Fail closed on unknown AI read commands

internal/ai/tools/strict_resolution_test.go

@@ -1343,13 +1343,10 @@ func TestExecutionIntent_ConservativeFallback(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-// TestExecutionIntent_ModelTrustedFallback validates that truly unknown commands
+// TestExecutionIntent_FailClosedUnknownCommands validates that truly unknown
-// (unknown binaries, custom scripts) that pass all blocklist and structural checks
+// commands are not allowed in pulse_read just because they passed structural
-// are allowed with IntentReadOnlyConditional and a "model-trusted" reason.
+// checks. Unknown binaries, custom scripts, and downloads can mutate state.
-//
+func TestExecutionIntent_FailClosedUnknownCommands(t *testing.T) {
-// This is the Phase 6 behavior: trust the model's judgment for commands that
-// aren't caught by any specific blocklist or structural guard.
-func TestExecutionIntent_ModelTrustedFallback(t *testing.T) {
 	unknownCommands := []struct {
 		name    string
 		command string
@@ -1363,12 +1360,12 @@ func TestExecutionIntent_ModelTrustedFallback(t *testing.T) {
 	for _, tt := range unknownCommands {
 		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			result := ClassifyExecutionIntent(tt.command)
-			if result.Intent != IntentReadOnlyConditional {
+			if result.Intent != IntentWriteOrUnknown {
-				t.Errorf("ClassifyExecutionIntent(%q) = %v (reason: %s), want IntentReadOnlyConditional",
+				t.Errorf("ClassifyExecutionIntent(%q) = %v (reason: %s), want IntentWriteOrUnknown",
 					tt.command, result.Intent, result.Reason)
 			}
-			if !strings.Contains(result.Reason, "model-trusted") {
+			if !strings.Contains(result.Reason, "read-only allowlist") {
-				t.Errorf("ClassifyExecutionIntent(%q) reason = %q, want 'model-trusted' in reason",
+				t.Errorf("ClassifyExecutionIntent(%q) reason = %q, want read-only allowlist reason",
 					tt.command, result.Reason)
 			}
 		})
@@ -1905,10 +1902,10 @@ func TestExecutionIntent_RejectInteractiveREPL(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-// TestExecutionIntent_AllowNonInteractiveREPL validates that commands with
+// TestExecutionIntent_AllowNonInteractiveDataClients validates that data
-// explicit non-interactive flags or inline commands are allowed.
+// clients with explicit read-only inline operations are allowed.
-func TestExecutionIntent_AllowNonInteractiveREPL(t *testing.T) {
+func TestExecutionIntent_AllowNonInteractiveDataClients(t *testing.T) {
-	// These should be allowed (non-interactive form)
+	// These should be allowed because content inspection proves the operation is read-only.
 	allowedCommands := []struct {
 		cmd    string
 		reason string
@@ -1922,12 +1919,6 @@ func TestExecutionIntent_AllowNonInteractiveREPL(t *testing.T) {
 		{`psql --command "SELECT 1"`, "psql with --command"},
 		{"redis-cli GET mykey", "redis-cli with command"},
 		{"redis-cli -h localhost PING", "redis-cli with flags and command"},
-		{`python -c "print(1)"`, "python with -c"},
-		{"python script.py", "python with script"},
-		{"python3 /path/to/script.py", "python3 with script path"},
-		{`node -e "console.log(1)"`, "node with -e"},
-		{"node script.js", "node with script"},
-		{`irb -e "puts 1"`, "irb with -e"},
 	}
 
 	for _, tc := range allowedCommands {
@@ -1941,6 +1932,35 @@ func TestExecutionIntent_AllowNonInteractiveREPL(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// TestExecutionIntent_BlocksDualUseInterpreterBypass validates that pulse_read
+// fails closed on language runtimes and shells even when the inline code is
+// non-interactive. These interpreters can perform arbitrary file I/O and spawn
+// processes, so they are not read-only by construction.
+func TestExecutionIntent_BlocksDualUseInterpreterBypass(t *testing.T) {
+	commands := []string{
+		`python3 -c "import os; open('/home/user/flag','w').write('done')"`,
+		`python3 -c "import subprocess; subprocess.Popen(['sleep', '100'])"`,
+		`python -c "print(1)"`,
+		`python script.py`,
+		`node -e "require('fs').writeFileSync('/tmp/flag', 'done')"`,
+		`node script.js`,
+		`ruby -e "File.write('/tmp/flag', 'done')"`,
+		`perl -e "open(my $fh, '>', '/tmp/flag')"`,
+		`bash -c "echo done"`,
+		`sh -c "echo done"`,
+	}
+
+	for _, cmd := range commands {
+		t.Run(cmd, func(t *testing.T) {
+			result := ClassifyExecutionIntent(cmd)
+			if result.Intent != IntentWriteOrUnknown {
+				t.Fatalf("ClassifyExecutionIntent(%q) = %v (reason: %s), want IntentWriteOrUnknown",
+					cmd, result.Intent, result.Reason)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
 // TestExecutionIntent_TelemetryCategories validates that blocking reasons
 // use the expected categorical labels for telemetry.
 func TestExecutionIntent_TelemetryCategories(t *testing.T) {

