mirror of
https://github.com/safing/portmaster
synced 2025-09-02 02:29:12 +00:00
475 lines
14 KiB
Go
475 lines
14 KiB
Go
package firewall
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import (
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"fmt"
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"net"
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"strings"
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"github.com/safing/portbase/log"
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"github.com/safing/portmaster/network"
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"github.com/safing/portmaster/network/netutils"
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"github.com/safing/portmaster/network/packet"
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"github.com/safing/portmaster/process"
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"github.com/safing/portmaster/profile"
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"github.com/safing/portmaster/profile/endpoints"
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"github.com/safing/portmaster/resolver"
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"github.com/agext/levenshtein"
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"github.com/miekg/dns"
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)
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// Call order:
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//
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// 1. DecideOnCommunicationBeforeIntel (if connecting to domain)
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// is called when a DNS query is made, before the query is resolved
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// 2. DecideOnCommunicationAfterIntel (if connecting to domain)
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// is called when a DNS query is made, after the query is resolved
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// 3. DecideOnCommunication
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// is called when the first packet of the first link of the communication arrives
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// 4. DecideOnLink
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// is called when when the first packet of a link arrives only if communication has verdict UNDECIDED or CANTSAY
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// DecideOnCommunicationBeforeDNS makes a decision about a communication before the dns query is resolved and intel is gathered.
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func DecideOnCommunicationBeforeDNS(comm *network.Communication) {
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// update profiles and check if communication needs reevaluation
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if comm.UpdateAndCheck() {
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log.Infof("firewall: re-evaluating verdict on %s", comm)
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comm.ResetVerdict()
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}
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// check if need to run
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if comm.GetVerdict() != network.VerdictUndecided {
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return
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}
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// grant self
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if comm.Process().Pid == os.Getpid() {
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log.Infof("firewall: granting own communication %s", comm)
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comm.Accept("")
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return
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}
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// get profile
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p := comm.Process().Profile()
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// check for any network access
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if p.BlockScopeInternet() && p.BlockScopeLAN() {
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log.Infof("firewall: denying communication %s, accessing Internet or LAN not permitted", comm)
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comm.Deny("accessing Internet or LAN not permitted")
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return
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}
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// continueing with access to either Internet or LAN
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// check endpoint list
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// FIXME: comm.Entity.Lock()
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result, reason := p.MatchEndpoint(comm.Entity)
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// FIXME: comm.Entity.Unlock()
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switch result {
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case endpoints.Undeterminable:
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comm.UpdateVerdict(network.VerdictUndeterminable)
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return
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case endpoints.Denied:
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log.Infof("firewall: denying communication %s, domain is blacklisted: %s", comm, reason)
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comm.Deny(fmt.Sprintf("domain is blacklisted: %s", reason))
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return
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case endpoints.Permitted:
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log.Infof("firewall: permitting communication %s, domain is whitelisted: %s", comm, reason)
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comm.Accept(fmt.Sprintf("domain is whitelisted: %s", reason))
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return
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}
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// continueing with result == NoMatch
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// check default action
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if p.DefaultAction() == profile.DefaultActionPermit {
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log.Infof("firewall: permitting communication %s, domain is not blacklisted (default=permit)", comm)
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comm.Accept("domain is not blacklisted (default=permit)")
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return
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}
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// check relation
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if !p.DisableAutoPermit() {
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if checkRelation(comm) {
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return
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}
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}
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// prompt
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if p.DefaultAction() == profile.DefaultActionAsk {
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prompt(comm, nil, nil)
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return
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}
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// DefaultAction == DefaultActionBlock
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log.Infof("firewall: denying communication %s, domain is not whitelisted (default=block)", comm)
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comm.Deny("domain is not whitelisted (default=block)")
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return
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}
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// FilterDNSResponse filters a dns response according to the application profile and settings.
