diff --git a/.github/workflows/README.md b/.github/workflows/README.md
index f4113c740e..3c694c6626 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/README.md
+++ b/.github/workflows/README.md
@@ -12,11 +12,12 @@ Use `false` unless a later command in the same job performs an authenticated
 Git write. The small number of write-path exceptions use `true` with the
 machine-checked `# required: authenticated git writes` rationale.
 
-Each workflow declares its default `GITHUB_TOKEN` permissions explicitly and
-enumerates scopes instead of using `read-all` or `write-all`. Workflow inputs,
-secrets, `github.token`, and attacker-controlled GitHub event metadata are
-passed to `run` steps through `env`; they are data and must never be
-interpolated into the generated shell program.
+Each workflow declares its default `GITHUB_TOKEN` permissions explicitly, and
+both workflow defaults and job-level overrides enumerate scopes instead of
+using `read-all`, `write-all`, or dynamic grants. Workflow inputs, secrets,
+`github.token`, and attacker-controlled GitHub event metadata are passed to
+`run` steps through `env`; they are data and must never be interpolated into
+the generated shell program.
 
 Workflows triggered by `pull_request` cannot reference confidential repository
 secrets. Canonical governance therefore keeps its pull-request checks local to
diff --git a/scripts/check_workflow_trust.py b/scripts/check_workflow_trust.py
index 03ecf339c6..fc7dee9635 100644
--- a/scripts/check_workflow_trust.py
+++ b/scripts/check_workflow_trust.py
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ SECRET_CONTEXT_TOKEN_RE = re.compile(r"(?<![\w.])secrets\b")
 NON_CONFIDENTIAL_PULL_REQUEST_SECRETS = frozenset({"PULSE_LICENSE_PUBLIC_KEY"})
 CHECKOUT_PREFIX = "actions/checkout@"
 WRITE_CREDENTIAL_RATIONALE = "# required: authenticated git writes"
+PERMISSIONS_RE = re.compile(r"^(\s*)permissions\s*:\s*(.*?)\s*$")
 
 
 @dataclass(frozen=True)
@@ -154,11 +155,16 @@ def audit_workflow(path: Path) -> list[Finding]:
                 )
 
     permission_declarations = [
-        index
+        (index, match)
         for index, line in enumerate(lines)
-        if re.match(r"^permissions\s*:", line)
+        if (match := PERMISSIONS_RE.match(line.split("#", 1)[0]))
     ]
-    if len(permission_declarations) != 1:
+    top_level_permissions = [
+        (index, match)
+        for index, match in permission_declarations
+        if not match.group(1)
+    ]
+    if len(top_level_permissions) != 1:
         findings.append(
             Finding(
                 path,
@@ -166,17 +172,20 @@ def audit_workflow(path: Path) -> list[Finding]:
                 "workflow must declare top-level permissions explicitly exactly once",
             )
         )
-    elif lines[permission_declarations[0]].split("#", 1)[0].strip() not in {
-        "permissions:",
-        "permissions: {}",
-    }:
-        findings.append(
-            Finding(
-                path,
-                permission_declarations[0] + 1,
-                "workflow permissions must use a scope mapping or explicit empty mapping",
+    for index, match in permission_declarations:
+        # GitHub applies job-level permissions after the workflow default. Audit
+        # every declaration so a job cannot reintroduce read-all, write-all, or
+        # a dynamic grant beneath an otherwise least-privilege workflow.
+        inline_value = match.group(2)
+        if inline_value not in {"", "{}"}:
+            scope = "workflow" if not match.group(1) else "job"
+            findings.append(
+                Finding(
+                    path,
+                    index + 1,
+                    f"{scope} permissions must use a scope mapping or explicit empty mapping",
+                )
             )
-        )
 
     for index, line in enumerate(lines):
         line_number = index + 1
diff --git a/scripts/tests/test_workflow_trust.py b/scripts/tests/test_workflow_trust.py
index 9cde5aa300..fc657d15bd 100644
--- a/scripts/tests/test_workflow_trust.py
+++ b/scripts/tests/test_workflow_trust.py
@@ -113,6 +113,41 @@ steps:
         dynamic = self.audit("permissions: ${{ inputs.permissions }}\njobs: {}\n")
         self.assertTrue(any("scope mapping" in finding for finding in dynamic))
 
+    def test_rejects_broad_or_dynamic_job_permission_overrides(self) -> None:
+        broad = self.audit(
+            """permissions:
+  contents: read
+jobs:
+  unsafe:
+    permissions: write-all
+"""
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(any("job permissions" in finding for finding in broad))
+
+        dynamic = self.audit(
+            """permissions: {}
+jobs:
+  unsafe:
+    permissions: ${{ inputs.permissions }}
+"""
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(any("job permissions" in finding for finding in dynamic))
+
+    def test_accepts_explicit_job_permission_mappings(self) -> None:
+        findings = self.audit(
+            """permissions:
+  contents: read
+jobs:
+  read_only:
+    permissions: {}
+  publisher:
+    permissions:
+      contents: write
+      id-token: write
+"""
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(findings, [])
+
     def test_rejects_shell_template_data_but_accepts_env_data(self) -> None:
         findings = self.audit(
             """permissions: {}