnabled(false)

internal/api/security_setup_fix.go

@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ func ensureAdminSession(cfg *config.Config, w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Req
 		// privileges for settings-bound routes.
 		if org := GetOrganization(req.Context()); org != nil {
 			orgID := strings.TrimSpace(org.ID)
-			if orgID != "" && orgID != "default" && org.CanUserManage(sessionUser) {
+			if orgID != "" && orgID != "default" && org.CanUserIDManage(sessionUser) {
 				return true
 			}
 		}

internal/api/tenant_user_membership_test.go

@@ -121,6 +121,54 @@ func TestTenantMiddlewareRejectsNonMemberSession(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestTenantMiddlewareRejectsContactEmailWithoutStoredPrincipalMatch(t *testing.T) {
+	defer SetMultiTenantEnabled(false)
+	SetMultiTenantEnabled(true)
+	t.Setenv("PULSE_DEV", "true")
+
+	dataDir := t.TempDir()
+	hashed, err := internalauth.HashPassword("Password!1")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("hash password: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	cfg := &config.Config{
+		DataPath:   dataDir,
+		ConfigPath: dataDir,
+		AuthUser:   "admin",
+		AuthPass:   hashed,
+	}
+
+	org := &models.Organization{
+		ID:          "org-a",
+		DisplayName: "Org A",
+		OwnerUserID: "u_owner",
+		OwnerEmail:  "owner@example.com",
+		Members: []models.OrganizationMember{
+			{UserID: "u_owner", Email: "owner@example.com", Role: models.OrgRoleOwner, AddedAt: time.Now()},
+		},
+	}
+	mtp := config.NewMultiTenantPersistence(dataDir)
+	if err := mtp.SaveOrganization(org); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("save organization: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	router := NewRouter(cfg, nil, nil, nil, nil, "1.0.0")
+
+	sessionToken := "contact-email-session-token"
+	GetSessionStore().CreateSession(sessionToken, time.Hour, "agent", "127.0.0.1", "owner@example.com")
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/config", nil)
+	req.Header.Set("X-Pulse-Org-ID", "org-a")
+	req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: "pulse_session", Value: sessionToken})
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	router.Handler().ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 403 for contact-email session, got %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+}
+
 func TestMultiTenantListOrgsShowsOnlyMemberOrganizations(t *testing.T) {
 	defer SetMultiTenantEnabled(false)
 	SetMultiTenantEnabled(true)

internal/models/organization.go

@@ -321,6 +321,16 @@ func (o *Organization) HasMember(userID string) bool {
 	return false
 }
 
+// HasMemberUserID checks membership using only the stored durable user ID.
+func (o *Organization) HasMemberUserID(userID string) bool {
+	for _, member := range o.Members {
+		if memberMatchesUserID(member, userID) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
 // GetMemberRole returns the role of a user in the organization.
 // Returns empty string if the user is not a member.
 func (o *Organization) GetMemberRole(userID string) OrganizationRole {
@@ -332,11 +342,26 @@ func (o *Organization) GetMemberRole(userID string) OrganizationRole {
 	return ""
 }
 
+// GetMemberRoleByUserID returns a role using only the stored durable user ID.
+func (o *Organization) GetMemberRoleByUserID(userID string) OrganizationRole {
+	for _, member := range o.Members {
+		if memberMatchesUserID(member, userID) {
+			return NormalizeOrganizationRole(member.Role)
+		}
+	}
+	return ""
+}
+
 // IsOwner checks if a user is the owner of the organization.
 func (o *Organization) IsOwner(userID string) bool {
 	return ownerMatchesUserID(o, userID) || ownerMatchesEmail(o, userID)
 }
 
+// IsOwnerUserID checks ownership using only the stored durable owner user ID.
+func (o *Organization) IsOwnerUserID(userID string) bool {
+	return ownerMatchesUserID(o, userID)
+}
+
 // CanUserAccess checks if a user has any level of access to the organization.
 func (o *Organization) CanUserAccess(userID string) bool {
 	if o.IsOwner(userID) {
@@ -345,6 +370,14 @@ func (o *Organization) CanUserAccess(userID string) bool {
 	return o.HasMember(userID)
 }
 
+// CanUserIDAccess checks access using only durable owner/member user IDs.
+func (o *Organization) CanUserIDAccess(userID string) bool {
+	if o.IsOwnerUserID(userID) {
+		return true
+	}
+	return o.HasMemberUserID(userID)
+}
+
 // CanUserManage checks if a user can manage the organization (owner or admin).
 func (o *Organization) CanUserManage(userID string) bool {
 	if o.IsOwner(userID) {
@@ -353,6 +386,14 @@ func (o *Organization) CanUserManage(userID string) bool {
 	return OrganizationRoleAtLeast(o.GetMemberRole(userID), OrgRoleAdmin)
 }
 
+// CanUserIDManage checks management access using only durable user IDs.
+func (o *Organization) CanUserIDManage(userID string) bool {
+	if o.IsOwnerUserID(userID) {
+		return true
+	}
+	return OrganizationRoleAtLeast(o.GetMemberRoleByUserID(userID), OrgRoleAdmin)
+}
+
 // GetMemberRoleForPrincipal resolves a role using the durable user ID first,
 // then email only as a legacy/contact fallback.
 func (o *Organization) GetMemberRoleForPrincipal(userID, email string) OrganizationRole {

internal/models/organization_additional_test.go

@@ -62,6 +62,32 @@ func TestOrganizationPrincipalIdentityCanonicalization(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestOrganizationStrictUserIDAccessRejectsContactEmail(t *testing.T) {
+	org := &Organization{
+		ID:          "org-1",
+		OwnerUserID: "u_owner",
+		OwnerEmail:  "owner@example.com",
+		Members: []OrganizationMember{
+			{UserID: "u_owner", Email: "owner@example.com", Role: OrgRoleOwner},
+			{UserID: "u_admin", Email: "admin@example.com", Role: OrgRoleAdmin},
+			{UserID: "u_viewer", Email: "viewer@example.com", Role: OrgRoleViewer},
+		},
+	}
+
+	if !org.CanUserIDAccess("u_owner") || !org.CanUserIDManage("u_admin") {
+		t.Fatal("strict user ID access should accept stored owner/admin principals")
+	}
+	if org.CanUserIDAccess("owner@example.com") || org.CanUserIDManage("admin@example.com") {
+		t.Fatal("strict user ID access must not authorize contact email")
+	}
+	if got := org.GetMemberRoleByUserID("admin@example.com"); got != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("strict member role for contact email = %q, want empty", got)
+	}
+	if got := org.GetMemberRole("admin@example.com"); got != OrgRoleAdmin {
+		t.Fatalf("legacy member role for contact email = %q, want %q", got, OrgRoleAdmin)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestOrganizationResolvePrincipalByEmail(t *testing.T) {
 	org := &Organization{
 		ID:          "org-1",