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func FilterDNSResponse(comm *network.Communication, q *resolver.Query, rrCache *resolver.RRCache) *resolver.RRCache { //nolint:gocognit // TODO
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// do not modify own queries - this should not happen anyway
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if comm.Process().Pid == os.Getpid() {
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return rrCache
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}
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// get profile
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p := comm.Process().Profile()
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// check if DNS response filtering is completely turned off
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if !p.RemoveOutOfScopeDNS() && !p.RemoveBlockedDNS() {
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return rrCache
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}
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// duplicate entry
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rrCache = rrCache.ShallowCopy()
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rrCache.FilteredEntries = make([]string, 0)
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// change information
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var addressesRemoved int
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var addressesOk int
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// loop vars
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var classification int8
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var ip net.IP
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// filter function
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filterEntries := func(entries []dns.RR) (goodEntries []dns.RR) {
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goodEntries = make([]dns.RR, 0, len(entries))
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for _, rr := range entries {
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// get IP and classification
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switch v := rr.(type) {
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case *dns.A:
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ip = v.A
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case *dns.AAAA:
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ip = v.AAAA
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default:
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// add non A/AAAA entries
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goodEntries = append(goodEntries, rr)
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continue
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}
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classification = netutils.ClassifyIP(ip)
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if p.RemoveOutOfScopeDNS() {
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switch {
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case classification == netutils.HostLocal:
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// No DNS should return localhost addresses
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addressesRemoved++
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rrCache.FilteredEntries = append(rrCache.FilteredEntries, rr.String())
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continue
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case rrCache.ServerScope == netutils.Global && (classification == netutils.SiteLocal || classification == netutils.LinkLocal):
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// No global DNS should return LAN addresses
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addressesRemoved++
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rrCache.FilteredEntries = append(rrCache.FilteredEntries, rr.String())
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continue
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}
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}
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if p.RemoveBlockedDNS() {
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// filter by flags
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switch {
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case p.BlockScopeInternet() && classification == netutils.Global:
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addressesRemoved++
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rrCache.FilteredEntries = append(rrCache.FilteredEntries, rr.String())
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continue
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case p.BlockScopeLAN() && (classification == netutils.SiteLocal || classification == netutils.LinkLocal):
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addressesRemoved++
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rrCache.FilteredEntries = append(rrCache.FilteredEntries, rr.String())
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continue
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case p.BlockScopeLocal() && classification == netutils.HostLocal:
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addressesRemoved++
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rrCache.FilteredEntries = append(rrCache.FilteredEntries, rr.String())
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continue
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}
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// TODO: filter by endpoint list (IP only)
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}
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// if survived, add to good entries
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addressesOk++
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goodEntries = append(goodEntries, rr)
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}
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return
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}
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rrCache.Answer = filterEntries(rrCache.Answer)
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rrCache.Extra = filterEntries(rrCache.Extra)
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if addressesRemoved > 0 {
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rrCache.Filtered = true
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if addressesOk == 0 {
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comm.Deny("no addresses returned for this domain are permitted")
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log.Infof("firewall: fully dns responses for communication %s", comm)
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return nil
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}
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}
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if rrCache.Filtered {
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log.Infof("firewall: filtered DNS replies for %s: %s", comm, strings.Join(rrCache.FilteredEntries, ", "))
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}
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// TODO: Gate17 integration
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// tunnelInfo, err := AssignTunnelIP(fqdn)
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return rrCache
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}
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// DecideOnCommunication makes a decision about a communication with its first packet.
