Normalize hot-dev auth defaults

This commit is contained in:
rcourtman 2026-04-22 16:28:52 +01:00
parent a60fa03d7f
commit a442eb6bda
11 changed files with 236 additions and 18 deletions

View file

@ -646,6 +646,15 @@ managed runtime, run the canonical browser recovery proof with the managed dev
credentials and browser entrypoint defaults, and fail with ownership or health
diagnostics instead of leaving operators to remember the exact Playwright
command and env combination by hand.
That same launcher boundary also owns the managed dev auth source of truth.
`scripts/hot-dev.sh` must seed the watched runtime auth `.env` from one
canonical managed-dev credential contract before it reloads runtime overrides,
so stale quick-setup changes under `tmp/dev-config/.env` cannot silently
change the default local login between launches. Repo-root developer docs,
verification wrappers, and integration helper defaults must therefore advertise
the same managed login and treat custom dev credentials as explicit
`HOT_DEV_AUTH_*` or `PULSE_E2E_*` overrides instead of inheriting leftover auth
state from a prior session.
That same takeover path must remain safe on the default macOS Bash runtime and
must not tear down the operator's current shell lineage while reclaiming a
foreground `hot-dev.sh` session. When the canonical ports are already owned by
@ -1040,13 +1049,15 @@ That same governed release-promotion boundary now also owns detached agent and
installer signatures. `scripts/build-release.sh`,
`scripts/release_update_key.go`, `scripts/render_installers.go`,
`scripts/release_ldflags.sh`, `Dockerfile`, `.github/workflows/create-release.yml`,
and `.github/workflows/publish-docker.yml` must derive the embedded update
trust root and installer SSH trust root from the governed release signing key,
`.github/workflows/publish-docker.yml`, `scripts/validate-release.sh`, and
`scripts/validate-published-release.sh` must derive the embedded update trust
root and installer SSH trust root from the governed release signing key,
render release installers with that pinned SSH verifier, emit both `.sig` and
`.sshsig` sidecars for shipped agent binaries and installer assets, and upload
those signatures with the matching release packet so published RC/stable
downloads can keep the updater and installer trust chain fail-closed instead
of downgrading to checksum-only trust.
`.sshsig` sidecars for shipped agent binaries and installer assets, upload
those signatures with the matching release packet, and fail validation if any
published artifact or `checksums.txt` is missing its `.sshsig` sidecar so
published RC/stable downloads can keep the updater and installer trust chain
fail-closed instead of downgrading to checksum-only trust.
The shell-installer boundary now also owns the QNAP boot bootstrap and
teardown contract end to end: `scripts/install.sh` must persist the wrapper on
the writable data volume, write a flash-backed `autorun.sh` block that waits