internal/ai/tools/tools_query.go

@@ -321,9 +321,11 @@ func classifySingleCommand(command string) IntentResult {
 		}
 	}
 
-	// === PHASE 6: Model-trusted fallback ===
+	// === PHASE 6: Fail closed ===
-	// Unknown command passed all blocklist and structural checks → trust the model
+	// Unknown commands may wrap interpreters, scripts, or side-effecting tools.
-	return IntentResult{Intent: IntentReadOnlyConditional, Reason: "model-trusted: passed all blocklist and structural checks"}
+	// pulse_read must only execute commands that are known read-only by construction
+	// or proven read-only by an explicit content inspector.
+	return IntentResult{Intent: IntentWriteOrUnknown, Reason: "unknown command is not on the read-only allowlist"}
 }
 
 // checkMutationCapabilityGuards checks for shell patterns that enable mutation
@@ -612,10 +614,6 @@ func suggestNonInteractiveREPL(command, cmdLower string) string {
 		return fmt.Sprintf("%s \"SELECT ...\"", command)
 	case "redis-cli":
 		return fmt.Sprintf("%s PING", command)
-	case "python", "python3", "python2":
-		return fmt.Sprintf("%s -c \"...\"", parts[0])
-	case "node", "nodejs":
-		return fmt.Sprintf("%s -e \"...\"", parts[0])
 	case "ssh":
 		// ssh host → ssh host "command"
 		return fmt.Sprintf("%s \"ls -la\"", command)
@@ -786,15 +784,13 @@ func hasTailShorthandBound(cmdLower string) bool {
 //   - ssh host (no command)
 //   - mysql, psql, sqlite3 db (no -c/-e/inline SQL)
 //   - redis-cli (no command args)
-//   - python, node, irb (no script/command)
+//   - python, node, irb
 //   - openssl s_client
 //
 // Allowed (non-interactive):
 //   - ssh host "command"
 //   - mysql -e "SELECT 1"
 //   - sqlite3 db "SELECT 1"
-//   - python -c "print(1)"
-//   - python script.py
 func isInteractiveREPL(cmdLower string) bool {
 	firstWord := cmdLower
 	if spaceIdx := strings.Index(cmdLower, " "); spaceIdx > 0 {
@@ -892,7 +888,9 @@ func isInteractiveREPL(cmdLower string) bool {
 		return !hasCommand
 	}
 
-	// Scripting REPLs: python, node, irb without script/command
+	// Scripting language runtimes are dual-use. Bare invocations are also
+	// interactive; non-interactive forms are blocked by the fail-closed
+	// read-only allowlist boundary.
 	if firstWord == "python" || firstWord == "python3" || firstWord == "python2" {
 		// Non-interactive if has -c or script file
 		if strings.Contains(cmdLower, " -c ") || strings.Contains(cmdLower, " -c\"") {

internal/ai/tools/tools_read.go

@@ -116,16 +116,9 @@ func (e *PulseToolExecutor) executeReadExec(ctx context.Context, args map[string
 
 	// STRUCTURAL ENFORCEMENT: Reject non-read-only commands at the tool layer
 	// This is enforced HERE, not in the model's prompt
-	// Uses ExecutionIntent: ReadOnlyCertain and ReadOnlyConditional are allowed;
+	// Uses ExecutionIntent: ReadOnlyCertain and explicitly inspected
-	// WriteOrUnknown is rejected.
+	// ReadOnlyConditional commands are allowed; WriteOrUnknown is rejected.
 	intentResult := ClassifyExecutionIntent(command)
-	if intentResult.Intent == IntentReadOnlyConditional && strings.Contains(intentResult.Reason, "model-trusted") {
-		log.Info().
-			Str("command", truncateCommand(command, 200)).
-			Str("reason", intentResult.Reason).
-			Str("target_host", targetHost).
-			Msg("pulse_read: allowing model-trusted command (no blocklist match)")
-	}
 	if intentResult.Intent == IntentWriteOrUnknown {
 		hint := GetReadOnlyViolationHint(command, intentResult)
 		alternative := "Use pulse_control type=command for write operations"