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func DecideOnCommunication(comm *network.Communication) {
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// update profiles and check if communication needs reevaluation
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if comm.UpdateAndCheck() {
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log.Infof("firewall: re-evaluating verdict on %s", comm)
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comm.ResetVerdict()
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// if communicating with a domain entity, re-evaluate with BeforeDNS
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if strings.HasSuffix(comm.Scope, ".") {
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DecideOnCommunicationBeforeDNS(comm)
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}
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}
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// check if need to run
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if comm.GetVerdict() != network.VerdictUndecided {
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return
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}
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// grant self
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if comm.Process().Pid == os.Getpid() {
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log.Infof("firewall: granting own communication %s", comm)
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comm.Accept("")
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return
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}
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// get profile
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p := comm.Process().Profile()
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// check comm type
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switch comm.Scope {
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case network.IncomingHost, network.IncomingLAN, network.IncomingInternet, network.IncomingInvalid:
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if p.BlockInbound() {
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log.Infof("firewall: denying communication %s, not a service", comm)
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if comm.Scope == network.IncomingHost {
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comm.Block("not a service")
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} else {
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comm.Deny("not a service")
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}
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return
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}
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case network.PeerLAN, network.PeerInternet, network.PeerInvalid:
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// Important: PeerHost is and should be missing!
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if p.BlockP2P() {
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log.Infof("firewall: denying communication %s, peer to peer comms (to an IP) not allowed", comm)
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comm.Deny("peer to peer comms (to an IP) not allowed")
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return
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}
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}
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// check network scope
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switch comm.Scope {
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case network.IncomingHost:
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if p.BlockScopeLocal() {
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log.Infof("firewall: denying communication %s, serving localhost not allowed", comm)
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comm.Block("serving localhost not allowed")
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return
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}
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case network.IncomingLAN:
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if p.BlockScopeLAN() {
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log.Infof("firewall: denying communication %s, serving LAN not allowed", comm)
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comm.Deny("serving LAN not allowed")
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return
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}
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case network.IncomingInternet:
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if p.BlockScopeInternet() {
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log.Infof("firewall: denying communication %s, serving Internet not allowed", comm)
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comm.Deny("serving Internet not allowed")
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return
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}
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case network.IncomingInvalid:
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log.Infof("firewall: denying communication %s, invalid IP address", comm)
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comm.Drop("invalid IP address")
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return
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case network.PeerHost:
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if p.BlockScopeLocal() {
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log.Infof("firewall: denying communication %s, accessing localhost not allowed", comm)
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comm.Block("accessing localhost not allowed")
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return
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}
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case network.PeerLAN:
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if p.BlockScopeLAN() {
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log.Infof("firewall: denying communication %s, accessing the LAN not allowed", comm)
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comm.Deny("accessing the LAN not allowed")
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return
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}
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case network.PeerInternet:
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if p.BlockScopeInternet() {
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log.Infof("firewall: denying communication %s, accessing the Internet not allowed", comm)
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comm.Deny("accessing the Internet not allowed")
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return
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}
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case network.PeerInvalid:
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log.Infof("firewall: denying communication %s, invalid IP address", comm)
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comm.Deny("invalid IP address")
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return
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}
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log.Infof("firewall: undeterminable verdict for communication %s", comm)
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comm.UpdateVerdict(network.VerdictUndeterminable)
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}
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// DecideOnLink makes a decision about a link with the first packet.
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func DecideOnLink(comm *network.Communication, link *network.Link, pkt packet.Packet) {
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// grant self
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if comm.Process().Pid == os.Getpid() {
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log.Infof("firewall: granting own link %s", comm)
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link.Accept("")
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return
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}
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// check if process is communicating with itself
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if comm.Process().Pid >= 0 && pkt.Info().Src.Equal(pkt.Info().Dst) {
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// get PID
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otherPid, _, err := process.GetPidByEndpoints(
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pkt.Info().RemoteIP(),
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pkt.Info().RemotePort(),
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pkt.Info().LocalIP(),
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pkt.Info().LocalPort(),
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pkt.Info().Protocol,
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)
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if err == nil {
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// get primary process
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otherProcess, err := process.GetOrFindPrimaryProcess(pkt.Ctx(), otherPid)
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if err == nil {
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if otherProcess.Pid == comm.Process().Pid {
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log.Infof("firewall: permitting connection to self %s", comm)
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link.AddReason("connection to self")
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link.Lock()
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link.Verdict = network.VerdictAccept
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link.SaveWhenFinished()
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link.Unlock()
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return
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}
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}
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}
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}
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// check if we aleady have a verdict
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switch comm.GetVerdict() {
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case network.VerdictUndecided, network.VerdictUndeterminable:
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// continue
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default:
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link.UpdateVerdict(comm.GetVerdict())
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return
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}
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// get profile
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p := comm.Process().Profile()
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// check endpoints list
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var result endpoints.EPResult
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var reason string
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// FIXME: link.Entity.Lock()
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if comm.Direction {
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result, reason = p.MatchServiceEndpoint(link.Entity)
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} else {
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result, reason = p.MatchEndpoint(link.Entity)
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}
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// FIXME: link.Entity.Unlock()
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switch result {
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case endpoints.Denied:
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log.Infof("firewall: denying link %s, endpoint is blacklisted: %s", link, reason)
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link.Deny(fmt.Sprintf("endpoint is blacklisted: %s", reason))
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return
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case endpoints.Permitted:
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log.Infof("firewall: permitting link %s, endpoint is whitelisted: %s", link, reason)
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link.Accept(fmt.Sprintf("endpoint is whitelisted: %s", reason))
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return
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}
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// continueing with result == NoMatch
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// implicit default=block for incoming
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if comm.Direction {
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log.Infof("firewall: denying link %s: endpoint is not whitelisted (incoming is always default=block)", link)
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link.Deny("endpoint is not whitelisted (incoming is always default=block)")
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return
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}
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// check default action
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if p.DefaultAction() == profile.DefaultActionPermit {
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log.Infof("firewall: permitting link %s: endpoint is not blacklisted (default=permit)", link)
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link.Accept("endpoint is not blacklisted (default=permit)")
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return
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}
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// check relation
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if !p.DisableAutoPermit() {
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if checkRelation(comm) {
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return
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}
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}
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// prompt
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if p.DefaultAction() == profile.DefaultActionAsk {
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prompt(comm, link, pkt)
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return
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}
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// DefaultAction == DefaultActionBlock
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log.Infof("firewall: denying link %s: endpoint is not whitelisted (default=block)", link)
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link.Deny("endpoint is not whitelisted (default=block)")
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return
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}
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// checkRelation tries to find a relation between a process and a communication. This is for better out of the box experience and is _not_ meant to thwart intentional malware.
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func checkRelation(comm *network.Communication) (related bool) {
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if comm.Entity.Domain != "" {
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return false
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}
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// don't check for unknown processes
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if comm.Process().Pid < 0 {
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return false
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}
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pathElements := strings.Split(comm.Process().Path, string(filepath.Separator))
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// only look at the last two path segments
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if len(pathElements) > 2 {
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pathElements = pathElements[len(pathElements)-2:]
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}
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domainElements := strings.Split(comm.Entity.Domain, ".")
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var domainElement string
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var processElement string
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matchLoop:
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for _, domainElement = range domainElements {
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for _, pathElement := range pathElements {
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if levenshtein.Match(domainElement, pathElement, nil) > 0.5 {
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related = true
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processElement = pathElement
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break matchLoop
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}
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}
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if levenshtein.Match(domainElement, comm.Process().Name, nil) > 0.5 {
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related = true
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processElement = comm.Process().Name
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break matchLoop
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}
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if levenshtein.Match(domainElement, comm.Process().ExecName, nil) > 0.5 {
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related = true
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processElement = comm.Process().ExecName
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break matchLoop
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}
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}
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if related {
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log.Infof("firewall: permitting communication %s, match to domain was found: %s is related to %s", comm, domainElement, processElement)
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comm.Accept(fmt.Sprintf("domain is related to process: %s is related to %s", domainElement, processElement))
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}
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return related
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}
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